



Cash transfers from the Red Cross have allowed this grandmother to pay her grandchildren's school fees, buy medication, buy goats to generate income, and hire labourers to tend her farm. She uses the produce to feed her family and sell at the local market. She works hard to try to keep her family safe, healthy and fed. But it is not always easy to do this in north east Nigeria, where conflict and poor rainfall have pushed 5.2 million people into food insecurity.
IFRC/Corrie Butler. September 2017.



5

COORDINATION

**Global objective: Strengthen
the coordination of cash and
voucher assistance**

Since 2017 there have been some efforts to develop a more predictable global approach to cash coordination, but with limited results

90 percent of key informants reported that the lack of clarity on cash coordination¹ is having real operational impacts, limiting opportunities for collaboration and for improving quality and effectiveness of CVA across the response. Over the past few years, global actors have made various efforts to resolve the key questions of leadership, responsibilities and positioning of cash coordination in the global humanitarian coordination system. For example:

- In 2016 the IASC asked the World Bank to develop a **Strategic Note on Cash Transfers in Humanitarian Contexts** which looks at how CVA should be scaled up, planned, delivered and coordinated in the humanitarian system. It recommended that the CWG function be clarified, that clarity is given on where resource allocation and prioritization decisions are taken, that Response Analysis Groups be developed, and that cash coordination be fully integrated in the humanitarian architecture. These recommendations have not been formally taken forward.²
- In 2018, donors in the Good Humanitarian Donorship group collectively wrote to the IASC Working Group Chair to request that the **IASC “decide upon, and issue clear, actionable guidance on cash coordination leadership”**.³
- A **joint NGO position statement** on cash coordination was sent to the IASC principals⁴ highlighting the **need for predictable, effective, and well-resourced cash coordination**, as well as supporting recommendations from the World Bank Strategic Note.⁵
- The **Global Cluster Coordinators Group (GCCG)** included cash coordination in the **2017 ToRs for Inter-Cluster Coordination Groups**.⁶ These ToRs clarify the role of the ICCG in cash coordination as responsible for “supporting service delivery across clusters/sectors” by “identifying and facilitating the coordination of multisectoral or joint programming such as multipurpose cash (MPC) and ensuring strategic and streamlined cash coordination throughout the response”. They also highlighted that Cash Working Groups (CWGs) should be set up as a sub-group of the ICCG, by the ICCG, and with their coordinators included as a member of the ICCG.
- The GCCG drafted a **model Terms of Reference for Cash Working Groups** which elaborates the CWG functions. However, two years after the process began the draft has not been approved by the GCCG due to disagreements over key issues.
- The GCCG, with technical support of CashCap and CaLP, developed **draft cash coordination guidance for cluster coordinators**, setting out responsibilities of the clusters, ICCG and CWGs in cash coordination. CaLP facilitated extensive country-level consultations on the guidance, this document has also not been approved by the GCCG due to disagreements over key issues.
- The IASC launched **revised humanitarian programme cycle (HPC) guidelines** which include a stronger focus on **more consistent consideration of cash** within and across sectors and identify MPC as an optional separate section of the HRP.⁷
- The **Grand Bargain Cash and Joint Needs Assessment Workstreams** have jointly launched a sub-workstream on Tackling Political Blockages to Effective Humanitarian Action which will attempt to use the political reach of the group to identify **and table key political issues which require a decision, starting with coordination**. The need for a resolution to global cash coordination issues was raised at the Grand Bargain Annual Meetings by various Sherpas in June 2020 but it is too early to know whether action will be taken.

¹ ‘Cash coordination’ is used as a short-hand term in this chapter, although the subject is the coordination of cash and voucher assistance (CVA) as a whole

² World Bank (2016) Strategic Note: Cash transfers in humanitarian contexts - Final draft prepared for the Principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, World Bank. New York: World Bank

³ Members of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (March 2018) Multi Donor Letter to the IASC Working Group Chair (Correspondence).

⁴ CCD (2018) Cash Coordination in Humanitarian Response – NGO Position Paper. Collaborative Cash Delivery Network.

⁵ World Bank (2016) Strategic Note: Cash transfers in humanitarian contexts - Final draft prepared for the Principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, World Bank. New York: World Bank.; Steets, J. and Ruppert, L. (2017) White Paper on Cash Coordination. GPPI and CaLP.

⁶ ICCG (2017) Standard ICCG TOR Final Version December 2017. ICCG.

⁷ IASC (2019) Revised Humanitarian Needs Overview and Humanitarian Response Plan templates, 2019. IASC.

Global issues with cash coordination remain intractable, causing real operational issues

Efforts made to resolve key questions around cash coordination have resulted in little tangible progress. To date, there has been no response from the IASC to the requests from donors or INGOs, and no official discussion of cash coordination has been tabled. Global clusters have not agreed upon the CWG TORs and guidance after more than two years of effort, despite significant resources being invested in their development.



There has been zero progress and lots of wheel-spinning. Considerable time and resources have been invested in making no progress. **Anonymous**

The lack of progress reflects disagreement on a number of fundamental issues which go beyond cash: a) the coordination of assistance which cuts across

sectors, including multipurpose cash; b) how we understand and monitor assistance whose use is determined by users, not by those who deliver it; and c) the relationship between clusters/sectors and response-wide planning.

BOX 5.1 Perceived challenges for effective coordination of CVA in a humanitarian response



These fundamental issues lead to disagreements on some of the most critical questions for those seeking to manage CVA coordination, including leadership and resourcing of CWGs, the role of CWGs’ in strategic coordination activities, coordination of MPC and multi-sectoral response analysis, and who fills the ‘provider of last resort’⁸ function for MPC.

The planning and coordination of MPC remains a particular challenge. While the updated HPC guidance has provided some clarity in terms of the treatment of MPC in humanitarian planning and reporting, the lack of agreement over where the optional MPC section should be used (including pushback from some actors on its use in any context) and how it should be used (e.g. whether it should include a budget line for MPC or simply describe its intended use) means that in practice multiple approaches persist and there is no clear and agreed framework.

Practitioners cited the same perceived challenges for effective coordination of CVA in 2017 as they did in 2019 (see box 5.1).⁹ These largely relate to the continued lack of global agreement on the scope and leadership of cash coordination.¹⁰ This was also reflected in feedback received from CWG coordinators during the CaLP-led regional coordination consultations in early 2019 (box 5.2). Similar findings have been highlighted in various research, evaluations, and learning reviews (box 5.3).

8 The concept that the coordination lead should commit to fill any gaps in the response: <https://bit.ly/3cNVTQU>

9 Note the 2017 practitioner survey did not include the response option about coordination of MPC.

10 Only two out of 20 key informants did not consider that there were serious challenges stemming from lack of global agreement on cash coordination.

BOX 5.2 Findings from CALP's regional consultations with CWG leads

CaLP conducted four workshops in 2019 to gather **feedback on draft GCCG coordination guidance** and CWG ToRs, with cash actors in Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Middle East and North Africa region, and the West Africa region. Participants included cluster coordinators, inter-cluster coordinators, CWG/Basic Needs Working Group leads, CashCap experts, donors and representatives of UN agencies and NGOs.

- Participants **welcomed efforts to provide guidance**, noting that lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of CWGs, or guidance to support cash coordination, were significant challenges.
- There was strong feedback that **coordination overall needs to evolve** in response to changing ways of working, that this must be field-driven and put operational needs before mandates.
- There was emphasis on the need for a **strengthened inter-cluster/inter-sector space in the response** to deal with cash and other cross-cutting issues.
- Participants were clear that **lack of dedicated resourcing** is a major issue affecting CWGs, with many groups being led by a person with only a small portion of time dedicated to chairing the group.
- **Lack of clarity on responsibility for cash coordination** emerged as a major issue. Participants felt that assigning responsibility to the ICCG is not clear enough, since (a) the ICCG has a long list of items for which they are accountable and (b) since the ICCG is composed of all cluster coordinators there is no single responsible entity meaning that accountability is diluted.
- Lack of clear **overall responsibility for ensuring quality CVA programming** was a significant concern.
- **Lack of clarity on how MPC** is planned, coordinated and reported, and how the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) is defined, was identified as a major weakness. Participants were clear this is a significant operational issue with no clear answer and one on which they would like clarity.
- **Greater clarity on ways of working between the ICCG and CWG** is needed. Questions arose about the balance of responsibilities and the relationship between the two bodies.

Source: CaLP (2019b) Consolidated Feedback from Field Consultations on the draft Cash Coordination Guidance for Cluster Coordinators and draft Standard ToRs for Cash Working Groups. Oxford: CaLP

Similarly, consultations with global cluster cash focal points¹¹ highlighted the challenges they face when there is no clear coordination mechanism, or clear delineation of responsibilities for the implementation of MPC. This lack of clarity includes confusion about what MPC can cover, who is responsible for coordinating activities such as assessment, monitoring and reporting, and adherence to humanitarian standards.

However, during feedback received as part of Cash Week 2019, several participants noted that the lack of global agreements on the scope and functions of CWGs enabled creativity and flexibility at the country level.¹² They shared concerns that standardisation, especially if based on the rather limited scope that clusters could currently agree to, would force many existing CWGs to contract their activities.

¹¹ Key informant interviews for SOWC2, clusters' cash task team meetings and bilateral meetings.

¹² CaLP (2020) Cash Week 2019 Event Report. Oxford: CaLP

BOX 5.3 Evidence for the impacts of ad hoc and under resourced cash coordination on the quality of humanitarian response

Evidence of the impact of ad hoc and under-resourced cash coordination on the effectiveness of humanitarian response includes:

- Research into the **challenges of cash coordination in Lebanon and the Ukraine** concluded that the lack of a standard model for cash coordination leads to resource shortfalls, delays, gaps in the response, and duplication of activities, while negotiating the structures and leadership creates tensions between agencies (Bailey & Aggiss 2016, Bailey & Harvey 2017)).
- The **Ethiopian government** reportedly suspended the cash response in one region following concerns about the lack of coordination in planning and targeting (CaLP 2018).
- The after-action review of **Cyclone Idai response** highlights that confusion over CWG leadership and rapid turnover led to a slower cash response and duplication of effort (Southern African Technical Cash Working Group 2019). There were similar challenges noted in the evaluation of the cash-based response to the **drought in Somalia** (Daniels & Anderson 2018).
- At the **Asia CWG regional learning event** 2019, participants strongly agreed on the need for a solution to the global coordination debates. Coordination is not adequately resourced anywhere in the region, with a tangible impact on the effectiveness of CWGs' efforts to ensure preparedness, reduce duplication and link humanitarian activities appropriately to the government (CaLP 2019a)

Vested interests and incentive structures are a major barrier to future progress

To move forward in this space, it is first essential to understand which factors continue to inhibit progress, despite the widespread and well evidenced view that changes are needed. In 2016 GPPI published a political economy analysis of barriers to future cash reform – such reform would include increasing the percentage of aid delivered as CVA, increased use of MPC, and consolidation of actors. GPPI's analysis included a focus on the humanitarian coordination system, acknowledging that these reforms would challenge established ways of working.¹³ The report concluded that rational self-interest of agencies is the major inhibitor limiting positive change:

"Simply put, good intentions alone are not enough... where reforms conflict with the self-interests of humanitarian organisations and donors"

"[Where] cash-based programmes would be implemented as large-scale, multi-sector programmes, ... those sectors that are highly amenable to the use of cash would lose relevance, unless they reinvent themselves as a cash sector."

This issue is particularly pertinent when it comes to the coordination of MPC – which the practitioner survey (Box 5.1) highlighted as the biggest perceived challenge with cash coordination. MPC does not fit easily within a system organised along sectoral lines and the growth of MPC poses a challenge for the established coordination architecture and agencies which rely on funding flows through this architecture. There is understandable concern about the implications of this from clusters and large operational agencies. These concerns are legitimate – any organisation will rationally act to protect its own interests.

Sectors are also concerned about whether they would be able to maintain relevant and necessary sector technical expertise if less aid is flowing through the sectors, reducing funding for specialist staff (see chapter 1 on funding, chapter 2 on mainstreaming, and chapter 3 on quality for more on this topic). They

¹³ Steets et al. (2016) Drivers and Inhibitors of Change in the Humanitarian System. Berlin: GPPI.

are concerned that donors will choose to prioritise funding for cash with a sharp focus on efficiency and a reduction in “overheads”, and that funding for other critical parts of the response – and in particular for the technical expertise that makes CVA more effective – will be lost, weakening the overall response. All 15 key informants who discussed barriers to progress, including interviewees from NGOs, CaLP, donors, UN agencies and clusters, shared the perception that the increased use of MPC could create winners and losers among humanitarian actors.

While some stakeholders argue that cash coordination should be conceived separately from cash delivery (i.e. that the coordinator of cash should not be seen as synonymous with the budget holder), in practice, the cluster coordination system tends to foster the consolidation of resources in the hands of those agencies who coordinate sectors. The same consolidation of coordination and control of budget could logically be seen to apply for any actor(s) assigned to coordinate an MPC chapter of the HRP. Some commentators have argued that agencies acting to protect their funding, space and power is a major inhibitor to change. One study argues that the MPC coordination challenge reflects the more fundamental challenge with the current organisation and financing of aid:

“[It] lays bare the strengths and weaknesses of the current system and can therefore be a compelling entry point for systemic change... coordination of all types of assistance must be done differently to foster a more holistic approach to humanitarian relief. But coordination reform which undermines sector-based decision-making, inevitably undermines organisational mandates.”¹⁴

While the lack of engagement of the IASC to date can be criticised, its members all stand to gain or lose from a decision on coordination – which is linked to and rooted in far broader issues related to mandates and business models – reaching agreement is therefore challenging.

A couple of key informants questioned the inclusion of MPC as a ‘standalone’ section of the HRP outside the clusters, on the basis that the coordination system is designed around achievement of specific outcomes and that cash/MPC is a modality rather than an outcome. Many others, however, focused on limitations in design of the system itself, highlighting that segregating outcomes ‘per sector’ is based on the needs of humanitarian actors rather than affected populations. While cash is of course a modality and not an outcome, the cross-cutting nature of unrestricted cash means it is the recipient - not the agency - who defines its use and therefore the outcomes.

Several key informants therefore felt that a chapter, or sector, focusing on broader basic needs or economic security would enable humanitarian actors to capture the impacts of cash without being bound by a purely sectoral lens. Several pointed to the ‘Basic Needs Approach’ adopted under the Refugee Coordination Model which coordinates an economic pillar in the response alongside access to other assistance and services. Several key informants voiced similar opinions, that it is the overall system for coordinating and financing aid which needs to change. Participants at a CaLP-facilitated regional coordination consultation in MENA proposed several models for an improved coordination system,¹⁵ all of which would provide increased inter-sectoral space to treat and manage issues and modalities which transcend sectors.

The IASC cluster system launched in 2005 as part of the Humanitarian Reform Agenda has proved critical in ensuring more coherent and complementary approaches in humanitarian responses, and in identifying ways to work together for better collective results. The cluster approach has also aimed to support a needs-based response.¹⁶ However, as aid has evolved it may be necessary to revise this to ensure that a needs-based response is not wholly defined by sectors but examined holistically, with support of sectors and with more inclusion from a variety of actors.¹⁷

¹⁴ Kerkvliet, E. (2018) Improving the Coordination of Humanitarian Cash Transfers - a Fool's Errand? Thesis submitted for obtaining the Master's Degree in International Humanitarian Action. Uppsala: Uppsala University.

¹⁵ <https://www.calpnetwork.org/blog/cash-coordination-a-proposal-from-members-in-mena/>

¹⁶ <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/why-do-we-need-the-cluster-approach>

¹⁷ For example, there is increased discussion on the potential for reorienting humanitarian coordination around an Area Based Approach: <https://goodpracticereview.org/12/chapter-3/area-based-approaches/>

Considering these structural issues, there are several options for ways forward

Clearly a solution needs to be found and some elements of a standard approach to CVA coordination, including MPC, agreed.

Despite clarity on the problem that needs to be solved, there is no clear agreement on what a solution might look like. Based on the analysis of coordination options set out in the GPPI report, and the reflections of key informants, four main options for the future of cash coordination are presented here (box 5.4). As with so many issues, the implications of and impetus for reshaping coordination are far broader than CVA, but it is CVA that has brought the shortcomings of the current system into view.

BOX 5.4 Cash Coordination: options for overcoming the impasse

Option	Implications
1: Assign leadership for cash coordination at country level to the main cash actor (or actors) in each response	<p>Potential Positive Implications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Removes the need to set a 'one size fits all' globally, while still ensuring greater predictability. ■ Some key informants think that this could better streamline coordination tasks in some contexts. Where the evolving operational models have consolidated a large portion of the cash response under one organisation (or organisations, in the case of a consortium approach), those same organisations have led cash coordination. For example, it has enabled ease of cash coordination in Lebanon, and Syria, where a few actors deliver 90% of the cash response.¹⁸ ■ A co-lead function could also be defined according to which organisation was best placed to provide additional technical support. <p>Potential Negative Implications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ There is still potential for disagreements on leadership between agencies, and delays, where several actors are leading large-scale cash programmes. ■ In sudden onset disasters or where cash is rapidly scaling up for the first time, or where there are multiple major CVA actors, there may be no clear lead actor. There are several examples of where the lack of clarity and competition over leadership has delayed the setup of cash coordination mechanisms. ■ The lead/co-lead agencies would still need to ensure they invest in good coordination capacities (as well as cash delivery) and resourcing for dedicated coordination roles. ■ There were concerns from some key informants that this approach could reduce transparency or limit engagement for those actors implementing smaller CVA programmes and filling gaps in the cash response. ■ It would not enable predictable support/funding to be channelled through a single 'lead' at the global level.

¹⁸ Note that these include examples falling under the refugee coordination model. Some key informants considered that overcoming the cash coordination challenge was easier in such contexts as coordination of the response as a whole tends to fall under the responsibility of fewer organisations.

BOX 5.4 Cash Coordination: options for overcoming the impasse (cont)

Option	Implications
<p>2: Assign an operational agency to lead cash coordination globally. They would be assigned responsibility for MPC and chair country-level CWGs.</p>	<p>Potential Positive Implications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ This approach is one way to institutionalise cash coordination in the current system, which could be applied in both IASC and refugee coordination models. ■ An agency with staff in responses all over the world, delivering cash, could be a last resort actor and provide clarity of responsibilities. ■ The question about a co-lead function could also be defined in advance. <p>Potential Negative Implications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Stakeholders raised some potential negative implications about how this could affect the efficiency and effectiveness of cash responses e.g. if it stifled innovation or if there was reduced competition. ■ Concerns about accountability and inclusiveness were also raised by stakeholders, though third-party monitoring could be one possible solution to this.
<p>3: Coordinate cash through the ICCG</p>	<p>Potential Positive Implications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Theoretically, the ICCG is the most logical place within the present system for enabling coordination of sector-specific and MPC (as already set out in the ICCG ToRs) since it provides a multi-sectoral space in the coordination system and all clusters have a seat on it. ■ A non-operational chair could separate the notion of 'cash/MPC coordination' from 'cash budget holder'. <p>Potential Negative Implications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ During regional coordination consultations, several actors expressed confusion about this model. If ICCG leads, would it mean the ICCG chair takes the final decisions or must all members of the ICCG agree? This should be clarified. ■ Key informants highlight that as ICCGs in many settings are already stretched, this approach would need strong investment.


BOX 5.4 Cash Coordination: options for overcoming the impasse (cont)

Option	Implications
<p>4: Redesign the coordination system</p>	<p>Potential Positive Implications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The cluster system was designed around mandates for a purpose, but humanitarian responses have since evolved. Many key informants, plus wider literature, think this needs to be reconfigured to be fit for purpose. ■ Redesign could enable more multi-sectoral programmes, capturing the notion of addressing economic insecurity/basic needs provision, and linking with national systems, while still retaining the benefits of a system that coordinates wider necessary technical sector expertise and services. ■ This would support effective programming that puts affected populations at the centre. <p>Potential Negative Implications</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ This is a medium-term solution but requiring the greatest effort and with many uncertainties around its success given the limitation of mandates. ■ Reconfiguration of funding and incentive structures would be necessary to move forward, as well as to safeguard the necessary technical expertise pertaining to sectors.


Experience in cash coordination at the field level is growing and strengthening through CWGs, despite the impasse at the global level

BOX 5.5 Perceptions of improvements in cash coordination

Perception that predictability of cash coordination has increased in the last 2 years



Perception that quality of cash coordination has increased in the last 2 years



Although the failure to resolve the global challenges facing cash coordination is a major impediment to progress, the accumulation of experience and the efforts of a broad range of stakeholders in different responses has resulted in tangible operational improvements. The practitioner survey highlights a perceived improvement to the predictability and quality of cash coordination since 2017, as seen in box 5.5. Perceptions of actors at national and local levels are noticeably more positive than those of global actors which suggests that the improvement relates to perceived progress in coordination of CVA at the level of the response. Findings from regional focus group discussions (FGDs) back this up, participants in East and Southern Africa, Asia Pacific, and Latin America and Caribbean regions elaborated a range of examples of how cash coordination has improved locally in the last two years. A consistent aspect mentioned in FGDs, and in all key informant interviews that covered cash coordination, was the important role of CWGs in enabling effective coordination. There are now over 45 active CWGs worldwide – though coordination structures and levels of activity vary. Since 2017 CWGs' scope of work has also changed, including more focus on coordination across the humanitarian-development nexus and 'shock responsive social protection' in several countries.



We see countries where there's a good critical mass of operationally strong partners and these tend to have good CWGs with effective operations. **WFP**

Finding the right people [to lead the group] is essential – success is very dependent on human relationships. **Mercy Corps**

A constraining factor is that there is no provider of last resort – when that person [the cash coordinator] leaves there is no guarantee that agencies will dedicate new people. Quality [of coordination activities] can be unreliable due to lack of resourcing. **DRC**

In the organisational survey, 35 organisations including donors, implementing agencies and cluster representatives consistently reported engaging with CWGs. Key informants, as well as recent lessons learned reviews on cash coordination, highlighted ways in which CWGs are contributing to the efficiency and effectiveness of programming as well as factors that were driving this success. The capacity building efforts of CashCap, which has supported 18 CWGs with 30 deployments in 18 countries since 2017, were frequently mentioned. At the same time common limitations were also identified. Box 5.6 provides a summary of the benefits of CWGs, enabling factors and limitations.¹⁹ Many of the limiting factors are consistent with the constraints listed earlier by CWGs (box 5.2) and stem from the global impasse. Even though progress is still limited, government actors are also increasingly being engaged in CWGs and, in some cases, leading them. Experiences and challenges of local actors and host governments' engagement in CWGs is discussed further under chapter 7 on localisation.

BOX 5.6 Role of CWGs in supporting effective responses

Key activities of CWGs

- Information sharing and 4W
- Joint/harmonised market assessments and monitoring
- Harmonising transfer values
- Calculating MEB
- Harmonising and reducing errors in targeting
- Developing joint understanding of FSP services and capacities
- Advocacy
- Training and capacity building

¹⁹ Based on findings of KIIS and FGDs, as well as recent lessons learned reviews (CaLP 2019b; SATCWG 2019).

BOX 5.6 Role of CWGs in supporting effective responses (cont)**Enabling factors for CWGs**

- Capacity building (see chapter 4)
- Skill sets – group facilitation and management, as well as strategic and technical capabilities
- Developing good personal relationships
- Resourcing a dedicated group lead
- Investing in a co-lead function to spread the workload
- Investing in preparedness planning
- Establishing systems for information sharing

Limiting factors for CWGs

- Extensive variation in abilities geographically
- Lack of resourcing
- Remain outside strategic discussions
- Difficult to keep members engaged / sharing information
- Lack of a full-time coordinator leads to delays and insufficient time to engage with all sectors.
- Challenges with continuity, loss of institutional memory
- Imbalance in capacities and engagement of sector actors
- Limited engagement of local CSOs/host governments

In 2020, in response to calls from CWG coordinators for greater clarity on the functions of and best practice around cash coordination, and in the absence of global guidance, CaLP published a Cash Coordination Tip Sheet based on extensive consultations with cash coordination actors.²⁰ This resource captures emerging best practice, tools and resources and provide clarity on the functions and scope of CWGs and cash coordination, and to serve as a practical resource for cash coordination actors.

PRIORITY ACTIONS

This chapter has outlined options to address the current global impasse in cash coordination. Key actions to make progress in this regard, and to continue to improve cash coordination at response level in the interim, are as follows:



The Grand Bargain Political Blockages Group and Donor Group should **continue to advocate for standardising a predictable approach to cash coordination by international actors**. This includes evaluating options to understand what the most **feasible approach is in the short to medium term** and what **more fundamental changes to the coordination system (not cash specific) may be necessary** in the longer term. Decisions should prioritise what makes most sense for affected populations – what ways of working are necessary to coordinate delivery of high-quality assistance.



The Grand Bargain Political Blockages Group and Donor Group should **approach the IASC again**, with clear options and recommendations.



Donors and other response level decision-makers should **ensure Cash Working Groups (CWGs) are adequately resourced and have strong links to the rest of the humanitarian response**. For example, include resourcing for CWGs within humanitarian response plans, establish dedicated cash coordinators, and advocate with humanitarian country teams (HCTs) and inter cluster coordination groups (ICCG) to include cash (and cash coordinators) in strategic decision making.



CWG leads, members and other relevant stakeholders should ensure more **systematic sharing and capturing of learning between Cash Working Groups**.

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