

SPACE Social Protection Approaches to COVID-19: Expert advice helpline



IDENTIFYING *PRACTICAL* OPTIONS FOR LINKING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE COVID-19 RESPONSE

DANIEL LONGHURST AND GABRIELLE SMITH, WITH VALENTINA BARCA, KARIN SEYFERT, SIMON LITTLE, CALUM MCLEAN, SOPHIE PONGRACZ, AND EXPERTS ON THE SOCIAL PROTECTION APPROACHES TO COVID-19: EXPERT ADVICE HELPLINE (SPACE) - CONTACT: SPACE@DAI.COM

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This Background Document was developed alongside others – most importantly [a Strategy Decision Matrix](#) and a [Delivery System Decision Matrix](#) – as a tool to structure an independent and unbiased analysis of COVID-19 response options. It builds on the [‘Unbundled’ framework](#). It does not necessarily represent FCDO or GIZ own views or policies.

1 WHY LINK HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL PROTECTION?

This short note examines the relationship between the humanitarian assistance sector and the routine social protection sector in response to COVID-19.¹ Whilst a variety of guidance is being developed to support humanitarian practitioners around the response to the pandemic, less material exists that guides humanitarian practitioners on how to *practically* link their responses to social protection (SP) systems and programmes in the COVID-19 response.

Both sectors have comparative advantages that together can improve overall outcomes:

- Routine social protection systems usually have larger reach, while humanitarian actors are specialised in serving the most vulnerable, working collectively they can achieve higher coverage, adequacy and comprehensiveness of assistance, to better meet needs of affected populations.
- Humanitarian actors are good at mobilising quickly, while routine social protection systems often work more cost-effectively. By working together, they can ensure better

¹By ‘humanitarian assistance sector’ we largely refer to cash and in-kind transfers distributed by humanitarian non-governmental actors to people affected by a humanitarian crisis. By ‘social protection sector’ we refer to routine government systems that distribute routine social protection benefits to citizens. These involve transfers such as pensions, school meals, food voucher, basic needs cash transfers etc.

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timeliness, cost-effectiveness, accountability, predictability and sustainability compared to working in parallel².

The exact ways in which this can be achieved – and trade-offs faced – depend on country context and on the relative strengths of each sector in that country.

The impact of COVID-19 in low income and fragile or conflict-affected states is yet to fully reveal itself, though there is obvious cause for concern. The direct impact on the health and well-being of the population, as well as the broader socio-economic implications of COVID-19 are complex and will result in a protracted, multi-dimensional response. The indirect impacts of COVID-19 may well be more severe and longer lasting, with increases in poverty, food insecurity, gender inequality, and the long-term effects of missed schooling. Poverty, vulnerability to COVID-19 impacts, and the effects of other shocks, are likely to overlap and exacerbate each other. Identifying the most vulnerable in a changing context with heightened needs and [newly affected population groups](#), will be a unique challenge.

A crisis of this magnitude clearly requires focusing on the common objective of protecting the most vulnerable, while leveraging the relative strengths of both the humanitarian and the social protection sector so as to meet immediate³ and medium-term needs. The social protection sector has already stepped up globally, proving central in the COVID-19 response⁴, yet responses have often been slow and insufficient to address compounding needs. This is especially the case in countries with unprepared, nascent or fractured social protection systems. A timely response is particularly important in contexts with pre-existing vulnerabilities, such as susceptibility to sudden onset shocks and conflict-related displacement. A timely and comprehensive response is also important for populations that are known to be vulnerable, including displaced populations, women and girls, people living with disabilities, and older persons.

2 STRATEGIES FOR LINKING ALONG THE DELIVERY CHAIN

In Table 1 below, this document defines potential links between humanitarian assistance and social protection along three main 'Building Blocks'⁵ – Policy, Programme and Implementation, and covering all components of the 'delivery chain'⁶. It offers practical examples of good practices of how joined up delivery using elements of the humanitarian and routine social protection system can deliver a more effective response that is mutually reinforcing. While this paper is aimed at the COVID-19 response, much of it will be applicable more widely.

Linking is largely not about sharing caseloads – but about sharing '*capacities*': Decisions on alignment and/or linkage between the humanitarian and social protection sectors need to

² See [Strategy Decision Matrix](#), TRANSFORM (forthcoming module), SPaN (2019), O'Brien et al 2018 for more on this.

³ E.g. reducing mortality and morbidity, supporting basic needs, protecting assets, livelihoods and rights, and accessing vulnerable groups.

⁴ See Gentilini et al (2020) [July 10 version](#)

⁵ Effective social protection systems are commonly understood to comprise a series of building blocks – for example these are defined in EUD (2019) as Governance and Institutions, Data and information Systems, Financing, Programme Design and Delivery Systems. Similarly the World Bank (2020) highlights Institutional Arrangements and Partnerships, Data and Information Systems, Financing and Programmes (which combines programme design and implementation along the delivery chain). This document follows the elaboration of building blocks and delivery chain set out in the SPACE Strategy Decision Matrix and Delivery System Decision Matrix.

⁶ The delivery chain constitutes the operational processes for implementing social protection or humanitarian assistance programmes. This paper builds on the much-used 'Unbundled' framing [here](#)

consider the relative strength or capacity of each sector, along every step of the delivery chain. Figure 1 below illustrates how capacities from the humanitarian sector (left column) could adjust to match those of the social protection sector. For instance, if vulnerability assessment capabilities in the social protection sector are low (fifth row), the humanitarian sector could complement that with stronger assessment capabilities. This is for instance the case in Lebanon.

Figure 1 – Systematically assessing practical options for humanitarian and social protection linkage along the delivery chain (graphic illustrates a theoretical example from a country context)

HUMANITARIAN/EMERGENCY					SOCIAL PROTECTION			
'WEAK' → 'STRONG'					'WEAK' → 'STRONG'			
Policy								
		x		\$	Financing		x	
	x			⚖️	Legal & Policy Frameworks			x
		x		🏛️	Governance & Coordination		x	
			x	👥	Capacity (cutting across all)	x		
Programme design								
			x	📋	Vulnerability Assessment	x		
		x		🎯	Targeting (eligibility setting)			x
			x	👤	Transfer Value, Frequency, modality		x	
	x			📄	Conditionality		x	
Administration/Implementation								
			x	📁	Information Systems			x
			x	📈	Price & Market Analysis	x		
			x	🗣️	Outreach & comms	x		
		x		📄	Registration and enrolment			x
		x		💳	Payments & Service Delivery			x
		x		⊖	Do No Harm, Protection, Accountability, Grievance		x	
			x	👁️	Monitoring and Evaluation		x	

Source: Adapted from Seyfert et al (2019) and TRANSFORM (forthcoming). Note: the specific choices of system 'strength', for both sectors, are indicative and would vary significantly from country to country – requiring assessment to determine the extent to which these can be leveraged.

Specific strategies for linking in the context of COVID-19 will therefore depend on the country context and on the capacity of both humanitarian and social protection sectors, but also on political economy, resourcing and other factors. In some cases, 'linking' may not even be a good idea (e.g. where the government is party to a conflict). Broadly, 'linking' strategies can include the following, noting more than one strategy may be employed in a response at any given time:

- Aligning design and implementation elements of humanitarian interventions to social protection programmes and systems (and vice versa) even where they are nascent, disrupted or under resourced. For example, aligning targeting criteria, transfer values, registration processes, monitoring and coordination, etc., to help ensure people receive similar forms of assistance. Where they do not, or cannot presently align, ensure a commonly agreed and understandable reason is provided. Support mutual learning on the tools and systems humanitarian and social protection actors can utilise and ensure *mutual* capacity-building takes place.
- Coordinating humanitarian and social protection programming to enhance coverage, adequacy and comprehensiveness of the overall response. This can include coordinating separate responses in different geographic areas and across different

target groups to enhance overall coverage; delivering different forms of assistance to the same household in a complementary manner to improve the adequacy and comprehensiveness of assistance (top ups/alignment/cash plus); or humanitarian actors identifying and assisting the 'newly in need' or those that fall outside of government led responses (e.g. refugees).

- **Reciprocal leveraging and building on each other's systems ('piggybacking')**. This might include using humanitarian tools, capacity, and/or data to deliver elements of a social protection response, especially social transfers, with a view to longer-term system building. This can involve the routine social protection sector making use of humanitarian rapid mobilisation capabilities. Or vice-versa humanitarian actors leveraging elements of the social protection sector, such as registration capabilities or existing beneficiary lists .
- **Cutting across - protecting people and systems**: Ensuring the core functionality and objectives of both humanitarian assistance and social protection are not compromised by clearly defining roles and burden sharing, and that both can deliver without risking further COVID-19 contagion (as part of a Do No Harm approach). Measures to safeguard recipients of humanitarian aid and/or SP must include identification and mitigation of risks of gender-based violence (including sexual exploitation and abuse), violence against children, and other forms of exploitation based on the power differentials between recipients.

When deciding which approach to take, it is better to look for specific places where linkage may be *practically possible* – and where not (for good reasons), rather than think generically (e.g. 'we will try to piggyback'). This may require some systems and programme analysis across the building blocks, including along components of the delivery chain, from policy and financing all the way to targeting, payments/service delivery and monitoring, to understand where linkage between humanitarian and social protection programmes may be most feasible and why – depending on policy, programmatic and implementation capacities. For example, depending on the context, system or programme, piggybacking may be possible for delivery of payments (e.g. using the same payment provider), but not in targeting/eligibility determination, where an alignment approach could be employed. Figure 1 above is designed to visually illustrate a 'summary' capacity assessment of an example country, informing which approach, from among the four bullets listed above, is the most appropriate. Our [Strategy Decision Matrix](#) and [Delivery Systems Matrix](#) can help support this process.

The overall intention is to align, coordinate or integrate activities when feasible and when it enhances the overall response and improves beneficiary outcomes. Table 1 sets out key considerations to bear in mind, along with possible actions that these actors can take. For each building block, and components of each building block, it includes examples of good (and bad) practice from experiences in linking the humanitarian assistance and social protection sectors. Those highlighted in **RED** are from the COVID-19 response.⁷ The table's aim is to guide decision-making with a primary focus on humanitarian, emergency and non-Government audiences (which we refer to as 'HA') rather than social protection audiences ('SP'). For more Guidance on 'preparedness' measures for social protection systems to become more responsive to shocks (and the role humanitarian actors could play in supporting this process), see [here](#).

⁷ NOTE this focuses on household-level responses through social assistance, it doesn't include any social protection responses to businesses such as covering the salaries of employees, for example.

Table 1 Issues and considerations for decision making along the delivery chain

Building Block	Key issues and considerations	Possible ACTIONS to consider	EXAMPLES from experience (not just COVID-19)
POLICY	KEY ISSUES TO REMEMBER WHEN MAKING DECISIONS ON POLICY LINKAGES		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Importance of building relationships with Govt. actors with responsibility for social protection implementation, at national but also sub-national levels, and other key government decision makers influencing social protection system and process design (e.g. - regulators, Central Bank, Ministry of Finance). • Understand the top line compromises, trade-offs and cost-benefit of using elements from the SP sector versus more independent HA responses - For instance, linking humanitarian assistance to national SP systems could achieve scale and sustainability but compromise effectiveness (e.g. reduced transfer values). It could increase the speed of delivery in the long term but take considerable time to design and establish and could be more rigid and less open to further adaptation. 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Routine SP funding and humanitarian funding are raised very differently. Routine SP systems have set budget and spending targets. In case of a shock response, national contingency funds or funds allocated to different budget lines (i.e. the investment budget) are appropriated for the response. If the political will to appropriate these funds is there, they can be mobilised pretty quickly. • In many countries, donors are providing long term financial development support to the national social protection system (i.e. Ethiopia and Pakistan). In these cases, there are often close donor-government relationships and funding within existing budgets can be quickly repurposed to fund a shock response. • Humanitarian funds are raised through donor appeals and are most often spent outside the national system. This is due to restrictions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage with social protection actors and public financial management (PFM) experts at relevant ministries to get a full picture of available resources and funding gaps, in social protection. • Engage with humanitarian actors to gain an understanding of funding levels for a humanitarian assistance response. • Consider repurposing existing development funds to support a social protection shock response. • Explore the possibility of channeling humanitarian funding into social protection government-led systems (while retaining accountability measures). Note that this may have significant PFM implications. When leveraging humanitarian financing, think through flow of funds and reporting/ reconciliation requirements from the start. • When transferring funds to/engaging government as co-implementer, plan and budget for operational costs incurred and any necessary activities to build capacities of services. • Explicitly budget for support activities to ensure inclusion of the most vulnerable via the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The UN joint SDG fund being piloted in 17 countries since 2019 includes 'bridging the silos between humanitarian and development assistance' as a key objective. In St Lucia and Nigeria, the link to COVID-19 has been made, and funds are being repurposed to support social protection response. • In the Philippines, WFP's humanitarian funds were transferred to government and used to finance the government's social protection response to typhoon Haiyan. This did not consider and budget for the additional operational costs incurred by the government social protection institution, which created difficulties for the department for social welfare. • In Turkey in 2016, humanitarian funds to support the emergency social safety net for Syrian refugees could only be channeled through humanitarian partners. Instead, mechanisms were set up to channel funds directly from humanitarian partners to banks and beneficiaries - even though all registration, data processing and beneficiary identification ran through government systems. • In Vanuatu as a multi-donor trust fund was set up to respond to COVID19, which sits with the Ministry of 	

		<p>placed on humanitarian funds, making channeling funds earmarked as 'humanitarian' through governments challenging.</p>	<p>humanitarian sector in partnership with civil society, even for a government-led social protection response.</p>	<p>Internal Affairs, through which transfers are funded. Contributors are the Vanuatu Business Council, the Australian and New Zealand government. This is a platform that can disperse humanitarian funds but also routine national social protection and remittances.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Madagascar in the context of COVID-19, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP and the World Bank developed a financing platform where money has been pooled to support government response – reached 120 m HH – similar approach used in Hurricane response for example in the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Fiji and in other contexts).
	<p>Legal & Policy Frameworks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National social protection systems are governed by national policies and legislation setting out the objectives of the system as well as who are key rights and responsibility holders. If social protection plays a role in shock response (alongside DRM institutions), this is reflected within these documents. Humanitarian assistance follows the human rights framework and internationally set down humanitarian principles (such as 'do no harm' etc. Both provide the regulatory framework for national or humanitarian institutions to carry out their tasks and responsibilities. The mandates of the two sectors overlap (i.e. to protect the most vulnerable). However, linkages, spelling out areas for collaboration, are not always made explicit and are 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Understand national social protection policies and strategies in the short to medium term and identify with government how humanitarian actors' shock response capabilities can support a shock response. Understand where national policies may be countervailing humanitarian principles (i.e. the definition of who is deemed deserving may differ between the national and the humanitarian system, certain groups may be excluded). Formally decide what level of collaboration at the policy level is appropriate. It may be enough to set out joint goals and objectives of collaboration. Or it may be appropriate to define an institutional set up (i.e. a Board, a Steering Committee, a Working Group) bringing together key decision makers, empowered to discuss and act on key issues faced by the response. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Anguilla and Barbados, social protection responses to COVID-19 have been complemented by regulatory actions of the government to waive duties and taxes on the importation of essential food and hygiene items and establish a maximum price ceiling for these essential items, to protect against price gouging or shortages. WFP is regularly monitoring trends in market prices to retain oversight of this. In Ethiopia both the humanitarian assistance and the social protection programmes are huge programmes, which until 2019 ran effectively parallel of each other – even being managed out of separate ministries. It is worth noting that this is a policy challenge more than a coordination challenge. There was at risk of competition for funding resources, and the move towards a more unified management met many obstacles. On both sides were concerns that one objective (i.e. the short-term humanitarian or the longer-term safety net) would overrule the other. In Turkey in 2016 a participatory process was used in developing the ESSN, the humanitarian cash

		frequently not formalised. New memoranda of understanding or policies are likely to be required, spelling out how the national social protection and the humanitarian assistance institutions would work together.		transfer for Syrian refugees. Initiated by DG ECHO with the Turkish government, working groups were set up to agree key features of the cash transfer – including targeting and application processes. This was at the policy level, before implementers were brought on board. The ESSN was implemented through a partnership between humanitarian actors (WFP with the Turkish Red Crescent and now, IFRC with TRC), and government social protection and DRM actors (the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, and the Directorate General for Migration Management). Changes in the policy and regulatory environment of the Turkish Government were necessary precursors to the feasibility of the ESSN design (i.e. introduction of IDs for refugees). ⁸
	Governance &	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social protection and humanitarian assistance sectors use different governance and coordination mechanisms. Decision making for day-to-day operations of the social 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spend time to understand the ‘politics’, who is who, the different perspectives of the different stakeholder ministries, where power lies with different kinds of decision, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Malawi, WFP supported the government to develop their ‘Crisis Interventions to Address the Effects of COVID-19 Master Plan’ – the central framework bringing together the social protection and humanitarian sectors to address the economic effects of COVID-19 in the country. Rather than having a SP response, and an emergency cash response WFP, along with other UN agencies, supported the government to develop one masterplan for harmonised crisis cash interventions. This would have links to the humanitarian sector through the food security cluster (to avoid duplicative cash assistance at different levels), and to social protection through the Malawi national social support technical committee. • In Mauritania, since 2015 the World Bank has been financing development of a shock-responsive social protection mechanism. This has required collaboration across government departments that manage the emergency response mechanism, the

⁸ Nick Maunder et al., ‘Evaluation of the ECHO Funded Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey November 2016–February 2018 Volume 1: Evaluation Report’, 2018.

	<p>protection sector is often at the DG or head of department level, with important decisions, especially those affecting the budget, taking place at ministerial or even cabinet level. There may be dedicated DRM focal points within departments, who liaise with DRM authorities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donors have a significant say in the governance of humanitarian cash assistance – and, jointly with the organisation’s cash experts are closely involved in key decisions. For coordination, humanitarian assistance mostly uses the working group approach (i.e. a cash working group), to which humanitarian organisations send representatives and to which the government delegates an observer or focal point. These are often junior to mid-ranking civil servants. • In practice, donors often fund both, humanitarian actors and a national social protection sector and play an important convening role, bringing humanitarian assistance and social protection actors to the same table. • An effective response will depend on coordination among a large number of different stakeholders: between government and international humanitarian actors and among humanitarian actors themselves. Multi-stakeholder coordination throughout implementation will be 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frame the response as one where different systems and actors can contribute through their comparative advantage to enhance comprehensiveness, coverage and adequacy of SP systems, and the COVID-19 response overall (see Strategy Decision Matrix). • Call for the mutual leveraging of systems, capacity etc. across sectors (respecting legislation and Do No Harm principles, including safeguarding), so that the humanitarian response identifies opportunities for supporting the building blocks of a Shock Responsive Social Protection (SRSP) system (see Delivery System Decision Matrix). • Enhance government leadership through combining or linking coordination groups (Humanitarian Cash Working Groups with SP committees and coordination bodies) and define this in Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). • Encourage, convene and resource these meetings, to initiate and facilitate linkages. • Proactively coordinate with and leverage the networks of ministries / representatives of gender, youth, refugees, disability, informal workers, civil society, and humanitarian NGOs where possible to enhance ownership and implementation capacity. • Agree on coordinated approaches to programme coverage across humanitarian and government-led SP programmes to achieve maximum reach and to ensure horizontal equity (that those in need receive similar forms of support unless for commonly agreed reasons). Value for Money (VFM) arguments can support the best use of resources. 	<p>national safety net programme and the early warning system. The Prime Minister’s Office dedicated an advisor to oversee the process and established a technical working group to assist in coordination of activities and improve dialogue between national institutions and partners.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Turkey, in 2017 an ESSN Taskforce (ECHO, INGOs, government and academic institutions) was set up to improve links to and complement the wider response. The Taskforce holds monthly meetings in four project locations. It has been effective in influencing changes to the ESSN transfer value and targeting criteria, and in aligning INGO protection activities to improve access to the ESSN. • In Tajikistan and Armenia, UNICEF invested in a feasibility study of how the national SP system can be leveraged to deliver a humanitarian (or emergency) cash assistance response. These were done in 2017 and were the basis for subsequent investment into national capacity development (trainings, peer exchange visits etc.). As a result, both governments were able to quickly scale up their SP response to COVID-19. <p>In Malawi, during the 2019-20 lean season response, the Social Welfare Ministry increased the transfer amount of its routine programme (a vertical expansion to address adequacy), whilst WFP provided cash to reach the remaining caseload (increasing coverage). WFP worked with the government on: Harmonising data collection tools to ensure that the findings were comparable across implementers; Presenting results under one platform to share key findings.</p>
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		critical to increasing effectiveness, reducing duplication and addressing capacity gaps.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote collaboration on practical issues such as sharing data, setting transfer values, minimising gaps and managing potential duplication in support to beneficiaries. • Donors can influence this process through funding key coordination functions, as well as requesting and incentivising humanitarian actors to work together with relevant line ministries. 	
	Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building capacities of national actors can help to institutionalise (cash) assistance in national organisations and systems – while educating humanitarian counterparts on core social protection programmes and systems can enhance the chances of effective coordination. • Working through national systems when capacities are not sufficient can undermine the social protection system. • When working through national social protection systems and institutions, there may be less of a need for high levels of operational capacity within humanitarian actors, rather their role can become more focused on technical assistance and other capacity building support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake ‘joint’ capacity assessments, considering both national and local level institutions and roles – across sectors. • Leverage government local implementation structures where appropriate, explicitly building their capacity in the processes where this is needed. • Offer technical support to solve challenges along the delivery chain. Where interest and opportunity arise, refer governments to TA (e.g. SPACE) for additional immediate support that is outside your own funding/programme capacity. • Coordinate capacity building actions with those of other humanitarian and development partners, in a strategic approach. • Leverage opportunities for joint training, such as the TRANSFORM curriculum. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Mauritania since 2016, development and humanitarian partners – the World Bank and WFP – have been engaged in a strategic partnership with the government to develop shock response capability in the social protection system. This has leveraged complementary skills and expertise for improvements to the early warning system and effective planning and implementation of responses.

KEY ISSUES TO REMEMBER WHEN MAKING DECISIONS ON PROGRAMME DESIGN

- The broad emphasis for linking humanitarian assistance to the SP sector should be on designing or adapting interventions with knowledge of government systems in mind, filling gaps in coverage and capacity, and working with and through government programmes systems, particularly if this results in faster and more effective delivery at scale. Strengthening national systems might also be done by strengthening existing blocks. Unless there are clear reasons for it, creating non-coordinated approaches should be avoided.
- Identify where the humanitarian sector has systems and tools to be offered as a service to support the design or strengthening of more shock responsive social protection systems. The opposite may also be true, the social protection sector can offer support to humanitarian actors in a response.
- Acknowledge that humanitarian and social protection programmes work with different mandates, for example around:
 - *different assessments of vulnerability* (informing 'targeting');
 - *different assessments of need* (informing 'transfer value, frequency, modality').

Despite those different ways of assessing need and vulnerability the HA and SP sectors often end up targeting very similar people (because poverty and vulnerability to crises often overlap). This can help us overcome the divergence in ways of measuring and assessing.

PROGRAMME DESIGN	Vulnerability/poverty Assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One of the most discussed and complex operational topics in linking humanitarian assistance to SP is that actors interpret vulnerability differently and apply different approaches and methodologies to assessment, which cascades down to all programmatic decisions on who should receive the benefit. The more joined up these processes can become, the better. • Vulnerability to compounding crises is important to consider (COVID-19 aggravating existing food insecurity or a sudden onset shock, for example). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Start by bringing those who have developed these different tools to assess vulnerability/poverty together to reflect on where information/data sets already exist, where they overlap and complement each other. • Humanitarians and social protection actors should do and share this type of analysis, while ensuring no duplication. • A gender analysis, using available data, should be conducted to understand the underlying gender inequalities and gender norms and how these may be affected by COVID-19 and measures put in place to respond. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Tunisia WFP carried out a vulnerability assessment on the government's request, to support the government's social protection response to COVID-19. • In Libya WFP and the World Bank have supported the development of the national social protection sector since 2017 and WFP carried out Vulnerability Assessments to inform a national social protection strategy. WFP is also supporting with vulnerability assessments to assess the impact of COVID19. • In the Philippines, WFP supported the Government in conducting a remote vulnerability assessment and monitoring exercise to assess the impact of COVID19.
	Targeting design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The underlying objectives of long-term social protection versus humanitarian assistance programmes will differ - the former aims to address poverty and lifecycle vulnerabilities and the latter to address impacts of shocks, from short-term relief to long-term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess the appropriateness of the existing social protection targeting system to identify those affected by the shock - how accurate is the targeting design in normal times; how often is eligibility reverified; how likely is it that these targeted populations have been badly affected by the shock; are there other populations that are also badly affected and are not captured (either 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Armenia, UNICEF is working with the Government to provide a coordinated social protection response to COVID-19 and reduce duplication and gaps. UNICEF provided technical assistance in the design of the targeting criteria for the Family Benefit programme, which prioritised those that could be quickly screened by social workers against data held in other government databases.

	<p>recovery. Of course, those who are identified as being most vulnerable and/or extremely poor and eligible for long term social assistance are also likely to be among those who are most affected by the impact of a shock. However, the extent of overlap depends on the nature of the crisis and the precise objective of the emergency support (is its immediate relief, or livelihood recovery).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social protection actors will find it very difficult to accept that, when delivering assistance to meet needs after a shock, targeting accuracy remains important but there is greater emphasis on timeliness of the response. In other words, accepting that provision of assistance should not be delayed achieving marginal gains in targeting accuracy: some inclusion errors can be accepted, with an emphasis on rapidly addressing exclusion errors. • Likewise, humanitarian actors sometimes underestimate the overlaps between chronic poverty and vulnerability in many contexts. • In times of shocks and crises, it is generally challenging to obtain reliable and newly updated data on things such as employment status/new poverty status, making targeting difficult. 	<p>because of the criteria or because of low coverage of social protection)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the basis of this assessment, either support social protection actors to develop a strategy to expand coverage to affected populations or complement their response (or both). • To maximise coverage and inclusion of those in need <i>across</i> programmes and fill gaps, approaches to targeting <i>within social protection and the wider humanitarian response</i> should be jointly discussed, and strategies aligned - who is currently being covered, how approaches could be aligned, who is likely to be left out, and how additional caseloads could be covered complementarily. This would ideally be carried out before a shock occurs, in 'quiet' times. This requires ground work combining social protection with humanitarian tools. • When setting targeting criteria for identifying new populations consider what (government) existing data sources could be used, and which are easy to verify. Share data from humanitarian vulnerability assessments/ other analyses to inform these targeting strategies. • Engage with local organisations to enhance inclusion, for example, women's rights organisations, disabled persons' organisations, child rights organisations, and informal workers' organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Nigeria, the Federal government is designing a social protection response for households affected by the economic impacts of COVID-19. This will use data from the national social register to identify the existing poor, where this data exists. However, this register does not have good coverage in urban areas and cannot be used to identify the 'new poor'. The government is designing a 'Rapid Response Register' which is proposed to be based on easy to verify criteria considered to identify vulnerability such as household size, composition etc. It will also use indicators in existing databases from local government and other organisations such as being registered with an association of informal sector workers. Humanitarian actors have ambition to align with and make use of the same targeting design for their COVID responses where this is appropriate. • In Iraq, since 2018 humanitarian actors such as the Cash Consortium have been working to align the design of targeting on their emergency cash assistance programmes with that of the core safety net programme of Iraq, to support a gradual transition of the humanitarian caseload onto the government programme as national capacity grows.
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	Transfer Value, Frequency, modality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transfer values/duration are set very differently across sectors: Due to budget constraints and long-term sustainability considerations social protection assistance can be low, at on average 10-30% of household needs, whilst humanitarian assistance can be 50-100% of needs; and is set to fill the gap in income that beneficiaries face when accessing a minimum range of goods and services that they need. • Aligning with the government transfer value can avoid delays and ensure consistency with government's schemes, supporting horizontal equity, acceptability and risk of confusion. But emergency needs are often greater than a cash transfer provided through social protection will cover, meaning the assistance may not adhere to humanitarian standards. • When assistance is being delivered through or linked with the social protection system, it is simplest to follow the regular payment cycle for social assistance. If these payments are not frequent enough to get emergency assistance out quickly, this may need to be temporarily adjusted, but it is important to ensure that there is capacity within the payment system to handle this change in frequency. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bring together humanitarian actors and government to calculate the transfer value that's needed to meet emergency needs. Where timeliness is critical, and especially if transfers are only going to be provided for a short duration (one-off for example), consider making use of a 'proxy' for an MEB, such as the minimum daily wage, or a country's poverty line, to represent the minimum consumption standards. • Assess how the regular social protection transfer value compares to the calculation of emergency needs. If regular social protection transfers are not enough to meet emergency, advocate for top-ups to this amount. • Ensure harmonisation of assistance amounts within and outside the social protection system. • For assistance provided to existing or new social protection beneficiaries, make use of the payment frequency used in the regular social protection programme – but consider whether to consolidate these into fewer, less frequent payments to reduce COVID19 transmission risks. For assistance provided through other payment channels, this frequency can be increased. However, consider the merits of still harmonising with the social protection payment schedule for ease of communication. • Where social protection is based on unrestricted cash, humanitarian assistance can be aligned with this cash modality. • Humanitarian actors can provide technical assistance and the implementation capabilities required for a switch to other modalities where necessary due to the shock. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Turkey in 2016, when setting the transfer value of the ESSN, the government stipulated that the transfer value to refugees should not exceed social protection benefits provided to poor Turkish citizens. After programme monitoring proved that this amount was insufficient to meet refugees' basic needs, WFP and TRC were able to negotiate an increase to the transfer value as well as quarterly top-ups for refugee households. • In Nepal, when UNICEF supported the government to expand social protection to meet emergency needs following the earthquake in 2015, UNICEF proposed a transfer value of NPR 3,000 per month in the 11 worst affected districts. The government insisted that all 19 affected districts must be included, which effectively halved the value of assistance provided per household and was not sufficient to address the needs of the whole family. Governments may prefer equity at the national level to adequacy of benefits, which might be preferred by humanitarian actors. • In Kenya, since 2015 the government social protection programme, HSNP, has had the capability to expand to aid households affected by drought. The programme's transfer value however is not enough to meet the wider needs that households face during these emergency times. Humanitarian actors that were also providing cash assistance in the drought response were instructed to align with the HSNP's transfer value. This was to enhance coordination and avoid social tensions, but this reduced the effectiveness of the assistance. Humanitarian actors through the cash working group have been advocating for the HSNP to increase transfer values during periods of drought.
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global evidence now shows that unrestricted cash is a more effective modality than restricted vouchers to meet emergency needs because of the choice, flexibility and dignity that they confer. Government social protection programmes tend to be cash rather than voucher based, in which case using unrestricted cash ensures alignment of modalities and (potentially) the use of the same delivery channels. • When humanitarian actors deliver emergency assistance, they may make the decision to maintain an ability to switch modalities (e.g. from cash to in kind) where the impact of the shock constrains the appropriateness of the modality. Most social protection programmes do not have this ability to switch between modalities as part of the design. This may be necessary in the response to COVID-19. 	<p>All of the above is with a view to improving the adequacy and equity of support across different caseloads.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the Philippines in 2013, humanitarian actors requested that the payment delivery schedule on the social protection shock response be made more frequent. This was done in order to align with the frequency of emergency assistance being provided through the parallel humanitarian system, but it created additional work to prepare, deliver and reconcile additional distributions at a time when capacity was stretched. • In Nigeria, WFP supported the national home grown school feeding programme to adapt modalities, to ensure routine social protection assistance could continue to be provided effectively to children despite the constraints of COVID-19, which had led to country wide closure of schools. WFP developed a guidance note on how to implement safe distributions of take-home rations and supported the government with a pilot roll out. • In Lebanon, since 2014 WFP has had an implementation role on the government safety net programme. In 2019 in response to the effects of the economic crisis in Lebanon, WFP developed a contingency plan and implemented preparedness measures to enable a switch to in kind distribution, in the event of a 'worst case' scenario where banks collapse.
<p style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);">Conditionality</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence on added value of conditions for achieving outcomes is inconclusive, while 'soft conditions' or labelling are proven to be effective⁹. • While on regular social protection programmes conditions may be used, in humanitarian contexts this does 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocate for removal of any existing conditions on social protection programmes, as appropriate in the short term to lower the burden on recipients. • Design any new programmes implemented through the social protection system or separately with unconditional modalities. 	<p>In the Philippines, transfers on the Pantawid program are usually conditional on school attendance and health checks for children and pregnant women, and attendance of parents at family development sessions. In 2013, DSWD passed a resolution that means when a state of calamity is declared, these conditionalities are waived for three months. After typhoon Haiyan in 2013 this procedure was activated.</p>

⁹ https://web.stanford.edu/~pdupas/Morocco_Tayssir_LCT.pdf

		not usually make sense – especially with COVID-19 (restrictions to accessing certain services, and the transmission risks of attendance or monitoring).		This meant that when WFP supported DSWD to provide emergency top-up payments to Pantawid beneficiaries in affected areas, families would not be penalised and could receive the regular and emergency assistance during this time.
	KEY ISSUES TO REMEMBER WHEN MAKING DECISIONS ON LINKING WITH 'DELIVERY SYSTEMS'			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Linking a humanitarian response with the existing social protection delivery chain successfully (whether the objective is full integration into current programmes, or developing new programmes that make use of one or more of these systems) requires that these underlying processes are reliable and robust, can continue to function during or post disaster, and offer flexibility to adapt processes where needed to make sense in the emergency context (i.e. to be accessible to those affected by the shock and in need of assistance, and deliver timely and safe assistance). <i>Considerations in the context of COVID-19: i) the pandemic does not create the same challenges to process and system continuity as other shocks which cause displacement or damage infrastructure; ii) processes need to be accessible to those population groups that are not the common recipients of social protection (especially those working in informal sector, and the urban poor); and iii) operational processes should comply with any locally-relevant containment measures and reduce risk of transmission, for both staff and beneficiaries.</i> • When linking is from the perspective of aligning humanitarian assistance with social protection, with a view to contribute to building national systems, success requires that the operational design decisions are informed by discussions with government social protection actors and development partners and aligned with any national vision for and existing or emerging processes. If designed with the objective of being transferrable to government, the design should be appropriate to the operational and technological context and existing capacities and include a plan for how this transfer will be supported. <i>Considerations in the context of COVID-19: this pandemic is not a 'normal' shock. This must be borne in mind when considering aligning humanitarian assistance with a view to building or strengthening national systems, since the scale or scope of the systems and processes required for the COVID-19 response may not be required again.</i> • In some contexts it will not be possible to work with all the social protection operational processes and systems and some parallel processes may still be needed, for example: if humanitarian agencies are not authorised to access or use specific national systems; where administrative processes are complex, inflexible, inaccessible or otherwise not conducive to effective response; or where there are capacity gaps which must be filled. <i>Considerations in the context of COVID-19: even in those countries that have invested in shock responsive social protection systems, the urban focus and share scale of impact of the pandemic means existing national systems may have capacity gaps or be unable to adapt to the extent needed. Here humanitarian actors can support/fill gaps in various ways.</i> • The humanitarian sector has systems and tools that can be offered as a common service to support a SRSP approach (whether integrated or operated in parallel). This may include market assessments and supply chain analysis, accountability functions (including feedback and complaints mechanisms), Management Information Systems (MIS), last mile solutions, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems and third-party monitoring. 			
ADMIN & DELIVERY	Information Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leveraging 'pre-positioning data' (and not food!) can make sense to enable timely expansions of cash transfer caseloads – and has been the norm in many countries in the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IF/when considering leveraging social assistance information systems, comprehensively assess their strengths and weaknesses (relevance, currency, coverage, etc.) – see here for Guidance. Most crucially – if 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Turkey, the eligibility of refugee applicants to the ESSN is verified by screening various household data through the government's integrated social assistance information system (ISAIS). This includes socio-economic data, as well as registration data from the Directorate General of

	<p>COVID-19 response (e.g. leveraging information from social registries)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The humanitarian and social protection sectors collect different data at different points in time, managing this data via different information systems (see e.g. this document on SP information systems). Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of each will be critical. • Coordinating humanitarian assistance and SP can be enhanced by data sharing and inter-operable data systems: where each sector knows who is being supported by the other and how (including in anonymised ways, e.g. via Zero Knowledge Proofs). Focus on basic information on who, what, where, when. • The issue is <i>how</i> data sharing is achieved in practice, with a priority being data protection and not compromising humanitarian principles. • Harmonisation and standardisation of data fields and collection approaches across sectors could also be an important step – while acknowledging and supporting the broader government data ecosystem. • In the medium-term, there may also be scope for humanitarian actors to support the development of stronger social protection information system 	<p>these were to be used, who would be left out and how can that risk be mitigated?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the SP sector to think out of the box, leveraging the systems they have in place (ID systems, SP information systems, etc.) creatively to reach new caseloads. • Discuss how to open-up closed humanitarian MIS systems and safely share data to reduce duplication and enhance accountability (whilst following shared standards such as data protection protocols and Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL)). See here for Guidance. • Where relevant, share technology infrastructure, human resource capacity, etc. with government, and not necessarily data itself. Include principles of privacy by design and rights protection from the outset, in a manner that is tailored to local needs – this will set foundations for the SP sector and help build capacity. • Set the foundations for future crises via development of SOPs, Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), shared data standards etc. – and critical inputs into the vision for the country’s overarching SP information system. • Think through data protection/ security/privacy implications in short and medium term and apply risk mitigation measures from the start, in light of the country’s legal framework. • Where appropriate advocate for/put in place MOUs for enhancing data sharing between government and humanitarian actors, and between humanitarian actors, ensure compliance with national data protection regime (where it exists) and also considering and mitigating protection risks. 	<p>Migration Management (DGMM), where refugees register to receive an ID. When the cash transfer for Syrian refugees was set up in 2016, an interface between ISAIS and the DGMM database had to be built. Further, in Turkey, strong legislation on data protection limits the access of international humanitarian actors to social protection beneficiary data. This had to be factored into the design of the ESSN for refugees, in terms of the partnerships needed and the data flows that were possible. For instance, instead of sharing beneficiary personal data or full datasets, ID numbers were shared to monitor payment and carry out reconciliation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Pakistan, the National Socio-Economic Registry (NSER) a Social Registry serving the flagship national social protection programme and others, is frequently used as a dataset to identify beneficiaries after a shock. In case of COVID19, existing beneficiaries received a 50% top-up over the period of four months. The NSER is also shared with provincial SP partners and humanitarian actors to support provincial and humanitarian responses. • In Kenya, prior to the HSNP2 roll out in 2015, a census of all households in the drought-affected counties where the HSNP is implemented was completed and participating households were registered into the program’s MIS (and pre-enrolled). This was an integral feature of the HSNP’s design and created a database of most households in northern Kenya comprising a range of household characteristics along with poverty scores, meaning households in the social registry can be wealth ranked. This means up to an additional 180,000 poor and vulnerable households are already registered and can potentially be reached with periodic emergency payments. Humanitarian partners fill gaps by registering and separately assisting other
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				affected households excluded from the HSNP. In contrast in Lesotho, despite the high coverage of households, in 2015 the NISSA social registry contained no data in 28 out of 64 community councils that were affected by El Niño, which prevented use of NISSA data for targeting of emergency assistance.
Price & Market Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Whether linking with social protection systems or not, for cash assistance to be an appropriate modality for shock response the market must be able to meet needs and without creating negative impacts. In the context of COVID-19, restrictions on movement and access to employment imposed by governments have potential to contribute to disruption of markets for food and other essential items, leading to stock-outs and price inflation. This is not commonly an activity led by national social protection actors. Other departments within government may lead on this. Humanitarian actors may also have a comparative advantage here. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Undertake regular market monitoring and analysis of critical supply chains to determine the continuing appropriateness of the type, size, frequency &/or modality of transfer. Ensure results are shared with government and in relevant coordination meetings, to inform the whole response (both government and humanitarian actor led). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Lebanon in 2020, WFP's market monitoring of prices and stocking of essential items is informing the design of the ongoing NPTP and refugee safety net programmes as well as the new planned World Bank financed emergency social safety net. 	
Outreach/communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social protection does not always take a comprehensive and coherent approach to outreach and communications – humanitarian counterparts could support the design and/or implementation of these. When extending assistance to new beneficiaries (whether expansion of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jointly assess capacity of governmental outreach systems to include affected populations. Where these outreach systems are accessible and have capacity to increase coverage without overburdening, these could be leveraged to disseminate messaging on programmes reaching new beneficiaries. Humanitarian agencies can also support where well placed to fill gaps. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In Serbia UNICEF is supporting the national social protection response to the COVID-19 pandemic, implementing a programme supporting households that are vulnerable but cannot be covered by the government's schemes. The Red Cross is providing the outreach as they have strong links with communities and with the social welfare offices. In Turkey, communication materials and channels used in the Turkish social assistance system for 	

		<p>an existing programme or creation of a new programme), the existing social protection outreach processes may not be accessible to the population groups affected by the shock (due to e.g. language, literacy, location, access to technology....). This risks overburdening social protection staff.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that social protection outreach messages are modified as needed, processes are adapted and accessibility for new beneficiaries is enhanced – leveraging humanitarian experience of communicating in emergency settings. • Where humanitarian actors implement outreach processes directly, consider whether and how lessons can be shared to influence and strengthen social protection outreach processes. 	<p>citizens are not as accessible to refugees. Therefore in 2017, WFP and TRC added new communication channels to ensure effective outreach on the emergency social safety net ESSN targeting refugees.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Yemen on UNICEF’s Humanitarian Cash Transfer in 2015, communicating messages through trusted Social Welfare Fund staff and a local community-based organisation ensured marginalised groups trusted the programme and that social tensions were avoided. • Experiences from the social protection response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa highlighted the need to transmit messaging through trusted individuals of great repute within the target community.
	<p style="text-align: center;">Registration and enrolment</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Especially if not prepared for in advance, undertaking new registration for shock response will take time to mobilise and complete. Social protection actors may lack the capacity to do so effectively – with choices being constrained by routine systems for registration in-country (which vary widely). • There is, however, extensive opportunity for ‘out of the box’ solutions, that humanitarian counterparts could help assess and negotiate. See e.g. – see e.g. here). • It will also be crucial to help ensure registration/enrolment processes are convenient, inclusive and safe (e.g. no risk of transmission). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess existing social protection registration capacity (institutions, staff, systems) to be able to manage registration of new, affected beneficiaries. • Where appropriate, increase capacity of government registration and/or directly fill gaps in registration, for example by establishing new registration centers, recruiting additional staff, recruiting a supporting partner, or providing training and quality assurance. • Provide special assistance to social protection counterparts to increase accessibility for vulnerable groups (e.g. take registration into communities, covering costs of transportation). • Provide guidance to simplify registration processes and develop related SOPs, to speed up new registration/remove barriers and bottlenecks. Advocate to relevant government counterparts to relax regulations, where this is required to enable these modifications. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Nigeria the Federal government is designing a social protection response for households in urban areas affected by the economic impacts of COVID-19. The long-term social protection schemes under NASSP are focused on the extreme poor, mainly in rural areas, whereas COVID19 has hit most heavily in urban settlements and has also affected the non-traditional poor. To register these the government is designing procedures for a Rapid Response Registry (RRR), which will have more simple screening processes than used on the regular social protection schemes. Development partners have provided TA to this design. Implementation will rely on staff in the SOCUs as well as survey firms to register households. Humanitarian partners will support through hiring survey firms and providing TA for consistent and quality data collection and analysis. • In Pakistan, the IRC had piloted the use of NSER data for emergency response. That proof of concept indirectly laid the foundations for the Government’s

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where social protection registration systems and capacities do not exist, directly implement registration activities suited to the requirements of the crisis and the needs of the affected populations – leveraging social protection local capacity and aligning with any national vision. Note that some registration requirements will be very specific to the requirements of COVID response and may not all be relevant for future social protection system building. • Generate evidence of best practices for improving/adapting processes and for accessing hard to reach populations. 	<p>COVID-19 response which combined the use of social registry data with on-demand registration of new beneficiaries (recognising that many of those affected by COVID19 are not included in the existing database, new applicants could send a text message to register for COVID19 relief, their data would be cross-checked against existing information to assess eligibility).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Turkey households requesting social protection must apply at local social protection offices and receive a home visit. When WFP, TRC and the government of Turkey began providing assistance to refugees through this system in 2016, the home visit requirement was postponed to within one year of enrolment on the programme, to facilitate rapid scale up and speed up registration. In localities with large numbers of households in need, TRC set up service centers to receive applicants and supplement registration capacity of social protection offices. INGOs provided handholding support to vulnerable households to help them with registration and enrolment such as providing transport and covering the cost of notaries and translators. • In Kyrgyzstan following the conflict, UNICEF and the government partnered to expand social protection to new affected households. Registration processes were modified to enable rapid registration. Local social commissions were set up to rapidly assess social protection applications, without needing a household visit. UNICEF recruited additional social workers which increased government capacity to take registration activity into communities, for mass enrolment. The verification of eligibility requirements were relaxed meaning households could begin receiving assistance in the interim while they sought the civil documents.
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	Payments & Delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Especially if not prepared for in advance, designing and undertaking payments to new caseloads will take time to mobilise and complete. Social protection actors may lack the capacity to do so effectively – with choices being constrained by routine payment systems for registration. • There is, however, extensive opportunity for 'out of the box' solutions, that humanitarian counterparts could help assess and negotiate. See e.g. here. • It will also be crucial to help ensure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) payment processes are convenient, inclusive and safe for any new intended beneficiaries to access; b) an appropriate frequency and timing of the payment schedule (e.g. modified compared to routine payments). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess the likely capacity of social protection delivery systems/partners (and their payment service providers) to be able to provide payments and adapt payment schedules, including the benefits and risks of using the SP delivery systems. • Provide TA or support to overcome barriers/make payment delivery processes accessible to new beneficiaries (especially vulnerable groups) – for example, 'doorstep' pay out points; help to complete transactions). • Support capacity building of services to manage any additional payments (e.g. additional staff; bring in IPs; additional administrative budget.) • If appropriate, support appraisal of other options for payment delivery- especially electronic payment systems which could allow beneficiaries to withdraw funds in different or safer locations, at their convenience, and to store funds. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the Philippines, since 2013, humanitarian actors have worked with government and the regulators to improve preparedness of social protection responses to shocks, through an agreement to temporarily relax Know Your Customer regulations upon declaration of a state of calamity. • In 2015 the HSNP in Kenya expanded for the first time to provide shock response payments to new beneficiaries. This highlighted the importance of sufficient capacity within the payment service provider and their agents to deliver additional emergency payments and manage liquidity. Since then, most humanitarian actors have opted to use alternative payment channels (mainly mobile money transfer) to deliver their complementary assistance to other drought-affected households in the ASALs. • On the EU's ESSN in Turkey in 2017, bank staff faced difficulties in communicating with Syrian refugees. Turkish Red Crescent provided focal points in bank branches to assist in making payments to refugees.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where parallel payment systems are used, using a common delivery channel and Financial Service Provider (FSP) between humanitarian and SP payments may be more cost efficient and provide a single point of contact with cash recipients, at the same time there is a risk that this overstretched the service provider. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If appropriate, advocate for and provide support to/a joint approach to digitising the social protection payment system. This will take time and is most relevant where assistance will be provided for medium duration. • Where working via government payment systems is not viable, directly implement a parallel delivery system more suited to the requirements of the crisis and the needs and preferences of affected populations. In this case consider collaborating with other humanitarian agencies, if this increases efficiency and effectiveness. • Where payments are delivered through a parallel payment system aim to generate evidence on the efficacy of these systems to influence the design of future social protection. Joint investment in digitising payments should be considered. • In coordination with government and other stakeholders, develop a roadmap for how any new delivery systems or adaptations to delivery systems may be transferred to government ownership and/or incorporated into national social protection systems. • Provide guidance, training and support to social protection staff and service providers on COVID-safe distribution. • Advocate for/put in place clear contracting arrangements with FSPs to facilitate effective linkages of social protection and humanitarian assistance, and/or shock responsive social protection. 	<p>The bank also updated ATMs to include Arabic language function for Syrian refugees.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Nepal in 2015, UNICEF and the national government embarked on shock response through social protection without assessing capacity of delivery systems. social protection payments are made by local government staff. The scaling up of the social protection programmes, at the same time as these staff were also engaged in various other responsibilities to support the national emergency response, placed considerable burden on social welfare staff. government and humanitarian actors had not adequately considered their capacity to deliver the additional funds. • In Serbia UNICEF is supporting the national social protection response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on assessment of the existing payment delivery system and alternative mechanisms, UNICEF has opted to contract its own FSP to provide e-payments conveniently and reducing risk for beneficiaries while avoiding overburdening the social protection system. • In Nigeria, the payment process on the NASSP is still essentially 'cash in hand' as full e-payment services do not have coverage in rural areas. On the government's planned COVID-19 social protection response in urban areas, however, there are other, more accessible channels available. The government is seeking to make transfers through mobile money accounts and UNICEF is supporting the federal government and 4 states to move forward the digitisation of the NASSP cash payment mechanism. • In Lebanon WFP has staggered the payment schedule on the NPTP e-voucher programme and the refugee emergency cash programme and
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				<p>provided onsite support at hotspot ATMs to reduce risks of COVID transmission.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Jamaica, with support from the World Bank social protection payment processes have also been adapted to reduce risk of transmission in COVID. This has included introduction of alphabetised payment dates. to reduce crowding at payment locations and introducing social distancing requirements and hygiene stations at payment locations. • In Malawi, Irish Aid has integrated a clause into their contract negotiations with their FSP that states the FSP will execute vertical top ups at no extra administrative cost.
	<p>Grievance/complaints and accountability mechanisms</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not all social protection systems include well-functioning complaints/feedback/accountability mechanisms. • Where they exist, they may not have capacity to log and respond to additional grievances raised on new or expanded programmes. • When extending assistance to new beneficiaries (whether expansion of an existing programme or creation of a new programme), the existing processes may not be accessible to these population groups (due to e.g. language, literacy, location, access to technology....). • Investment in improving, or implementing, a social protection mechanism must consider the timeframe of the planned response. Major investments will make less sense on a very short-term 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian actors could support the capacity of existing mechanisms to cater for new beneficiaries and needs through hiring additional staff, providing training, improving processes, or including additional channels accessible to these new groups. Practical support could also be provided on data management, managing sensitive cases (e.g. protection against sexual exploitation and abuse), etc. • Alternatively, humanitarian actors can choose to implement the mechanisms directly. • Regardless, these should ideally be equipped to receive and respond to issues of safeguarding, protection and sexual exploitation and abuse and make appropriate referrals to services and authorities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Montenegro UNICEF is planning to provide financial and technical support to the Ministry of Social Affairs to implement a three-month social protection response to new beneficiaries. If this involves a one-off and immediate payment, UNICEF will not seek to influence improvements to the social protection grievance mechanism. By investing directly in independent monitoring UNICEF will still understand issues and risks. • In Yemen on the Emergency Cash Transfer Program linked to the Social Welfare Fund in 2017, UNICEF set up a new complaints mechanism and data management system and built capacity of social welfare officers to manage this. • In Turkey on the ESSN in 2017, WFP and TRC set up and managed a separate complaints and feedback mechanism, outside of the national social protection system. This hotline in 5 languages is accessible to and effectively manages issues relating to the programmes for refugees.

		<p>intervention. Humanitarian actors must then decide how accountability and protection will be ensured.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Lebanon on the proposed ESSN to the COVID pandemic, WFP will support MOSA to develop a CFM for use on social assistance. • In Turkey on the ESSN for refugees in 2017, WFP explicitly budgeted for a separate accountability mechanism (hotline) that was important for generating the data needed to identify problems and ensure programme effectiveness. • In Nigeria, Save the Children is funding the development of civil society platforms in 4 states to engage with government, monitor implementation of the planned response to COVID-19 and ensure assistance is reaching those in need.
M&E		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The monitoring processes on social protection programmes are geared to the requirements of long-term programming. Data on outcomes for households will be collected mainly only during periodic evaluations. In contrast, humanitarian actors must report on expected outcomes in the short to medium term. • Government social welfare officers tasked with monitoring may lack capacity to increase monitoring activities to new caseloads. • In cases where humanitarian actors are transferring funds to government, government's financial tracking, monitoring and reporting processes must be robust and timely enough for donor reporting purposes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider joint humanitarian and SP M&E of implementation effectiveness. • Offer M&E capacity (e.g. for data analysis) and systems (e.g. approaches/tools, indicators, software, etc.) to support SP M&E processes, with an eye to building capacity in the medium-term. • Implement additional separate monitoring activities to fill gaps in data without overburdening the existing social protection system. • Support surge in staff from other non-affected areas or include an independent service provider to support monitoring. • Help to modify existing social protection monitoring procedures and activities to incorporate what is needed – only relevant in contexts of full integration of shock response into social protection programmes. • Advocate for and support the engagement of third-party monitoring and accountability via CSOs and local organisations, to monitor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responses in Fiji, the Philippines and Nepal provide examples of where humanitarian actors have channeled their support through governments to expand social programmes and have complemented this with independent post distribution monitoring (PDM) to ensure they had the data needed to report on results and have visibility of issues. • In Lebanon, WFP has leveraged lessons and systems from the refugee humanitarian response to inform technical assistance to improve PDM on the government's social assistance programme, the NPTP. These emerging systems and national capacities to manage these, will be further enhanced as a core component of the proposed Emergency Social Safety Net programme in response to COVID-19. • In Nigeria, the government has requested technical support to roll out its proposed Rapid Response Registry (RRR) and associated cash assistance to households affected by the economic impacts of COVID-19. At Federal level ILO will be providing capacity building for NASSCO on monitoring, for transparency in budget management, to ensure

			<p>government action on commitments and hold the government accountable.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support independent evaluation of the full social transfers response to Covid-19 – paid for by donors and looking across the full spectrum of response. Evaluation criteria to include cost-effectiveness (Value for Money). • Piloting and disseminating learning from COVID-19 assistance initiatives (from both the government and humanitarian side) and other linkage efforts. 	<p>accountability. Save the Children is supporting civil society platforms in 4 states to engage with government, monitor implementation of the planned support and ensure assistance is reaching those who need it.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Yemen, UNICEF’s emergency cash transfer programme in 2017 partnered with a CSO and private sector organisation who provided independent monitoring and social accountability in locations where UNICEF had restricted access.
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Source: DFID/GIZ Social Protection Approaches to COVID-19 (SPACE) team (2020) – D. Longhurst and G. Smith, with V. Barca, K. Seyfert, S. Levine, S. Little, C. McLean and S. Pongracz – building on [Seyfert et al \(2019\)](#), TRANSFORM Shock Responsive Social Protection Module (forthcoming), [UNICEF \(2019\)](#); [SPaN \(2019\)](#), [CALP \(2020\)](#) and [O’Brien et al \(2018\)](#). The examples also build on SPACE country engagements as well as the SPACE and Grand Bargain sub-group hosted webinar on “Unbundling the delivery chain: linkages between humanitarian cash transfers and social protection” [here](#).

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