

ADVOCACY & COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

Final – August 2017

INTRODUCTION

The Libya Cash & Markets Working Group (CMWG) [Strategic Framework & 2017 Workplan](#) outlines 'communication and advocacy' as a 'deliverable' for supporting 'HC/HCT decision making'.

Throughout March & April 2017, the CMWG Steering Committee used a series of tools¹ as part of a seven-step process² to reaching this final plan. This plan will guide CMWG Members towards a cohesive and structured approach to persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders more often, through evidence-based and solution-focused messages.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The Libya humanitarian operation is not aligned with the global commitment of 'why not cash?' and if not now, when?³

Globally the humanitarian community is no longer questioning Cash Based Interventions (CBI) as a modality to achieving humanitarian objectives. Operational experiences have generated evidence that CBIs are an appropriate and cost-efficient response modality in many emergency contexts. However, there is a perception that 'Libya is different' and liquidity, inflation etc. inhibit effective and efficient CBIs. These perceived constraints are being used as excuses not to address the complexity and depth of analysis needed to inform well designed CBIs and to prioritise the limited funding to in-kind as a 'safer' option than CBIs.

Many concerns have been raised about CBI in Libya. Some common concerns are not supported by evidence, and these can be tackled fairly directly. However, where the basis of the concern is prejudice – these people cannot be trusted to spend the money wisely – this will be more of a challenge, and evidence from elsewhere may not be seen as valid. However, the body of Libya specific CBI evidence is limited and requires further dissemination.

Concerns raised in relation to CBI include security aspects, risks of redistribution, risks of supporting migrant smuggling, and what is called 'inappropriate' or 'anti-social' use of the cash. All of these are perfectly valid, and all of them also apply to the distribution of commodities. It is quite normal to monitor the use of cash quite closely and to follow up how it is used, but this depth of monitoring is not equal to the scrutiny applied to in-kind assistance: where commodities have been distributed and subsequently exchanged for cash there is neither monitoring to see how the cash is used, nor understanding of market distortion, despite equivalent risks.

Other concerns that are specific to CBI include the reputational risk to the humanitarian organisation, the loss of an opportunity for visibility and promotion of the work, lack of implementing partner capacity and poor financial infrastructure to support the distribution process e.g. lack of bank liquidity. All of these concerns have been identified and are being addressed through evidence gathering and piloting by those humanitarian organisations that are using CBI successfully both within Libya and other similar humanitarian operations.

Some concerns have a real evidence-base to support them. In some cases, there are practical solutions to these concerns: they can be mitigated. In other cases, they cannot, and actors may need to look at in-kind interventions and/or a combination of both in-kind and CBI. Currently organisations implementing CBI are relying on organisational guidance and procedures as CMWG technical guidance is still being drafted.

Within the Libyan operation, humanitarian actors have a limited understanding of what is the full scope of CBI and markets, and the potential to achieve sectoral objectives through CBI as a modality. This is compounded by the lack of a comprehensive CBI feasibility study for Libya and key large-scale detractors. Therefore, CBI is not considered on an equal footing and alongside other options, and the most appropriate response is not yet selected on the basis of evidence.

There is a significant evidence-base that demonstrates the value of CBI. Within the Libyan context and similar humanitarian operations there are examples of successful CBI projects, and there are case studies, evaluation reports, and standard reporting from operations to use as evidence. However, there are significant gaps in the evidence when it comes to the issues that organisations have identified and had to grapple with and overcome prior to implementing CBI in Libya. This presents us with a challenge, as this is precisely the evidence that would be most useful in our advocacy.

Note: To support the above, a more detailed 'Barriers & Perceptions' table has been completed and Annex 1 contains a summary of the problem statements.

¹ CaLP Making the Case for Cash, CaLP Advocacy Strategy, IFRC Cash transfer programming - engaging National Society leadership, Afghanistan Cash and Voucher Working Group - Advocacy Strategy & briefing notes and UNICEF Advocacy Toolkit.

² Adapted from the IFRC Humanitarian Diplomacy Guidance Series & toolkit

³ Doing cash differently. How cash transfers can transform humanitarian aid. (ODI, 2015)

ADVOCACY GOAL

Humanitarian stakeholders are using evidence to consider cash based interventions as a response option, alongside other forms of response, based on the Libyan context, situation, needs and capacities.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

1. Libya specific evidence compliments global experience to increase humanitarian stakeholders understanding of the comparative advantages of, and beneficiary preferences for CBI (**evidence & perceptions**)
2. Agreed CBI 'space' defined to support at least three 'early majority' to initiate CBI pilots together with expanding scale of the existing 'early adopters' (**implementation**)
3. Sectors are developing CBI objectives, that are included in strategic documents, including HRP, and reported on 2018 (**mainstreaming**)

Note: Indicators of success and actions are listed against each specific objective in annex 2:

KEY MESSAGES

Win-Win	Dignity
With a coordinated approach, the 'space' for CMWG actors is large enough for all. Working together as a team will be beneficial for all. Diverse and larger number of actors delivering CBI and market strengthening programming will not only increase the impact for targeted beneficiaries but also spread the institutional risk for donors.	Humanitarian actors have an obligation to provide emergency assistance in a way that reinforces human dignity and provides options for the most vulnerable. CBI escapes the cookie-cutter response that treats all vulnerable households as essentially the same, and empowers beneficiaries to take decisions to meet the unique needs of their family during an emergency. It also strengthens the local economy and market activities, and is comparatively more cost effective and secure for implementing agencies to deliver.
Evidence	Comparative advantage
A solid evidence base should underpin operational response analysis and decision-making. Cash programming is effective in global operations with similar constraints as Libya. Institutional support is imperative for Libya specific evidence gathering that is undertaken through or on behalf of the CMWG. Where possible harmonising methodologies to allow for comparative analysis. All actors should promote strong analysis of field monitoring, particularly around market interactions, and actively share findings publically. Contribute evidence and you will get evidence.	CBI is more than bank transfers and cash in envelope. It can help achieve sectoral objectives more effectively and efficiently through a variety of cash and market interventions. Engaging with financial service providers and authorities has the potential to significantly scale up CBI and navigate macro-economic constraints. There is little evidence to support that cash is riskier than in-kind assistance. Multi-modal programming is also encouraged. Similarly market based programming should be a priority for all humanitarian actors, at minimum market integrated relief.

Note: In support of the above, the CMWG have more detailed key messages, supporting evidence tables and key messages specific to issues such as government payments.

STAKEHOLDER MAPPING

The mapped stakeholders linked to the problem statements and advocacy objectives have been grouped as primary and secondary targets.

Primary Targets

International Humanitarian Community

The approximately 10 UN agencies, 12 INGOs and 3 Red Cross Movement actors are predominately operating remotely from Tunis. Of the 25 actors, half are considered active members of the CMWG.

As the drivers (strong allies) of the CMWG, approximately 25% actors are considered to be 'fully aware and accurately informed' of CMWG issues and priorities. While a rapidly decreasing number of actors (less than 10%) are considered to be either 'unaware' or 'aware but not informed'. While some actors are considered to be 'neutral' on CMWG objectives, no 'opponents' have been identified.


A 'medium' to 'very high' level of access exists for most of the international humanitarian community, most of whom have are considered to be 'moderately' or 'very important' for engagement as they generally have a 'moderate' or 'significant' influence over the CMWG objectives.

Institutional donors

The approximately 17 donors known to be supporting Libya, 7 embassies and 10 institutional donors, are varied in their prioritisation of humanitarian, stabilisation and development priorities.

Half the donors have been or will be directly supporting cash/market interventions in 2016 – 2018. These donors are considered to be of 'moderate importance' or 'critical players' in achieving the CMWG priorities, as they are generally 'very influential' and the CMWG has a 'medium' to 'high' level of access. While this group are 'medium' or 'strong' allies, their awareness of the issues are often only 'partially informed'.

The CMWG Members have no engagement and therefore no understanding of the awareness, position, interests and awareness of the half of the donors not currently supporting CBI.




Coordinating bodies

As well as bi-lateral engagement, the following coordination forums have been identified as important for engaging the primary targets: HC/HCT, INGO Forum, ISC with Sector lead & co-leads.

Secondary Targets

While many of the secondary targets are 'critical players' and 'very influential' over the CMWG objectives, the existing level of access of CMWG members is considered to currently be 'none' or 'very low'. Therefore, efforts will be undertaken to build relationships, and therefore awareness and allies, with the following actors:



SUPPORTING ANALYSIS

Risks

- i. Case of corruption in one partner project will potentially shut down all other partners CBI (High impact – medium likelihood)
 - a. *Mitigation – strong support to orgs on remote management risk mitigation and guidance in the CMWG Technical Guidelines*
- ii. Focusing on the some 'early majority' and 'early adopters' may isolate other organisations and individuals that could otherwise become more active in CBI and who are also sector leads/co-leads and hence targets of the advocacy (Low impact – high likelihood)
 - a. *Mitigation – All CMWG members will be prioritised in events and dissemination of materials. Support provided to all CMWG members demonstrating interest in CBI.*
- iii. This plan does not target Libyan authorities and stakeholders including beneficiary groups. This could lead to misapprehension that could hinder the delivery of CBI, impacting all partners. (High impact – medium likelihood)
 - a. *Mitigation – CMWG Coordinator to meet with Libyan authorities to open up communication lines. CMWG materials should be translated into Arabic when possible. INGO access framework will be applicable.*
- iv. Expectations raised by this plan are not met in terms of CBI programming quality and scale, based on external factors e.g. security, access. Then beneficiaries don't receive assistance, their expectations are not met and donor trust is diminished (High impact – medium likelihood)
 - a. *Mitigation - Key messages and other documentation to be clear on the differences between perceptions and constraints. No over commitment where evidence cannot back it up.*

Human & financial resources

CMWG Coordinator

The implementation of this plan is dependant on the sustainability of the CMWG, with an active Steering Committee. This is then hinged on having a dedicated Coordinator that prioritises all Members equally. The Coordinator is responsible for many of the activities and outcomes of the Strategic Framework and responsible for representing the CMWG at humanitarian and other forums. UNHCR as Lead is responsible for continuity of the Coordinator function throughout 2017 and will be supported by Steering Committee as needed.

Cash & Market Specialists⁴

It is critical for the three 'early majority' and four 'early adopters' to maintain staff who are well trained, well informed and up to date on CBI. They are responsible for deciding if and when a cash or markets component is appropriate and how it should be executed to greatest effect. This person may be a CBI specialist or a program manager with cash expertise. This person should also have, or be accompanied by someone with market analysis expertise.

Monitoring

In accordance with the monitoring of the CMWG Strategic Framework & 2017 Workplan, the Steering Committee will monitor this plan by:

- Using a 'quick performance checklist' quarterly
- Review progress during the annual CMWG Self Assessment Exercise.

ANNEXES

1. Problem Statement & Issues
2. Indicators of success & actions
3. Stakeholder plotting
4. Stakeholder Mapping & Analysis Table (attached separately)
5. Perceptions & Constraints table (attached separately)

⁴ Adapted from the Afghanistan Cash and Voucher Working Group - Advocacy Strategy & briefing notes