

LINKING HUMANITARIAN CASH ASSISTANCE AND **NATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS**


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Objectives

- Identify the most effective connecting points for convergence;
- Identify the key enablers and barriers to convergence; and
- Provide strategic, policy, and operational reflections on the potential and value add of convergence.

Analytical Framework

Continuum of delivery options



Source : Seyfert et. al (2019)

Analysis of 16 different elements in each programme, grouped into four levels:

- 1) national policy;
- 2) programme objectives;
- 3) programme design;
- 4) and programme implementation

Instead of framing the humanitarian-social protection links as an 'either-or', the framework 'unbundles' the variety of ways and options that actors can consider

	Parallel System	Alignment	Piggy-backing	National System
Legal and policy framework				
Financing				
Governance				
Coordination				
Programme objectives				
Poverty/Vulnerability assessment				
Price and market analysis				
Targeting design, eligibility, and qualifying criteria				
Transfer value, frequency, and modality				
Conditionality				
Beneficiary MIS				
Outreach and communication				
Registration and enrolment				
Payment and delivery				
AAP				
M&E				

6 country case studies

- > Analysis focused on cash assistance components of studied programs
- > Selected programs for comparison had to support at least 5,000 households and provide cash assistance for at least three months

Burkina Faso

Focus: seasonal drought response and IDPs

Programs:

- PFS- WB funded
- PFS (KfW funded)
- PFS (AFD funded)
- UNICEF
- FAO
- PROGRES (NGO Consortium)
- WFP
- Red Cross
- Oxfam

Chad

Focus: Refugee support

Programs:

- PARCA
- WFP support to refugees
- DIZA Sud and DIZA Est (Developpement Inclusif des Zones d'Accueil)

Mali

Focus: seasonal drought response

Programs:

- Jigisemejiri horizontal expansion
- PRESA (Programme de Renforcement du Dispositif National de Securite Alimentaire)
- WFP emergency response
- EU-funded PDU implemented by consortium

Mauritania

Focus: seasonal drought response

Programs:

- Tekavoul programme
- Elmaouna shock response program
- WFP, Oxfam, ACF

Niger

Focus: COVID-19 response

Programs:


- World Bank funded response
- WFP and UNICEF BMZ funded response

Senegal

Focus: seasonal drought response

Programs:

- World Bank funded shock responsive pilot for lean season
- Start Network's ARC replica (2020 response)
- WFP lean season response 2021



Nascent Social Protection systems – some more mature than others – which is an important contextual factor

- Since 2014, the six Sahel countries have been laying the foundations of national ASP systems with the support of the SASPP.
 - Despite achievements and improved reach, national systems in most countries are still not able to cover all the poorest through regular safety nets, and even less so to support at scale in the lean season
 - Coordination with humanitarian partners is key to expanding reach in Sahel
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Why aiming for convergence?

Convergence is not a goal in itself, and does not always result into better outcomes

But there are strong reasons in the region to aim for it:

- Strategic reasons: recurrent / cyclical needs; important to strengthen resilience
 - Resource situation: should oblige partners to work more efficiently together
 - Coordination with humanitarian partners is essential to extend the coverage in the Sahel
-

The
 “alignment landscape”
 across the region

TABLE 9.
 The state of convergence across the region

	Parallel system	Alignment	Piggy-backing	National system
Legal and policy framework	MAURITANIA SENEGAL	MAURITANIA (E) MALI	SENEGAL	BURKINA FASO CHAD NIGER
Financing	BURKINA FASO MAURITANIA NIGER SENEGAL CHAD	SENEGAL	MALI	
Governance	MALI MAURITANIA NIGER SENEGAL CHAD	BURKINA FASO	BURKINA FASO	SENEGAL
Coordination	MAURITANIA (T) SENEGAL MALI	MAURITANIA (E) SENEGAL CHAD	SENEGAL BURKINA FASO	NIGER
Program objectives	MALI	MAURITANIA (T) MALI CHAD	MAURITANIA (E) BURKINA FASO	CHAD BURKINA FASO SENEGAL NIGER
Poverty/vulnerability assessment	MAURITANIA (T) MALI CHAD	CHAD BURKINA FASO MALI NIGER	MAURITANIA (E) BURKINA FASO	BURKINA FASO SENEGAL
Price and market analysis	SENEGAL MALI MAURITANIA	BURKINA FASO SENEGAL	CHAD	NIGER
Targeting design, eligibility, and qualifying criteria	MAURITANIA (T) BURKINA FASO CHAD	SENEGAL NIGER BURKINA FASO	SENEGAL MALI MAURITANIA (E) BURKINA FASO	MAURITANIA (E) BURKINA FASO
Transfer value, frequency, and modality	MAURITANIA (T) BURKINA FASO CHAD SENEGAL	BURKINA FASO NIGER	MALI CHAD	MAURITANIA (E) BURKINA FASO
Conditionality	MAURITANIA (T) CHAD SENEGAL	CHAD		MALI MAURITANIA (E) BURKINA FASO
Beneficiary MIS	BURKINA FASO MAURITANIA NIGER SENEGAL MALI CHAD		SENEGAL NIGER	
Outreach and communication	BURKINA FASO NIGER MALI CHAD	MAURITANIA (T) SENEGAL	MAURITANIA (E) SENEGAL	
Registration and enrollment	MAURITANIA (T) BURKINA FASO MALI CHAD NIGER	BURKINA FASO	MAURITANIA (E) BURKINA FASO SENEGAL	NIGER
Payment and delivery	BURKINA FASO MAURITANIA NIGER SENEGAL MALI CHAD			
AAP	BURKINA FASO MAURITANIA (T) NIGER SENEGAL MALI CHAD	MAURITANIA (E) BURKINA FASO SENEGAL	NIGER	SENEGAL
M&E	BURKINA FASO MAURITANIA NIGER SENEGAL MALI CHAD			SENEGAL



Mixed picture of convergence

- Overall, there isn't strong convergence yet in the region, despite opportunities and avenues for it
 - Convergence is not one-directional, it can be reversed
 - Some key elements which are weak on convergence are not very contentious but are not yet fully leveraged
 - Common tools can be a way of achieving efficiencies, but the investment in their set-up is often a long-term endeavour – there are often different opinions about the business case of this investment
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Ways of Working: Enablers and barriers exist on a spectrum




FIGURE 10.
Ways of working that enable or hinder convergence



Some ways of working are bidirectional: helping when existing,
hindering when not

Donor policy and procedures

- > How donors use their influence on programme design and implementation plays a major role for convergence
- > Donors do not always leverage their potential for encouraging convergence.
- > Donors' priorities and risk appetite can be a disincentive for convergence

Some ways of working are bidirectional (continued)



Government leadership

- Stable government leadership is important in setting clear policy objectives and contributes toward having a stronger system which partners can converge with.

Senegal and Mauritania show strong signs toward convergence , in part resulting from the established systems and government’s clear role and lead.

- Less established systems in Chad and Burkina Faso -> *partners are less keen to converge*

Institutional set up and division of responsibilities

- Stable institutions that reflect buy-in for SP and for building linkages with responses to shocks are pre-requisite for getting partners to rally.
- A government set-up where roles and responsibilities are unclear, where there is high turnover or ‘fragmentation by design’ is a barrier for stronger coherence


Barriers



Political economy and institutional interest

- All actors have institutional interests. They may be well known but remain unsaid, leaving specific barriers undiscussed.
- Competition between agencies undermines trust and impedes further harmonisation, even among cash assistance programmes
- Adopting government systems means losing control over, and potentially funding for, implementation arrangements and associated funding, including overhead budgets.

Program elements: How easy or contentious is it to align?



Less contentious elements



Payment
systems

- In many countries government and partners already contract the same payment delivery services but separately; limited attempts to leverage joint negotiations to achieve better terms

Outreach,
community
engagement
and
accountability

- Many programmes partner with local civil society organisations. In several countries, these local partners already work across various programmes but rarely a systematic mapping of those overlapping engagements.
- Their presence on the ground could enable convergence if used for consolidated and harmonised communication

Contentious but room to move forward



Registration

Registries can be a connecting point but they can also be contentious

- > *Agreement that a national social registry is a key building block of a SP system and can potentially be a useful instrument for humanitarian programmes*
- > *Tension over the registry is often caused by diverging technical opinions on the methodology and perceived lack of transparency of the process*

**The challenge of coordination
and inclusion: use of social
registries and broader social
protection information
systems for capturing multiple
vulnerabilities in West Africa**


REGIONAL SYNTHESIS REPORT

NOVEMBER 2023

On the question of registries...
... the devil is in the detail !


The data collection strategy
of a Social Registry
for example
strongly influences the future
use,
e.g. by humanitarian actors

Programmes using Social Registers across the region



Having a large amount of data is pointless if that data isn't used to inform programming - and ultimately extend coverage.

Example Niger - coverage and use of data



The considerable efforts made to date in terms of data collection have not been accompanied by sufficient use of the data or support for populations in need.

Contentious and difficult to change



Transfer
value

- > Humanitarian actors base the transfer value calculation on the objective of meeting basic needs without resorting to negative coping strategies
- > Governments are under higher pressure to prioritise coverage and often follow the principle of equity and want to ensure fiscal sustainability
- > Humanitarians usually prioritise adequacy over coverage and accept that they can only select a limited number of beneficiaries as their resources are finite.


This is also the reason why they pay such high attention to the beneficiary selection process

Harmonising does not necessarily mean ‘homogenising’ transfer values.



Conclusions and Recommendations





How do we translate the principled agreement that working together will bring better results into practical ways of doing so?

- Focus on the **strategic added value and shared objectives** first.
 - > Need to establish a **shared and clear vision** of
 - 1) what it means in country and 2) how it should look like.
- Use **scarce resources more efficiently** through stronger convergence - should be nudged more strongly by donors.
 - > **Reducing overhead costs** can be possible, either by leveraging government social protection delivery systems but also by negotiating better terms and conditions e.g., with financial service providers



Conclusions and Recommendations

- **There will continue to be trade-offs**
 - > between coverage and the adequacy of the support
 - > between mounting a timely response and investing in systems building
- There can be disincentives to align, e.g. the fear of losing jobs, funds, influence.
- Develop common ground, step by step.

Conclusions and Recommendations



Bring actors together

🌀 physically 🌀 technically 🌀 ideologically

Build knowledge to break down barriers – learn how “the other side” works.

Speak with one voice – do not “divide and rule” – find common ways to navigate challenges.

Look for the quick(er) wins first, e.g. partnering with same local NGO; negotiating shared contracts with FSPs.

Be prepared for the long haul – it’s a marathon not a sprint.



Thank you