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REVIEW OF FOOD FOR PEACE MARKET-BASED EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Global Report

January 31, 2018



This report was prepared by Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO) International, Inc.

This report was made possible by and produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Food for Peace (FFP). It was prepared by Jeanne Downen, Nancy Mock, Tim Frankenberger, Carrie Presnall, Padraic Finan, Maryada Vallet, Elizabeth Cuellar, Doug Brown, William Lynch, Monica Mueller, and Niloy Chowdhury.

The review team would like to acknowledge the assistance received from colleagues at USAID FFP whose time and thoughtful reflections helped improve the review: Dina Esposito, Susan Bradley, Arif Rashid, Ruco Van Der Merwe, John Lamm, Holly Tripp, and Deanna Gordon. The review also benefited from inputs from Dan Maxwell, David Kauck, and Paul Harvey. We would also like to thank the valuable input from stakeholders in implementing partner organizations, other donor agencies, the private sector, government, and United Nations agencies operating in case study countries. The review team would like to thank the independent consultants who contributed to case study primary data collection: Abba Makinta (Nigeria), Byenda Kabagambe Persévérance (DRC), Carlington Honye (Zimbabwe), Chantal Vielot (Haiti), Dalan Consultants (Sierra Leone), Farai Magomedze (Zimbabwe), Hawa Ibrahim (Kenya), Joan Gichuki (Kenya), Kethi Mullei (Kenya), Nazangani Mutapo (DRC), Omar Al Saket (Jordan), Phanol P. Philippe (Haiti), Samuel Fonnio (Sierra Leone), Twite Kisimba Luc (DRC), and Ya Ashe Bulama (Nigeria). We especially thank the communities and households who generously provided the review team insight into their experiences and the FFP and implementing partners who participated in the online survey. The review team thanks Robin Al-haddad (Research Consultant, TANGO) for her research contributions and Rod Ellis (Platform I Design LLP) for graphic design support.

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. The authors regret any factual errors, misrepresentations, or omissions, which are our own.

Cover photos: TANGO International

Figure 1: Summary of FFP market-based emergency food assistance funding via Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) and Enhanced Section 202(e) funds



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
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ACRONYMS

APS	Annual Program Statement
ARCC	Alternative Responses for Communities in Crisis
BCG	Boston Consulting Group
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CFA	Cash for Assets
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
DFAP	Development Food Assistance Program
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EDE	Ending Drought Emergencies
EFSP	Emergency Food Security Program
ENSURE	Enhancing Nutrition, Scaling Up Resilience and Enterprise
EU	European Union
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning System Network
FFA	Food for Assets
FFP	Food for Peace
FGD	Focus group discussion
FY	Fiscal year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
HDDS	Household Dietary Diversity Score
HFIAS	Household Food Insecurity Access Scale
HHS	Household Hunger Scale
IDA	International Disaster Assistance
IDP	Internally displaced person
IP	Implementing partner
KI	Key informant
KII	Key informant interview
LEWIE	Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation
LRP	Local and Regional Purchase (of food)
MBEP	Market-Based Emergency (Food Assistance) Program

NGO	Non-governmental organization
NVS	Nutrient Value Score
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OFDA	Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PREG	Partnership for Resilience and Economic Growth in Kenya
rCSI	Reduced coping strategies index
RUTF	Ready-to-use Therapeutic Foods
SIM card	Subscriber identification module card
TANGO	Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations
ToC	Theory of Change
TOPS	Technical and Operational Performance Support program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
WFP	World Food Programme

Figure 2: Map of FFP EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced-funded countries, FY2016



Case study countries

Afghanistan	Iraq	Rwanda
Algeria	3 Jordan*	6 Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso	4 Kenya	Somalia
Burma	Lesotho	South Sudan
Burundi	Liberia	Sudan
Chad	Madagascar	Swaziland
Colombia	Malawi	Syria (regional response)
Cote d'Ivoire	Mali	Tanzania
1 Dem. Republic of Congo	Mauritania	7 Turkey*
Ecuador	Mozambique	Uganda
El Salvador	Nepal	Ukraine
Fiji	Nicaragua	West Bank and Gaza
Guatemala	Niger	Yemen
Guinea	5 Nigeria	8 Zimbabwe
2 Haiti	Pakistan	
Honduras	Papua New Guinea	

* Jordan and Turkey are part of the Syria Regional Response

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Efficient and effective use of humanitarian funds is critical to meet the emergency needs of as many people as possible, especially as emergencies in developing countries have become more numerous, complex, and protracted. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Food for Peace (FFP) is the largest donor providing funds for emergency food assistance. Since 2010, FFP has used a variety of approaches to meet emergency food security needs quickly and cost-effectively¹ via U.S. sourced in-kind food aid or through market-based modalities such as cash transfers, vouchers, and locally or regionally purchased food (LRP). Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) and Title II Section 202(e) and Enhanced Section 202(e) funds have also been available for complementary services designed to support the primary food assistance interventions.²

This review of FFP market-based emergency programming (MBEP) activities from 2010-2016 has four objectives: (1) document the history and evolution of FFP market-based emergency assistance; (2) review program design and implementation processes; (3) analyze program cost-efficiency trends;³ and (4) qualitatively assess the effects of FFP projects on local economies and market actors.

The review drew on an expansive body of literature relevant to emergency food assistance programming; program documents from and Key Informant (KI) interviews of FFP and its implementing partners (IPs); an online survey, and seven case studies. The review presents an analysis of the broader system of emergency food assistance programming at FFP as well as seven field case studies. Case study country field sites were selected to represent ongoing FFP programming around the world and included a mix of slow-onset crises, acute crises, and regional emergencies.

SYSTEMS-LEVEL ANALYSIS

Food assistance programming is one of the most rigorously studied areas in the development and humanitarian sectors. The review team (RT) assessed over 2,700 studies and program documents on the design, implementation, and effects of food assistance programs. The impetus for this large body of literature stems from theory (political economy), strong evidence about the positive performance of market-based programming and cash transfers, and international consensus on beneficiary-centered programming. The literature leads to the following conclusions:

- Cash transfers to beneficiaries are generally safe, effective, efficient, and are not associated with higher risks to gender equity differentials compared to other modalities.

¹ Cost-effectiveness measures the costs of achieving a certain level of outcomes under alternative investments.

² Complementary services, as described in the FY2015 Annual Program Statement for EFSP funding, are activities that support the primary food assistance interventions and can include activities focused on improving agriculture and food security (e.g., inputs such as seeds and tools), livelihoods, and nutrition. Complementary activities eligible for 202(e) funds include analysis, social behavior change communication, and resilience interventions in protracted recovery or conflict-affected settings (FFP 2014; FFP 2016c).

³ Cost-efficiency compares the costs of alternative investments to provide a specific output, such as sourcing specific quantities of commodities from local, regional, or international (U.S.) markets. Cost efficiency is used to find the lowest cost investment to achieve a given level of output.

- The design of emergency food assistance is complex and context-specific, requiring multi-modal intervention strategy options.

Based on KIs with FFP staff, IP program staff, and other stakeholders as well as the document review, the RT concludes that the evolution of MBEP within FFP is a good case of adaptive management. FFP and IP staff and beneficiaries emphasized the dramatic sense of empowerment that MBEP provided. FFP and IP staff expressed strong support for their diversified toolbox of food assistance modalities that allowed them to select a strategy for the context as opposed to using a single tool (i.e., U.S.-sourced in-kind food assistance) for all contexts. The review analysis also resulted in the conclusion that using flexible and blended modalities is often the most appropriate strategy for meeting the needs of emergency-affected populations due to the wide variation in contexts.

MBEP funding⁴ grew over 400 percent during fiscal years (FY) 2010-2016; from \$244 million in FY2010 to just over \$1 billion in FY2016, supporting programming in 70 countries and five regional responses. The largest proportion of MBEP funding, just over 50 percent, supported local and regional purchase of food, for which nearly \$2.5 billion was awarded between FY2010 and FY2016. FFP funding for vouchers (27 percent) and cash transfers (14 percent) comprised another 41 percent of the funding, representing just over \$1.8 billion. In FY2016 alone, the EFSP planned to reach 25.5 million beneficiaries.

CASE STUDY HIGHLIGHTS

The **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)** case illustrates the complexity and diversity of contexts in which MBEP programming is designed and implemented. It highlights the need for provincial- and smaller-scale assessments, local market monitoring, and flexibility to pivot between different modalities as required by changing contexts. Important dynamics that affect modality and design choice include factors such as influxes of refugees from neighboring countries; sporadic inter-tribal conflict and subsequent internal displacements; seasonally poor road conditions; and insufficient mobile networks. In the DRC, where the context can vary greatly between geographic areas, having a variety of modalities to choose from is important. Voucher fairs with in-kind aid (U.S.-sourced and LRP) have been particularly useful. This case also highlights collaborative programming between FFP and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

Haiti is a very low-income country, with a degraded ecological setting that faces repeated threats from multiple hazards. The Kore Lavi program is an excellent example of FFP's use of emergency and development programming to strategically address Haiti's vulnerability and serves as a model for the national social protection program. FFP partners in Haiti also effectively used multiple modalities across and within programs and sequenced modalities over time. As Hurricane Matthew approached, families in hurricane evacuation centers received hot meals immediately, even before the storm struck, because of the availability of versatile Title II Enhanced Section 202(e) funds.⁵ This was followed by food aid, cash (including cash for work and essential non-food items), agricultural vouchers, and finally Kore Lavi food

⁴ In this report funding includes the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) and Enhanced Section 202(e) funds, using data from FFP funding trackers for FY2010-2016 last updated in October 2017. This report reviewed only 202(e) and 202(e)-enhanced contributions from Title II trackers. Future references to FFP funding data will be cited as "FFP funding trackers as of October 2017."

⁵ Enhanced Section 202(e) funds are hereafter referred to as "202(e)-enhanced"

voucher programming. Here too, close cooperation between FFP and OFDA was notable. The Haiti case represents the sole case study in the Western hemisphere.

Jordan and Turkey: The response to the Syria regional crisis exemplifies the challenges of and opportunities to deliver food assistance to largely urban refugee populations in Jordan and Turkey and to conflict-affected people in Syria through cross-border operations. This case study differs from others in that the crisis affects middle-income countries where markets are highly developed, global, and well integrated. Moreover, the political dynamics of the region and the agricultural resources in Turkey make this a unique case. This case study focuses on operations managed from two of the five countries supported by the FFP regional response, Jordan and Turkey. Well-established banking systems and information technology enabled new technological approaches for providing transfers to beneficiaries such as the OneCard platform managed by the World Food Programme (WFP), which is also piloting blockchain technology.⁶ The main food assistance strategies used by IPs are (1) cross-border supply of LRP flour from Jordan and Turkey to bakeries in Syria and food parcels delivered to Syria and (2) e-vouchers for refugees in Jordan and for Syrian refugees living in camps in Turkey. Good infrastructure and well-developed markets in Jordan, combined with a rigorous experiment to compare modality performance have allowed the piloting by WFP of a beneficiary-centered choice strategy where refugees can choose the assistance modality that best meets their needs. This case also illustrates the importance of considering the multi-sectoral needs of middle-income urban beneficiaries, where rent, not food, is their largest expense. Food assistance lessens but does not stop decapitalization of refugee assets over time. The regional political dynamics of refugee-hosting countries and the fluidity inside Syria require IPs to be adaptive. They had to reposition their management structures, develop novel approaches to program delivery, and find creative solutions to program risks.

The **Kenya** case reflects the Horn of Africa context where repeated droughts and conflicts, as well as pastoralism, are important contextual drivers of program strategy. The FFP Kenya strategy highlights an example of how FFP emergency and development programs can build crisis-responsive social protection programs, potentially reducing the need for emergency donor support in the future. Because the government of Kenya is devolving authority and resource management to the county level, this case illustrates how FFP can strengthen sub-national government systems for delivering food assistance. Flexible modalities allowed IPs to give cash transfers in semi-arid areas along functioning market corridors, and to provide food in more-remote drought-affected areas and in refugee camps. Kenya is a good example of layering humanitarian and development programming, such as with the Partnership for Resilience and Economic Growth in Kenya (PREG) to address emergency and development needs. Thus, through collaborative programming, the joint inputs have a better chance of successfully facilitating the transition to livelihood development and improving resilience pathways.⁷

⁶ Blockchain technology is expected to allow WFP to directly recharge e-vouchers for beneficiaries without a bank as intermediary, saving transaction costs, increasing transaction speed, and improving the protection of financial transactions and beneficiary information. Without blockchain, the e-voucher system requires a three-way transaction between WFP, the retailer, and a bank. Eliminating the bank is expected to eventually create savings for WFP, reduce monitoring costs and the risk of fraud, and create savings for cash beneficiaries by eliminating ATM fees.

⁷ Resilience, as defined by USAID, is “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth” (USAID 2012).

Nigeria is an example of food assistance in a conflict situation in the Sahelian context. The response used information technology to deliver one of the more sophisticated applications of voucher programs. This case is a good example of proactive IP mechanisms and monitoring systems to help detect and prevent fraud in a highly insecure context. Urban areas with functioning markets use e-vouchers, some with biometrics and technologies that provide efficiencies for beneficiaries and IPs. This case also illustrates a high degree of collaboration between FFP, OFDA, and IPs.

Sierra Leone reflects the challenges of providing food assistance in the wake of a major infectious disease epidemic. Food insecurity increased due to severely restricted movement in affected communities. The epidemic created fear, confusion, and mistrust of the government, which presented great obstacles to the delivery of assistance. The review focuses on post-epidemic interventions to improve food security. This is the sole case study where larger, less frequent cash disbursements were given unconditionally to beneficiaries. The larger cash disbursements increased efficiency relative to more frequent distributions and allowed beneficiaries to buy foods in bulk. The savings from bulk purchases enabled beneficiaries to pay school fees and make modest long-term livelihood investments. The review team also noted a high level of beneficiary enthusiasm for the program. Remarkably, cash transfers were successfully implemented despite poorly developed financial and telecommunications systems.

Zimbabwe reflects the recent Southern African drought crisis during a regional El Niño-related drought and a national cash crisis. With a high level of uncertainty about the regional food supply and the national economy, in 2016 FFP largely shifted to U.S. sourced in-kind food aid, while other donors continued cash transfers. FFP funding to WFP supports the Productive Asset Creation program, which has strong livelihood development linkages that help beneficiaries move to resilience pathways and prepare for future climatic shocks. Excellent coordination among humanitarian actors and the government contributed to an effective patchwork of cash transfers and in-kind aid, thus maintaining a sufficient national supply of both food and cash with which to buy food.

CONCLUSIONS

Objective 1: Historical narrative of FFP. FFP provides a good example of adaptive management using an increasingly flexible and sophisticated toolbox of emergency food assistance modalities. This toolbox expanded from solely U.S.-sourced, in-kind food aid to LRP foods, vouchers, and cash transfers, as well as complementary activities. FFP has creatively used both EFSP and Title II 202(e)-enhanced funds to evolve MBEP. FFP has refined guidance to IPs and developed tools to improve program decision-making, in some cases with the support of the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and the FFP-funded Technical and Operational Performance Support (TOPS) program. It also has added staff and reorganized to adapt to its growing and increasingly complex portfolio. FFP still has limited staff in the areas of response analysis and market analysis and design, and monitoring and evaluation. The roles and responsibilities of FFP field components are not sufficiently clear. The lack of a robust information management system also limits FFP's organizational growth, development, and accountability. FFP needs to improve its alignment with the Grand Bargain⁸ in terms of its use of local partners, improved joint

⁸ The Grand Bargain is a 2016 agreement endorsed by 18 donor countries and 16 international aid organizations, in which donors and aid organizations commit to improve transparency and coordination through steps including

and impartial needs assessments, multi-year planning and funding, and streamlined reporting requirements. FFP and its IPs identified several areas where additional capacity development is needed for FFP and IP staff.

Objective 2: Program design and implementation processes. The increased diversity and flexibility of market-based food assistance modalities has enabled FFP to employ an effective and context-specific mix of approaches tailored to highly complex and diverse emergencies. Programs use many different combinations of modalities and sequencing of specific interventions in response to changing beneficiary needs. Decisions about modality type, mix, and mechanisms for distribution are highly context-specific. FFP and IP staff frequently expressed the need to strengthen response analysis and define criteria for shifting modalities. A related concern is inconsistent monitoring and evaluation systems to guide on-going program management and response analysis.

FFP MBEP program design misses opportunities to strengthen resilience. In part because of Title II development efforts, national crisis-responsive safety net and disaster management systems are emerging. However, conditional cash transfers are not sufficiently developed or linked with unconditional cash transfers.

Though FFP is not responsible for developing national beneficiary registries, where viable opportunities to support national registry development through the beneficiary registration process exist, they should be carefully considered from the perspective of their value addition to current, ongoing and/or future responses. This is consistent with FFP's increasing focus on strengthening systems in both emergency and development contexts. Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program provides an example where FFP emergency resources supported the initial development of a government-owned registration process.

Objective 3: Program cost-efficiency trends. Cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness measurement are complex analytical undertakings with demanding data requirements. A USDA-funded study found that LRP grain was more cost-efficient than U.S.-sourced grain, but the cost efficiency of more-highly-processed commodities varied by commodity and country (Lentz, Pasarelli, and Barret 2013). A FFP analysis also found that LRP cost 35 percent less than an equivalent Title II basket (USAID 2014b). Cost data have been collected and reported by IPs, though analysis for this review was hindered by data gaps. While requirements for data reporting have been strengthened under the FY2017 Annual Program Statement (APS) and information management system, this review suggests additional data are needed to construct useful cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness measures. Still missing are other direct operating costs such as in-country transportation costs, cash transfer distribution costs, and complementary services. Better collection and analysis of this data would foster more informed choices between modalities.

Objective 4: Effects of MBEP on local economies and market actors. The development impacts of MBEPs are notable—economic improvement, technology transfer, improved resilience, and greater psychological well-being of beneficiaries, although these impacts are not systematically monitored by IPs. New studies on local area-wide economic impacts are getting the attention of national and local governments, however, which will result in increasing government engagement in modality choice. Developmental impacts are still constrained by a lack of systematic linkages between relief and development programming and insufficient coordination of humanitarian and development actors.

implementing a shared open-data standard and common digital platform, improving the use of cash, and increasing flexible funding. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand_Bargain_final_22_May_FINAL-2.pdf

RECOMMENDATIONS

APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES THAT SHOULD CONTINUE AND/OR BE EXPANDED

- 1) FFP should continue to evolve and expand its use of MBEP programming. While FFP has developed a range of modalities and distribution mechanisms to provide food assistance, FFP should continue to conduct research to maximize the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of its assistance, including its potential impact on resilience and development objectives. FFP should maintain its flexible food assistance toolbox that includes U.S.-sourced in-kind food, cash transfers, vouchers, LRP, and complementary services.
- 2) FFP should continue to seek ways to link emergency and development programs to promote resilience, both at the project level and to promote crisis-responsive national program strategies. The new FFP strategy and the ways that Title II development programs are being designed to be flexible in the face of shocks reinforce the importance of these linkages. For example, the Sudan development program was able to switch to emergency programming as conditions changed, and the Malawi and Madagascar development programs added emergency components to respond to El Niño. These linkages will also be supported through continued coordination with Feed the Future initiatives and other development programs supported by USAID and other donors. This will enable FFP emergency programs to be linked to further complementary programs that improve livelihoods, food security, education, and social protection.
- 3) FFP should continue to insist on good response analyses to inform modality decisions. The FY2017 Annual Program Statement (APS) currently requires analysis and assessment of markets, risk, gender, social dynamics, feasibility, and many other factors as well as a modality decision tool. The FY2017 APS does not require analysis of national policy or an assessment of food assistance programming being implemented by other donors and organizations, which should be included in the response analysis. To the extent possible, especially for projects of more than ten months duration, full proposals should include data supporting the response analysis. Moreover, the APS should clarify that modality choice and design should be systematically revisited throughout the program, such as during each quarterly management review. FFP should continue and expand the use of APS amendments to tailor responses to emerging contexts such as conflict, disease, natural disaster, and economic shocks.
- 4) FFP should continue to encourage IPs to allocate time and resources to strengthen beneficiary engagement, such as through trainings about e-wallets, mobile phone technology, and complaint mechanisms. FFP IPs should continue to ensure that beneficiaries understand targeting criteria and what type of food benefit they are eligible to receive (e.g., supplemental and/or therapeutic foods).
- 5) FFP should continue to deepen coordination with OFDA and other partners to provide an adequate multi-sectoral resource transfer to beneficiaries. For example, FFP and OFDA have joint programs in Somalia, the DRC, and Haiti. There is thus an opportunity in these countries to structure a single grant instrument to encompass food and non-food needs through a unified humanitarian package. This would aid in the harmonization of multi-sectoral strategies and reduce duplication of efforts.

APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES TO MODIFY

- 1) Information management is an urgently needed priority at FFP. An information management system should be immediately financed and developed, perhaps through FFP's management support contract with Macfadden. FFP should invest in an office-wide information management strategy. Document archives need to improve, and the RT recommends a management information system that uses streamlined project reporting, consistent with the Grand Bargain commitments, to track in a timely manner: the project award, implementation start and end dates, efficiency data, and effectiveness measures for MBEP programs. Databases also need to be aligned with analytical needs. Online forms could be used to collect and aggregate standardized data. External technical experts in efficiency analysis could be brought in to review cost-efficiency data and analyses carried out by FFP.
- 2) FFP should upgrade IP requirements for monitoring and evaluation by requiring at least one subjective indicator of food insecurity; the review team recommends the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS). FFP should require IPs to collect anthropometric measures of Global Acute Malnutrition in household surveys using the SMART methodology. GAM should be reported by its two components, that is, wasting and edema. In choosing food security indicators for monitoring in emergency situations, four important considerations are: (1) Can data for measuring the indicator be quickly and easily collected? (2) Is the indicator solid in terms of its validity and reliability? (3) Is the indicator sensitive enough to capture shock-induced food security changes? and (4) Is the indicator consistent with IPC/FEWS NET analysis frameworks? With IPs adopting these indicators, FFP can improve accountability for resources allocated. As per FFP guidance on baseline and endline surveys, household level data should be collected if the project duration is ten months or more in duration.
- 3) Recognizing that emergency programs vary in size, duration, and modality, resources for M&E will vary. However, adequate budgetary resources should be allocated to ensure that IPs have the resources to monitor the indicators above in recommendation 2, monitor markets and beneficiary concerns, and conduct beneficiary baseline and endline surveys and formative research when needed. For example, a multi-year \$3 million project should consider budgeting 3 percent for M&E. FFP should also encourage IPs to routinely collect and monitor outcome data related to development impacts (identified first through qualitative methods) and consider information from both formal (e.g., FEWS NET, national nutrition assessments) and informal sources (e.g., key informants). Extending project timeframes (see recommendation 4, below) should facilitate the establishment of stronger monitoring and evaluation systems.
- 4) FFP should plan adequate timeframes for projects, given the differing requirements of rapid-onset disasters and ongoing support to crisis-affected people. Where FFP supports Title II development programs, a multi-year framework exists. Yet outside Title II development, FFP is limited by short project timeframes in contexts where assistance will be needed for many years (e.g., catastrophic natural hazards, fragile states, and conflict). FFP should consider widening the APS project timeframe to three years for all implementing partners.
- 5) FFP should prepare an organizational development plan. While FFP staffing has grown and evolved to support its larger and more complicated portfolio, more work needs to be done to make FFP a highly effective organization. FFP has a strategic plan, but it does not yet have an operational plan for developing organizational capacity. FFP should place a greater emphasis on field staff capacity and empowerment, clearly articulate field staff roles and responsibilities, and in some cases, increase the

number of field staff. At headquarters, greater capacity is needed in national and regional institutional policy development (e.g., better linkages with policy players in FFP, World Bank, and European Union) so that FFP can contribute more to empowering national governments to manage emergency food assistance. The FFP markets team should also be strengthened and linked with FEWSNET, Leveraging Economic Opportunities, and other USAID programs with market analysis/monitoring expertise. External expertise should be called upon periodically to help upgrade and refine value-for-money analyses, still an emergent area of work in food assistance programming. Greater capacity in project design, monitoring and evaluation also is needed both in terms of more positions as well as professional development opportunities. This will enable FFP to increasingly provide more sound and efficient responses tailored to specific emergency contexts.

- 6) FFP should strengthen analytical guidance in the APS solicitations. The APS should emphasize the importance of robust response analysis by providing guidance for a structured decision making process regarding modality selection. The analysis should integrate information from—at minimum—market assessments, conflict sensitivity analysis, risk analysis, gender considerations, and relevant national government policies. The APS should require applicants to describe their response analysis plan in the concept note and full proposal. Proposals should also describe in the project monitoring section of the proposal what indicators will be monitored over time and how monitoring information will inform consideration of modalities on an ongoing basis. Monitoring of changing conditions affecting project implementation should be an explicit component of quarterly and annual reports. Best practices in response analysis components should be shared among partners.
- 7) FFP should increase and better tailor capacity support to IPs. FFP should emphasize capacity support to field staff through CaLP and FFP’s information management strategy. It should also encourage IPs to improve their readiness to develop supply pipelines relevant to different modalities. APS announcements should highlight the evolving supply chain requirements of different modalities and stipulate that proposals plan for these requirements. FFP should also require IPs to develop supply chain strategies in emergency hotspots. For example, supply chains for cash distribution through mobile phones are different from those that distribute food. FFP should ensure that IPs verify mobile phone network coverage for supply chains that depend on mobile phones and have contingency plans in case private-sector partners cannot deliver services at the needed scale, speed, or quality.
- 8) FFP should consider relaxing its policy regarding the origin of food FFP purchases with cash. For example, during the El Niño drought, food was not available in local or regional markets. LRP rules need to be relaxed to enable FFP to use cash to buy food on the international market if food is not available locally or regionally and if international purchase is more timely, appropriate, and cost-effective than purchasing Title II U.S.-sourced commodities. While there is a clause in the APS allowing for this exception on rare occasions, there is a need for greater openness to non-LRP commodities.
- 9) FFP should encourage IPs to identify context-specific, predictable resource needs, which, if left unaddressed, could undermine the protective impacts of resource transfers. Examples could include the need to procure seeds for the planting season, pay annual school fees, or even procure mosquito nets at the start of the rainy season. “Top-up” transfers provided to enable vulnerable households to meet these expenses without reducing their food consumption, may be seen as supporting complementary activities—or even a form of conditional transfer—contributing to improved food security outcomes. Good examples of timely disbursements of such “top-up” grants

were found in Sierra Leone, using EFSP resources, and in Zimbabwe, using DFID cash transfers. Alternatively, larger, less frequent transfers may also improve vulnerable households' ability to take advantage of favorable food prices, and navigate other household expenses without compromising household food consumption. EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced resources can be used to support such activities.

- 10) As discussed in Recommendation 9 (above) FFP should work with IPs to pilot the practice of distributing cash transfers in larger tranches. Based on findings in Sierra Leone, larger tranches can allow beneficiaries to use resources more creatively to meet their basic food security needs and invest in livelihood activities. Post-distribution monitoring and market monitoring will be especially important in these cases to assess market impacts and other outcomes from larger tranches, as well as to identify contexts where larger tranches are appropriate.
- 11) FFP should hold itself accountable to its 2016-2025 Food Assistance and Food Security Strategy, which prioritizes the introduction of distribution modalities and project activities that enable vulnerable households to manage risk and protect their productive assets as early as possible in the recovery process. In prolonged emergency/recovery responses, FFP should carefully monitor the project impacts, including how different modalities affect beneficiaries' ability to prepare for and recover from shocks. It should also develop strategic, cost-effective approaches for linking conditional and unconditional cash transfers, at both beneficiary and community levels, to help households and communities recover more quickly from emergencies. FFP should systematically assess and coordinate with national initiatives to manage crisis response through social protection and other mechanisms.
- 12) Another priority for both emergency and development programs that is highlighted in FFP's Strategy but rarely implemented is to sequence emergency and development interventions within FFP programs and in coordination with other development partners such as in support of strengthening local and national systems of protection—Haiti, Kenya, and Ethiopia provide good examples. FFP would also benefit from strengthening its own capacity to coordinate more effectively with other donors engaged in social protection and disaster management.

There has been an evolution of crisis-responsive national safety net programs and other national disaster management initiatives supported by diverse donors. Where devolution of budgets is occurring (e.g., Kenya), national safety net initiatives are the responsibility of local governments; therefore this is an important opportunity for building resilience. Specifically, FFP, along with other donors, should support the development of national beneficiary registries, where appropriate, to improve coordination between government agencies, implementing partners, and donors and strengthen links between humanitarian relief and development activities. Typically, these initiatives require multi-donor efforts, and FFP should coordinate with the larger constellation of actors supporting these programs.

- 13) FFP should capitalize on the opportunity to build back stronger after a disaster and encourage IPs to design programming to meet food security needs and catalyze additional development effects. For example, FFP can promote financial inclusion of vulnerable populations by encouraging IPs to deliver cash transfers via banks and mobile phones. FFP and IPs should also ensure that monitoring systems capture the contributions of such efforts to development outcomes, e.g., the extent of improvements to market functioning and psychological wellbeing following MBEP.
- 14) FFP should continue to explore ways that its emergency cash transfer programs may contribute to broader resilience-building efforts, while balancing cost tradeoffs. One strategy that has been used with success in Kenya and Somalia is using emergency food transfers as a foundation for other

OFDA and/or Mission investments in livelihoods, education, WASH, and protection programs. FFP should support comparative operational research to assess design criteria and modalities for different contexts. This could include comparing responses such as building community assets versus providing short-term food or cash transfers; cash transfers versus vouchers; and regular (e.g., monthly) cash transfers versus larger, less-frequent (“lumpy”) disbursements. The study conducted by BCG for WFP in Jordan and Lebanon is an excellent example of this type of research.

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) emergency food assistance architecture is unique among major international donors. Under its mandate, the Office of Food for Peace (FFP) manages all emergency food assistance and has a development assistance program. FFP manages resources from two different sources. Title II funds are authorized through the Farm Bill, and International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds are authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act. The agriculture committees in the United States (U.S.) Congress have oversight authority over Title II, and the foreign affairs committees have oversight of IDA. Unlike other major donors funding humanitarian assistance, FFP must clearly link its assistance to food security objectives and broader humanitarian objectives. As part of this dual mandate, FFP provides Title II assistance and “untied” food assistance, that is, food assistance via modalities that are not just U.S.-sourced such as cash transfers, vouchers, or locally and regionally purchased foods that are selected based on contextual needs. Because of this dual mandate, FFP answers to two major political constituencies: one concerned with the Farm Bill and one concerned with the Foreign Assistance Act. These dual objectives create inherent challenges in terms of developing results metrics, coordinating within the U.S. government, and fulfilling more complex accountability requirements for FFP’s political constituents.

The context in which FFP delivers emergency assistance is both complex and highly political. FFP programming has been studied by the Government Accountability Office (e.g., GAO 2016a, GAO 2016b, GAO 2015) and the USAID Office of the Inspector General (e.g., USAID 2016a). These studies have primarily assessed specific issues or questions about FFP’s use of cash transfer options, though without situating the findings in the broader context of market-based emergency programming (MBEP). FFP considered it essential to undertake a balanced review of its progress in transitioning to MBEP, using a variety of modalities. A solid scientific evidence base supports the use of multi-modality food assistance programming. This review focuses on how FFP, as a unique actor and the largest international food assistance donor, has evolved to address food security in crisis contexts.

This review has four main objectives:

- 1) Establish a historical narrative about the evolution of market-based emergency food assistance programming including the policy, processes, and capacity to design and implement food assistance within a market-based framework.
- 2) Review program design and implementation processes for selected cases to examine in-depth:
 - a) The appropriateness of modality choices in relation to program objectives, predicted cost-effectiveness (see below), implementation capacity and financial infrastructure, participant preferences; market conditions, functionality, and dynamics; the ability to manage risks such as those relating to social protection and gender; assessment of accountability risks; and resource availability;
 - b) Implementation processes: proper targeting, beneficiary registration, timeliness, mechanisms for ensuring protection, post-distribution monitoring, and risk mitigation regarding fraud, leakage, and other potential impediments to efficiency and effectiveness;
 - c) Monitoring of changing market conditions and other key contextual factors; the degree to which FFP and its partners are able to adapt to contextual changes and shift transfer modalities as needed; and any factors that contribute to or impede flexibility; and

- d) Evidence that the projects contribute to reducing hunger and food insecurity and other development impacts (e.g., functioning markets).
- 3) Program cost-efficiency trends across a range of variables including market structure and dynamics, financial and information technology infrastructure, security context, modality, partner type, emergency classification, and delivery mechanism. Costing the delivery of food assistance across modalities is a critical piece to ensuring value for money and allows FFP to maximize the efficient use of its resources.
- 4) Evidence of the effects of MBEP on local economies and market actors.

Key research questions include:

- 1) To what extent have FFP and its partners developed the capacity to implement multi-modal assistance and to pivot (adjust or change modalities) as the program context changes? (Objective 1)
- 2) To what extent has this improved FFP's ability to achieve its food security mandate? (Objective 1)
- 3) What is the evidence base available and what qualitative insights can be provided? (Objective 4)

This study report concludes with recommendations about good practices and approaches to consider modifying.

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Key terms are defined in this section and Table I below.

Cash-based programming refers to cash used by donors and IPs to locally or regionally purchase food (LRP), implement voucher or cash transfers to beneficiaries, or undertake complementary programming. That is, it refers to cash that is available for programming even though some of that programming, indeed a large portion of it, is in-kind food.

Cash transfers refer to cash transferred directly to beneficiaries. Cash transfers can be either conditional or unconditional.

Complementary services, as described in the FY2015 Annual Program Statement for EFSP funding, are activities that support primary food assistance interventions. They can include activities to improve agriculture and food security (e.g., providing inputs such as seeds and tools), livelihoods, and nutrition (e.g., trainings; distribution of nutrition products; water, sanitation and hygiene activities). Complementary activities eligible for 202(e) funds include analysis, social and behavior change communication, and resilience interventions in protracted recovery or conflict-affected settings (FFP 2014; FFP 2016c). IPs can propose to devote up to 20 percent of the total budget to complementary activities.

The **Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP)** complements USAID's in-kind food aid to support local and regional procurement of food as well as cash transfers and vouchers to address food security needs in emergency contexts (USAID website).

In-kind food transfers provide beneficiaries with a food transfer. The source and origin of foods provided can be local, regional, or international. FFP provides in-kind transfers through either Title II emergency food aid originating in the U.S. or food that is locally and regionally purchased.

Market-based emergency programming provides emergency food assistance by working through or in support of local and regional markets. Interventions are designed to strengthen and catalyze local market systems (CaLP N.d.). Some degree of market analysis is a critical part of all situation and response analyses.

Modalities are the mechanisms through which assistance is transferred to beneficiaries. MBEP employs three primary modalities: in-kind food (sourced locally, regionally or internationally in relation to beneficiary location), cash transfers, and value or commodity vouchers.

Resilience, as defined by USAID, is “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth” (USAID 2012).

Tied aid or tied food assistance means that food aid or food assistance must be sourced from the donor country, the United States. This encompasses the majority of Title II emergency food assistance.

Title II is USAID’s primary mechanism for food assistance. It provides U.S.-grown in-kind commodities to food insecure people (USAID 2017a).

Title II Section 202(e) emergency funding includes interventions that fall into two general categories: 202(e) and 202(e)-enhanced.

- **202(e) funding** (sometimes referred to as 202(e)-regular funds) is used for administrative, management, personnel, transportation, storage, and distribution costs necessary to implement Title II in-kind food assistance programs (USAID 2016a, 4).
- **202(e)-enhanced funding** (also called Impact Funds, hereafter referred to as 202(e)-enhanced) is used (1) for LRP, cash transfers, and food vouchers, and (2) to replace monetization⁹ by funding the direct administrative costs of implementing LRP, cash transfer or food voucher programs.

Untied food assistance delivers food assistance via market-based modalities, which are selected based on contextual needs.

Vouchers are paper or electronic transfers reflecting entitlements of a certain monetary value available to purchase items, while **commodity vouchers** allow recipients to purchase quantities of specific commodities.

⁹ Monetization refers to selling Title II commodities to pay for administrative costs.

Table 1: Typology of Modality Types

In-kind Transfers	Local Procurement		Commodity which is purchased in the same country where it will be distributed		
	Regional Procurement		Commodity which is purchased on the same continent where it will be distributed		
	International Procurement		Commodity which is purchased on a different continent from where it will be distributed		
	U.S. In-kind		Commodity which is sourced from the United States		
Cash Transfer Programs	Cash Transfer		Resource transfer denominated as a cash value; always unrestricted		
	Voucher Transfers	Value Voucher	Paper, token or electronic card that can be exchanged for a set value of goods within a category (e.g., \$50 of food commodities)		
		Commodity Voucher	Paper, token, or electronic card that can be exchanged for a set of goods (e.g., 10Kg maize and 5Kg beans) or services		
All modalities can be:	Conditional	Beneficiary must complete a requirement before transfer occurs (e.g., Cash for Work, Food for Assets, Food for Training)	Cash transfer programs can be:	Restricted	Limited choice on how it can be spent (e.g., commodity voucher)
	Unconditional	No requirements to be met (e.g., general food distribution, unconditional cash transfers)		Unrestricted	No restrictions on how it can be spent (e.g., cash)

Source: USAID program documents

2. METHODOLOGY

This section describes methods used in this review.¹⁰ The methods are detailed more thoroughly in the inception report and protocol.

The central theme shaping the approach to this review is a balanced, useful, scientifically credible, and independent analysis of the effects of adding market-based programming to FFP food assistance programming in emergency settings. The review team used multiple methods including quantitative indicator data from FFP project and document databases, key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGDs), and field visits to case study countries where emergency food programming is ongoing. The scope of the review is fiscal year (FY) 2010 to FY2016, the period during which MBEP (cash transfers, vouchers, and locally/regionally procured foods) was added to FFP's repertoire of food assistance programming tools. The review employs two levels of analysis: systems level and case studies.

SYSTEMS LEVEL OF ANALYSIS: At the systems level, we (1) reviewed the literature, (2) analyzed FFP databases including the Development Experience Clearinghouse, archived program documents, and FFP funding trackers (EFSP and Title II),¹¹ (3) conducted KIIs with FFP staff and IP headquarters' staff, and (4) conducted a stakeholder online survey. During the course of this review, the team reviewed over 100 academic studies, expert reviews and reports, and almost 2,700 FFP and IP documents.

ONLINE SURVEY: An online survey was developed to capture the opinions and self-assessments of FFP and IP staff involved in MBEP implementation. A total of 118 individuals were invited to take the survey, comprised of 20 FFP staff and 98 IP field staff. The FFP staff were identified by FFP Washington as current staff with a role in MBEP. The IP staff included chiefs of party/project directors of FFP MBEP and market analysts who had worked in countries with FFP MBEP since 2010. The IP list included one representative per IP per country. Limitations to this methodology include self-selection bias (i.e., survey participation was voluntary); staff turnover; limited time to complete the survey; and a small sample size. Forty-three (43) individuals filled out the survey: 13 FFP staff, 22 staff from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 4 from United Nations (UN) agencies, and 1 from private sector. The response rate for FFP staff was 65 percent, and 28 percent for IP staff. Overall, the response rate was 36 percent.

LIMITATIONS: FFP information management-related factors limited analysis in this review. FFP lacks an effective centralized archival system for the numerous reporting documents it receives, which made finding the relevant documents a challenge. For this review, documents were retrieved over several months by the FFP staff supporting this review, Country Backstop Officers, Agreement Officer's Representatives, the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse online archive system, and IPs in each of the seven case study countries. Despite this support, the review team rarely had a complete set of documents for any one project. For many awards, the review team only had access to proposals, concept notes, and a few miscellaneous documents. A second challenge was finding specific information in available documents. Report formats vary by IP, and reports sometimes omit key information such as submission date and FFP award number. In addition, rather than presenting summary tables with


¹⁰ A review differs from a program evaluation or audit in that it is a broad assessment of program performance, process, and operational issues. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines a "review" as "distinct from evaluation and more closely associated with monitoring. They are periodic or ad hoc, often light assessments of the performance of an initiative and do not apply the due process of evaluation or rigor in methodology" (UNDP 2009).

¹¹ This report reviewed only 202(e)-regular and 202(e)-enhanced contributions from Title II trackers and data provided by FFP.

standardized data, reports often give narrative descriptions with partial information or variably formatted data (described in Section 8).

CASE STUDIES: Seven case studies were selected to reflect a variety of emergency contexts and to facilitate learning of emergent promising practices (further details in Section 5, Case Studies). The case studies include countries affected by sudden-onset or chronic crises. Regional crises included the West Africa Ebola epidemic of 2014-2015, the Southern African drought of 2015-2016, and the Syria crisis (2011-present). Additionally, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kenya were selected to reflect chronically crisis-affected countries. Northeast Nigeria was selected to reflect recent severe conflict. For each single-country case, the team visited a sample of field sites. For the Syria regional response, the team conducted a field visit in Jordan and remotely conducted interviews with key informants in Turkey, based on security considerations and the presence of ongoing MBEP projects.

Figure 3: Map of seven case study locations



The case study teams conducted 75 FGDs with beneficiaries and community members (643 people total); 270 KIIs with FFP, NGO staff, donors, vendors, and government or UN representatives (see Annex 3); and 20 life history interviews.¹²

¹² Life history interviews follow methods adapted from Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (Scott and Diwakar 2016).

3. BACKGROUND

SUMMARY FINDING

An emerging evidence base points to the importance and highly contextual nature of MBEP.

SUMMARY OF LITERATURE ON THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF EVIDENCE FOR EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE

This section provides a brief review of findings from the literature. A more detailed version is included in Annex 4.

SUMMARY OF LITERATURE: Given the contextual nature of response interventions, the literature review emphasizes the critical importance of strong formative research, monitoring, and evaluation of MBEP programs. Until relatively recently, emergency food assistance was provided through in-kind food often sourced from developed countries, primarily the United States (Gentilini 2016a and 2016b; Schnepf 2015; Harvey and Bailey 2011). The first widespread use of cash-based programming—cash used by donors and IPs to locally or regionally purchase food, distribute vouchers or cash transfers to beneficiaries, or undertake complementary programming—in modern humanitarian settings was in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.

The goal of emergency food assistance is to achieve food security for crisis-affected populations. During the past seven years, there has been a rapid evolution in programming towards that end. While there is a lack of consensus on the best strategies to achieve this goal for crisis-prone populations, Gentilini summarizes the body of literature on differing approaches to emergency food assistance as follows: “While recalling the general caveats on comparability, studies have generally concluded that transfer appropriateness is context-specific and hinges on multiple factors that shape the performance of transfers across time and space” (Gentilini 2016b, 6). Our review of the literature mirrors Gentilini’s findings and supports the evolution of flexible, and often more complex, market-based and multi-modal strategies to achieve food security.

EVOLUTION: Beginning in the mid-1990s, applied research in Latin America established new levels of acceptance for applying rigorous experimental and non-experimental impact evaluation designs to studies of social programs (Davis et al. 2012; Skoufias 2005). As new evidence from social protection programs—notably from Mexico (Education, Health and Feeding Program—*Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación*), Brazil (Food Basket—*Bolsa Alimentação*), and Honduras (Family Allowances Program—*Programa de Asignación Familiar*)—demonstrated the versatility of cash transfers as an effective and appropriate instrument for alleviating extreme poverty (Harvey and Bailey 2015), impact evaluations pushed forward better methodologies, techniques, and design and implementation practices and led to the expansion of cash transfers globally (Davis et al. 2012; Ballard 2013; Nelson et al. 2015; Bailey and Harvey 2015). Growing concerns about international food aid efficiency and cost-effectiveness—particularly related to transoceanic shipments, local monetization of commodities and tied food assistance—contributed to the emergence of dialogue and experimentation in the use of cash transfers in global humanitarian and development aid programs (Schnepf 2015; Gentilini 2016a and 2016b; Barrett and Maxwell 2005).

After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the preferred staple, rice, was locally available but unaffordable to disaster victims (Lentz et al. 2013). Large cash donations gave several aid agencies the flexibility to experiment with small-scale cash transfers, vouchers, and LRP of food to test suitability and feasibility (Harvey and Bailey 2015; Schnepf 2015; Lentz et al. 2013). In 2010, the Government of Pakistan provided prepaid debit cards to 1.7 million flood victims (ODI 2015). In 2011, a consortium of international NGOs and local partners responding to the Somalia famine faced restricted access due to security threats (Humanitarian Outcomes 2013; ODI 2015). Humanitarian agencies could not distribute food aid but were able to distribute millions of dollars in unconditional cash transfers and commodity vouchers.

EFFECTIVENESS: Bastagli and colleagues (2016) conducted exhaustive, systematic literature reviews on the benefits of cash transfers in low-income contexts and found strong evidence linking cash transfers to increased school attendance, increased utilization of health services, improved dietary diversity, and positive impacts on savings, investment, and production. Contrary to concerns that cash transfers might be a disincentive to work, more than half the studies showed no significant impact of cash transfers on employment. Of the studies that did show a significant effect, the majority found that cash transfers were associated with increased participation and intensity of employment. Other research suggests that cash does not carry excess risk compared to other modalities (ODI 2015; Bailey and Harvey 2015; Evans and Popova 2017). These risks include fraud, abuse, and concerns about discretionary spending (beneficiaries using transfers for temptation goods).

Gentilini's (2016a and 2016b) meta-analysis of 11 studies in 10 countries assessed the performance of different food assistance modalities. The study concluded that the results were ambiguous, suggesting that different modalities perform differently in different contexts (see Figure 16 in Annex 4). Gentilini concluded that the complexity of programming renders unnecessary arguments about the comparative advantages of the effectiveness of different modalities.

The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) (2017) conducted an individually randomized study comparing effectiveness, efficiency, and local economy impacts between cash and voucher transfers among Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. This study found that cash performed at least as well as if not better than vouchers on all criteria (e.g., value for money, dignity, flexibility, and cash-flow management), with the result that WFP began piloting a strategy for Jordan and Lebanon whereby beneficiaries chose their preferred modality.

Recent research also highlights the multiplier effects of food assistance modalities. Using a Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) econometric analysis, Thome and colleagues (2016) found that every \$1 transferred to Social Cash Transfer program recipients in Sub-Saharan countries generated an additional \$0.27-\$1.52 of local income. Recent evidence relating to the local economic impact of refugees in Rwanda indicates that each additional refugee receiving \$120-126 in cash transfers increases the real annual income of the local economy by \$205-253—much more than the value of the cash transfer—within a 10-mile radius of refugee settlements (Taylor et al. 2016). In simulations, in-kind food for each additional refugee generated a smaller real annual income impact of \$145. It is worthwhile to note that all modalities have multiplier effects: an important consideration is where FFP wants the effects to accrue—in the United States, or in and around countries experiencing emergencies.

LRP was another modality strategy that rapidly grew in recent years. The U.S. government saw the theoretical advantages of LRP in terms of appropriateness, efficiency, and development impact, leading

the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to implement a small, well-funded LRP experiment. The results were rigorously studied by a Cornell University team, which found favorable but context-specific efficiency and effectiveness gains with LRP (Barrett et al. 2013). Consequently, global funding for LRP increased quickly following policy changes in the European Union, Canada, and the United States (Lentz et al. 2013).

Other studies evaluated criteria related to appropriateness. Despite concerns about impacts to local markets, Garg and colleagues (2013) found that in seven countries, short-term, small-scale LRP activities had no statistically significant relationship with local price levels or volatility in most cases.¹³ Violette and colleagues (2013) assessed local preferences for locally-procured rations compared to U.S.-sourced foods in Burkina Faso, Guatemala, and Zambia and found that individuals receiving locally procured rations, especially less well-off recipients, were more satisfied than recipients of U.S.-sourced foods. This finding supports the idea that worse-off households are more satisfied with foods they are accustomed to and have a harder time incorporating new foods such as U.S.-sourced bulgur wheat or lentils into their diets.

Understanding local and regional markets is critical to MBEP. Cash transfers can be used flexibly by recipients to fulfill multi-sectoral needs but require a functioning private market (Harvey 2005; Gentilini 2016). Consequently, market analysis becomes an important component for project design and modality selection. Market stability and price dynamics have a strong influence on beneficiary preferences and therefore on project outcomes and efficiency (Gentilini 2016). Despite this, market stability is not a prerequisite for cash transfer programs: implementing cash transfers in a context of insecurity and weak markets is difficult but not impossible (Harvey 2005). Moreover, markets can recover quickly, and cash distribution can trigger a supply-side response in which traders make goods available (Bailey et al. 2008). Nevertheless, no transfer modality fits every situation: modality selection depends heavily on contextual factors (Hoddinott 2013; Gentilini 2016). In most cases, modalities should be chosen based on program objectives, context, and cost-efficiency (Gentilini 2016; Hoddinott 2013; Harvey and Bailey 2011).

SUMMARY FINDING

FFP funding has increased in amount, flexibility, and complexity over time.

Market-based programming is becoming more embedded in policies, guidelines, standards, and statements of principle (ODI 2015). ECHO's 10 principles for multi-purpose cash programming have been endorsed by European governments and the High Level Humanitarian Cash Panel. WFP has written a cash and voucher manual to help country offices choose the most appropriate transfer modalities (WFP 2014). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is investing greater effort in ensuring that cash programming is integrated into coordination mechanisms (ODI 2015). CaLP seeks to strengthen organizations' capacity by compiling and sharing

¹³ The seven countries are Burkina Faso, Guatemala, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Niger, Uganda, and Zambia. The six commodities distributed, which varied by country, included beans, cowpeas, Incaparina, millet, maize, and white maize.

good practices in cash transfer programs (e.g., CaLP n.d.; Harvey and Bailey 2011; CaLP 2013; CaLP 2014; Venton et al. 2015).

Decision-making support tools have emerged to help agencies and donors select context-appropriate modalities (Maxwell, Parker, and Stobaugh 2013). Food security analyses and tools are often technically complex, may be prescriptive, and may not address the specific choices and options available at a given agency, and organizations may lack the capacity or time to utilize the tools (Maxwell, Parker, and Stobaugh 2013). Other factors that influence decision-making include (1) program contexts and priorities such as the need for timeliness and speed of delivery, cost, benefits to local producers, and beneficiary preferences (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett 2013; Harou et al. 2013), (2) design parameters for targeting method, conditionality, transfer size, and duration, (3) technical issues such as the functioning of markets (Gentilini 2016; Maxwell, Parker, and Stobaugh 2013), and (4) recipient-country government policy, logistical and time considerations, risk considerations, and personal experience (Maxwell, Parker, and Stobaugh 2013; Levine and Bailey 2015).

CaLP recently conducted an analysis of humanitarian assistance cases that emphasized the contextual nature of project design and the need for appropriate response analysis (Boulinaud and Coneff 2017). Maxwell et al. (2013) were among the first to explicitly define response analysis for the design of food assistance programs, including for the selection of food modalities. TANGO (2017) conducted a meta-analysis of 30 WFP evaluations of programs implemented in urban settings and concluded that flexibility and adapting to changing contexts with the most appropriate modality or modalities is important to success. The TANGO study also noted that monitoring and evaluation systems are inadequate to capture the range of important program outcomes.

Mobile information management platforms and tools allow more efficient transfer of resources to beneficiaries (ODI 2015). Remote sensing and the availability of drones are revolutionizing targeting (Abelson, Varshney, and Sun 2014). Information technology is changing the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of cash, voucher, and food supply chains and creating more effective feedback loops with beneficiaries. The application of these systems to humanitarian problems also has secondary development effects on beneficiary households, most notably financial inclusion (Center for Financial Inclusion 2017).

4. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF FFP MARKET-BASED FOOD ASSISTANCE

Objective I: Establish a historical narrative about the evolution of market-based emergency food assistance programming including the policy, processes, and capacity to design and implement food assistance within a market-based framework.

Key research questions include:


- To what extent have FFP and its partners developed the capacity to implement multi-modal assistance and to pivot (i.e., adjust or switch modalities) as the program context changes?
- To what extent has this improved FFP's ability to achieve its food security mandate?

This section describes the evolution of MBEP, addressing Theory of Change, policy and process changes, and investments in capacity.

THEORY OF CHANGE

A simple schematic depicting the theory of change is provided in Figure 4 (next page). The diagram illustrates how changes in funding streams (the addition of EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced resources) and the range of programming options increases FFP's flexibility to respond to food security crises. An array of program modality choices and an expanded scope to provide complementary inputs should lead to better results in terms of efficiency (cost/beneficiaries reached), effectiveness (achieving food security outcomes at the household level for a greater percentage of the target population) and development impact (food assistance modalities chosen will have favorable effects on livelihoods and markets). Key to the strategy is addressing beneficiary choice, dignity, and engagement, which were elements lacking prior to increased utilization of market-based modalities.

Figure 4: FFP Theory of Change



Risks include:

- theft and corruption;
- security;
- inflation and deflation;
- insufficient protection of vulnerable populations; and
- food safety risks.

Assumptions underlying this theory of change are that FFP and its IPs possess or will develop capacities to utilize these modalities in order to maximize results. These capacities include:

- institutional capability to review and manage more complex and analytically sophisticated IP project proposals
- strengthened capacity to monitor project results and processes
- institutional capacity to manage a greater array of political constituents
- ability to rapidly adapt office policies in response to changing field needs
- ability to coordinate more effectively across U.S. government agencies and donors
- ability to stimulate a vibrant and competitive landscape among IPs and
- bureaucratic responsiveness.

For IPs, these capacities include:

- institutional capacity to conduct response analysis and market analysis
- institutional capability to recognize changing crisis contexts
- ability to develop and/or adopt new indicators to monitor processes and results of a wider array of food assistance modalities

- institutional capacity to pivot when changing circumstances call for it
- institutional capacity to work with local and regional private sector organizations
- institutional capacity to coordinate with a wider array of humanitarian actors and
- bureaucratic flexibility.

POLICY CHANGES AND FUNDING DEVELOPMENT

Since its inception in 1954, FFP has diversified the ways it meets food security needs, with the most significant policy changes occurring since the 1990s (FFP 2016a). Policies relevant to FFP and its various funding streams are described more in-depth elsewhere (e.g., FFP 2016a; Schnepf 2015; Hanson 2009). This section describes policies most relevant to the scope of this review, EFSP and 202(e), and summarizes key events in Table 2 below.

FFP was originally established to use surplus commodities to support foreign policy objectives and international trade, under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law (P.L.) 480). FFP bought food grown in the U.S. and partnered with both private voluntary organizations (NGOs) and public international organizations (UN agencies) to provide in-kind food aid to beneficiaries around the world. This had the dual benefits of improving food security in other countries while also helping American farmers by expanding markets for U.S.-sourced commodities and ensuring cargo to transport via U.S.-flagged ships (Hanson 2009).

FFP objectives shifted over the years. First, a 1966 amendment to P.L. 480 focused FFP on addressing hunger and malnutrition and encouraging economic development in developing countries. Later, the 1992 USAID Policy Determination defined food security as having three key dimensions—availability, access, and utilization— “when all people at all times have both physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life” (USAID 1992). Significant changes began in the mid-1990s and continued into the 2000s (FFP 2016a). A 1995 USAID policy paper set priorities such as addressing food security in the most food-insecure countries and improving agricultural productivity and nutrition; importantly, it signaled the end of Title II programs as surplus commodity disposal. Based on policy shifts called for in this policy paper, FFP implemented programs, documented lessons learned in the 2002 Food Aid and Food Security Assessment, and integrated those lessons into its 2006-2010 strategy in which FFP referred to “food assistance,” rather than “food aid;” an important change indicating a shift toward multi-sectoral food and non-food approaches.

Table 2: FFP timeline

1954	 FFP established Beginning of 60+ years addressing global hunger and malnutrition  Most food aid is provided in-kind	
1990	1990 Farm Bill defined 'food security' and focused FFP on improving food security in the developing world as its main objective	
1992	 1992 USAID Policy Determination defined food security with three key dimensions: availability, access, and utilization	
1995	 USAID publishes Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper; signals the end of Title II as an agricultural commodity surplus disposal program	
2000	 Congress authorizes prepositioning of food; consideration of timeliness as a component of program effectiveness begins	
2006	 FFP strategy shifts from "food aid" to "food assistance" (i.e., multi-sectoral programming) and includes food and non-food assistance	
2008	 Request denied for funding for LRP under the 2008 Farm Bill but a USDA pilot was approved	
	 Global food price spike (2008-2009)  Congress approves supplemental funding for FFP to use LRP	
2010	 EFSP begins: President's FY2010 budget approved with funding for LRP, cash transfers, and vouchers	2010–2015 FFP reaches about 50 million people in 52 countries
2012	 FFP begins regional response to Syria complex emergency	
2013	 FFP begins regional Ebola response in West Africa	
2014	 Food for Peace Act of the Farm Bill approves 202(e)-enhanced funds for LRP, cash transfers, vouchers	
2015	 El Niño affects crops worldwide; FFP responds in Central America, Africa	
2016	 Policy milestone: Global Food Security Act is approved, which codifies EFSP	
2017	 FFP manages over \$2 billion from multiple funding streams to help meet chronic and acute food needs; 4 billion beneficiaries since 1954	
<div style="display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; justify-content: space-around;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> Title II food aid</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> Policy change</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> LRP</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> Cash crisis</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> Global program</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> Conflict</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> Epidemic</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> Drought</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> Achievement</div> </div>		


Source: FFP 2016a

Further major shifts occurred in the 2000s. In 2000, Congress authorized USAID to pre-position food in the United States and in foreign countries (GAO 2014). This started conversations about considering timeliness as a component of program effectiveness and reform, which was later used to justify EFSP. In 2004, a request by USAID administrator Andrew Natsios for funds for LRP was denied. The following year, Natsios made a speech defending the LRP proposal, stating that FFP’s primary objective is to save lives; benefitting American farmers and ship owners, while important, was secondary (Hanson 2009).

Food aid reform was at that time a bipartisan issue but one that pitted states against one another depending on whether or not they had agricultural and maritime interests. In 2008 the White House Administration requested funds to be used for LRP (FFP 2016a). Although the request was denied, Congress authorized the USDA to pilot LRP instead of in-kind donations to meet similar food security objectives. Second, around the same time, a global food price spike (2008-2009) contributed to food insecurity in many developing countries. The Administration lobbied to save money and time by buying locally or regionally. Congress responded by approving supplemental funds that FFP and OFDA could use for LRP. LRP was a key consideration in the food aid reform dialogue and was tied to the President’s Feed the Future agenda to reinforce local and regional markets and help poor farmers feed themselves and their neighbors.

Global funding for LRP increased quickly following policy changes in the United States, European Union, and Canada, growing from 11 percent of global food aid in 1999 to 67 percent in 2010 (Lentz et al. 2013b). With the launch of the Local and Regional Procurement Pilot Program in 2008 and shortly thereafter, the formalization of the EFSP, the United States went from funding almost no LRP to funding more LRP than any other donor. In FY2011, about three quarters of EFSP funding was allocated to LRP, with the remainder largely allocated to cash transfers and vouchers (Figure 5).


Figure 5: FFP MBEP funding (EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced) used per modality, FY2010-FY2016



Source: FFP funding trackers as of October 2017. Figures above reflect fiscal year totals and are not adjusted for inflation

LRP remains the predominant modality for FFP food assistance, with 63 percent of EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced funding used for LRP in 2016.¹⁴ In both 2010 and 2016, UN agencies spent the majority of FFP emergency funding on LRP, whereas NGOs spent the largest portion of FFP emergency funding on vouchers (Figure 6). IP proposals and the type of emergency play a large part in determining which modalities are used. IPs—both NGOs and UN agencies—conduct response analysis and propose to FFP the modality or modalities they intend to use for specific emergency contexts. For example, emergency responses in conflict settings might need U.S.-sourced or LRP in-kind food due to limited market functioning. FFP awards funding based on the global appeals processes and proposals submitted by IPs through the Annual Program Statement (APS).

Figure 6: Percentage of EFSP funds spent per modality by UN agencies and NGOs in FY2010 – FY2016




Source: FFP funding trackers as of October 2017

¹⁴ Source: FFP funding trackers as of October 2017

Building on these gains, two years later, the FY2010 Congressional Budget Request included emergency food security funding through IDA to be used for LRP, cash transfers, and food vouchers, thereby establishing the FFP EFSP. A few years later, the Agricultural Act of 2014 modified Section 202(e) to increase funding and expand eligible expenses to include market-based food assistance (e.g., LRP, food vouchers, cash transfers) and complementary services. These increased funds are referred to as “Impact Funds” or “202(e)-enhanced” to distinguish them from other programmatic and administrative uses of Section 202(e) funds (USAID 2016a, 4). Finally, in April of 2016, EFSP was formally authorized in the Global Food Security Act of 2016. Figure 7 shows five years of FFP funding by type of account.

Figure 7: Five years of FFP funding, by account (FY2012-FY2016)



Note: BEHT is the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, authorized under the Agricultural Act of 2014, through which FFP can access funds to respond to unanticipated food crises abroad when other Title II resources are not available (USAID 2014a). CDF is the Community Development Funds, used to complement Title II resources and support community-level development activities (USAID 2017b). Dollar amounts reflect FY totals and are not adjusted for inflation. Figure source: FFP email, August 2017.

In FY2016, FFP received funding from five funding streams, and its budget exceeded \$2.6 billion. Over 80 percent of FFP’s budget was for emergency food assistance via two funding streams: Title II Emergency (50 percent of FFP’s budget) and EFSP (33 percent of FFP’s budget) (Figure 8).

Figure 8: FFP funding streams, FY2016



Source: FFP email, August 2017


FFP continues to see EFSP as a way to support African farmers to produce more and better quality products to help feed others in Africa. FFP is considering a new initiative under EFSP to buy approximately \$50 million worth of food stocks on the African continent for WFP forward-purchase facilities. This could allow FFP to buy commodities when prices are low, package food in branded bags, and strategically use the commodities to increase timeliness and cost-efficiency.

FFP’s 2016-2025 Food Assistance and Food Security Strategy emphasizes the critical role of both in-kind and cash-based food assistance, and the importance of building resilience. The strategy prioritizes the use of modalities and project activities that enable vulnerable households to manage risk and protect their productive assets as early as possible in the recovery process. It also highlights the importance of sequencing emergency and development interventions both within FFP programs and in coordination with other development partners, such as to support the strengthening of local and national protection systems.

An increasing number of IPs have received EFSP funding (Figure 9), but UN agencies received more EFSP resources than NGOs, as of 2016 (Figure 10).

Figure 9: Number of EFSP awards funded for NGOs and UN Agencies annually, FY2010-2016


EFSP funding is awarded to a greater number of unique NGOs than UN agencies each year



Source: FFP funding trackers as of October 2017

Figure 10: EFSP funding awarded annually to NGOs and UN Agencies, FY2010-2016


More EFSP funding was awarded to UN Agencies than to NGOs each year from FY2010 to FY2015. In FY2016 more EFSP funding was awarded to NGOs than UN agencies



Source: FFP funding trackers as of October 2017

Figure 11 below shows the 10 countries and regional responses receiving the most FFP MBEP funding (i.e., EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced) in 2016. The Syria regional response received the most funding of any country or regional response in 2016.

Figure 11: The Syria regional response was awarded the most FFP emergency funding in FY2016




Source: FFP funding trackers as of October 2017

Note: The FY2016 EFSP funding tracker (as of Oct. 2017) lists “Syria” not “Syria regional response.”

FFP has managed an increasing number of awards over time. Figure 12 shows that EFSP awards, new awards, and/or modifications to UN agencies and NGOs have increased from FY2010 to FY2016.

Figure 12: The number of EFSP awards to both UN agencies and NGOs increased between FY2010 and FY2016



Source: FFP funding trackers as of October 2017

PROCESS CHANGES

The policy changes described above increase FFP flexibility as the agency simultaneously increases program complexity that demands new skills, analysis, and documentation (e.g., of funding use, outcomes). Rather than only sending in-kind food aid, FFP and its partners have new decisions to make such as which modality or modalities to use in each context, where to procure commodities, and how to assess market impacts. Moreover, in addition to the complex task of tracking multiple funding streams, FFP also needs to strike a balance between flexibility and meeting emergency needs quickly while still ensuring that accountability, risk management, and a host of other factors are addressed. FFP has been responsive to the USAID Office of Inspector General and U.S. Government Accountability Office audit findings and recommendations, as seen in subsequent changes to procurement process and the APS, and investments in capacity.

PROCUREMENT PROCESSES: In the early years of LRP, FFP was continually challenged to revisit definitions and purposes of different modalities, such as defining what “local” and “regional” mean for LRP (Table I, above in section I), especially in countries where most locally sold items are produced elsewhere (e.g., Jordan) or where locally produced goods are much more expensive than on the global market (e.g., vegetable oil in Zimbabwe). In the first few years of EFSP, volumes were small enough that FFP did not have to strictly review modality options using precise definitions. However, as the scale of EFSP increased substantially in 2014, FFP had to carefully review the modality choices to balance the competing objectives of cost savings and market development and in 2016, FFP created requirements for the source and origin of LRP (FFP 2016b). Taking advantage of strong market linkages between Asia and Africa, WFP has in some instances used EFSP resources designated for LRP to purchase commodities on the international market in order to save money (e.g., vegetable oil from Indonesia for use in Zimbabwe). This did not match the intent of LRP (i.e., strengthening local and regional markets). In numerous instances FFP denied WFP proposals to procure commodities from certain markets despite cost savings.¹⁵ According to senior FFP staff, Congress continues to point out that while FFP advocated for EFSP to be about LRP, the report on the source and origin of commodities indicates that FFP does not always follow the agenda; FFP staff have consistently faced challenges balancing efficiency gains and the strict policy on LRP.¹⁶ Moreover, per FFP staff, when FFP added multi-modality programming, FFP’s workload doubled due to requirements to complete paperwork for Title II and EFSP in parallel, which is still a major inefficiency that reduces incentives to do multi-modality programming.

The amount of cash and Title II commodities needed each year depends on the nature of emergencies occurring worldwide. While FFP often had the opportunity to use more cash than it had in hand, there were also times when FFP suddenly needed more in-kind food. For the Southern Africa El Niño-related drought in 2015-2016, food was not available in sufficient quantities locally or regionally amid predictions of a five-million-ton grain deficit and an ongoing national cash shortage in Zimbabwe. FFP had to figure out how to use cash to buy U.S. commodities without violating the EFSP intent for local and regional procurement.

¹⁵ For example, vegetable oil has been procured from Asia at lower cost than purchasing locally.

¹⁶ In the DRC, EFSP funding was approved for LRP, but during implementation, commodities were not available locally or regionally, so WFP bought yellow split peas in Turkey and Plumpy from WFP’s stock in Asia (WFP 2015a). This met timeliness goals but did not strictly follow the LRP rules.

APS FOR INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE: FFP APSs contain instructions for prospective applicants for emergency food assistance funding (Title II and/or EFSP). FFP has released APSs since 2010; they have increased in page length and specificity over time. FFP has also amended APSs as needed to address emerging crises such as in Yemen and the Sahel in FY2013 and the Ebola Virus epidemic in FY2015.

“There is a need to train IPs to understand the underlying factors for decision-making on market-based assistance.”

(IP staff)

In FY2015, the FFP Grants Management Services Team released an updated APS for EFSP that contained significant changes to the existing APS. First, funded modifications and cost extensions needed to apply through the new APS. Second, new applications needed to include a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan and a Safety and Security Plan, and were encouraged to include an Assessment of, or Controls on, Risk of Fraud or Diversion for all modalities. Third, up to 20 percent of a program budget could be dedicated to providing services that complement the primary food assistance mechanism, such as supporting agricultural inputs like fertilizer, seeds, and training; livelihood restoration and support for community-level savings; promotion of community-based nutrition services such as infant and young child feeding practices in emergencies; and social and behavior change communications.

Changes in the FY2017 APS indicate a higher priority for M&E. For the first time, the APS required that Food Consumption Score (FCS), a food security indicator, be monitored for any project lasting more than 10 months. Awardees can propose additional indicators if desired and applicable. Other required monitoring includes (1) post-distribution monitoring to track factors such as food assistance utilization, safety, and beneficiary preference, (2) process monitoring to track issues such as waiting times, complaint mechanisms, and quantity and quality of items distributed, and (3) market monitoring to identify which commodity prices the awardee will track and with what frequency.

In FY2016, awardees were provided more flexibility for designing cash-based programming. Cash programming could be used for a broader array of complementary services such as market strengthening (e.g., to support market actors, infrastructure, services). The FY2016 APS added cash programming as a response option for protracted crisis; previously its use was limited to relief and recovery.

INVESTMENTS IN CAPACITY FOR MARKET-BASED PROGRAMMING

FFP CAPACITY: FFP manages a large workload despite insufficient staff and has made changes to improve staff capacity. All programs, including EFSP, are managed by Country Backstop Officers. As a result of increased funding, the number of EFSP and Title II awards increased. Similarly, the need for more people with knowledge of relevant regulations to manage these awards also increased. Prior to EFSP, USAID contributed to market monitoring via FEWS NET. It started collecting price monitoring data in the 1990s, Cross-Border Trade Monitoring and Production and Trade Flow Mapping in the late 2000s, and Regional Supply and Outlook Projections and Market Fundamentals Reporting in the 2010s. When EFSP began, FFP created an EFSP team comprised of four or five people. After two years, FFP decided to integrate EFSP into the Geo Team so that all officers would be responsible for EFSP. In 2015, FFP created a markets team, whose function is to support MBEP, provide technical support to FFP, and review the market analysis sections of APS concept notes and applications. In 2016, FFP

developed a Modality Decision Tool, which provides a matrix of key questions to help FFP officers and IPs choose the most context-appropriate modality or modalities (see Annex 2). Online survey findings suggest that FFP and IP staff would like more training, particularly for assessing food security and nutritional implications of different modalities and calculating/ comparing cost effectiveness and efficiency of different modalities.

SUMMARY OF ONLINE SURVEY FINDINGS: The 40 FFP and IP staff who took the survey represent MBEP work at the global/headquarters level and across Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The survey was sent to 118 individuals, comprised of 27 FFP staff including Country Office Directors, Team Leaders, and five regional office staff, and 91 IP staff including Country Directors and staff involved in emergency programming. The survey included international and national staff. FFP and IP staff were asked about training they have received, their skills to implement market-based approaches, and their organization’s capacity related to MBEP.

The most common training reported by FFP and IP staff, is fraud prevention (received by 82 percent of respondents) (Table 3). The second- and third-most-commonly reported trainings are market assessments and outcome indicators (both 78 percent of respondents). The two least frequent trainings, according to survey respondents, are on local or regional purchase processes and MARKit. The respondents most frequently received training internally, from their own agency, rather than from outside organizations or institutions. See Annex 6: Survey Monkey results, Q10 for further results.

Multiple respondents commented that much of their training on MBEP has been informal learning on the job, such as by reading online resources and publications or implementing MBEP with technical experts from their organizations. One IP staff with market-based experience observed that there is a need to increase attendance at market-based trainings because, “...as market-based programming becomes more prevalent, there is a need for others within our organizations to understand these concepts as well— leadership, operations teams, proposal teams, etc.—but it is often difficult to get people in these positions to take or prioritize a training like this.”

Training topic	No training		Training from any source	
	%	#	%	#
Fraud prevention	18	7	82	32
Market assessment	22	10	78	36
Outcome indicators	22	10	78	35
Market monitoring	33	14	67	29
Cash transfers - electronic	33	14	67	28
Vouchers - electronic	33	12	67	24
Response analysis	35	15	65	28
Vouchers - non-electronic	37	13	63	22
Cash transfers - non-electronic	38	14	62	23
Conditional transfers	39	15	61	23
APS requirements	43	16	57	21
Cost-efficiency/ cost-effectiveness analysis of modalities	54	19	46	16
Local purchase process (e.g., price negotiation, quality control, audits, work w/ vendors)	63	22	37	13
Regional purchase process	74	23	26	8
MARKit	75	21	25	7
<i>n</i> =37				


When rating their own knowledge and skills on a variety of topics, most FFP/IP respondents indicated they need additional training in half of the topics listed (Table 4). Seventy percent of respondents said they need additional training or mentoring in assessing food security and nutritional implications of different modalities; 19 percent reported being satisfied with their skill level in this area, and 11 percent reported not needing this skill for their job. The next most-desired training topics are selecting outcome indicators for MBEP (62 percent), and calculating cost-efficiency/effectiveness of different modalities (61 percent).

	%	#
Assessing food security and nutritional implications of different modalities	70	26
Choosing outcome indicators for market-based emergency programming	62	23
Calculating/ comparing cost effectiveness and efficiency of different modalities	61	22
Response analysis	50	18
Targeting using different modalities	49	18
Market assessment	43	16
Evaluating different distribution mechanisms for cash and vouchers	43	16
Market monitoring	42	15

Most IP staff report their organizations have adequate or strong capacity for targeting using different modalities (95 percent), selecting outcome indicators for MBEP (91 percent) and market assessments (90 percent) (Figure 13). The two topics where respondents rated their organization’s capacity the lowest are calculating cost efficiency and cost effectiveness for different modalities (74 percent) and assessing the food security and nutrition implications of different modalities (76 percent).

In conclusion, the capacity of FFP country offices and IPs is fairly strong across the board.

Figure 13: Percentage of survey respondents who rate their organization’s capacity for topics in MBEP as adequate or strong



“FFP is doing a great job in boosting in-house capacity for market-based programming; however, more effort to assist field-based FFP Officers to build skills in formal ways would be beneficial.”
(FFP staff)

5. CASE STUDIES: SUMMARY OF KEY PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS

In this section and in **Error! Reference source not found.**, we summarize key characteristics of the seven case studies. Full case study reports are available separately.

TABLE 5: CASE STUDY COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS

Country visited	Shocks and stressors	Modalities and target population			Defining characteristics of the emergency and context
		Cash	Voucher	LRP	
Case: Southern and East Africa Drought					
Kenya 	Recurrent drought; refugees from drought and conflict	Drought-affected households (HHs)	n/a	Drought-affected HHs and refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resilience-building through layering and sequencing humanitarian and development assistance Government ownership at national & county levels Corn is the main staple, importing up to 34% in 2016/17 due to low production during drought (USDA 2017)
Zimbabwe 	Recurrent droughts combined with cash crisis	Drought-affected HHs	n/a	Drought-affected HHs and refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exemplifies cash and food response across donors, with careful consideration of how food/cash crosses borders Asset creation and livelihood linkages help beneficiaries move to resilience pathways Nearly 1 million tons of corn imported in 2016 to cover shortfall, down to 5000 tons for 2017 (FAO 2017a)
Case: Recurrent and Severe Multi-hazard Context					
Haiti 	Prolonged droughts, the 2010 earthquake, tropical storms and hurricanes	Earthquake, drought, hurricane-affected HHs	Earthquake, drought, hurricane-affected HHs	Drought-affected HHs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Example of linked emergency-development programs Frequent use of blended modalities and effective use of layered and sequenced modalities Rice and corn are staples; imported 75% of rice in 2013/14 (pre-drought); record high imports in 2015 (FAO 2017b) Unique relationship to and proximity with United States
Case: Conflict/Complex Emergencies					
Jordan and Turkey 	Civil conflict resulting in large-scale displacement: refugees and IDPs	IDPs in Syria; refugees in Jordan	Refugees in Jordan and Turkey	Refugees in Jordan; wheat to bakeries, food parcels to IDPs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Largest FFP program, unprecedented in size and nature Sophisticated use of IT to deliver/ monitor food assistance WFP Jordan pilot allows choice of cash, vouchers, or mix FFP piloting cash for IDPs and conflict-affected HHs (Syria) Syrian agricultural sector devastated by conflict; food assistance relies on LRP from markets in Jordan, Turkey
DRC 	Civil conflict causes displacement; new arrivals and legacy refugees	IDPs (some to refugees)	IDPs and refugees	IDPs and refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Block grant funding and varied modalities provide flexible, timely responses; DFAPs target causes of conflict Shows importance of local response analysis Main staples: cassava and maize; most is produced in-country. 98% of wheat/ 7% of rice imported (FAO 2016)
Nigeria 	Insurgency in northeast causes mass displacement	IDPs	IDPs and hosts	IDPs in conflict areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Boko Haram and counterinsurgency disrupted local markets necessitating food aid (LRP) on the frontlines. As security improved markets reopened, quickly allowing IDPs to use vouchers Good example of sophisticated voucher technology and IP monitoring systems
Case: Epidemic (Ebola in West Africa)					
Sierra Leone 	Ebola causes wide-spread food security crisis	Ebola-affected HHs	n/a	Fortified food for mothers, children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Movement restrictions led to low food production; food could not get to markets; demand was also hampered by low household income. Cash response was highly appropriate Cash transfers in lump sums improved food security and positively impacted beneficiary lives and livelihoods

SOUTHERN AND EAST AFRICA DROUGHT

Kenya



- Total affected people: 3.4 million Kenyans affected by 2017 drought and 595,000 refugees requiring food assistance
- Total FFP emergency funding FY2010–FY2016: \$153.3 million

Kenya is a good example of connecting emergency and development programming and of government participation at national and county levels. It shows adaptations to varied conditions and the use of a range of modalities in response to recurrent drought and the influx of refugees due to regional conflict and drought. FFP MBEP is reaching Kenyan communities facing prolonged and recurrent drought through a productive safety net and resilience-building asset creation program and is providing food assistance to refugees. In the south/southeastern semi-arid and coastal areas of Kenya, building assets through cash for assets (CFA) is the main activity. In the arid north, a pastoral environment mostly isolated from large market corridors, the main activities are in-kind food (Title II U.S. commodities and LRP) through FFA. There are plans to gradually shift to market-based programming in some of the northern counties as markets allow, and because cash transfers fit with the government's preference for cash and support the safety net program. According to a KII, a market analysis in Baringo county informed a shift to CFA as part of a comparison study with Isiolo county, where beneficiaries receive in-kind aid.

FFP programming is aligned with the government's Ending Drought Emergencies Initiative and is also part of a larger coordinated approach called the Partnership for Resilience and Economic Growth (PREG)¹⁷ in Kenya's northern arid region. PREG brings together USAID-funded programs including WFP (and IPs); the Government of Kenya; and county governments¹⁸ in an innovative approach to building resilience with WFP's asset-creation programs as the foundation.¹⁹

Over three-quarters of Kenya's agricultural production is from small-scale rain-fed farming or livestock production. To take advantage of this local production, FFP funding has enabled some county governments to locally purchase food assistance, which has been important as under the new constitution, decision-making and authority have devolved to county governments. WFP is also working at the national level, building the capacity of the National Drought Management Authority, and through its resilience-building program (PRRO 200736) it is working on transitioning certain programs to the national government.²⁰ The focus of the drought response has shifted to resilience building, and important linkages are being made between emergency and development programming and across a range of international donors and partners. In 2016, WFP transitioned 94,000 CFA beneficiaries deemed

¹⁷ The partnership consists of USAID programs and IPs, and works with the Kenya National Drought Management Authority and county governments (USAID 2016b).

¹⁸ Key Government partners include Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (Department of Livestock); Ministry of Devolution and Planning; Ministry of Water and Irrigation (Water Trust Fund and Water Resource Management Authority); Ministry of Public Health; Ministry of Education; the county governments of Baringo, Isiolo, Graissa, Marsabit, Mandera, Samburu, Tana River, Turkana, and Wajir (USAID 2016b).

¹⁹ PRRO 200736: Bridging Relief and Resilience in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands

²⁰ Currently the programs are being transitioned to the government include: (1) school meals programme in Tana River county; (2) FFA households that no longer require transfers; (3) treatment of moderate acute malnutrition in counties where global acute malnutrition prevalence was below 10 percent; and (4) withdrawal of general distributions in arid counties given national safety net coverage and improved food security in early 2016 (WFP SPR 2016).

to have attained food security out of the program and began linking them with other development activities for further assistance.

Kenya hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world. The FFP response to date in camps is Title II in-kind food commodities. Some markets have developed around the camps, which was a factor in other donors' decisions to start providing cash assistance. WFP implements a program that is jointly funded by the Department for International Development (DFID)/ European Union and the U.S. government, which provide 30 and 70 percent of the funding, respectively. The U.S. government will continue to distribute U.S.-sourced food and with strong markets, will incorporate cash programming in the future as part of the assistance.

Key lessons from the Kenya case relate to WFP's emergency response with an asset-creation component as part of PREG to promote resilience, and developing capacity of the local government for drought mitigation and response.

Zimbabwe



- 4.1 million food-insecure people (IPC 3, crisis level) predicted at peak hunger season, (January–March 2017) (ZimVAC 2016)
- Total FFP emergency funding FY2010-FY2016: \$67.4 million + Title II Development Food Assistance Program (DFAPs)

In the last two years, Zimbabwe experienced a drought followed by a much more severe El Niño-induced drought, which contributed to over four million people being food insecure. In parallel, Zimbabwe has been experiencing a national cash shortage crisis since early 2016. Thus, it is a setting where MBEP must be implemented with careful attention to the balance of food and cash available in the country and region due to porous borders and the regional impacts of the El Niño-related drought on harvests. FFP-funded programs provided unconditional food and cash transfers during the lean season and supported CFA or FFA projects linked to community infrastructure and livelihoods development. WFP's Productive Asset Creation program has been greatly appreciated by beneficiaries, allowing them to create assets such as community gardens and small dams, which produce longer-term food security and dietary impacts and have income-generating potential. This combination helped people diversify their income sources and better manage shocks and stresses and has put them on a resilience pathway.

Before the 2016 lean season, FFP shifted to U.S.-sourced in-kind food and some LRP in response to food shortage projections. FFP decided against cash transfers based on market assessments and reports of beneficiaries having trouble redeeming their mobile transfers for cash (“cashing out”) for reasons such as insufficient mobile network coverage, implementation delays, an insufficient number of mobile phone agents with cash to meet beneficiary needs, and shop owners either charging a small fee or requiring beneficiaries to purchase a minimum amount before they would cash out the balance. European Union and DFID projects continued to use cash transfers (CARE International UK 2017) and in the end, there was no national food shortage because food entered the country from other countries through both formal and informal channels. Formal channels included interventions by humanitarian actors (e.g., FFP and DFID). With FFP funding, two DFAPs distributed U.S.-sourced in-kind food, and one IP distributed LRP food. DFID further bolstered the food supply by implementing an innovative, though risky, private sector import option, the Grain Market Facilitation Fund (Development Tracker 2017). Multiple key informants stated that grain also entered Zimbabwe through informal private sector channels. Cash transfers were effective in part because there was sufficient market supply to avoid price spikes and

people learned to use their transfers as credit instead of cashing out. In a setting like this, the main learning is the importance of donor coordination to implementing a patchwork of food and cash responses. Geographic coordination and information sharing between donors, IPs, and the government were very good; deeply divided opinions about modality selection, however, limited consideration of implementing a mixed modality of cash and food. The coordination with the government at the district and national levels, with some exceptions (see full case study report), also contributed to program achievements, helping coordinate coverage and harmonize rations.

Another lesson learned comes from a DFID-funded program, which gave beneficiaries a small supplemental transfer (i.e., a top-up) before the start of the agricultural season. Key informants reported that beneficiaries used the grants for agricultural inputs and benefitted from low seasonal prices.

RECURRENT AND SEVERE MULTI-HAZARD CONTEXT

Haiti



- Total affected people: 1.5 million affected by the 2015 drought and Hurricane Matthew in 2016
- Total FFP emergency funding FY2010-FY2016: \$116.6 million + DFAPs

Haiti represents a high-risk, multi-hazard environment. Since 2010 the country has faced a combination of prolonged slow-onset and severe rapid-onset disasters that affect livelihoods and food security. The review team visited FFP-funded programs responding to Hurricane Matthew (October 2016) and the prolonged drought, which started in 2015. An emergency response to Hurricane Matthew was immediately implemented, involving the distribution of hot meals to families in hurricane evacuation centers. In carefully sequenced programming, IPs shifted within weeks to use multiple and blended modalities and worked to layer modalities, that is, implement multiple interventions simultaneously. Cash for Work was implemented to rebuild roads and provide income for beneficiaries, and then programs began distributing vouchers to stimulate newly rebuilt markets and address nutrition needs. FFP and OFDA launched a joint program to add transfers for agricultural inputs as another layer of support.

The Haiti context is important because Haiti is close and accessible to the United States, which means local Haitian churches and civil society organizations may receive interventions directly from contacts in the United States, and there is a different relationship to the United States compared to many other countries where FFP operates. Haiti is a country with low development and has received large amounts of Title II funding over the years. It also has a history of misappropriation of emergency dollars, humanitarian coordination challenges, and security problems with food aid. The Haiti case study provides yet another good example of linking development and emergency funding, as the government has followed the Productive Safety Net Program model of Ethiopia in some geographic areas.

Main lessons from Haiti are the importance of layered and sequenced programming to first address emergency relief needs and then support livelihoods; the importance of having a DFAP to build on with flexible modalities in response to rapid-onset disasters; and the importance of collaboration with OFDA.

CONFLICT/COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Syria Regional Response



- 7 million food-insecure people in Syria in 2016 (FSIN 2017)
- 4.8 million refugees in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq (FSIN 2017), which increased to over 6 million refugees in 2017 (UNICEF 2017)
- Total FFP emergency funding 2010-2016: \$1.9 billion

The Syria regional response exemplifies the challenges of and opportunities to deliver food assistance in a widespread, largely urban, refugee and IDP crisis affecting upper middle-income countries. This case study focuses on FFP-funded activities based in Jordan and Turkey, two of the five countries supported by the FFP regional response.²¹ Activities in Jordan and Turkey reviewed included food assistance to refugees in both countries, and cross-border support to conflict-affected areas of Syria from Jordan.

Jordan is a lower middle-income country, hosting a largely urban Syrian refugee population. The Jordan response has two main components: 1) supplying food to Syria, e.g., wheat to support bakeries, and food parcels and ready-to-eat meals to IDPs in conflict areas, and 2) an e-voucher food assistance project for Syrian refugees in Jordan. These modalities were considered appropriate and more cost-effective than Title II food, as the region has highly-developed import and commercial markets. Jordan imports most of its food, and WFP and other IPs used the same commercial supply chain for LRP. In doing so, they have avoided the costs of maintaining a separate supply chain as well as the costs of obtaining U.S.-sourced food. Wheat procured by vendors in Jordan was sent to Syria to support bread production by bakeries. With limited humanitarian access in Syria there are challenges around accountability and difficulties with monitoring; elaborate systems for targeting and monitoring are used to help mitigate those issues. Nonetheless, humanitarian actors generally agreed those activities have been important for food security for conflict-affected people in Syria. For refugee populations outside of Syria, IPs are employing sophisticated technology, for example, WFP in Jordan is managing a OneCard platform and piloting blockchain technology for the electronic food voucher project. Refugees in Jordan receive maintenance food assistance that is inadequate to cover their full needs, and struggle to find income to meet the high cost of living in urban areas, especially rent for housing. Beneficiaries state that food vouchers provide food security and dignity but that they also prefer cash to meet needs like school fees and medical care. WFP is planning to pilot a “choice” program based on a rigorous randomized study conducted in Jordan and Lebanon that will allow refugees to choose cash, vouchers, or a mix to fit their needs.

In Turkey, FFP also supports an electronic food voucher project for Syrian refugees living in camps. Turkey’s large-scale economy and well integrated international markets are able to accommodate LRP of food commodities for this assistance.

Key lessons from Jordan and Turkey are the importance of IPs’ flexibility to adapt to ever-changing contexts by moving and changing modalities; that the middle-income urban context, where rent is the main expense, is different from other cases; and that local purchase of commodities from international markets reflects more-complex globalized supply chains.

²¹ The six countries supported by the Syria regional response are Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. In addition, FFP’s Syria internal response supports the needs of IDPs.

DRC

- Total affected people: 485,000 refugees and 3.7 million IDPs
- Total FFP emergency funding 2010-2016: \$112.2 million + DFAPs

Food assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is provided for different reasons and in different forms, and is adapting over time. The DRC hosts nearly a half million refugees: newer arrivals from Central African Republic and South Sudan, as well as longer-term refugees from Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda, among others. There are 3.7 million IDPs from the legacy of the civil war in eastern DRC and from sporadic inter-tribal conflict. This case study looked at two main EFSP programs using FFP/OFDA block grant funding, which is designed to respond to new sources of internal displacement on a case-by-case basis and not require donor approval for each case (also documented in Boulinaud and Coneff 2017). Each year, both IPs have received new funding that is not tied to a specific population, in order to enable them to respond to crises as needed. Current programming is responding to the internal civil conflict in North Kivu and Tanganyika provinces, whereas the Kasai region is resulting in new displacements for which new funding will need to be found.

Basing their decisions on market assessments, IPs have most frequently used either in-kind distributions or voucher fairs—both distributing locally and regionally purchased foods. Voucher fairs work with local vendors to assemble a temporary market near IDPs who do not have access to regular/permanent markets because of security concerns, bad roads, and long distances. Both IPs also carry out non-food-item distributions when needed (in-kind or using cash or vouchers), often to the same recipients as the voucher fair for food assistance. In Goma, voucher recipients used their vouchers at the large, permanent local market, rather than at a voucher fair. Low levels of literacy/numeracy in the beneficiary population have presented some challenges with the use of vouchers—a modality that beneficiaries were not familiar with, particularly when the voucher is denominated in dollars. However, respondents did indicate that over time, the modality was becoming more familiar, and they appreciated the choice that vouchers provide in contrast to in-kind distribution. In some locations, where vendors cannot access IDPs due to insecurity or distance, and in conjunction with local market assessment, there is in-kind distribution. LRP works well in some regions, bringing in commodities from Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania when local markets do not have sufficient supply to meet anticipated demand.

An important lesson from the DRC case is that market functioning cannot be assessed at the provincial level—cash may work well in one conflict area but be infeasible in other parts of the same region—so every response area needs its own local assessment. Finally, though the block grants funded jointly by FFP and OFDA work well, IPs lament the short-term focus of these responses. To address longer-term development needs, DFAPs are being implemented, but these are constrained by short-term problems requiring immediate attention, such as conflict and refugee influxes. Fortunately, the three most recent DFAPs target underlying issues of conflict (e.g., natural resources, livelihoods, and resilience) and should, if successful, reduce the need for short-term emergency responses.

Nigeria



- Total affected people: 4.7 million conflict-affected in the north
- Total FFP emergency funding 2015: \$18.2; 2016: \$61.5 million

This case study addresses the emergency response in northeastern Nigeria, where a Boko Haram insurgency aligned with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has caused internal displacement of an estimated 2.3 million people. The conflict occurred at the same time the national economy experienced a decline in oil prices, which reduced foreign exchange reserves and triggered an economic recession. To preserve foreign exchange, the government imposed a tariff on imported rice to spur local production, which raised local prices and caused shortages. This downturn meant the government had fewer resources for the initial response; however, it is currently distributing in-kind food in conflict areas across the north.

IPs in Nigeria implemented a variety of modalities appropriate to the specific program areas; here we highlight WFP's program diversity. In urban/peri-urban centers where mobile network coverage was adequate, WFP provided cash transfers via mobile phones, thereby promoting mobile phone use by beneficiaries. Many beneficiaries had never owned a phone prior to this program and will likely continue using a phone for various services and transactions after the program ends. WFP has also distributed LRP food in newly accessible areas until other NGOs could arrive and begin relief programming. As markets reopened in recently secured areas, WFP transitioned to vouchers or cash transfers.

The Nigeria case is also an example of programs that implemented high-tech vouchers with good monitoring and commendable anti-fraud systems in a largely unaccountable context. The initial FFP response used paper vouchers but now uses primarily e-vouchers, employing a highly developed system that includes biometrics and new technologies that provide efficiencies for beneficiaries and IPs. E-vouchers include designated purchase categories—"wallets"—in one e-voucher card that can be used for high-nutrient foods, cash, and non-food items, representing flexibility and convenience to beneficiaries and for IPs and lower administrative processing costs compared to paper vouchers. However, IPs do not reap the full benefit of e-voucher technology because IPs use different service providers and thus miss out on being able to more easily cross-check beneficiary lists across programs.

Nigeria is also a country that has not declared a Category III emergency in many years; the emergency is still perceived as "new" even after three years of global response. In initiating MBEP, IPs have had to significantly scale up their institutional technical capacity, yet have struggled to recruit and retain both the international and national emergency staff needed for the continued response. Despite these challenges the program has been effective overall in saving lives and preventing further suffering. While there is no link to development programming, there is coordination between OFDA and FFP and plans to link future programming.

EPIDEMIC (EBOLA IN WEST AFRICA)

Sierra Leone



- Total affected people: 3.5 million food insecure after Ebola
- Total FFP emergency funding for Ebola outbreak 2015-2016: \$36.9 million + DFAP

Sierra Leone was selected as a case study through which to examine the Ebola response because FFP programming was still ongoing at the time of the field visit. The epidemic had major implications for human behavior, and both fear and stigmatization of the virus had swept over the country. Restrictions on movement to prevent the spread of Ebola led to low agricultural production and obstructed the transport of food to markets, resulting in an impending food security crisis as the epidemic was subsiding. The DFAP was modified to respond to the crisis. WFP provided in-kind food baskets (via LRP) early in the response to Ebola survivors.

In the recovery phase, FFP responded with a highly appropriate and vigorous cash intervention implemented by five NGOs, which provided cash in a series of lump sums (mostly three-month tranches) to the most vulnerable households in the most food-insecure districts. This was the first cash transfer project implemented by FFP-funded IPs in Sierra Leone. The first cash distributions were delayed because they were linked to the national social protection program, requiring an extensive targeting and registration process. In addition, setting up the supply chain and logistics for the cash took longer than expected. Using program savings that had accumulated due to favorable currency exchange rates, some IPs decided to disburse supplemental top-up transfers to beneficiaries. Some of these were distributed during the lean/planting season to support the restoration of agricultural livelihoods. Programming was also strengthened by a strong field presence of the government's Anti-Corruption Commission, financed by DFID, which helped prevent fraud. Thorough targeting, registration, and anti-fraud systems along with government partnership and community sensitization at start-up all contributed to beneficiary satisfaction and security.

The most striking finding of the Sierra Leone case study is the dramatic and significant impact the lump sums of cash had on the wellbeing and livelihoods of beneficiaries and their communities as a whole. There was tremendous happiness with the program and numerous other psychosocial and food security benefits for households. Sierra Leone is also a context where, after overcoming implementation delays, cash transfers worked well despite limited banking and mobile phone infrastructure in remote areas. Another unique component was removal, per an amendment to the FY2015 APS, of the limit on allowable funding for complementary activities, which is usually 20 percent. IPs focused initially on meeting emergency food security needs and added more complementary activities in later phases.

6. PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

SUMMARY FINDING

FFP has demonstrated adaptive management in highly complex and diverse contexts.

Decisions about modality type and modality mix are highly context-specific.

The evolution of FFP MBEP is an excellent example of adaptive management, though not without some challenges, as this section will describe. The section addresses Objective 2: Review program design and implementation processes for selected cases to examine in-depth (1) the appropriateness of modality choices, (2) implementation processes, (3) monitoring of changing market and other key conditions, and the adaptability of FFP and IPs, and (4) evidence that projects contribute to reducing hunger and food insecurity and other development impacts.

APPROPRIATENESS OF MODALITY CHOICES

The EFSP provides IPs with a wide choice of modalities: Title II in-kind, LRP, cash transfers, and food vouchers. This section describes the response analysis IPs use to choose modalities and then describes the main attributes of different modalities using examples from the case studies.

RESPONSE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENTS: When choosing modalities, IPs are required by the APS to provide a rationale for their modality choice based on timeliness, appropriateness, and cost-effectiveness. EFSP is designed to complement Title II, such as when Title II in-kind foods cannot arrive quickly enough (i.e., considering timeliness), U.S.-sourced commodities are mismatched with local preferences or are expected to negatively affect local markets (i.e., considering appropriateness), or if more beneficiaries can be reached by using market-based modalities (i.e., considering cost-effectiveness). IPs also consider other factors in their response analysis, including security, logistics, donor preference, local policies, and their own capacity. Some IPs have more flexibility than others to shift modalities, as described below in “Flexibility and Changes To Program Design.”

As part of their response analysis, IPs conduct independent and joint assessments and market analyses. For example, to inform the Syria regional response, in Jordan and Turkey, the Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment conducted in June 2012 estimated that there were 1.5 million food-insecure households in Syria and that the number would double by end of the year. IPs also conducted FGDs in Syria in 2012 and 2016. The WFP Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping unit continues to provide assessment data. The Emergency Market Mapping Analysis of 2013, the Cash Transfer Feasibility Report of 2014, and the ongoing Syria Needs Assessment Project each informed IPs of the needs and the deteriorating situation through 2016. Assessments in Turkey and across the border in Syria showed that the greatest needs included ready-to-eat rations for the newly displaced, flour and yeast to allow bakeries to produce the staple, bread, and vouchers to allow conflict-affected populations to purchase bread and other food in locations where markets continued to function. These needs were most pronounced among newly arrived refugees in Turkey as well as those living in Aleppo, rural Damascus, and Idlib. Initially the government of Turkey prohibited WFP from assisting refugees not living in camps. This severely restricted WFP’s activities, although the prohibition was recently relaxed, and WFP is able to assist through local partners. Making cash transfers from Turkey to beneficiaries in Syria initially was

ruled out by IPs due to insecurity and FFP anti-terrorism regulations. Over time, this has been re-evaluated, and more recently, FFP has approved small cash pilots in Syria.

LOCAL AND REGIONAL PURCHASE: In the FFP context, LRP refers to the location or source of commodities procured for distribution to beneficiaries. Local procurement is the purchase of commodities sourced in the country where they will be distributed; regional procurement is the purchase of commodities sourced within the same continent as the country where they will be distributed (FFP 2016c). LRP food can help stimulate local and regional markets, agricultural production, and farmers' linkages to markets. LRP tends to be used where local and regional commercial markets are functional. LRP also tends to provide local varieties of commodities that are better matched to local preferences compared to U.S.-sourced commodities.

VOUCHERS AND E-VOUCHERS: Vouchers and e-vouchers are appropriate in areas where markets are functioning. They can be redeemed by beneficiaries in pre-selected locations such as voucher fairs, supermarkets, and specific vendors, to purchase commodities equivalent to a maximum monetary value or for a predetermined number of items, usually food (Gentilini 2016a). E-vouchers often include a value-for-food component and some cash value that can be used to purchase non-food items (e.g., seeds and tools) or pay for expenses such as water, transportation, rent, or medical needs.

Vouchers have been used in all seven case study countries, though to a limited extent in Zimbabwe and in Sierra Leone, where they were used for seeds. In Nigeria, four of the five NGO IPs were implementing voucher programs at the time of the study, reasoning that food insecurity was very high and household dietary diversity was low, and food vouchers would better ensure beneficiary access to adequate food compared to cash transfers. Some IPs also felt vouchers were more secure than cash and less likely to cause intra-household or community tensions; however, response analysis conclusions and the resulting modality decisions differed across IPs in Nigeria. Some IPs started out using paper vouchers, with or without beneficiary photos; both types were vulnerable to fraud, such as by sale or transfer to another person or by a beneficiary registering more than once. After the first months of the program, e-vouchers were introduced by all IPs in Nigeria, and vouchers could be used with or without internet connection. Several IPs in Nigeria have large international service contracts with for-profit e-voucher or mobile money providers, which also influenced their choice of provider because contracting could be completed quickly.

Moreover, e-voucher companies provide technical support and equipment including point-of-sale biometric scanners, which help reduce fraud. One IP in Nigeria compared banks, mobile money, and remittance agencies (e.g., Western Union) with e-vouchers and found that e-vouchers were the modality that is cheapest, safest, and easiest to scale up. In Jordan, IPs changed from paper to e-vouchers based on the administrative and cost benefits of using electronic systems. In Syria, IPs retained paper vouchers, in part due to beneficiary fears about being tracked through electronic systems.

CASH TRANSFERS: Cash transfers are appropriate in areas where markets are functioning and beneficiaries live close to markets. All case study countries have used cash transfers to some extent. In the DRC, cash transfers are less common for a variety of reasons—including situations where a market assessment clearly indicates that this modality is not advised, logistical issues related to cash (both physical and electronic forms), donor preferences, and host-government constraints.

One option for cash transfers is a mobile money system (whereby money is transferred via a mobile device such as a phone). However this is often inappropriate where mobile networks and banks or liquidity are very limited and/or government policies prohibit or discourage cash transfers. In the DRC, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, banks are not widespread, so some IPs arranged for distribution of cash in envelopes at delivery points, which entailed security risks. IPs mitigated this risk by hiring security during the deliveries. In the DRC, WFP and some NGOs are implementing cash-based programming—except in refugee camps, where the government discourages cash transfers.

In some cases, the cash modality was appropriate, but the delivery method was inappropriate because of a faulty supply chain: Zimbabwe and Nigeria, for instance, experienced mobile money supply chain challenges. In those countries, IPs decided to use cash transfers because markets were functioning and secure. IPs decided to transfer cash to beneficiaries via mobile phones with SIM cards and signed agreements with the local mobile phone provider. The telephone companies, however, were unable to station an adequate number of cash agents in communities and/or agents had insufficient cash to cash out the mobile transfers. Further complicating matters, some geographic areas did not have adequate mobile phone coverage, so beneficiaries had to pay for transportation to travel to areas with mobile phone reception, reducing the timeliness and value of their transfer. To address transportation costs, one IP in Zimbabwe increased the transfer amount for beneficiaries who had to travel to redeem their transfers; for beneficiaries in a very remote area with very limited mobile phone service, the IP chose to distribute cash in envelopes. In Zimbabwe, these challenges, along with predictions of grain shortages due to drought, factored into the decision to shift from cash transfers to U.S.-sourced in-kind aid during the El Niño response. Although insufficient liquidity due to the national cash shortage in Zimbabwe constrained beneficiaries' ability to cash out mobile money transfers, beneficiaries have learned through IP trainings and experience that they can keep credit on the SIM card and use it as needed. This has had the unintended but positive effect of helping people adapt to the national cash shortage.

Beneficiaries in FGDs across all case studies repeatedly spoke in favor of e-vouchers and cash transfers. They stated that they feel safer receiving e-vouchers or mobile money transfers because with in-kind aid and cash in envelopes, others know when they receive the assistance: neighbors and family are more likely to ask to share; and the recipient is more vulnerable to theft. In contrast, beneficiaries can anonymously redeem e-vouchers or mobile money transfers at stores at a time of their own choosing. Where markets are functioning, most beneficiaries stated that they prefer to receive an e-voucher and/or cash transfers. Refugees appreciate the dignity and anonymity provided by cash and vouchers, which allow them to shop like local people and in the same places. Other beneficiaries, mainly women, expressed a preference for a food voucher or a mix of food voucher and cash; they feel a food voucher better ensures food security because the voucher has a designated portion that must be used for food, thus eliminating the decision about whether to spend money on food or other critical (non-food) household needs.

READY-TO-USE THERAPEUTIC FOODS (RUTF): RUTFs are energy-dense, micronutrient-enriched pastes used for therapeutic feeding. RUTFs are produced both in the United States and abroad; IPs using 202(e) funds to purchase RUTF have found RUTF products manufactured by trusted sources in Europe and regional markets that are comparable to those of U.S. origin. However, in some countries FFP has required IPs to use 202(e) funds exclusively for U.S.-origin RUTF.

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES

TARGETING: IPs use criteria to target beneficiaries, and change the criteria as needed. Kenya and Zimbabwe IPs, for example, use a community-based process to identify the most vulnerable households. In Zimbabwe, IPs also used information from the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee market assessment reports and gathered input from the District Administrators and District Disaster Response (DDRCs) and community members. Targeting for one program in Haiti was based on the Haitian Deprivation and Vulnerability Index (HDVI), which was created by the IP and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor; later programs followed a similar process and expanded the assessment to additional areas. Discrepancies between national targeting and local realities, however, posed a challenge in Haiti, which IPs mitigated by verifying the lists at the local level with local government authorities and members of local community groups.

In the DRC, three IPs indicated that they changed the basis of their targeting approach from broad demographic or other categories (e.g., displaced persons) to specific vulnerability criteria. This approach is designed to better ensure that assistance is provided to those most in need. However, key informants indicated that this approach has required sensitizing the local population, including government and local authorities, since it differs considerably from the “blanket” approach used in the past. WFP noted that in the DRC, the targeting process is the same for all three modalities (cash, vouchers, and in-kind assistance) and involves the following steps:

1. determination of the IPC phase classification, which identifies the zone to be targeted for action;
2. vulnerability assessment for both host and displaced populations; and
3. market assessment to understand available options.

In Jordan, WFP carried out initial targeting in 2014 and early 2015 using data from various sources, including the interagency Vulnerability Assessment Framework, WFP’s Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise, UNHCR registration data, and World Bank models. The targeting exercise included an appeal process that resulted in 19 percent of families who were removed from assistance rolls being reclassified as eligible for assistance or for increased assistance. In 2017, WFP conducted a validation exercise to verify all beneficiaries and was in the process of reviewing its current targeting model to help minimize inclusion and exclusion errors.

Where possible, government participation and leadership at the early stages of a program are critical to the success of the program. Governments have different preferences for modality and targeting approach. For example, the Government of Ethiopia prefers cash while the Government of Zimbabwe prefers food. IPs in these countries coordinated with national and local governments to different extents in the targeting process. In Sierra Leone, targeting and registration were led by the government, which fostered a coordinated approach among IPs and humanitarian actors and added legitimacy to the process among community members. In Haiti, IPs partnered with government (as described above), and in Zimbabwe, Jordan, and Turkey, the government was informed and consulted—though to a lesser extent than in Sierra Leone and Haiti. Challenges in coordinating with the Government of Zimbabwe are described below in “Beneficiary Registration.”

The case studies revealed challenges in the targeting process such as a lengthy process, failure to differentiate between chronically and acutely affected households, exclusion error, and disagreement about whether to target at the household or community level. In multiple cases, the targeting process was cumbersome and extensive, which caused delays in project start-up, but was ultimately considered

effective in selecting the most vulnerable households. In some cases, the targeting did not distinguish between households that are chronically vulnerable and those that are acutely affected by an emergency. FGDs in Nigeria noted exclusion error: fraudulent registration was not a problem, but the targeting criteria excluded too many equally needy IDPs. Some Sierra Leone stakeholders believed targeting at the household level may not have been the most appropriate in an acute crisis and that if targeting is done at the household level, the project should be designed so the entire community can still clearly benefit and work together for their recovery.

BENEFICIARY REGISTRATION: Clear targeting and beneficiary selection criteria combined with community sensitization contributed to greater community and government support in some case study countries (e.g., Zimbabwe). For example, as of 2015, WFP Kenya implemented the Complementarity Initiative to coordinate five food assistance programs in ASAL counties into a single registry to streamline targeting and registration systems and databases and reduce duplicate beneficiary registrations (WFP 2015c). Other benefits of Kenya’s centralized database are reduced fraud, informed budget planning, access to beneficiary feedback, and macro-statistics.

Other good practices identified include periodically verifying beneficiary registration lists to eliminate duplication, using beneficiary PINs and biometrics (e.g., right thumb prints), including the name of next of kin, and using voucher cards with a photograph of the recipient’s face.

Challenges found in the registration process include delays and “double dipping” (i.e., registration in more than one humanitarian program). The lengthy targeting process in some cases contributed to a long registration process and thus program implementation delays. A factor contributing to program delays in one cash transfer program in Zimbabwe was that the mobile transfer partner could not supply enough SIM cards or process the registration data quickly enough. As described above, in Nigeria, paper vouchers were vulnerable to beneficiaries registering more than once.

In Haiti, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, the lack of a central database of beneficiary information constrained stakeholder coordination and led to inefficiencies. In Zimbabwe, IPs coordinated their interventions through the Humanitarian Country Team and informed the government about their activities. However, in early 2016, the government began distributing food in areas where WFP had already registered beneficiaries, leading to duplication of assistance. WFP consequently modified its targeting but still found that some households had already received assistance. WFP and the government then conducted verification exercises to reduce overlap. WFP hopes that forthcoming electronic ID cards, once agreed upon with the government, will make registration in Zimbabwe more efficient (WFP 2017b). Similarly, World Vision in Haiti is using internal stand-alone technology called Last Mile Mobile Solutions to assist in distribution planning, monitor the use of food and cash, and simplify beneficiary registration.

TIMELINESS: Timeliness of response was found in some places to be negatively affected both by the proposal award process and by the initial establishment of a supply chain for cash. In Sierra Leone, the time from concept note submission to award ranged from three to nine months. This long proposal phase was not due to FFP or the modality choice, explained a key informant from a Sierra Leone IP; rather, it was due to IP internal processes, which have now improved: turnaround time in the Phase 2 proposal was only two weeks. The months-long lag time between award and first cash distribution in Sierra Leone may be similar for commodities; as one of the IP project proposals explains, Title II food would likely take four months or more to arrive. For four of the five IPs, four months passed between the date of the award from FFP and the first cash transfer, a delay also noted by a USAID Office of Inspector General audit (2016). Delays were due to the novel challenges of programming and of establishing a new cash transfer supply chain in the Sierra Leone context. This meant IPs in Sierra Leone

and other cases, had to vet and contract private service providers and build staff capacity to implement cash transfers, vouchers, and LRP. Once systems were in place, distributions could take place quickly and efficiently. Despite the delays in the early phases of the program, all IP staff in Sierra Leone considered cash transfers to be a time-efficient modality once the distributions began. One IP staff in Sierra Leone with Title II emergency food aid experience commented that “Cash is faster and more efficient” than U.S.-sourced in-kind food.

Analysis of response timeliness is limited by data gaps, as found by GAO (2016) and also in this review. Timeliness is not typically reported by IPs in their annual reports. The documentation FFP provided to the review team was an assortment of award documents, reporting documents required in the APS (quarterly reports, annual reports, final reports) and others—but rarely a complete set of documents for any one project. A review of available proposals and interview data found numerous examples of applicants predicting improved timeliness of market-based modalities compared to Title II commodities. For example, local suppliers in Jordan see LRP as crucial to the success of the food assistance program, as LRP is faster and less costly than importing commodities from the U.S. Suppliers in Jordan also observed that humanitarian agencies want goods immediately, whereas transit time from the United States is often 60 to 90 days.

MECHANISMS FOR ENSURING PROTECTION: Protection principles include mitigating unintended effects that increase people’s vulnerability to physical and psychosocial risks and result in harm, exploitation, and abuse; ensuring access to impartial assistance and services in proportion to need; setting up accountability and complaint mechanisms; and supporting the development of individual and community self-protection capacities. IPs in all case studies took steps in support of these principles, both through modality selection and other actions.

To minimize theft, harm, and abuse, IPs selected transfer modalities that, where needed, are more discreet than in-kind aid. IPs also carefully consider household gender dynamics. Both male and female FGD participants stated that it was common for women to make decisions regarding household food purchases (e.g., in the DRC, Haiti, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe). The review team heard minimal reports of gender-based violence or theft related to FFP emergency funding, though given the limited number of observations, findings on this issue cannot be generalized. In many FGDs, participants stated that food assistance helped to alleviate household tensions. Beneficiaries in Nigeria, Haiti, and Kenya, who are either receiving e-transfers or are aware of e-transfer programs, considered e-transfers more discreet than either U.S.-sourced or LRP in-kind aid “because no one else knows when you receive it” (beneficiary, Nigeria). The e-voucher modality eliminates the need for physical distribution points, which are prone to security risks and unregistered individuals seeking food e.g., as seen with unregistered IDPs in Nigeria). Surprisingly, all FGD participants in Sierra Leone agreed that physical cash is easier to keep secure in the household than food because when the beneficiary leaves the household, they can easily hide their cash or carry it on them. Zimbabwe program beneficiaries noted that cash in envelopes is more visible than mobile phone transfers but still less visible (and thus more secure) than transporting a large bag of rice and food basket home from an in-kind distribution; moreover, IPs in Zimbabwe provided security when distributing cash in envelopes.

While innovations like e-vouchers and mobile money offer many advantages in terms of risk reduction, nevertheless, illiteracy, limited numeracy, and lack of familiarity with technology may increase vulnerability of some beneficiaries as they struggle to manage these modalities. Some FFP-funded programs have attempted to remedy this by providing sensitization on how to use these transfer formats and providing SIM cards (e.g., in Nigeria and Zimbabwe).

In FGDs in Jordan, beneficiaries said that the food voucher helps ensure their food security but is not enough to cover all their food needs, which may contribute to vulnerability. WFP provides 70 percent of a person's average monthly food expenditure to the poorest families. FGDs indicated that many households are in debt due to their inability to get jobs and the high cost of living in Jordan. In households where the adult male is disabled or absent, beneficiaries reported that it is common for teenagers, especially boys, to drop out of school and work informally. Among refugee boys between 15 and 18 years of age, 37 percent are economically active, though this is reported to be in line with practices in Syria before the war (ILO 2015). Rent is a significant expense for refugees in Jordan, and many beneficiaries reported feeling insecure about their ability to make rent payments.

IPs in all case studies had established accountability mechanisms, including complaint and feedback systems, and tailored to context. Systematic reporting of complaints and IP responses were found in all countries.

POST-DISTRIBUTION MONITORING: Post-distribution monitoring (PDM) provides valuable information on how programs can be adapted to better meet beneficiary needs. IPs in all case study countries systematically conducted PDM to monitor distribution processes; learn how beneficiaries used their cash, food, or voucher transfers; record challenges experienced by beneficiaries; and capture changes in food security indicators and markets.

As noted, PDM for cash activities gathers information on how cash transfers are used. This is important information given that critics of cash transfers fear that beneficiaries will waste their money on temptation goods (e.g., alcohol, tobacco). The review team, in its small sample, found no evidence of this, though this finding cannot be generalized to other cases. The case studies in this review provide evidence that beneficiaries use cash primarily for food and essential items.

RISK MITIGATION REGARDING FRAUD AND LEAKAGE: Loss and fraud were reportedly not common or major issues for MBEP projects. Many IPs in case study countries established sophisticated systems to prevent and mitigate risks, such as by using biometrics to prevent beneficiary identity cards from being used by the wrong person, and direct in-person monitoring of vendor transactions. E-transfers in particular allow for real-time monitoring and swift corrective action. In all cases, cash transfers were viewed as equally or less risky than Title II in-kind food.

OTHER POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS: The timing and amount of transfers may have an effect on efficiency and effectiveness in reaching food security goals. However, little research has been done on this topic, despite evidence of important trade-offs between reaching food consumption benchmarks and building the self-reliance of target populations. The existing literature includes the following findings: (1) Four studies showed that timing and frequency—such as timing distributions to coincide with the school fee payment calendar, or with the agricultural season—can have important effects on specific indicators; (2) 15 studies showed that larger transfers were associated with greater positive impacts on food expenditures, savings, and investments in livestock; and (3) 24 studies showed that programs with long-term cash transfers had better outcomes—though one study showed that even after years of cash transfers, beneficiaries had great difficulties after the transfers ended, highlighting the need for complementary activities (Bastagli et al. 2016).

In many cases, food assistance transfer levels (i.e., the contents of a U.S.-sourced or LRP in-kind food basket or the value of a cash or voucher transfer) are set at levels below what is required to meet basic needs. According to FFP data, for all programs that received new awards in 2015 and for which data were available, the percent of monthly household food needs met by cash and LRP transfers ranged

from 9 to 100 percent, averaging 70 percent for cash transfers and 75 percent for LRP. Food assistance is often the only humanitarian assistance that affected populations receive. Thus, beneficiaries must make difficult choices about if and how to fulfill unmet food and other needs. Food assistance alone is not enough to stop decapitalization and debt, as shown in the cases of the DRC, Jordan, and Nigeria. For example, beneficiaries in Nigeria had incurred debt, mostly to purchase food prior to the FFP-funded emergency program, and spent most of their transfer paying down those debts, not purchasing food.

Another factor in efficiency and effectiveness is the extent of linkages with other humanitarian actors who can help to meet the range of critical needs of the affected population. OFDA in particular is a good partner for providing multi-sectoral humanitarian support, as shown in the DRC and Haiti. In Haiti and Kenya, the review team observed that layered and sequenced food assistance interventions with multi-sectoral strategies contributed to promoting resilience and food security. However, examples of layering and sequencing are not common. There is a need to explore ways of building on the example of using multiple funding streams, such as with Feed the Future, OFDA, and FFP, layering activities in the areas of agriculture, other livelihoods, protection, health, education, and water, sanitation and hygiene and to promote greater resilience.

PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION: As mentioned above, multi-service partnerships and layered interventions are important for meeting beneficiary needs and placing them on pathways to resilience. There are also important opportunities with MBEP for expanding partnerships with government, commercial agriculture, and the private sector (e.g., banks, insurance, and communications companies).

Some cases demonstrated exemplary coordination among MBEP IPs. In Sierra Leone, IPs were well coordinated and engaged regularly in learning and exchange, thanks to FFP leadership in Washington, D.C. and in country. Through the informal Cash Working Group, IPs met regularly and genuinely collaborated. The Humanitarian Coordination Team in Zimbabwe, despite deeply divided opinions about appropriate modalities, helped IPs coordinate and harmonize the patchwork of food and cash transfers and liaise with government representatives.

Coordination was lacking in Nigeria partly because the government did not permit the formation of the United Nations cluster system, so cash working groups, a typical feature of the cluster system, were not functional at the onset of the response. This necessitated more coordination from FFP and initiative from the IPs.


MONITORING OF MARKET CONDITIONS AND OTHER KEY CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

MARKET MONITORING: Market monitoring serves multiple purposes, including verifying that the transfer value is sufficient to meet food security needs and ensuring that the transfer does not distort local market prices. Cash transfers, in particular, are subject to loss of value in a situation of rapid currency devaluation, as occurred in South Sudan. Fluctuations in market prices require adjusting transfer values and changing modalities. For example, WFP's Vulnerability Assessment Mapping unit in Kenya monitors food prices monthly (or weekly if required) to detect a 10 percent change in average price per metric ton (Watkins 2014). A key informant noted that if food prices increase, WFP requests additional funds from FFP for FFP-supported programs. In extreme cases, a shift from cash to food is feasible. WFP Kenya also monitors food availability to ensure there is enough food available in the region to absorb the increased demand stemming from a market-based modality.

Another example of market monitoring comes from a Sierra Leone IP: using monthly market monitoring data, the IP detected increased prices for fish in 2016 but determined that no change to the cash

transfer amount was needed at that point because other affordable proteins were still available on the market to complement the food basket (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Market monitoring by Sierra Leone IP shows price increases are due to normal rainy season shortages



Source: CARE Annual Results Report F16, Bombali and Tonkolili districts.

Quarterly and more-frequent monitoring in Sierra Leone found that some commodity prices were increasing; importantly, rice. Sierra Leone depends on rice imports, and the price of rice and other imported foods increased in the second and third quarters of FY2015 (WFP 2015b). At the same time, households suffered major harvest losses and low production. IPs changed their plan for monthly cash transfers to three-month tranches so households could purchase rice in bulk. Another benefit of the tranche reported by the IPS was that it helped households plan, and from an efficiency standpoint, the tranche was much more logistically simple and efficient: one distribution instead of three.

PROJECT CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCING HUNGER AND FOOD INSECURITY

FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES: MBEP has contributed to improvements in food security across the seven case countries. We cite examples from case study countries below and note here that data gaps limit higher level analysis, as discussed in the sub-section below, “Tracking Project Outcomes and Impact.”

Food consumption scores (FCS) results measured by one DRC IP showed that the average status of all beneficiary households across 11 project sites improved from 22.39 (“poor”) to 34.76 (“borderline”) over the course of the project (August 2014-January 2017), and the percentage of households with “acceptable” FCSs increased from 10 percent at baseline to 50 percent at endline (Samaritan’s Purse 2017). In Nigeria, IDP beneficiaries in one voucher program improved from zero households with acceptable FCS at baseline to 57 percent with acceptable FCS eight months later. Zimbabwe programs

contributed to an increased average number of meals per day, and a cash transfer program improved the percentage of households with “borderline” FCS scores from 74 percent at baseline to 90 percent at endline (WFP 2017b). A joint emergency food security assessment conducted two months after Hurricane Matthew in Haiti found that food insecurity in the affected southern departments decreased by more than half as communities received emergency assistance (EFSP and complementary activities outside of EFSP) (WFP 2017a). In Sierra Leone, Syria, Haiti, and Nigeria, beneficiaries and key informants considered MBEP life-saving, helping beneficiaries to escape severe hunger and malnutrition.

In addition to improving food security among beneficiaries, MBEP contributes to multiplier effects that have economic benefits for the larger community (discussed above in Section 3) and spillover food security benefits to non-beneficiary households by supporting the economy and employment systems more generally, which feed back into food security indicators of target households. For example, during the field mission in Zimbabwe, the review team saw vegetables and cash crops growing in community gardens, which improved household and community level outcomes (described below in “Conditional Transfers...”).

In Kenya, CFA projects along with the earned income are credited by beneficiaries with improving food security and enabling them to use the cash in ways that would best support their livelihood, which in turn helps to improve food security. Some IPs in Kenya report that food security results vary by region, especially where severe recurring drought limits food security improvements and outcomes. However, despite not using their transfers solely for food, some beneficiaries used the cash to increase productive assets, an important contributor to long-term food security. While positive food security outcomes were reported in all case studies, some target areas or projects within case studies showed mixed results, mainly due to insufficient funding and thus inadequate assistance. The Kenya and Nigeria case studies also showed that cash transfers do not necessarily result in more diverse diets and that, depending on the context and population, it is important to complement transfers with nutrition education. Changes made to modalities to address dietary diversity are discussed under modality monitoring below.

CONDITIONAL TRANSFERS AND COMMUNITY ATTITUDES ABOUT SHAPING THEIR FUTURE THROUGH ASSET BUILDING:

Zimbabwe is a prime example of beneficiary enthusiasm for a community asset creation program, which depending on the context (e.g., rainfall, harvest levels, market assessments) provided cash or food. Participants described the benefits they had received from community assets, especially community dams and gardens, which provided water for household and community use (e.g., for gardens, brickmaking, and washing clothes) and vegetables for household consumption and sale, which increased dietary diversity, household income, and community access to nutritious foods. The review team, however, noted potential sustainability and resource management challenges stemming from overuse by community members and those in adjacent areas. Furthermore, no cost-efficiency analysis was conducted on asset creation projects. In Kenya, beneficiaries in some CFA project areas reported that cash transfers helped reduce their food insecurity through food purchases or improved agricultural production as a result of the assets created. In Nigeria, one IP used cash for work to restore host community assets such as schools and water systems. This activity targeted IDPs and host community members already in the e-voucher program to provide supplemental cash. It aimed to smooth tensions between displaced and host populations related to resource use.

MODALITY MONITORING/RE-ASSESSMENT: Across the seven cases, IPs monitored and assessed modality implementation and made changes to better address food security needs. In some cases the content of the modality was changed. In Nigeria, for example, one IP created a high-nutrient “wallet” within the food e-voucher to ensure household consumption of protein to respond to nutrition assessments that showed low dietary diversity. Some Nigeria IPs added a cash element to the e-voucher to cover transportation and water to mitigate the levels of monetization of food purchased with vouchers. Many stakeholders in Haiti also preferred the modality of food vouchers as they provide beneficiaries with options to purchase local nutritious foods; noting, however, the success of vouchers depends on having operational markets, and access and availability of diverse and nutritious foods.

TRACKING PROJECT OUTCOMES AND IMPACT: IPs across the seven cases indicated that they are tracking one or more of the standard food security indicators such as FCS, Household hunger score (HHS), Coping Strategy Index (CSI), and Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS). In some cases FFP required consistent reporting of a standard set of food security indicators for quarterly, annual, baseline and endline reports. In other cases the tracking of food security indicators greatly varied across IPs, and IPs defined and measured some similar indicators in different ways. To assess food security indicators reported by IPs, the review team looked at documents received from FFP and IPs (Annex 9: Document inventory and food security indicators reported by FFP EFSP programs awarded in 2016). Of the 27 EFSP awards granted in FY2016, the review team found food security indicators reported by 15 of the awards. Indicators varied; 11 IPs reported FCS; 7 IPs reported HDDS; 7 IPs reported CSI or Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI); one IP reported HHS; and one reported Food Expenditure Share. Whether or not the remaining 12 awards reported on food security indicators is unknown due to missing documents, despite efforts to find documents (described in Section 2, Methodology). The FY2017 APS requires FCS.


One challenge in the tracking and interpretation of the indicators in dynamic displacement contexts (i.e., Nigeria, the DRC) is the continuous absorption of new recipients into the programs after the initial baseline study. There are also examples of innovative tools used for outcome data collection; in Zimbabwe, WFP, in partnership with Voto Mobile and Geopol, began using mobile technology for real-time market monitoring and for Mobile Vulnerability Analysis Mapping.

Key findings from FFP and IP staff surveyed online

In an online survey of FFP and IP staff involved with market-based emergency programming, the majority agree that flexible MBEP modalities contribute to more effective emergency responses (39 respondents).

- Nearly 90% of respondents agree that the availability of flexible modalities for emergency food assistance has led to innovations in food security programming that yield better results.
- More than 82% agree that it results in better nutritional status among beneficiaries and two-thirds say it results in positive development effects.
- More than 92% agreed MBEP gives FFP-sponsored programs greater flexibility to meet changing circumstances.
- 85% of respondents agree that MBEP improves market recovery and functioning and beneficiary reach. MBEP has strengthened FFP's ability to choose the most appropriate response modality, as per 85% of respondents.
- 80% of respondents disagreed that in-kind food aid is easier to target than MBEP.
- Nearly 90% disagreed that MBEP has made it overly complicated to effectively program food assistance, and only about 36% agree that MBEP has created additional analytical hurdles.
- 74% agree that MBEP has improved cost efficiency of emergency food assistance programming
- 77% agree that MBEP has increased timeliness of food assistance in emergencies.

FFP and IP staff opinions about how flexible modalities have affected programming are fairly positive, with almost all respondents agreeing that flexible modalities have enabled programs to change modalities as the context changes (See Annex 6 for the complete results of the online survey.)



7. DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS

SUMMARY FINDING

The development impacts of MBEP include: economic improvement, technology transfer, improved resilience, and greater psychological well-being.

Objective 4: Identify evidence of the effects of MBEP on local economies and market actors. What is the evidence base available and what qualitative insights can be provided?

IMPROVEMENTS TO LOCAL ECONOMIES

MARKET IMPROVEMENTS: The large investment of resources in the Syria regional response has resulted in significant market effects. WFP reports that as of 2016, its e-voucher program had infused an additional \$1.7 billion into the local economies and directly created 1,300 new jobs. The review team verified that small and medium sized vendors were able to grow their businesses as a result of the voucher program. Local purchase of wheat flour in Jordan destined for Syrian bakeries enabled a Jordanian miller to purchase new heavy equipment and expand his production. Smaller MBEPs such as in Nigeria and the DRC have created jobs at participating vendors' stores. Vendor interviews indicate they typically hire two to six additional staff to handle the increased volume of business resulting from vouchers and cash transfers.

Recipients in Sierra Leone report that goods that were only available in the weekly market became readily available as recipients of unconditional cash transfers opened small shops. Targeted support of women-owned small vendor operations suggests that indirect market support also is a promising strategy in situations where markets are affected by a crisis. Food vendors were introduced to new ways of doing business including large scale procurement, credit sales based on electronic transfers, and the use of point of sale technology that can also be used for inventory control. Vendors across the countries studied said they are dealing with new and increased numbers of suppliers.

COMMUNITY LIVELIHOODS: Conditional cash transfer programs such as those focused on asset building can be linked to emergency programming so that the overall impact has longer term effects on resilience. Examples of such asset building programs in Zimbabwe, including the WFP Productive Asset Creation program and the Enhancing Nutrition, Scaling Up Resilience and Enterprise (ENSURE) program, illustrate this point. Both programs combined emergency resources with longer term asset creation activities to have add-on effects for beneficiaries and communities (see "Conditional Transfers..." section above and Life History 2 in Annex 5: Life histories: Food assistance and resilience trajectories). In Sierra Leone, non-beneficiaries benefitted from the cash tranches when jobs were created, such as when the beneficiaries hired laborers to work in their fields.

COMMUNITY SAFETY NET SUPPORT/DEVELOPMENT: In several cases unconditional cash transfers had a detectable effect on community safety nets. In the cases of Sierra Leone and Haiti, community savings and loan groups were replenished or catalyzed by the unconditional cash transfers.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

TECHNOLOGY UPTAKE THROUGH MOBILE PHONES: The use of SIM cards for cash transfers has been shown to expand recipients' use of mobile phones. SIM card recipients embrace the new technology and report purchasing used low cost (\$5) mobile phones in the local market. This technological jump makes a particularly significant impact for a mostly rural and illiterate population now using phones, albeit with some challenges due to limited literacy and numeracy skills. Mobile phones allow them to receive information such as government safety net updates, and health and education alerts. FFP beneficiaries and IPs stated that mobile phones significantly reduce isolation and help beneficiaries develop their informal safety nets. Local mobile phone service providers stated these programs are creating further demand for mobile phones and network coverage, notably in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. However, a recent study on financial inclusion found that objectives around financial inclusion are often over-ambitious and not met, and exposure to mobile cash transfers through humanitarian programs does not mean that people will continue mobile money transactions on their own, especially if more accessible and profitable alternatives are available (Bailey 2017).

MBEP programs also have an effect on the growth and development of banking, mobile money, and cellular services. In Sierra Leone, the cash distribution company, Splash, saw large increases in its infrastructure and reach in the country. The Apex bank and community banking network's profile were raised by the program leading to improvement in Apex's revenue during the time of the project. In Zimbabwe, the mobile money network that was set up had a development impact on the communities where not only money could be transferred but also market information.

E-transfers, especially in the cases of unconditional cash transfers, connect people with local banks, often for the first time. Once the emergency subsides, this connection potentially offers expanded access to bank services such as savings accounts and formal sector lending and use of debit and credit cards, though there is not much evidence yet of this, and people may discontinue use of bank accounts due to bank charges. At the leading edge of technology transfer is WFP's piloting of blockchain technology to transfer funds, eliminating banks as intermediaries. In at least one case, Sierra Leone, Apex Bank reported increases in community bank subscriptions due to the transfer programs.

"The mobile phone fundamentally changes the way rural Africa works, and Nigeria is no different."
(IP staff)

IMPROVED RESILIENCE

Building resilience²² in countries facing recurrent crises requires a holistic, collaborative approach that enables households and communities to better manage shocks and stresses in a given context. This involves reconciling short-term and long-term approaches, addressing both the actual problems and causes in specific contexts. In the emerging context of combined humanitarian and development approaches and resilience programming, multi-year funding provides many potential advantages. These

²² USAID defines resilience as "the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth."

advantages include predictability, flexibility, lower operational expenses, and the ability to develop partnerships, all of which can contribute to making humanitarian assistance more efficient and effective.

By virtue of its emphasis on markets, MBEP can be an important strategy for building resilience in crisis-prone, low-income settings. FFP emergency programming can have larger scale impact on enabling households to manage shocks by linking emergency and development programming. FFP has successfully leveraged DFAPs to build national social protection programs (e.g., Ethiopia, Haiti). There is some evidence that MBEP, particularly those programs linking short-term emergency assistance with asset building development programs implemented by WFP, have a greater impact on food security and ultimately on resilience capacities. In Zimbabwe, FGDs and anecdotal evidence suggest that longer term benefits associated with Productive Asset Creation have larger impacts on food security than the short-term lean season assistance, and that gardens are expected to contribute to food security beyond the program end (Brewin et al. 2014; Save the Children 2015). A quasi-experimental study in the DRC found that UNICEF's ARCC II cash transfer program significantly improved beneficiary well-being, reduced vulnerabilities, and decreased their use of negative coping mechanisms, which increased resiliency at the household level overall (Bonilla et al. 2017). There is also evidence in the literature distinguishing the food security impact from one MBEP modality choice to another (e.g., BCG 2017).

Moreover, DFAPs can be designed with effective flexibility to scale up for rapid emergency response, such as the DFAP in Zimbabwe ENSURE. This program scaled up quickly to respond to El Niño-related food shortages. ENSURE, implemented by World Vision with CARE, scaled up dramatically from 30,000 to 400,000 beneficiaries in just 11 days from the time funding was awarded and distributed sorghum, pulses, and vegetable oil from October 2016–March 2017. After the emergency, ENSURE scaled down and resumed its development activities.

Better links to resilience-building programs can help to address the different needs of beneficiaries such as those who are chronically vulnerable and need long term support to escape poverty versus those who are acutely affected by the immediate emergency and only need short-term assistance. CFA programs, such as in Kenya, allow women to earn local currency, which gives them greater control over money in their households. The CFA programs enabled women to invest in livestock assets that contribute to greater resilience in the face of drought. In Zimbabwe, asset creation programs established community dams and gardens, which enabled people to grow, eat, and sell vegetables and sustain livestock, thereby building up their long-term livelihood options, dietary diversity, and social capital in the community.

“There is a need to think about multi-year interventions in chronic emergency contexts.”

(IP staff)

PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING

FGD participants, vendors, and IP staff in the case study countries each noted the beneficial psychological effects that the MBEP has on program participants. Numerous FGD participants in Sierra Leone said that being free of the worry of where their family's next meal would come from allowed them to engage in farming, trading, or day labor. Beneficiaries described finally being able to eat and sleep with peace of mind after a long period of uncertainty and stress. In Haiti, Sierra Leone, and

Zimbabwe, being able to think beyond their next meal gave beneficiaries the confidence they needed to participate in social and economic development. In Jordan, people said that being able to go to a store and purchase food with a voucher gives them dignity. It is important to note that where humanitarian assistance was inadequate, this psychological boost was absent, such as among refugees from the DRC in Rwanda, as observed by the review team.

LIFE HISTORIES: FOOD ASSISTANCE AND RESILIENCE TRAJECTORIES

“Giving participants control over their development has been empowering, especially for women, giving participants a sense of hope.”

(IP staff)


In-depth life history interviews were conducted with program participants in each case study to better understand the impact of food assistance in the broader context of the major events of their lives—in particular, how food assistance contributed to their resilience trajectories. Most interviewees were identified by community members and focus group participants as people who had participated in emergency food security programs and had adapted particularly well to challenging circumstances. As such, these interviews likely reflect better-than-average outcomes. The life history below provides an illustrative example of a success story in Sierra Leone. More life histories are presented in Annex 5. For the full series of life history interviews, please see the individual case study reports.

Life History I: Eunice

Cash transfers in Sierra Leone support female-headed household to bounce back better after Ebola



Eunice*
Female
Age 40
Kailahun District
Sierra Leone



*Name has been changed. Note: the graph for this case study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team.

Eunice was born in 1977 in a village of Kailahun District, Sierra Leone, into a family of rice farmers. She never attended school, which she remembers as one of the lowest points of her life. Despite not having formal education, she taught herself how to conduct business and petty trade to care for her family. Eunice worked hard in order to build her own home and grow her small business of selling cooked rice, but then Ebola struck the area. She was forced to close her business, and she found it difficult to feed her children. She credits the cash transfer program with helping her to revamp her livelihood and to improve her life- and the lives of her children-to a level that is even better than before Ebola. The business is now thriving. With the money she has made, she is able to adequately feed her children, enroll her children in school again, and she has even made upgrades to her mud hut.

8. COST-EFFICIENCY TRENDS

SUMMARY FINDING

Cost-efficiency analysis and cost-effectiveness are complex measures.

Analysis is limited by data gaps, though FFP has taken some steps to improve data collection.

Objective 3: Analyze program cost-efficiency trends across a range of variables including market structure and dynamics, financial and information technology infrastructure, security context, modality, partner type, emergency classification and delivery mechanism. Costing delivery of food assistance across modalities is a critical piece to ensuring value for money and allows FFP to maximize the efficient use of its resources.

FFP partners are implementing technologies that, while they require substantial initial investments, can offer long term savings and provide multi-sectoral impacts. These range from highly sophisticated (e.g., blockchain technology being piloted by WFP Jordan, iris scans used by UNHCR Jordan) to more modest technologies such as mobile phone transfers used in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Haiti, Nigeria and auto-recharge of e-vouchers (Jordan). These technologies are expected to improve efficiency, privacy, and protection.

In recent years, donors, including DFID and USAID, have adopted a Value for Money framework as a means to assess the comparative benefits and effectiveness of alternative investments. Value for Money is a general framework that embraces several more specific concepts to measure, in particular:

- **Cost-efficiency** compares the costs of alternative investments to provide a specific output, such as sourcing specific quantities of commodities from local, regional, or international (U.S.) markets. Cost efficiency is used to find the lowest cost investment to achieve a given level of output.
- **Cost-effectiveness** measures the costs of achieving a certain level of outcomes under alternative investments. For example cost-effectiveness can measure the relative cost of achieving a certain level of food security outcomes under alternative food assistance transfer modalities. Under this measure, cash transfers could be more cost-effective if a given value of cash transfer permits households to purchase a more nutritious combination of foods than a transfer of in-kind commodities with an identical cost.

Value for Money is a general framework that considers both lenses of efficiency and effectiveness to measure the relative costs and benefits of alternative investments. It considers both the lowest cost method to provide a particular set of outputs, as well as the lowest cost method to achieve a particular set of outcomes. Value for Money can also include cost-benefit analysis, which considers the relative costs and benefits, measured in monetary terms, of achieving different sets of outcomes under alternative investments.

The review team assessed existing FFP data and determined that there was a large data gap and a lack of clarity and consistency in the data. FFP funding tracking sheets contain a lot of useful data about EFSP and Title II emergency awards, and they also contain some heterogeneously formatted data, which limits comparability. EFSP data for costs per beneficiary vary in format and unit: dollar amount (e.g., \$91.62; most are formatted this way), cost per unit of time (e.g., \$10.54/month, \$168/year), cost per person per unit of time (\$9/person/month), cost per household, cost per intervention, unknown values (e.g., 0.28

per day, 13.6/month), and amount of food but no cost information (e.g., 333 gms rice per person per day). The revised FY2016 EFSP tracker (as of August 2017) has modified the data format for cost per beneficiary but variations in data categories continue to limit comparability.

More relevant to the cost-efficiency question, FFP partners regularly estimate and compare the cost of LRP versus in-kind commodities, with planned costs of commodities included in proposals. However, the review team found very few examples of reports with actual costs and no reports comparing the actual costs of market-based modalities to U.S.-sourced in-kind foods. The FY2015 APS instructs awardees to submit quarterly reporting tables in their reports, comparing, if applicable, the cost of LRP to Title II commodities or data related to cash or vouchers (e.g., amount proposed versus actually disbursed, number of beneficiaries, frequency of distributions). The review team did not find this information in the few available quarterly reports for FY2015 awards. This could be due to the small sample size. The FY2016 APS states that awardees, as applicable, should fill in the LRP Commodity Report (LRPR) or cash/voucher table online through FFP Management Information System (FFPMIS). This data from FFPMIS was not shared with the review team but could indicate a step toward more centralized and systematically collected data. Further research is needed.

FFP has conducted cost-efficiency analyses. FFP analyzed new awards issued in 2012, after the programs had ended and found that overall, local and regional procurement saved 35 percent compared to an equivalent Title II basket with ocean and inland transportation costs (USAID 2014b). As discussed earlier in Section 3, USDA implemented a well-funded study of LRP in 2013, which found that cost-effectiveness varied according to commodity type, with locally or regionally procured grains costing 50 percent less than U.S.-sourced grains, and processed commodities (e.g., vegetable oil, corn soy blend) costing more in some cases (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett 2013). More recently, FFP has conducted a preliminary analysis comparing the cost of different modalities (i.e., in-kind, cash transfers, vouchers, and LRP). The results from the analyses indicate that different modalities (cash, in-kind, or mixed modalities) have varying degrees of cost-efficiency depending on the context. However, the presentation of the analysis does not provide sufficient level of detail to assess the factors that underlie the differences in cost by modality, whether the differences are caused by relative price differences at the commodity source (i.e., U.S., local, regional markets), or differences in operational costs across the modalities (e.g., complementary services; in-country transportation costs for in-kind, and distribution costs for cash/vouchers). This level of detail on the cost elements, along with information about the trends for cost elements over time would provide a more complete picture of the actual and projected cost-effectiveness of alternative delivery modalities.

WFP has developed a comprehensive analytical framework for measuring both cost-efficiency (Alpha) and cost-effectiveness (Omega) of alternative delivery modalities. The Alpha cost-efficiency analysis measures outputs against inputs in monetary terms and facilitates comparison of alternative transfer modalities in order to use available resources as efficiently as possible (see Annex 7: Alpha and omega cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness formulas).

The evaluation team recommends that the Alpha and Omega tools be adopted to measure cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness of alternative food assistance distribution modality options.

9. FINDINGS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR MODALITY CHOICES

The degree to which FFP and its partners are able to adapt to contextual changes and shift modalities as needed is very much linked to systems of reporting and data management that are effective for decision-making. In the DRC, the joint FFP/OFDA program is exemplary for its responsiveness to new conflict and has encouraged modality decisions based on market and vulnerability assessments. Overall, FFP systems-level data management needs improvement. The following are factors that contribute to or impede flexibility based on well-informed decisions:

- Analytical requirements of more complex programs are demanding. However, IP assessment and Monitoring and Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning information strategies have not kept pace.
- FFP information management has not kept pace. The document archives are incomplete and difficult to use, and project tracking and cost data gaps and inconsistencies limit cost-efficiency and other analyses.
- Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation by IPs have improved but need further improvement (as described below) to allow comparison of effectiveness, efficiency, and development impact across MBEP strategies.
 - Market and inflation-rate monitoring need to be conducted on a consistent basis and in relation to when cash transfers start, are distributed, and end, as was done in Sierra Leone.
 - Analyses should include both formal and informal market information (e.g., as needed in Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone).
 - Better monitoring of development impacts and linkages to resilience pathways is needed (e.g., as observed in Zimbabwe, Kenya).
 - Monitoring of currency exchange rates should be included in ongoing market monitoring.
 - In the absence of required food security indicators, MBEP IPs have reported on varied indicators (e.g., in progress reports) (see Annex 9), which limits analysis across programs.
- In-kind food assistance requires more extensive and intensive monitoring systems than cash monitoring.

Other lessons learned from this review include:

- Cash, voucher, and LRP are all associated with market development. However, market effects are not systematically monitored or studied, and short-term programming typically has neither the mandate nor the resources to do longer term monitoring. Increasing use of LRP by WFP requires continued regional market analysis.
- Strong fraud-prevention efforts and positive outcomes demonstrate that MBEP can be implemented even in insecure and unaccountable environments (e.g., as observed in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, the DRC, Haiti).

- Larger and less frequent (i.e., “lumpy”) transfers of sufficient quantity may have important effects on self-sufficiency through both psychosocial and livelihood support mechanisms (e.g., as observed in Sierra Leone). Further research is needed to verify if this is true in other countries and to monitor market effects.
- Flexibility in program design is critical, including for modality, timeframe, and sequencing and layering of interventions. Haiti provides a good example of using blended modalities in sequence (e.g., in-kind aid followed by vouchers for food and agricultural inputs, and then cash for work).
- All modalities require supply chains for their delivery. Efficiency and timeliness are affected when infrastructure is not in place, regardless of modality. Modality selection and comparison must adequately take this into account.
- The relationship between modality choices and food security outcomes is contextual and nuanced. Different modalities affect food security outcomes in different contexts. This is why a good response analysis is important.
- Voucher modalities (e.g., cash value, commodity, seed vouchers) are more expensive to administer than direct cash transfers but offer greater controls on what recipients do with the transfer.
- MBEP helps to meet food security needs and can catalyze additional development effects such as financial inclusion, increased mobile phone infrastructure and usage, and psychological wellbeing and potentially strengthen long-term resilience such as through community asset construction, though further research is needed.
- In some cases, the lack of a national registry slowed the beneficiary registration process and limited coordination between partners, potentially creating opportunities for beneficiaries to register for benefits from multiple programs.
- At times, FFP policy regarding the origin of LRP food is overly restrictive—such as when food is not available locally or regionally but is available from trusted international vendors and yet must be sourced from the United States—thus contributing to implementation delays.

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES THAT SHOULD CONTINUE AND/OR BE EXPANDED

- 1) FFP should continue to evolve and expand its use of MBEP programming. While FFP has developed a range of modalities and distribution mechanisms to provide food assistance, FFP should continue to conduct research to maximize the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of its assistance, including its potential impact on resilience and development objectives. FFP should maintain its flexible food assistance toolbox that includes U.S.-sourced in-kind food, cash transfers, vouchers, LRP, and complementary services.
- 2) FFP should continue to seek ways to link emergency and development programs to promote resilience, both at the project level and to promote crisis-responsive national program strategies. The new FFP strategy and the ways that Title II development programs are being designed to be flexible in the face of shocks reinforce the importance of these linkages. For example, the Sudan development program was able to switch to emergency programming as conditions changed, and the Malawi and Madagascar development programs added emergency components to respond to El Niño. These linkages will also be supported through continued coordination with Feed the Future initiatives and other development programs supported by USAID and other donors. This will enable FFP emergency programs to be linked to further complementary programs that improve livelihoods, food security, education, and social protection.
- 3) FFP should continue to insist on good response analyses to inform modality decisions. The FY2017 Annual Program Statement (APS) currently requires analysis and assessment of markets, risk, gender, social dynamics, feasibility, and many other factors as well as a modality decision tool. The FY2017 APS does not require analysis of national policy or an assessment of food assistance programming being implemented by other donors and organizations, which should be included in the response analysis. To the extent possible, especially for projects of more than ten months duration, full proposals should include data supporting the response analysis. Moreover, the APS should clarify that modality choice and design should be systematically revisited throughout the program, such as during each quarterly management review. FFP should continue and expand the use of APS amendments to tailor responses to emerging contexts such as conflict, disease, natural disaster, and economic shocks.
- 4) FFP should continue to encourage IPs to allocate time and resources to strengthen beneficiary engagement, such as through trainings about e-wallets, mobile phone technology, and complaint mechanisms. FFP IPs should continue to ensure that beneficiaries understand targeting criteria and what type of food benefit they are eligible to receive (e.g., supplemental and/or therapeutic foods).
- 5) FFP should continue to deepen coordination with OFDA and other partners to provide an adequate multi-sectoral resource transfer to beneficiaries. For example, FFP and OFDA have joint programs in Somalia, the DRC, and Haiti. There is thus an opportunity in these countries to structure a single grant instrument to encompass food and non-food needs through a unified humanitarian package. This would aid in the harmonization of multi-sectoral strategies and reduce duplication of efforts.

APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES TO MODIFY

- 1) Information management is an urgently needed priority at FFP. An information management system should be immediately financed and developed, perhaps through FFP's management support contract with Macfadden. FFP should invest in an office-wide information management strategy. Document archives need to improve, and the RT recommends a management information system that uses streamlined project reporting, consistent with the Grand Bargain commitments, to track in a timely manner: the project award, implementation start and end dates, efficiency data, and effectiveness measures for MBEP programs. Databases also need to be aligned with analytical needs. Online forms could be used to collect and aggregate standardized data. External technical experts in efficiency analysis could be brought in to review cost-efficiency data and analyses carried out by FFP.
- 2) FFP should upgrade IP requirements for monitoring and evaluation by requiring at least one subjective indicator of food insecurity; the review team recommends the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS). FFP should require IPs to collect anthropometric measures of Global Acute Malnutrition in household surveys using the SMART methodology. GAM should be reported by its two components, that is, wasting and edema. In choosing food security indicators for monitoring in emergency situations, four important considerations are: (1) Can data for measuring the indicator be quickly and easily collected? (2) Is the indicator solid in terms of its validity and reliability? (3) Is the indicator sensitive enough to capture shock-induced food security changes? and (4) Is the indicator consistent with IPC/FEWS NET analysis frameworks? With IPs adopting these indicators, FFP can improve accountability for resources allocated. As per FFP guidance on baseline and endline surveys, household level data should be collected if the project duration is ten months or more in duration.
- 3) Recognizing that emergency programs vary in size, duration, and modality, resources for M&E will vary. However, adequate budgetary resources should be allocated to ensure that IPs have the resources to monitor the indicators above in recommendation 2, monitor markets and beneficiary concerns, and conduct beneficiary baseline and endline surveys and formative research when needed. For example, a multi-year \$3 million project should consider budgeting 3 percent for M&E. FFP should also encourage IPs to routinely collect and monitor outcome data related to development impacts (identified first through qualitative methods) and consider information from both formal (e.g., FEWS NET, national nutrition assessments) and informal sources (e.g., key informants). Extending project timeframes (see recommendation 4, below) should facilitate the establishment of stronger monitoring and evaluation systems.
- 4) FFP should plan adequate timeframes for projects, given the differing requirements of rapid-onset disasters and ongoing support to crisis-affected people. Where FFP supports Title II development programs, a multi-year framework exists. Yet outside Title II development, FFP is limited by short project timeframes in contexts where assistance will be needed for many years (e.g., catastrophic natural hazards, fragile states, and conflict). FFP should consider widening the APS project timeframe to three years for all implementing partners.
- 5) FFP should prepare an organizational development plan. While FFP staffing has grown and evolved to support its larger and more complicated portfolio, more work needs to be done to make FFP a highly effective organization. FFP has a strategic plan, but it does not yet have an operational plan for developing organizational capacity. FFP should place a greater emphasis on field staff capacity and empowerment, clearly articulate field staff roles and responsibilities, and in some cases, increase the

number of field staff. At headquarters, greater capacity is needed in national and regional institutional policy development (e.g., better linkages with policy players in FFP, World Bank, and European Union) so that FFP can contribute more to empowering national governments to manage emergency food assistance. The FFP markets team should also be strengthened and linked with FEWSNET, Leveraging Economic Opportunities, and other USAID programs with market analysis/monitoring expertise. External expertise should be called upon periodically to help upgrade and refine value-for-money analyses, still an emergent area of work in food assistance programming. Greater capacity in project design, monitoring and evaluation also is needed both in terms of more positions as well as professional development opportunities. This will enable FFP to increasingly provide more sound and efficient responses tailored to specific emergency contexts.

- 6) FFP should strengthen analytical guidance in the APS solicitations. The APS should emphasize the importance of robust response analysis by providing guidance for a structured decision making process regarding modality selection. The analysis should integrate information from—at minimum—market assessments, conflict sensitivity analysis, risk analysis, gender considerations, and relevant national government policies. The APS should require applicants to describe their response analysis plan in the concept note and full proposal. Proposals should also describe in the project monitoring section of the proposal what indicators will be monitored over time and how monitoring information will inform consideration of modalities on an ongoing basis. Monitoring of changing conditions affecting project implementation should be an explicit component of quarterly and annual reports. Best practices in response analysis components should be shared among partners.
- 7) FFP should increase and better tailor capacity support to IPs. FFP should emphasize capacity support to field staff through CaLP and FFP’s information management strategy. It should also encourage IPs to improve their readiness to develop supply pipelines relevant to different modalities. APS announcements should highlight the evolving supply chain requirements of different modalities and stipulate that proposals plan for these requirements. FFP should also require IPs to develop supply chain strategies in emergency hotspots. For example, supply chains for cash distribution through mobile phones are different from those that distribute food. FFP should ensure that IPs verify mobile phone network coverage for supply chains that depend on mobile phones and have contingency plans in case private-sector partners cannot deliver services at the needed scale, speed, or quality.
- 8) FFP should consider relaxing its policy regarding the origin of food FFP purchases with cash. For example, during the El Niño drought, food was not available in local or regional markets. LRP rules need to be relaxed to enable FFP to use cash to buy food on the international market if food is not available locally or regionally and if international purchase is more timely, appropriate, and cost-effective than purchasing Title II U.S.-sourced commodities. While there is a clause in the APS allowing for this exception on rare occasions, there is a need for greater openness to non-LRP commodities.
- 9) FFP should encourage IPs to identify context-specific, predictable resource needs, which, if left unaddressed, could undermine the protective impacts of resource transfers. Examples could include the need to procure seeds for the planting season, pay annual school fees, or even procure mosquito nets at the start of the rainy season. “Top-up” transfers provided to enable vulnerable households to meet these expenses without reducing their food consumption, may be seen as supporting complementary activities—or even a form of conditional transfer—contributing to improved food security outcomes. Good examples of timely disbursements of such “top-up” grants

were found in Sierra Leone, using EFSP resources, and in Zimbabwe, using DFID cash transfers. Alternatively, larger, less frequent transfers may also improve vulnerable households' ability to take advantage of favorable food prices, and navigate other household expenses without compromising household food consumption. EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced resources can be used to support such activities.

- 10) As discussed in Recommendation 9 (above) FFP should work with IPs to pilot the practice of distributing cash transfers in larger tranches. Based on findings in Sierra Leone, larger tranches can allow beneficiaries to use resources more creatively to meet their basic food security needs and invest in livelihood activities. Post-distribution monitoring and market monitoring will be especially important in these cases to assess market impacts and other outcomes from larger tranches, as well as to identify contexts where larger tranches are appropriate.
- 11) FFP should hold itself accountable to its 2016-2025 Food Assistance and Food Security Strategy, which prioritizes the introduction of distribution modalities and project activities that enable vulnerable households to manage risk and protect their productive assets as early as possible in the recovery process. In prolonged emergency/recovery responses, FFP should carefully monitor the project impacts, including how different modalities affect beneficiaries' ability to prepare for and recover from shocks. It should also develop strategic, cost-effective approaches for linking conditional and unconditional cash transfers, at both beneficiary and community levels, to help households and communities recover more quickly from emergencies. FFP should systematically assess and coordinate with national initiatives to manage crisis response through social protection and other mechanisms.
- 12) Another priority for both emergency and development programs that is highlighted in FFP's Strategy but rarely implemented is to sequence emergency and development interventions within FFP programs and in coordination with other development partners such as in support of strengthening local and national systems of protection—Haiti, Kenya, and Ethiopia provide good examples. FFP would also benefit from strengthening its own capacity to coordinate more effectively with other donors engaged in social protection and disaster management.

There has been an evolution of crisis-responsive national safety net programs and other national disaster management initiatives supported by diverse donors. Where devolution of budgets is occurring (e.g., Kenya), national safety net initiatives are the responsibility of local governments; therefore this is an important opportunity for building resilience. Specifically, FFP, along with other donors, should support the development of national beneficiary registries, where appropriate, to improve coordination between government agencies, implementing partners, and donors and strengthen links between humanitarian relief and development activities. Typically, these initiatives require multi-donor efforts, and FFP should coordinate with the larger constellation of actors supporting these programs.

- 13) FFP should capitalize on the opportunity to build back stronger after a disaster and encourage IPs to design programming to meet food security needs and catalyze additional development effects. For example, FFP can promote financial inclusion of vulnerable populations by encouraging IPs to deliver cash transfers via banks and mobile phones. FFP and IPs should also ensure that monitoring systems capture the contributions of such efforts to development outcomes, e.g., the extent of improvements to market functioning and psychological wellbeing following MBEP.
- 14) FFP should continue to explore ways that its emergency cash transfer programs may contribute to broader resilience-building efforts, while balancing cost tradeoffs. One strategy that has been used

with success in Kenya and Somalia is using emergency food transfers as a foundation for other OFDA and/or Mission investments in livelihoods, education, WASH, and protection programs. FFP should support comparative operational research to assess design criteria and modalities for different contexts. This could include comparing responses such as building community assets versus providing short-term food or cash transfers; cash transfers versus vouchers; and regular (e.g., monthly) cash transfers versus larger, less-frequent (“lumpy”) disbursements. The study conducted by BCG for WFP in Jordan and Lebanon is an excellent example of this type of research.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: REFERENCES

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ANNEX 2: USAID FFP MODALITY DECISION TOOL

Table 6: Excerpts from the USAID Food For Peace Modality Decision Tool							
<p>HOW TO USE: The process involves evaluating all modality response options against four key questions. It is intended to use all available data and build consensus through engaging content or context experts. It is certainly possible to complete the process on an individual basis; however, there are distinct advantages to completing the process together with other relevant staff. The questions should be answered in the order they are presented as it narrows down and prioritizes the options. Results could potentially indicate that several suitable modality options exist for a specific context. The flexible nature of the MDT allows it to fit anywhere into the application development or review process. It can be applied to a specific application or be completed to reflect consensus on a homogenous geographic area. The MDT process could and should be applied whenever there is a need to identify modality recommendations.</p>							
Question 1				Is the modality appropriate given the market conditions?			
Question 2				Does the proposed modality and delivery mechanism have a reasonable chance of success considering the context, infrastructure and programming risks?			
Question 3				Is the modality appropriate, given the market conditions?			
Question 4				Is the modality cost-efficient relative to others and in respect to available resources?			
<p>MDT MATRIX: Teams might find it useful to complete the MDT matrix below as they answer each one of the key questions. Completion of the matrix also serves the purpose of acting as a written justification of modality choice. Each key question should be applied to the list of modalities and a corresponding answer (or color) of yes, partially or no should be entered in the table.</p>							
		<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Yes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Partially</td> </tr> <tr> <td>No</td> </tr> </table>			Yes	Partially	No
Yes							
Partially							
No							
	Appropriateness	Feasibility	Objective	Cost			
Local Procurement							
Regional Procurement							
International Procurement							
U.S. In-kind							
Cash Transfer							
Food Vouchers							
<p>*Note that any modality with a red label needs strong justification for proceeding and should explore mitigation measures or wait for contextual changes. Source: USAID Food For Peace Modality Decision Tool. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pbaae883.pdf</p>							

ANNEX 3: NUMBER OF KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED

Case Study	Number of KIIs
DRC	76
Haiti	43
Jordan/Turkey	37
Kenya	32
Nigeria	42
Sierra Leone	40
Zimbabwe	58
WFP Rome	5
FFP Washington DC/other	13
Total	270

ANNEX 4: LITERATURE SYNTHESIS

Synthesis of Literature on the Recent Evolution of Evidence for Emergency Food Assistance

This is a more detailed version of what appears earlier in the report (Section 3: Background).

Introduction: Until relatively recently, humanitarian assistance, and specifically emergency food assistance, was provided through in-kind food, often sourced from developed countries, primarily the United States (Gentilini 2016; Schnepf 2015; Harvey and Bailey 2011). The first widespread use of cash-based programming—cash used by donors and IPs to locally or regionally purchase food (LRP), distribute vouchers or cash transfers to beneficiaries, or undertake complementary programming—in modern humanitarian settings can be traced back to the 2004 Asian Tsunami humanitarian response. Since then, there has been rapid growth and increased sophistication in the use of different programmatic strategies, modalities of food assistance, resource transfer distribution infrastructure, and management information platforms/systems.

The goal of emergency food assistance is to achieve food security for crisis-affected populations. During the past seven years, there has been rapid evolution in programming towards that end. While there is a lack of consensus on the strategies that best achieve this goal for crisis prone populations, Gentilini (2016, 6) best summarizes the body of literature on differing approaches to emergency food assistance as follows: “While recalling the general caveats on comparability, studies have generally concluded that transfer appropriateness is context-specific and hinges on multiple factors that shape the performance of transfers across time and space.” Our review of the literature mirrors Gentilini’s findings and supports the evolution of flexible, and often more complex, market-based and multi-modal strategies to achieve food security.

The evolution of cash-based programming and MBEP has garnered a great deal of scrutiny by different stakeholders (GAO, USAID IG, academics, think tanks) from different disciplinary and sectoral orientations. There have been a number of meta-analyses and reviews of various aspects of MBEPs (Bastagli et al. 2016; Gentilini 2016; Kardan et al. 2017; Lentz et al. 2013b; Hoddinott et al. 2013). We synthesize this literature in this section of the report.

Various organizations see three levels of support to markets as depicted by the Figure 15 below.

Figure 15: Levels of support to markets provided by market-based programming



Source: Henderson et al. 2013.

Food assistance can support markets by being integrated into markets (market-integrated relief) or by strengthening markets (indirect support through markets and market strengthening and development). FFP strategies include all three of these approaches, though it is dominated by market-integrated assistance through LRP, cash and vouchers.

EVOLUTION OF MBEP: There were two major breakthroughs towards increasing adaptation of MBEP. The first was the line of literature that supported cash transfers to beneficiaries as a viable strategy to improve food security among the poor. The second was demonstrating that local and regional purchase of commodities could result in more efficient and timely humanitarian assistance while also supporting local and regional market systems (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett 2013).

A GROWING EVIDENCE BASE FOR CASH TRANSFERS AS A LEGITIMATE MODALITY FOR EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE: Beginning in the mid-1990s, successful Latin American experiments ushered in a “revolution” of cash transfer programs within the region, and established a new acceptance of applying rigorous experimental and non-experimental impact evaluations of social programs (Davis et al. 2012; Skoufias and Quisumbing 2005). As new evidence from social protection programs—notably from Mexico (*Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación*), Brazil (*Bolsa Alimentação*), and Honduras (Family Allowances Program or *Programa de Asignación Familiar*)—demonstrated the versatility of cash transfer programs as an effective and appropriate instrument toward alleviation of extreme poverty (Harvey and Bailey 2015), impact evaluations pushed forward better methodology, technique, design and implementation practices and helped expand cash transfer programs globally (Davis et al. 2012; Ballard 2013; Nelson et al. 2015; High Level Panel of Experts on Humanitarian Cash Transfers 2015). At the same time, growing concerns about international food aid efficiency and cost-effectiveness—particularly related to transoceanic shipments, local monetization of commodities (Schnepf 2015) and tied food assistance—contributed to the emergence of dialogue and

experimentation in the use of cash transfer programs within global humanitarian and development aid programs (Gentilini 2016; Barrett and Maxwell 2005).

Widespread use of market-based programming as part of emergency response expanded following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami when rapid, large-scale assistance was needed. After the tsunami, the preferred staple, rice, was locally available but unaffordable to disaster victims (Lentz et al. 2013b). Large donations of cash gave several aid agencies the flexibility to experiment with small-scale cash transfers, vouchers, and LRP of food to test suitability and feasibility (Harvey and Bailey 2015; Schnepf 2015; Lentz et al. 2013b). In 2010, the Government of Pakistan provided prepaid debit cards to 1.7 million flood victims (ODI 2015). In 2011, a consortium of international NGOs and local partners responding to the Somalia famine faced restricted access due to insecurity (Harvey et al. 2013; High Level Panel of Experts on Humanitarian Cash Transfers 2015). Humanitarian agencies could not distribute food aid but were able to distribute millions of dollars in unconditional cash transfers and commodity vouchers.

However, systematic evidence that rigorously assessed the effectiveness, efficiency, and development impact of different assistance modalities is relatively new. This is the result of the evolution of more sophisticated evaluation methodologies and the increased sophistication of evaluation studies that apply appropriate counterfactuals (cash, vouchers, etc.), varied design characteristics (gender, amount/timing of transfers) and study an array of outcomes (food security, psychosocial well-being, livelihood assets, market resilience).

Further adding to the evidence base indicating the legitimacy of cash transfers, Bastagli and colleagues (2016) conducted one of the more exhaustive systematic literature reviews on cash transfers in low-income contexts. Their review does not compare other food assistance modalities, and the literature reviewed was heavily dominated by non-humanitarian settings, but the review found strong evidence linking cash transfers and a variety of humanitarian and development goals such as reduced monetary poverty, increased school attendance, increased use of health services, and improved dietary diversity. The review also found positive impacts on savings, investment, and production. Contrary to concerns that cash transfers might be a disincentive to work, more than half the studies showed no significant impact of cash transfers on employment, whereas of the studies that showed a significant effect, the majority found that cash transfers were associated with increased participation and intensity of employment. Decreases in employment were associated with the elderly, those caring for dependents, and reductions in casual labor. Findings about women's empowerment were mixed; evidence shows that transfers can increase women's decisionmaking power and reduce physical violence but may increase non-physical abuse by men.

Other research suggests that cash does not carry excess risk compared to other modalities (ODI 2015; Bailey and Harvey 2015; Evans and Popova 2017). These risks include fraud, abuse, and concerns about discretionary spending (beneficiaries using transfers for temptation goods).

Design features related to better outcomes included the magnitude and timing of cash transfers and the duration of program exposure (Bastagli et al. 2016; Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013; Haushofer and Shapiro 2016). Only two of these studies evaluated the effects of large cash transfers in highly contextual settings and only one included food security outcomes (Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013). Their research suggested that short-term food security and livelihoods may be differently affected by timing and amounts of transfers with short-term food security outcomes somewhat better for smaller, regular transfers. However, it is unclear whether or not the magnitude of differences in food security are


meaningful, and the study was not long enough to examine the longer term food security impacts of larger and “lumpier” transfers.

Gentilini (2016) produced the most relevant analysis of studies designed to compare and contrast the performance of different modalities of food assistance. He conducted a more focused and systematic review of 11 rigorous impact studies in 10 countries evaluating in-kind food and vouchers as the counterfactual to cash transfers in development and humanitarian settings. The analysis of effectiveness differences between cash transfers and food/vouchers found ambiguous results, suggesting that different modalities perform differently in different contexts (see Figure 16 below). Moreover, the complexity of programming renders unnecessary arguments about the comparative advantages of the effectiveness of different modalities. Gentilini also found that cash/vouchers were generally more efficient than in-kind food in the small set of cases he examined, though the robustness of the results is limited by data limitations and methodological differences in cost accounting. This finding echoes findings by Hoddinott et al. (2013), who concluded that when food procurement costs are removed from the analysis, food is always more expensive. However, where in-kind food procurement is cheaper than the price of retail purchase locally, the gap between food and cash/voucher would narrow and may even reverse.

Most recently, BCG (2017) conducted an individually randomized study comparing effectiveness, efficiency, and local economy impacts between cash and voucher transfers among Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. This study had three arms, voucher, cash, and choice, which allowed researchers to assess beneficiary choice empirically. This study found that cash performed at least as well if not better than vouchers on all criteria (e.g., value-for-money, dignity, flexibility, and cash-flow management), resulting in a choice strategy for Jordan and Lebanon.

Recent research also highlights multiplier effects of food assistance modalities. Using a Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) econometric analysis, Thome and colleagues (2016) found that every \$1 transferred to Social Cash Transfer program recipients in Sub-Saharan countries generated an additional \$0.27-\$1.52 of local income. Recent evidence relating to the local economic impact of refugees in Rwanda indicates that each additional refugee receiving \$120-126 in cash transfers increases the real annual income of the local economy by much more than the value of the cash transfer, \$205-253, within a ten-mile radius of refugee settlements (Taylor et al. 2016). In simulations, in-kind food for each additional refugee generated a smaller real annual income impact of \$145. This prompted the Government of Rwanda to favor a national policy of cash transfers. Findings from a study of the effects of refugees in Uganda were similar with respect to the multiplier effects and the superiority of cash over food. It is worthwhile to note that all modalities have multiplier effects; an important consideration is where FFP wants the effects to accrue: in the United States or in and around countries experiencing emergencies.

Figure 16: Summary of impacts by cash and food transfers and indicators in ten countries



EVOLUTION OF LRP OF COMMODITIES FOR PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE: LRP was another modality strategy that grew rapidly in recent years. The U.S. government recognized the theoretical advantages of LRP in terms of appropriateness, efficiency, and development impact, so USDA implemented a small, well-funded LRP experiment. Findings from this study found favorable but context specific efficiency/effectiveness gains with LRP (Barrett et al. 2013). Consequently, global funding for LRP quickly increased following policy changes in the European Union, Canada, and the U.S. (Lentz et al. 2013). The U.S. went from funding almost no LRPs to funding more than any other donor, and in FY2011, about three quarters of EFSP funding was allocated to LRP, with the remainder largely allocated to vouchers and to a lesser extent cash transfers.

With the rapid expansion of new modalities, emerging research assessed cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of different modalities. Lentz, Passarelli, and Barret (2013) cite numerous studies providing evidence that, based on data from large-scale food aid provider WFP, LRP is cost-effective and timely. In their evaluation of smaller-scale procurement, typical of procurement by NGOs, in nine countries, LRP or distributing cash or vouchers reduced distribution time by 62 percent, almost 14 weeks, compared to transoceanic delivery of in-kind food aid (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett 2013). Cost-effectiveness varied according to commodity type. Locally or regionally procured grains cost 50 percent less than U.S.-sourced grains, whereas local or regionally procured processed commodities, such as vegetable oil and corn soy blend, cost more in some cases and varied by country.

Other studies evaluated criteria related to appropriateness. Despite concerns about impacts to local markets, short-term, small-scale LRP activities had no statistically significant relationship with local price levels or volatility in most cases (Garg et al. 2013). A small number of price changes, though difficult to attribute to any one source, highlight the importance of both ex-ante response analysis and ex-post market monitoring. Violette and colleagues (2013) assessed local preference for locally-procured rations compared to U.S.-sourced foods in Burkina Faso, Guatemala, and Zambia and found that individuals receiving locally procured rations, especially less well-off recipients, were more satisfied than recipients of U.S.-sourced foods. Harou et al. (2013) compared the performance of LRP and transoceanic shipment of food aid using six criteria (timeliness, cost, market price impacts, satisfying recipients' preferences, food quality and safety, and benefiting smallholder suppliers) in two countries (Burkina Faso and Guatemala) and found that neither modality had clear advantages across all criteria in either country.

Understanding local and regional markets is critical to MBEP. Cash transfers can be used flexibly by recipients to fulfill multi-sectoral needs but require a functioning private market (Harvey 2005; Gentilini 2016). Consequently, market analysis becomes an important component for project design and modality selection. Market stability and price dynamics have a strong influence on beneficiary preferences and therefore on project outcomes and efficiency (Gentilini 2016). Despite this, market stability does not dictate the appropriateness of cash transfer programs. Implementing cash transfers in a context of insecurity and weak markets is difficult but not impossible (Harvey 2005). Moreover, markets can recover quickly, and cash distribution can trigger a supply side response in which traders make goods available (Bailey et al. 2008). Nevertheless, no transfer modality fits every situation; modality selection depends heavily on contextual factors (Hoddinott 2013; Gentilini 2016). In most cases, modalities should be chosen based on program objectives, context, and cost-efficiency (Gentilini 2016; Hoddinott 2013; Harvey and Bailey 2011).

MBEP is becoming more embedded in policies, guidelines, standards, and statements of principle (ODI 2015). ECHO's 10 principles for multi-purpose cash programming have been endorsed by European governments and the High Level Humanitarian Cash Panel. WFP has written a cash and voucher manual to help country offices choose the most appropriate transfer modalities (WFP 2014). UNOCHA is

investing greater effort to ensure that cash programming is integrated into coordination mechanisms (ODI 2015). CaLP seeks to strengthen organizations' capacity by compiling and sharing good practices in cash transfer programs (e.g., Harvey and Bailey 2011; Venton et al. 2015). CashCap is a new initiative to provide standby capacity of experts in cash programming.

Decisionmaking support tools have emerged to help agencies and donors select context appropriate modalities (Maxwell, Parker, and Stobaugh 2013). Despite recent improvements in food security analysis and tools, the tools are often technically complex, may be prescriptive, may not address the specific choices available to the agency, and/or organizations may lack the capacity or time to utilize the tools (Maxwell, Parker, and Stobaugh 2013). Selection of food assistance modalities is influenced by donor resources and internal, organizational factors, thus limiting decisionmaking based on more complete evidence and analysis. Other factors that influence decisionmaking include (1) program contexts and priorities such as need for timeliness/speed of delivery, cost, benefits to local producers, and beneficiary preferences (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett 2013; Harou et al. 2013), (2), design parameters such as targeting method, conditionality, transfer size, and duration, 3) technical issues such as the functioning of markets (Gentilini 2016; Maxwell, Parker, and Stobaugh 2013), and recipient-country government policy, logistical and time considerations, risk considerations, and personal experience (Maxwell, Parker, and Stobaugh 2013). Levine and Bailey (2015) provide a guide for selecting modalities.

A wide range of actors have become engaged in MBEP, including governments, international aid, and national civil society organizations (Adams 2007; Harvey and Bailey 2011; Harvey 2005). Notably Oxfam, WFP, Save the Children, and Catholic Relief Services have all had a "pioneering role" in the expansion of cash transfer programs (Harvey and Bailey 2011). Donors are also contributing more; DFID, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and USAID have all expanded their funding for cash-based interventions.

TRENDS IN MBEP: CaLP recently conducted an analysis of cases of humanitarian assistance in which multimodal approaches were employed. The review emphasized the contextual nature of project design and the need for appropriate response analysis (Boulinaud and Coneff 2017). Maxwell et al. (2013) were among the first to explicitly define response analysis for the design of food assistance programs, including for the selection of food modalities. Programs have become increasingly sophisticated in design and implementation, recognizing that analysis and adjustment to changing context is important. TANGO (2017) recently analyzed 30 WFP program evaluations of operations in urban settings, communities that are typically engaged in a cash economy. The analysis concluded that flexibility and adapting to changing contexts with the most appropriate modality or modalities was important to success. It also identified the need for WFP to provide a stronger decision framework to guide field operators in program design and implementation. They noted that monitoring and evaluation systems were inadequate to capture the range of important outcomes of programs.

An important macro-level development is the interest in integrating humanitarian assistance into social protection programs, termed shock responsive social protection programs (Kardan et al. 2017). Many donors view this movement as a way to transition humanitarian assistance to management by national governments. However, the analysis rightly identifies the overlapping and sometimes parallel activities of social protection, humanitarian and disaster risk management systems. The review also finds that social protection programs and those focused on humanitarian emergencies have differences related to many design parameters such as objectives, underlying values and principles, and duration of assistance. This affects design parameters such as targeting, transfer amounts, and modality choice. The report endorses the need for more thoughtful work to ensure that national crisis response initiatives are coherent.

Rapid development of information technology and cellular communications is enabling more effective and efficient use of all modalities. Mobile information management platforms and tools allow more efficient transfer of resources to beneficiaries (ODI 2015). Remote sensing and the availability of drones is revolutionizing targeting (Abelson, Varshney and Sun 2014). Information technology is changing the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of cash, voucher and food supply chains and is also creating more effective feedback loops with beneficiaries. The application of these systems to humanitarian problems also has secondary development effects on beneficiary households, most notably financial inclusion (Center for Financial Inclusion 2017). These trends will continue to reduce the costs of resource transfers, particularly cash and vouchers.

In summary, MBEP has evolved considerably over the past decade. An emerging evidence base suggests the importance of a market-based approach, the highly contextual nature of program design, the importance of continued monitoring and adjustment to context. Added to this is the critical importance of taking into account different outcomes to monitor effectiveness, efficiency, and development impacts together with studies that have sufficiently long timeframes to understand the temporal dimensions of intervention impacts. Given the contextual nature of response to interventions, the literature review emphasizes the critical importance of strong formative research, monitoring, and evaluation of MBEP programs.


ANNEX 5: LIFE HISTORIES: FOOD ASSISTANCE AND RESILIENCE TRAJECTORIES

In-depth life history interviews were conducted with program participants in each case study to better understand the impact of food assistance in the broader context of the major events of their lives—in particular, how food assistance has contributed to the resilience trajectories of beneficiaries. This section provides one summarized life history from each case study. For the full series of 2-3 life history interviews per country, see individual case study reports.

TRAJECTORY—BETTER OFF WITH THE SUPPORT OF MBEP: The life history summaries below from Zimbabwe and Haiti are examples of success stories in which the beneficiaries interviewed have recovered from the emergency with the help of the food assistance and are even better off.

Life History 2: Atwell

Zimbabwe: Food assistance linked to livelihood development and community asset creation builds resilience to economic + climatic shocks



*Name has been changed.


Atwell was born in 1965 in Zimbabwe. His schooling was interrupted several times, by war, because of being in ill-health as a child, due to his mother's death, and lack of funds. As a young man, Atwell worked hard to provide for his wife and children. His life was improving, but as an untrained carpenter it was difficult to make a good living. Since 2015, Atwell has participated in the Productive Asset Creation garden program, which he reports has helped diversify his livelihoods. The program provides unconditional food or cash transfers during the lean season, and provides cash for assets to build community assets that help them manage their natural resources amidst the strains of climate change. Atwell uses skills learned in Productive Asset Creation trainings to improve his home garden and field crops. Atwell also built a small dam at his homestead to water his garden. Atwell supplements his income with building, carpentry and blacksmithing jobs and with earnings from the garden VSLA. The trajectory of his life since joining the program has been very positive.

Life History 3: Jacqueline

Haiti: Participating vendor expands her business activities and livelihood assets



Jacqueline*
 Female
 Age 60
 Central Department
 Haiti




*Name has been changed.

Jacqueline was born in Haiti in 1957 into a family of very modest means. Her parents could not afford to send her to school. She married young and had seven children. She had always made some income providing a laundry service, and her parents' garden was a source of food. But after her divorce she experienced extremely difficult times. She migrated to the Dominican Republic to find work for a few years. She began small trading in 2007 at the age of 50. She sold oil, spices, and bananas. In 2014 she joined an FFP-funded NGO project as a vendor to sell the beneficiaries fresh produce. This was a time of drought in her community, which affected the small traders and markets. With this opportunity her life has changed. She no longer does the laundry work, but instead she has focused on expanding her small business, adding new products and carrying larger quantities of products. She has also been able to increase the number of chickens and cattle that she owns.

TRAJECTORY—ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY: The life history summaries that follow from Nigeria, Jordan, Kenya, and the DRC provide stories of beneficiaries who have been able to significantly recover from hardship as a result of MBEP and may very-well be on a resilience trajectory; yet, the road to full recovery is long. Longer-term assistance is needed.

Life History 4: Fatima

Nigeria: Voucher improves well-being of IDP after facing terror and tragedy




Fatima*
 Female
 Age 35
 Maiduguri IDP camp
 Nigeria

*Name has been changed.

Fatima was born in a town a few hours from Maiduguri, in northern Nigeria, where she is now an IDP. As a young child she remembers that her family was healthy and they ran a large farm. At age 14 she was married and started a family. They had a good sized farm and life was going well, she says. The conflict with Boko Haram started in 2014 and her village was ransacked. All of their farm assets were taken. In the chaos one child went missing, her five-year old boy, and he was never found. While held captive she was able to sneak away during the night and walked for two weeks to Cameroon. Fatima was pregnant at the time, yet miscarried while in a packed truck heading back to Nigeria. There was no assistance being offered yet and they were begging from anyone who would help. Ten months ago Fatima received the e-voucher. Her family now has enough food, which has helped their well-being greatly, though it is not enough to keep the children in school. Six weeks before the interview, Fatima bore her eighth child, a healthy boy. She dreams of the day they will return to the farm.

Life History 5: Azza

Syria: FFP-funded voucher combined with housing and business supports from other sources are the turning point for a widow of the war




*Name has been changed.

Note: the graph for this case study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team.

Azza was born in Syria in 1988. She described her childhood and youth as happy with abundant support from her parents. At age 19 she married a man from her village, and life seemed normal for a few years. Due to the fighting, Azza and her family were displaced from their home. Her husband's life was threatened, and one day, he disappeared. She knew then she had to leave Syria and fled to Jordan. Upon arrival to the camp she received two months of food aid. She felt fortunate to find a Syrian trading association in Jordan looking after widows of the war. She was provided with a small apartment, and they helped her buy kitchen supplies that have allowed her to cook food to sell. Then Azza received a food voucher and a cash transfer. The impact of this assistance was immense, she said, as it enabled her to cope with the difficulties of life as a refugee. She reported that cash assistance, compared to food aid, has had a stronger impact on her life, allowing her to operate her new business. She used part of the cash to buy raw materials and inputs. Cash and food voucher, she explained, gave her flexibility and options, which, combined with support from the Syrian association, has helped strengthen her resilience.

Life History 6: Faith

Kenya: Cash assistance supports recovery of agro-pastoralist after drought




*Name has been changed. Photo not available.

Note: the graph for this case study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team.

Faith was born in 1959 in a village in Taveta District, Kenya. She was born into an extremely poor household with an alcoholic father. Faith was “heartbroken” when she was pulled out of school, and sent to work in Nairobi. At the age of 26, a marriage was arranged for her. Faith moved back from Nairobi to her husband’s home. Together, they produced vegetables to sell in the market and then began keeping livestock, including goats and cows. She was involved in community table banking, which supported her to buy and multiply her livestock. Over the years their family grew to include seven children, and Faith proudly acknowledged she has managed to keep her children in school. The drought of 2011 greatly affected her family’s food security and livelihood. The price of livestock dropped, which was a great financial strain on them. When she first joined the IP program in 2013 she received food aid, but later received money as part of a CFA project. With the cash, she has started other income activities that have grown over time. Faith also improved her farming methods through the trainings provided by the IP. The cash assistance, in her opinion, was preferred, as it allowed her to meet the other financial needs of her family such as purchasing medication and paying for school fees. Faith attributes her current well-being and recovery to the IP program.

Life History 7: Matayo and Furaha DRC: Couple struggles to recover livelihood after conflict, receive food voucher/NFIs



*Names have been changed. Note: the graph for this case study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team.

Matayo and **Furaha** of the DRC are still in their younger adult years, but have already been together for nearly 17 years. They started off well in their life together, with both involved in petty trading and farming. While there was a year of hardship due to sickness in the family, their household well-being was improving for the most part. The years that followed, though, were increasingly difficult. There was the tragic death of their youngest child, and then the inter-tribal fighting began. In November 2016 they fled, leaving their plot of farmland and the few assets they owned behind. They were hungry, often suffering from illness, and they lacked adequate shelter and access to land. In June 2017 they moved to a village in North Kivu. Restarting their livelihood has been challenging for various reasons: they no longer have any trading capital for small business activities, they have to pay rent for the farmland, and they have debts for their children's school fees. They are thankful for the help they have received from the IP. They received NFIs and vouchers. With the food, they are now eating well. This has provided them with a measure of stability to get re-established. While they are on the road to recovery, assistance in the form of cash would give them the means to pay bills and invest in some form of economic activity. This household is still in need.

ANNEX 6: SURVEY MONKEY RESULTS

Q1: Which of the following statements best describes your involvement with market-based emergency food assistance programs (funded with EFSP, 202(e), and/or 202(e)-enhanced)?

Answer Choices	Responses	
I am currently involved, or was previously involved, in policy, planning or management of Food for Peace (FFP)-funded emergency food assistance programs.	97.56%	40
I have never been involved in policy, planning or management of Food for Peace (FFP)-funded emergency food assistance programs.	2.44%	1
	Answered	41
	Skipped	1

Q2: What is/was the primary geographic focus of your work? (check only one)

Answer Choices	Responses	
Global	7.50%	3
Africa	55.00%	22
Asia	0.00%	0
Latin America and the Caribbean	12.50%	5
Europe and Eurasia	0.00%	0
Middle East	25.00%	10
	Answered	40
	Skipped	2

Q3: Organization (check only one)

Answer Choices	Responses	
USAID Food for Peace	32.50%	13
Implementing partner—NGO	55.00%	22
Implementing partner—WFP	5.00%	2
Implementing partner —private sector	2.50%	1
Other (please specify)	5.00%	2
	Answered	40
	Skipped	2

Q4: # years working on food assistance/ food security programming

Answer Choices	Responses	
0-1	10.00%	4
2-4	27.50%	11
5-9	42.50%	17
10+	20.00%	8
	Answered	40
	Skipped	2

Q5: Please indicate your level of agreement with these statements.

	Strongly disagree		Disagree		Agree		Strongly agree		Don't know/ no opinion		Total
In-kind food is less vulnerable to waste, fraud and/or abuse than cash.	12.82%	5	61.54%	24	17.95%	7	0.00%	0	7.69%	3	39
The use of blended modalities is usually the most appropriate strategy.	2.56%	1	23.08%	9	51.28%	20	23.08%	9	0.00%	0	39
In-kind food is easier to target than cash.	12.82%	5	66.67%	26	10.26%	4	5.13%	2	5.13%	2	39
In-kind food disrupts the local market.	2.56%	1	48.72%	19	35.90%	14	7.69%	3	5.13%	2	39
Vouchers are generally preferable to cash transfers.	5.13%	2	51.28%	20	30.77%	12	5.13%	2	7.69%	3	39
Comments											18
										Answered	39
										Skipped	3

Q6: Have the FFP-funded emergency program(s) you have worked on conducted any type of response analysis?

Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	71.79%	28
No	28.21%	11
	Answered	39
	Skipped	3

Q7: Please indicate your level of agreement with this statement: With regard to the FFP-funded emergency program(s) I have worked on, response analysis has been done with sufficient rigor to inform decisions about the most appropriate modality/(ies) to use in emergency settings.

Answer Choices	Responses	
Strongly disagree	10.71%	3
Disagree	17.86%	5
Agree	60.71%	17
Strongly agree	7.14%	2
Don't know/ no opinion	3.57%	1
Comment		10
	Answered	28
	Skipped	14

Q8: What types of response analysis have been done in the FFP-funded emergency program(s) you have worked on? (Tick all that apply.) Each response analysis category is followed by examples of the tools used in that type of analysis. There may be additional examples in each category. Please specify other types of response analysis using the “other” option. (Categories from Maxwell, Parker, and Stobaugh 2013)

Answer Choices	Responses	
Market analysis (e.g., EMMA, WFP Market Analysis Tool, SCP Tool, MIFIRA, implementing partner internal tools)	89.29%	25
Livelihoods sector-specific analysis (e.g., LEGS, SSSA, implementing partner internal tools)	35.71%	10
Nutrition sector-specific analysis (e.g., WHO Decision Chart for Implementing Selective Feeding Programs, WFP Decision Tree for Response Options—Nutrition Intervention Food Products, FAQR Decision Trees, implementing partner internal tools)	42.86%	12
Modality-specific analysis (e.g., Good Practice Review Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies, ECHO Decision Tree for Response Options, Save the Children Risk Assessment Tool, implementing partner internal tools)	53.57%	15
Harm mitigation analysis (Benefits/Harms Analysis, Do No Harm, Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations, implementing partner internal tools)	25.00%	7
Process/consensus oriented analysis (FAO Response Analysis Framework, WFP Response Analysis Project, Oxfam Response Analysis Guide, implementing partner internal tools)	10.71%	3
Emergency Food Security Assessment	50.00%	14
Other (please specify)	7.14%	2
	Answered	28
	Skipped	14

Q9: Please indicate your level of agreement with these statements: “The availability of flexible modalities for emergency food assistance...”

	Strongly disagree		Disagree		Agree		Strongly agree		Don't know/ no opinion		Total
...has confused beneficiaries.	10.26%	4	53.85%	21	20.51%	8	0.00%	0	15.38%	6	39
...has resulted in developmental effects.	0.00%	0	2.56%	1	58.97%	23	7.69%	3	30.77%	12	39
...has increased dietary diversity among beneficiaries.	0.00%	0	5.13%	2	58.97%	23	23.08%	9	12.82%	5	39
...has resulted in better nutritional status among beneficiaries.	0.00%	0	2.56%	1	66.67%	26	15.38%	6	15.38%	6	39
...has led to better linkages between emergency food assistance and longer-term interventions aimed to improve food security.	0.00%	0	5.13%	2	51.28%	20	33.33%	13	10.26%	4	39
...has led to innovations in food security programming that yield better results.	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	48.72%	19	41.03%	16	10.26%	4	39
...has enabled FFP-sponsored programs to change modalities as the context changes.	0.00%	0	2.56%	1	43.59%	17	48.72%	19	5.13%	2	39
...has created additional analytical hurdles.	0.00%	0	51.28%	20	23.08%	9	12.82%	5	12.82%	5	39
...allows sequencing and layering, e.g., in-kind food immediately after a disaster, followed by cash for work, nutrition interventions, and complementary programming.	0.00%	0	2.56%	1	35.90%	14	48.72%	19	12.82%	5	39
Comments											4
...has strengthened the ability of FFP-supported programs to choose the most appropriate modality/(ies) based on the context.	0.00%	0	7.69%	3	35.90%	14	53.85%	21	2.56%	1	39
...has made it too complicated to effectively program food assistance.	17.95%	7	71.79%	28	2.56%	1	2.56%	1	5.13%	2	39
...has improved cost efficiency of emergency food assistance programming.	0.00%	0	7.69%	3	48.72%	19	25.64%	10	17.95%	7	39
...has increased timeliness of food assistance in emergencies.	0.00%	0	12.82%	5	46.15%	18	30.77%	12	10.26%	4	39
...has expanded geographic coverage of food assistance programs.	0.00%	0	10.26%	4	46.15%	18	20.51%	8	23.08%	9	39
...has increased # of beneficiaries reached.	0.00%	0	12.82%	5	43.59%	17	30.77%	12	12.82%	5	39
...has contributed to price inflation.	0.00%	0	64.10%	25	10.26%	4	0.00%	0	25.64%	10	39
...has accelerated local/regional market recovery in emergencies.	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	48.72%	19	35.90%	14	15.38%	6	39
...has enhanced local /regional market functioning.	0.00%	0	2.56%	1	51.28%	20	25.64%	10	20.51%	8	39
...has increased beneficiary satisfaction with food assistance.	0.00%	0	5.13%	2	41.03%	16	35.90%	14	17.95%	7	39
										Answered	39
										Skipped	3

Q10: What training have you received, and from whom? For each topic for which you received training, please indicate the source(s) that provided this training (you may check >1 source for each topic). If you did not receive training, tick “no training.” If you received training but do not recall the source, tick “don't recall.”

	No training		FFP		Other donor (not FFP)		The IP that I work for		Another IP		WFP		TOPS		CaLP		ODI		Academi c/ research institution		Gov't body/ ministry		Don't recall		Total	
Local purchase process (e.g., price negotiation, quality control, audits, work w/ vendors)	64.71 %	22	5.88%	2	0.00%	0	14.71 %	5	5.88%	2	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	5.88%	2	0.00%	0	5.88%	2	0.00%	0	8.82%	3	34	
Regional purchase process	69.70 %	23	6.06%	2	0.00%	0	12.12 %	4	3.03%	1	3.03%	1	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	9.09%	3	33	
Cash transfers - electronic	38.89 %	14	11.11 %	4	0.00%	0	16.67 %	6	11.11 %	4	5.56%	2	5.56%	2	27.78 %	10	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	8.33%	3	36	
Cash transfers - non-electronic	40.00 %	14	8.57%	3	0.00%	0	14.29 %	5	5.71%	2	2.86%	1	5.71%	2	28.57 %	10	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	8.57%	3	35	
Vouchers - electronic	36.36 %	12	9.09%	3	0.00%	0	21.21 %	7	15.15 %	5	6.06%	2	3.03%	1	18.18 %	6	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	9.09%	3	33	
Vouchers-non-electronic	38.24 %	13	8.82%	3	0.00%	0	17.65 %	6	17.65 %	6	2.94%	1	0.00%	0	17.65 %	6	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	8.82%	3	34	
Conditional transfers	41.67 %	15	16.67 %	6	0.00%	0	16.67 %	6	5.56%	2	0.00%	0	2.78%	1	13.89 %	5	0.00%	0	8.33%	3	0.00%	0	8.33%	3	36	
Response analysis	42.86 %	15	14.29 %	5	0.00%	0	14.29 %	5	8.57%	3	8.57%	3	5.71%	2	14.29 %	5	0.00%	0	11.43 %	4	2.86%	1	11.43 %	4	35	
Market assessment	27.03 %	10	13.51 %	5	2.70%	1	27.03 %	10	8.11%	3	8.11%	3	5.41%	2	18.92 %	7	0.00%	0	10.81 %	4	2.70%	1	8.11%	3	37	
Market monitoring	37.84 %	14	13.51 %	5	2.70%	1	18.92 %	7	8.11%	3	2.70%	1	2.70%	1	16.22 %	6	0.00%	0	10.81 %	4	2.70%	1	8.11%	3	37	
MARKit	67.74 %	21	3.23%	1	0.00%	0	9.68%	3	6.45%	2	0.00%	0	3.23%	1	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	9.68%	3	31	
Outcome indicators	27.78 %	10	25.00 %	9	8.33%	3	27.78 %	10	13.89 %	5	5.56%	2	5.56%	2	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	8.33%	3	2.78%	1	8.33%	3	36	
Fraud prevention	19.44 %	7	25.00 %	9	5.56%	2	41.67 %	15	2.78%	1	2.78%	1	0.00%	0	2.78%	1	0.00%	0	5.56%	2	2.78%	1	8.33%	3	36	
Cost efficiency/ effectiveness analysis of modalities	52.78 %	19	11.11 %	4	0.00%	0	13.89 %	5	2.78%	1	2.78%	1	2.78%	1	2.78%	1	0.00%	0	8.33%	3	0.00%	0	8.33%	3	36	
APS requirements	47.06 %	16	32.35 %	11	0.00%	0	14.71 %	5	2.94%	1	0.00%	0	11.76 %	4	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	8.82%	3	34	
Other (please specify)																									5	
																									Answered	37
																									Skipped	5

Q11: In your current or past work in market-based emergency programming, how would you rate your knowledge and skills in these areas?

	Need additional training/ mentoring in this area		Satisfied with current skill level		Not needed: not applicable to my job		Total	
Response analysis	50.00%	18	36.11%	13	13.89%	5	36	
Calculating/ comparing cost effectiveness and efficiency of different modalities	61.11%	22	19.44%	7	19.44%	7	36	
Market assessment	43.24%	16	37.84%	14	18.92%	7	37	
Market monitoring	41.67%	15	36.11%	13	22.22%	8	36	
Assessing food security and nutritional implications of different modalities	70.27%	26	18.92%	7	10.81%	4	37	
Choosing outcome indicators for market-based emergency programming	62.16%	23	27.03%	10	10.81%	4	37	
Evaluating different distribution mechanisms for cash and vouchers	43.24%	16	37.84%	14	18.92%	7	37	
Targeting using different modalities	48.65%	18	35.14%	13	16.22%	6	37	
Comments							2	
							Answered	37
							Skipped	5

Q12: IP Respondents Only: How would you rate your organization's capacity in these areas:

	Low/ limited capacity		Capacity meets current need		Strong capacity		Don't know/ NA		Total	
Response analysis	4.76%	1	61.90%	13	23.81%	5	9.52%	2	21	
Calculating/ comparing cost effectiveness and efficiency of different modalities	21.05%	4	47.37%	9	26.32%	5	5.26%	1	19	
Market assessment	9.52%	2	57.14%	12	33.33%	7	0.00%	0	21	
Market monitoring	19.05%	4	42.86%	9	38.10%	8	0.00%	0	21	
Assessing food security and nutritional implications of different modalities	19.05%	4	57.14%	12	19.05%	4	4.76%	1	21	
Choosing outcome indicators for market-based emergency programming	4.76%	1	38.10%	8	52.38%	11	4.76%	1	21	
Evaluating different distribution mechanisms for cash and vouchers	9.52%	2	47.62%	10	38.10%	8	4.76%	1	21	
Targeting using different modalities	0.00%	0	66.67%	14	28.57%	6	4.76%	1	21	
Comments									0	
									Answered	21
									Skipped	21

Q13: In your opinion, how much influence does each of these factors have on decisions about which food assistance modality/ (-ies) to use in emergency contexts? (More factors listed on next page.)

	Little to no influence		Some influence		Strong influence		Don't know/ no opinion		Total
FFP (HQ level) mandate/ policy/ preference	0.00%	0	28.57%	10	68.57%	24	2.86%	1	35
FFP (national level) mandate/ policy/ preference	5.71%	2	28.57%	10	65.71%	23	0.00%	0	35
Other (non-FFP) donor preferences	17.14%	6	62.86%	22	17.14%	6	2.86%	1	35
My organization's mandate/ policy/ preference	11.43%	4	31.43%	11	54.29%	19	2.86%	1	35
Host government mandate/ policy/ preference	8.57%	3	48.57%	17	40.00%	14	2.86%	1	35
Implementation capacity of partners	2.86%	1	51.43%	18	42.86%	15	2.86%	1	35
Host government capacity	22.86%	8	45.71%	16	25.71%	9	5.71%	2	35
Amount of funding available	2.86%	1	31.43%	11	60.00%	21	5.71%	2	35
Constraints in how funding can be used	8.57%	3	20.00%	7	68.57%	24	2.86%	1	35
Bureaucratic process inside my organization	28.57%	10	34.29%	12	28.57%	10	8.57%	3	35
Bureaucratic process within USAID	22.86%	8	28.57%	10	45.71%	16	2.86%	1	35
Response analysis	5.71%	2	34.29%	12	54.29%	19	5.71%	2	35
Adequacy of guidelines to operationalize response analysis and recommendations	8.57%	3	34.29%	12	40.00%	14	17.14%	6	35
Beneficiary preference	11.43%	4	40.00%	14	45.71%	16	2.86%	1	35
Market analysis/ monitoring	8.57%	3	20.00%	7	68.57%	24	2.86%	1	35
Supply chain for the modality	8.57%	3	25.71%	9	62.86%	22	2.86%	1	35
Risk of waste, fraud, and/or abuse	8.57%	3	20.00%	7	71.43%	25	0.00%	0	35
Political or cultural context	8.57%	3	42.86%	15	45.71%	16	2.86%	1	35
Comments									1
								Answered	35
								Skipped	7

Comments/open-ended response: [SELECTION OF RESPONSES PROVIDED, NOT ALL]

- **Q: Please share any examples of how modalities were creatively used to respond to emergency needs (please name the country).**
- **Q: Please share any examples of how modalities were changed in response to changing needs during a project (please name the country).**

[Names of countries have been deleted for confidentiality]

- The cash transfers were changed from monthly disbursements to quarterly. The cash transfers had originally been planned to take place every month. However, feedback from project participants indicated that they preferred quarterly disbursements because this enabled them to buy in bulk and to reduce transport costs related to frequent purchases as most markets were quite distant from their homes. On the Agency side, quarterly cash transfers were more cost effective in terms of logistical costs and liquidation time lines.

- Feedback from monitoring visits in the first phase of the cash transfer project (September 2015 to January 2017) indicated that project participants who belonged to active farming or savings groups were more resilient compared to those who belonged to no group. This was because groups enabled project participants to share farm labor to cultivate more food and they had more cash savings, which they used to send children to school and to improve their housing structures. Based on this learning, it is important to support complementary activities such as encouraging project participants to work in groups, financial literacy training, nutrition and hygiene training, and agricultural training in the second phase of the project (February to December 2017)

-Due to the unique economic shock from the emergency and widespread use of donated commodities, market systems were significantly impacted. Unconditional cash transfers were used to assist market recovery. The flexibility available through cash allowed households to resume agricultural productivity that was disrupted during the emergency, having a greater impact on their long-term household food security than short-term food assistance. In addition, market suppression due to the emergency and market closures were stimulated by cash encouraging market actors to re-enter particularly small rural markets.

-The initial phases of the projects were targeting affected communities, but modalities changed in the recovery phases when the focus became more on resilience and transition. New aspects that include financial inclusion were introduced and beneficiaries had to undergo training on resilience programming.

-Strengthening of linkages between cash transfers and nutrition and household economic education helps participants make better decisions in utilization of cash. Linkages to savings groups gave participants access to cash and loans allowing them to extend the benefits of cash inputs.

-One IP introduced mobile money transfer in the middle of its emergency program implementation after learning from another IP's successful experience.

-Modalities were changed for refugee feeding programs due to pipeline breaks and a shortfall of available cash. The shift was towards more in-kind food and a suspension of vouchers. This was not a preferred change but a necessity. The refugees lamented the loss of monthly cash supplements and indicated that it decreased choices for food diversity.

-We used mixed modalities but switched to in-kind during the El Nino drought response due to the combined concerns related to local and regional market availability and in-country liquidity constraints. In-kind was selected as the best option to insulate our food security interventions from these shocks. We made this decision based on several different market analyses, data from the VAC and FEWS NET, and through extensive consultation with implementing partners.

-In the El Nino emergency 2016-2017, different donors funded different modalities (cash-based transfers and in-kind, Local/regional purchase) within same provinces and sometimes same implementer.

-The program incorporates both electronic and paper vouchers based on appropriateness for different locations.

-There is a need to train implementing partners to understand underlying factors for decision making on market-based assistance.

-There is a need to think about multi-year interventions/approaches/mechanisms in chronic emergency contexts.

-Giving participants control over their development has been empowering especially for women, giving participants a sense of hope.

- Monthly distribution of benefits (cash or in-kind) should be based on local market conditions, i.e. more money or more food in areas where food prices are high. Cash is only a preferred modality in areas where food is readily available. Banks should be encouraged to understand the emergency nature of the programs and not profit making mechanisms. Implementing partners should consider the literacy and numeracy capacity of the beneficiaries when considering mobile money.

-FFP is going a great job in boosting in-house capacity for market-based programming, however more effort to assist field-based FFPOs to build skills in formal ways would be beneficial.

ANNEX 7: ALPHA AND OMEGA COST-EFFICIENCY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS FORMULAS

The first step for the Alpha cost-efficiency calculation is to compare the in-kind procurement value and logistic costs (local transport, storage and handling, quality control, and salaries for logistic staff) to transport U.S.-sourced or LRP commodities to the respective distribution points with the cash transfers and local market prices at the same point in time. If sufficient data is available, a seasonal analysis should also be presented.

The second step includes the in-kind operational costs including partners, equipment, training, supplies, and travel—Other Direct Operating Costs—and the equivalent operational costs for cash and vouchers: delivery and other.

The ratio of the local market price plus operational costs, to the total cost to WFP and its donors to deliver the commodity from an external source to the locality is known as the alpha value. Alpha values vary considerably depending on the situation of the country concerned, but a value higher than one (1) suggests that the in-kind option is more cost-efficient and vice versa. Alternatively, the calculations can be presented as a comparison between the costs to achieve the desired output—in WFP’s case, delivering a balanced food basket covering the daily basic kilocalorie needs to the targeted beneficiaries.

Cost-effectiveness analysis measures the comparative costs of achieving the desired outcomes. The current WFP cost-effectiveness tool is the omega value. The omega value is formulated as the ratio of the Nutrient Value Score (NVS)/full cost of an in-kind food basket compared against the ratio NVS/full cost of a cash transfer or voucher basket. If the result of the calculation is higher than 1, the in-kind transfer modality should be considered as more cost-effective. If the result of the calculation is below 1, the cash-based transfer modality should be considered more cost-effective.

Additionally (or alternatively in case of data availability limitations), the in-kind vs. cash transfer costs per percent increase in average household FCS should also be analyzed. Table 7 below shows the formulas for the calculation of the cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness metrics.

These Alpha and Omega tools developed by WFP are conceptually appropriate analytical tools to measure cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness (based on the effect of the modality on food consumption patterns) of alternative food assistance modalities. However, WFP has not adopted the application of these measures on a regular basis. Rather, these tools have only been used in a few specific case studies.

Table 7: WFP cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness formulas

Cost analysis	Formulas
Cost efficiency	$\frac{\text{CBT transfer value} + \text{CBT related costs}}{\text{In-kind commodity costs} + \text{external transport} + \text{Itsh} + \text{odoc}} = \text{alpha value}$
	$\frac{\text{In-kind commodity costs} + \text{external transport} + \text{Itsh} + \text{odoc}}{\text{No of beneficiaries}} = \text{In-kind cost per beneficiary}$
	$\frac{\text{CBT transfer value} + \text{CBT related costs}}{\text{No of beneficiaries}} = \text{CBT cost per beneficiary}$
Cost efficiency	$\frac{\text{In-kind NVS}}{\text{In-kind commodity costs} + \text{external transport} + \text{Itsh} + \text{odoc}} / \frac{\text{CBT NVS}}{\text{CBT transfer value} + \text{CBT related costs}} = \text{omega value}$
	$\frac{\text{In-kind commodity costs} + \text{external transport} + \text{Itsh} + \text{odoc}}{\% \text{ improvement in average HH FCS (in kind)}} = \text{cost per \% improvements in FCS}$
	$\frac{\text{CBT transfer value} + \text{CBT related costs}}{\% \text{ improvement in average HH FCS (CBT)}} = \text{cost per \% improvements in FCS}$
Cost effectiveness (optional)	$\frac{\text{In-kind FCS}}{\text{In-kind commodity costs} + \text{external transport} + \text{Itsh} + \text{odoc}} = \text{In-kind FCS value per US\$}$
	$\frac{\text{CBT FCS}}{\text{CBT transfer value} + \text{CBT related costs}} = \text{CBT FCS value per US\$}$
	$\frac{\text{In-kind CSI}}{\text{In-kind commodity costs} + \text{external transport} + \text{Itsh} + \text{odoc}} = \text{In-kind FCS value per US\$}$
	$\frac{\text{CBT FCS}}{\text{CBT transfer value} + \text{CBT related costs}} = \text{CBT CSI value per US\$}$

ANNEX 8: NOTE ON OUTCOME-LEVEL INDICATORS FOR FFP EMERGENCY PROJECTS

In choosing an indicator or indicators of food security for monitoring in emergency situations three important considerations are: (1) data for measuring the indicator can be quickly and easily collected; (2) the indicator is solid in terms of its validity and reliability; and (3) it is sensitive enough to pick up on the changes in food security that are induced by shocks that lead to emergency situations.

Focusing only on indicators that meet the first consideration (data can be easily and quickly collected), here are our thoughts on the relative merits of the following: Household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS), Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), Household hunger score (HHS), Coping strategies index (CSI), Reduced coping strategies index (rCSI), Food consumption score (FCS), and Household dietary diversity score (HDDS).

HFIAS AND FIES: The HFIAS and FIES are experiential food insecurity scales that have the advantage of being conceptually and empirically valid, comprehensive indicators of food security covering both food consumption adequacy and dietary quality. The scales have been empirically validated to represent increasing severity of food insecurity with increasing values of the scale. They cover the full range of severity from no food insecurity to severe food insecurity, the latter as represented by the extreme behavior of going for a whole day without eating. We recommend that at least one of these be used for FFP's monitoring and evaluation in emergency situations.

The FIES, recently developed by FAO, has the advantage that is being used to monitor SDG goal #2.1 on hunger and food insecurity, and preliminary analysis of data from 150 countries is showing that it is reliably measured and comparable across countries. Eventually it would be good if this indicator was used by all international organizations, governments, and NGOs. However, validation has only taken place using data collected with 12-month recall (and at the individual [adult] level rather than household level), since the purpose was to produce country-level estimates of food insecurity prevalence annually. Data for measuring the indicator can be collected using a one-month recall period, which is more relevant to data collection in emergency situations. The FIES has never been applied in such a situation so we don't know how sensitive it is to shocks. FIES is currently being collected in FFP baseline studies for development programs.

We recommend that HFIAS be used by FFP rather than the FIES for the following reasons: (1) it has been shown in TANGO's work to be sensitive to shocks in a number of shock-prone contexts, including those in Ethiopia, Niger, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Northern Kenya, Zimbabwe and Somalia; (2) it is already being widely used by implementing agencies for monitoring and evaluation purposes.

While there might be some debate as to whether the cut-offs actually indicate "food insecurity", what is most important for monitoring in emergency situations is that it is able to pick up on changes in food security over time, not the absolute levels. Further, even if the HFIAS overestimates food insecurity at least it doesn't underestimate it, which would certainly be worse (following the "do no harm" principle), and is a risk when using the HHS.

Some people think that cross-cultural validity is an important trait for a measure of food security. Indeed confidence in such validity would be good, since then FFP could have a general idea of which emergency situations are the most dire, which is helpful in allocating resources. With this in mind, the HFIAS

questions were purposefully formulated to be applicable to the range of severity in food insecurity and the diversity in life circumstances found in developing countries.

Nevertheless, an empirical study by Deitchler et al. (2011) concluded that the HFIAS is not comparable across settings, and this has led some organizations to stop using it. We take issue with this conclusion and believe that the HFIAS has yet to be properly validated for cross-cultural comparability. Here we cite text from a memo we wrote for FAO evaluating the HFIAS:

Psychometric testing for cross-cultural validity was undertaken for the HFIAS in a validation study undertaken by FANTA in partnership with FAO and Tufts University in 2008 (see Deitchler et al. 2010; Deitchler et al. 2011). The study concluded that the HFIAS is not cross-culturally comparable and that only three of the questions, the last three at the highest severity end of the scale, that is, #7, #8, and #9, can be used for cross-cultural analysis. It is claimed that the “Household Hunger Scale” formed from these three questions has been “rigorously validated” for cross-cultural use (Ballard et al. 2011).

Although the psychometric methods used for the HFIAS validation study by FANTA were appropriate, the data employed and interpretation of the results were not, for the following reasons:

1. The data were collected in localized areas within only six countries, four of which are in Southern Africa, one in East Africa and the other the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This limited set of locations does not represent the full range of developing country settings.
2. Most of the surveys were for vulnerable populations purposefully targeted by NGOs, including HIV-affected households, which is not representative of the broad range of severity of food insecurity in developing countries. (This explains why only the most severe end of the HFIAS scale was left after validation).
3. The sample sizes were too small to be able to rigorously test for cross-sample validity (the smallest samples sizes were 152, 176, 299 and 491 households).
4. Too strict a criterion for cross-sample comparability was employed, with even small deviations from exact correspondence considered rejections of validity.
5. The statistical focus of the analysis means that conceptual validity (specifically that all domains of food insecurity be represented) was not adhered to.

HHS: Data for the HHS will already be collected if they are collected for the HFIAS, so no additional data collection would be necessary for calculating the HHS. Tufts has found that the HHS has in some contexts not been sensitive to shocks (although our work in Ethiopia showed it to be sensitive in response to drought there). Further, it will most certainly tend to underestimate food insecurity since it only represents its most extreme forms. Thus we don’t recommend using it to the exclusion of the full HFIAS--only for additional information (to specifically measure “hunger”) if desired.

CSI AND rCSI: The CSI is an index based on the use of eleven coping strategies potentially used by households in response to food insecurity. Like the HFIAS and FIES, it is meant to be a comprehensive measure of food insecurity, covering both dietary adequacy and quality. However, many of the coping strategies are not applicable across all households in a setting or across settings. To overcome this problem the rCSI, containing only five coping strategies, was developed to be more broadly applicable globally.

We feel that the HFIAS is better suited as a comprehensive food security indicator than the rCSI because with a full nine experiences that cover the broad range of severities of food security, it has a more finely-tuned capability of picking up subtle changes in food security in the face of shocks.

Note that in TANGO's work the CSI has been very useful in capturing the responses of households to shocks and we use it as an intermediate outcome variable between shocks and impact measures (e.g., food security, nutritional status) (see Frankenberger and Smith 2015).

FCS AND HDDS: While the FCS and HDDS have been used as measures of overall food security (and have been found to be correlated with measures of the latter to various degrees), conceptually they are indicators of dietary quality. So if FFP is interested in specifically monitoring the dietary quality dimension of food security it should consider one of these in addition to the HFIAS.

Note, however, that TANGO found in our work on pastoral households in Ethiopia that the HDDS actually increased in response to drought because pastoral households in Borana were turning to alternative sources of staples (plantain bananas, a root/tuber) and consuming more animal products than usual as coping strategies. This indicator probably works better for farming communities and urban areas. In Sahelian West Africa (Niger and Burkina Faso) we found no impact of shocks (the most common of which was drought) on HDDS. Based on a FEWS NET study in West Africa, the FCS was not sensitive to shocks in Niger.

Without further investigation of the empirical evidence, we can't make a solid recommendation as to whether the FCS or HDDS is a better indicator of dietary quality. See Cafiero et al. (2014) for a discussion of each of the indicators with regards to validity and reliability.

In conclusion, we feel that one indicator should be used from each category: one for diet quality (either FCS or HDDS) and one experiential one (either HFIAS or FIES).

Sources:

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Frankenberger, T. and L. Smith. 2015. Ethiopia Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement and Market Expansion (PRIME) Project Impact Evaluation. Report of the Interim Monitoring Survey 2014-2015. USAID Feed the Future Feedback Project. November.

ANNEX 9: DOCUMENT INVENTORY AND FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS REPORTED BY FFP EFSP PROGRAMS AWARDED IN 2016

Country and 2016 award	Awardee	Documents in review team collection			FS measured	Food security indicators reported			
		Award letter	Quarterly report	Annual report*		FCS	HDDS	CSI	Other
DRC 3	WFP	Yes	No	SPR 2016	Yes	Y			
DRC 1	WFP	No	No	SPR 2015	Yes	Y	Y	y	
Haiti 3	WFP	Yes	Yes	SPR 2016	Yes	Y	Y	y	
Nigeria 3	CRS	Yes	Yes	2016 Baseline	Yes	Y	Y		
Nigeria 4	SC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Y			
Nigeria 5	AAH	Yes	Yes	No	Yes		Y		
Sierra Leone 1	Save the Children	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			y	
Zimbabwe 1	WFP	Yes	Yes	SPR 2016	Yes	Y			
Jordan/Turkey 1	WFP**	Yes	Yes	SPR 2016	Yes	Y		y	
Jordan/Turkey 2	WFP**	Yes		SPR 2016	Yes	Y			
Turkey 1	Concern	Yes	Yes	No	Yes		Y		HHS
Turkey 4	Goal	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Y		y	Food expenditure share
Turkey 5	Mercy Corps	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Y		rCSI	
DRC 2	WFP	Yes	No	SPR 2016	Yes	y	Y	y	
Haiti 1	World Vision	Yes	No	Yes	Yes		y		
Jordan 1	IRD modification	Yes	Yes	No	No				
Turkey 2	IRD modification	Yes	No	No	No				
Turkey 3	Goal	Yes	No	No	No				
Turkey 6	Mercy Corps	Yes	Yes	No	No				
DRC 4	CRS (Joint FFP-OFDA)	No	Yes	No	No				
DRC 5	ACTED (Joint FFP-OFDA)	No	No	No	No				
DRC 6	WFP	No	No	SPR 2015	No				
DRC 7	Samaritan's Purse (Joint FFP-OFDA)	No	No	No	No				
Haiti 2	CARE	No	Yes	No	No				
Nigeria 1	Mercy Corps	Yes	No	No	No				
Nigeria 2	AAH	Yes	No	No	No				
Nigeria 6	WFP	No	No	No	No				

*Annual reports are annual results reports for most IPs and Standard Project Reports for WFP. ** regional operation