



REVIEW OF FOOD FOR PEACE MARKET-BASED EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Democratic Republic of Congo Case Study Report

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ACRONYMS

CAR	Central African Republic
CFW	Cash for Work
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
CT	Cash Transfer
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DFAP	Development Food Assistance Program
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EFSP	Emergency Food Security Program
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FFP	Food for Peace
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HDDS	Household Dietary Diversity Score
HH	Household
HHS	Household Hunger Scale
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IP	Implementing Partner
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
KII	Key Informant Interview
LRP	Local and Regional Purchase (of food)
MBEP	Market-Based Emergency Programming
MSA	Multi-Sector Assessment
NFIs	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Government Organization
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
RRMP	<i>Réponse Rapide aux Mouvements de Population</i> or Rapid Response to Population Movements
TANGO	Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations, International
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE DRC

The **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)** case illustrates the complexity and diversity of contexts within which program design and implementation occurs. It highlights the need for provincial-scale assessments, local market monitoring, and flexibility to pivot to different modalities depending on changing contexts such as influxes of refugees from neighboring countries; sporadic inter-tribal conflict and subsequent internal displacements; seasonally poor road conditions; and insufficient mobile networks. All modalities were useful in at least some of the heterogeneous contexts, especially voucher fairs with in-kind aid (U.S.-sourced and locally and regionally purchased foods). This case also highlights collaborative programming between FFP and the United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

I. INTRODUCTION

CASE STUDY SCOPE AND APPROACH

This report is one of seven case studies conducted under a global review of Food for Peace (FFP) market-based emergency programs (MBEP) that received Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) or Title II 202(e)-enhanced funding between FY 2010 and 2016. This case study provides context-specific information that relates to the global review's four main objectives: (1) establish a historical narrative about FFP market-based emergency food assistance programming between 2010 and 2016 (sections 2 and 3), (2) review program design and implementation processes (section 3), (3) analyze program cost-efficiency trends across a range of variables (see section 4), and (4) identify developmental impacts of the projects on local economies and market actors (see section 5).

The global review¹ is based on: FFP's guidance and award documents and partner reports; field visits to seven countries specified by FFP; and data, documentation, and information provided by FFP, implementing partners (IPs), key informants, and program beneficiaries. A consistent methodology was used across cases to allow for comparison and aggregation of findings for the Global Report. The review is intended to gather lessons learned that focus on how FFP, as a unique actor and the largest international food assistance donor, has evolved to address food security in crisis contexts. The case study is not a formal evaluation of MBEP in the DRC; rather it is a selective review of the experience of IPs and other stakeholders.

Field work was conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from July 14–30, 2017. The review team conducted in-person interviews where possible; given security concerns and logistical constraints, the review team conducted some interviews remotely via Skype. For further details, see Annexes 4 and 5. This case study concludes with recommendations about good practices to continue and approaches to consider modifying in the DRC.

¹ A review differs from a program evaluation or audit in that it is a broad assessment of program performance, process, and operational issues. The United Nations Development Program defines a "review" as "distinct from evaluation and more closely associated with monitoring. They are periodic or ad hoc, often light assessments of the performance of an initiative and do not apply the due process of evaluation or rigor in methodology" (UNDP 2009).

COUNTRY CONTEXT

The Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to face high levels of conflict, political uncertainty, and poverty. DRC ranks very low (176 out of 188 countries) on the 2016 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2016), and in 2012, 64 percent of the population was living in poverty (World Bank, 2017). The continued postponement of the 2016 elections is expected to lead to escalating political crisis and livelihood interruptions (FEWS NET, 2017a). Ongoing military operations in multiple provinces along with ethnic fighting and the escape of thousands of prisoners contribute to general insecurity and violent conflict. Violence against humanitarian actors (Aljazeera, 2017; UN News Centre, 2009) has limited non-governmental organization (NGO) access and involvement since 2008 (UN OCHA, 2017), though humanitarian funding reached a peak in DRC in 2013 at \$741 million (Financial Tracking Service, 2017). People living in conflict-affected areas have limited access to markets and agricultural land, and agricultural production has been negatively affected over the years by challenges such as rainfall shortages, pests (e.g., fall armyworms) and disease (e.g., avian flu (FEWS NET, 2017b), cassava mosaic virus (USAID, 2015)). The number of internally displaced people rose to 3.7 million in March 2017, and DRC hosts over 460,000 refugees from neighboring countries: the Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, Rwanda, and South Sudan (FEWS NET, 2017b).


COMPLEX EMERGENCY: Every year since at least 2009, USAID has classified DRC as a Complex Emergency and has reported regularly on the evolution of the situation through a series of factsheets, although regional armed conflict has been ongoing in eastern DRC since 1998 (USAID, 2010). Significant refugee populations from the CAR and South Sudan are found in the northern part of DRC and from Rwanda and Burundi in eastern DRC (UNHCR, 2017)². There are also significant populations of internally displaced people (IDP) resulting from ongoing civil and sporadic inter-tribal conflict, primarily in North and South Kivu and Tanganyika Provinces (USAID, 2010, 2014, 2016, 2017a)³. More recently, however, this complex emergency has reached into the Kasai Region of southern DRC, with the U.S. government declaring a disaster due to increased conflict and displacement in May 2017 (USAID, 2017a). As a result, the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) for DRC is very heterogeneous (World Food Programme (WFP), 2017) – with pockets of Emergency (Phase 4) and Crisis (Phase 3) classification in the south and east in parts of the country where there is conflict and internal displacement, a Crisis classification in pockets where there are refugees in the north, and the balance of the country is either Stressed or Minimal (Phase 2 or 1). Thus, in addition to the IDP and refugee populations, there are significant numbers of people who are extremely vulnerable and food insecure, many of whom are hosting the displaced; this vulnerable population in need of humanitarian assistance was estimated at 8 million in 2017, the majority facing acute food insecurity (USAID, 2017a; WFP, 2017).

² UNHCR reported that there were 472,396 refugees from neighboring countries in DRC as of June 2017 (USAID, 2017a).

³ OCHA reported that there were 3.7 million internally displaced people in DRC as of March 2017 (USAID, 2017a).

MARKET FUNCTIONING: Studies carried out for USAID (O'Donnell et al., 2015) and by FEWS NET (FEWS NET, 2015) highlight the highly fragmented nature of value chains and markets in DRC, illustrated by the map in Figure 1 (right). Conflict issues and transportation challenges are important cross-cutting challenges (O'Donnell et al., 2015) that limit access between regions of the country and even within provinces. For example, even within the relatively small area of South Kivu, there are districts that are more or less cut off from larger urban or regional markets as a result of poor transportation infrastructure or insecurity (active conflict or the threat of it). This can also vary over time not only due to differences between, for example, rainy and dry seasons but also due to sporadic restrictions arising from inter-tribal conflict. All informants (IPs, vendors, and beneficiaries) spoke of these challenges in one way or another. While there might be some circumstances where food is not locally available, this is most often due to security or transport/access issues rather than a deficit in local (within a province) agricultural production. This heterogeneity in market access and function over space and time has obvious implications for market based interventions and the selection of the most appropriate modality of intervention.

Figure 1: Highly localized marketing basins in eastern DRC



Source: FEWS NET, 2015

2. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF FFP MARKET-BASED FOOD ASSISTANCE IN DRC


FOOD FOR PEACE ROLE IN DRC: USAID has had an ongoing presence in the DRC since long before the period of this study. Food security reviews for DRC highlighted the importance of agricultural livelihoods for food security in most of the country and the serious challenges presented by conflict, crop disease, artisanal mining and access to land (Murphy et al., 2015a; Murphy et al., 2015b). These assessments have no doubt had an impact on the development of FFP's program in DRC. Over the period of this study, FFP assistance to the DRC has grown considerably from US\$ 7.4 million in 2012 to US\$47.3 million in FY2016 (see Figure 2). Additionally, the amount of funding allocated to the various modalities (in-kind, local and/or regional purchase (LRP), vouchers, and cash) has changed significantly over that same period (Figure 3). For example, LRP and vouchers have been used since 2012, with the largest portion of funding used for LRP; cash transfers have been used since 2015 and received the second largest funding amount of US\$10 million in FY2016. To some extent this increased use of LRP and cash transfers is a response to the changing circumstances in the country but

"Having buy-in and encouragement from the donor has been important for development of market-based approaches." ~IP staff

also to an openness to consider alternative modalities of assistance. IPs reported being required by FFP to carry out market assessments and to base decisions on them.⁴

Figure 2: FFP emergency funding in DRC from 2012-2016


MBEP funding increased, especially EFSP funding in 2016. 202(e) and 202(e)-enhanced funds were also awarded in the DRC



Source: FFP funding trackers

Figure 3: FFP emergency funding (EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced funds) awarded in the DRC (FY2012-2016)

Most FFP emergency funding in the DRC was awarded for LRP foods. Food vouchers were used each year, and funding for cash transfers was awarded in 2015 and increased in 2016.



Note: "Other" funding in FY2015-16 was for road construction and strengthening Food Security Cluster coordination. Source: FFP funding trackers and program award documents

⁴ FFP requires market assessments. Interviewees stated that IPs value market assessments and want to buy them.

This encouragement from FFP to carry out market assessments has no doubt contributed to the evolution of the use of various modalities, and it has also been part of a more general change in approaches by various actors – including donors and implementing agencies (both WFP and NGOs). For example, while the majority of WFP’s portfolio is still GFD (general food distribution), from 2013 on there has been a growing use of cash transfers. Additionally, with increasing flexibility on the part of donors, more in-kind distribution is being done through LRP. Each of the four IPs interviewed indicated an evolution in their use of various modalities over time in their work with FFP. Several started out primarily using in-kind distribution (of U.S.-sourced food) and have shifted towards either cash or voucher-based forms of food assistance. Others have never used U.S.-sourced in-kind food (having depended on LRP for any in-kind distribution) but have also been shifting towards the use of vouchers. At the same time, some of those who have shifted almost exclusively to vouchers are now doing more direct distributions as the situation dictates.

Each of the IPs has gained considerable experience with various aspects of MBEP over the review period. Typically, they began with a pilot using vouchers, cash, or some form of LRP for in-kind distribution and have evolved and adapted programming based on experience gained. That said, there has not been a universal shift to one dominant modality; although, according to some, cash transfers seem to dominate in terms of beneficiary preference and among donors and NGOs. In eastern DRC, where the field visits for this review took place, a mixture of modalities are being used, which are determined on a case-by-case basis. In-kind distribution of U.S.-sourced commodities is taking a back seat to either LRP or vouchers for either general use or at a voucher fair, where an IP organizes pre-selected vendors to assemble in one location at a given time for beneficiaries to redeem their vouchers. Cash transfers are less commonly used in the DRC for a variety of reasons including cases where a market assessment clearly indicates that cash transfers are not appropriate and also because of logistical issues related to cash (both as physical and electronic transfers) as well as donor preferences or host-government constraints.

It should also be noted that FFP as a whole takes a longer-term view than its emergency programming (EFSP) portfolio would seem to imply. Three large, multi-year Development Food Aid Programs (DFAPs) have recently concluded (The Mitchell Group, 2016), and three new ones are beginning (USAID, 2017b),⁵ led by three different IPs that also have experience implementing EFSP/MBEP and DFAPs. Some of the DFAP objectives target underlying issues related to governance, resilience, and livelihoods that EFSP and MBEP are not readily able to deal with.

3. PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

DESIGN DECISIONS: MODALITY CHOICE AND CHANGES, TARGETING STRATEGY

FFP programming evolved from an exclusive focus on in-kind food assistance to the use of market-based approaches, though, as noted above, in-kind distribution is still the most important modality. That being said, in 2016 almost 50 percent of the in-kind food was purchased locally or regionally (46 percent) rather than being sourced from the United States (47 percent). In other words, when taken together,

⁵ FFP funds three NGOs (Catholic Relief Services, Food for the Hungry, and Mercy Corps) for “longer-term development food assistance projects to improve agricultural capacity, maternal and child health and nutrition, civil participation and local governance, disaster risk reduction, water and sanitation, natural resource management and biodiversity, and microenterprise productivity.”

market-based approaches (LRP for in-kind, vouchers, cash) were used for 53 percent of food assistance in 2016 in contrast to just 9 percent two years previously.

MODALITY CHOICE: Each of the IPs as well as WFP initially focused on some form of in-kind distribution. However, as they have gained experience with other modalities, their strategies have gradually shifted. That being said, each of the IPs base their modality decisions on some combination of market assessment combined with an assessment of need and beneficiary preferences.

While cash may be sometimes a preferred option by both IPs and beneficiaries, it does present challenges. One IP noted that in the camps (referring to those in eastern DRC which initially housed Rwandan refugees but now house IDPs), the government is against the use of cash as they know who controls the camps and has the ability to levy taxes on residents. On the other hand, this is not a problem with IDPs in host communities. Cash in the form of banknotes presents some security challenges since banks are not widespread and money has to be transported to delivery points. In the case of WFP, its use of cash has been in partnership with banks who arrange to have their staff and security personnel present for any distribution of cash. While e-cash has some potential, network coverage is spotty, and liquidity can be a problem for mobile network agents in the field when intervening far from markets – it can be a problem for people to actually get the cash when and where they need it.

“The population at large has a strong preference for cash since they can diversify more than with either vouchers or in-kind assistance” ~IP staff

“Our first attempt with cash via mobile money was a fiasco since there was no liquidity in the villages – we needed to use the physical cash” ~IP staff

“We exclusively use cash in banknotes and not as bank transfers or mobile money because it is more convenient for people” ~IP staff

“Electronic transfers are best in more stable, developed contexts – the DRC is very difficult in this way as network coverage is very limited and there is a problem for people actually getting the cash when and where they need it” ~IP staff

When working with local vendors for in-kind distribution or for vouchers, two IPs have found that they are able to access sufficient quantities of commodities locally. Where local supplies are insufficient, vendors purchase from neighboring regions within the DRC or regionally from neighboring countries (e.g., Uganda, Tanzania) and import it themselves.

All IPs had some experience with vouchers—mostly paper vouchers—with some variations in program design. In larger towns with small shops and/or a functioning, regular market, vouchers can be used in a subset of shops. However, where markets are not accessible, IPs typically bring in vendors for a voucher fair. One of the IPs opened up the voucher fair to any vendor regardless of whether they have official government documents or not. However, two of the IPs used a screening process for vendors – working through the local vendors association (*Fédération des Entreprises du Congo*) and ensuring that vendors are properly registered with the government. One IP has focused on voucher fairs using local vendors (i.e., inviting vendors in the nearest town to participate in a fair in a neighboring community without vendors) and locally-purchased in-kind distribution, based on prior market analysis. Experience has helped IPs refine the voucher process to be more transparent and target vendors close to

distribution sites, helping to maximize local economic benefits. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) has also piloted e-vouchers with some success (CRS, 2017b), but key informants report that more experience is needed to draw conclusions.

“We have relied on voucher fairs since weekly markets in rural areas may not be able to meet the demand arising from a number of people with vouchers coming into a regular market” ~IP staff

The general sense of key informant interviews (KIIs) is that it is important to have all modality types as options, that is, U.S.-sourced or LRP in-kind aid, vouchers, and cash, including paper and electronic versions of vouchers and cash transfers. The majority of key informants stated that each modality has its place, so one should not emphasize any one modality at the expense of another, especially in a context as fluid and heterogeneous as the DRC. Key informants felt that this flexibility is important, as most of them have experience with the various modalities, and having all MBEP modalities available helps them to respond better. However, all IPs made that point that the deciding factor needs to be the market assessment, which needs to be conducted at the right administrative level because circumstances are so variable over space and time.

MARKET ASSESSMENT: Each of the IPs has adopted some variation of the Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis Toolkit for market assessment. IPs regularly conduct market assessments both as part of ongoing monitoring activities and when planning humanitarian interventions in response to a crisis. IPs typically conduct additional analyses, preferring some form of a multi-sector assessment approach (MSA). Each of the IPs also reported using additional modules related to food security, beneficiary preferences, and conflict sensitivity.

There is considerable heterogeneity of circumstances, and market assessments by local actors in one area may reach different conclusions than a more general, regional assessment.⁶ Because of this heterogeneity – in space and time – each of the IPs made the point that a current, locally-relevant, context-specific market analysis was essential to any modality decisions.

The WFP decision process, once it is clear who is in need and what they need, assesses markets with a series of questions:

- Are there functioning markets?
- Are they accessible to the target population?
- Are the things they need available in the market? And at an affordable price?
- Do traders have the capacity to respond right away? Or without a long delay?
- Are local markets linked to regional ones adequately if local supply is insufficient?

Based on KIIs, IPs follow a similar process.

As one IP pointed out, circumstances in a village differ considerably from those in a town. A village might have a weekly market or more limited market infrastructure such as just a few kiosks with a very limited supply of basic local foods, making it impossible for a significant influx of people to obtain food locally

⁶ This was a problem in the Kasai region. One NGO had declared that markets were not functioning in the Kasai region and that a cash or voucher-based approach would not work. However, one IP stated that in the part of the Kasai region where they were active, markets were functioning quite well and, therefore, cash or vouchers would be viable options.

even if they have cash or vouchers with which to purchase goods. In contrast, traders in towns are more likely to have shops and a warehouse where they buy goods locally or from nearby markets. In these circumstances, cash or vouchers redeemable at a local merchant are a viable option.

“While we have mostly been relying on voucher fairs, in some cases there have been direct distributions where the location has been too far for vendors to come.” ~IP staff

“We are currently planning for an in-kind distribution in another community since it is too far for vendors from the main town to go (165 km).” ~IP staff

“As an NGO, we want to accept what the market analysis suggests but sometimes we are limited by external factors such as donor preferences or prohibitions.” ~IP staff

TARGETING: The approach taken to targeting has also been undergoing a change. In the past, the approach had generally been to take a blanket approach to helping a specific group affected by a crisis – i.e., a group of refugees or IDPs located in a camp or even with host families in a host community. This has sometimes caused friction between IDPs who receive assistance and host communities, which typically do not, even though often 50-70 percent of the households in recipient communities are also vulnerable.

IPs have therefore increasingly adopted approaches targeting vulnerable households, which includes IDPs and their hosting communities. One IP has used cash for work (CFW) as a conditional transfer as a means to help local communities that are hosting IDPs since it takes everyone into consideration for targeting, including those who do not qualify for general food distributions, regardless of modality. However, they also noted that it is important that the activities undertaken are useful to the local community.

Two IPs as well as WFP indicated that they have changed their general targeting approach from simply basing it on a specific category or group of people. Current practice is to identify vulnerable households/families whether they are those that are displaced/returned or in the host community.

WFP noted that the targeting process is the same for all MBEP modalities (LRP, cash, and vouchers) and involves the following steps:

- determination of the IPC phase classification, which determines the zone to be targeted for action,
- vulnerability assessment for the host population as well as the displaced, and
- market assessment to understand the options that are available.

All the IPs and WFP indicated that they work closely with the RRMP (*Réponse Rapide aux Mouvements de Population*)⁷ process led by UNICEF and implemented by different actors (lead agencies) in different provinces of DRC. Where there is a localized population movement due to, for example, inter-tribal

⁷ RRMP (Rapid Response to Population Movements) is a UNICEF-managed multi-donor (OFDA, ECHO, DFID) funded project that facilitates ongoing context monitoring, rapid analysis and response to population movements due to crisis situations in DRC – with different combinations of implementing partners for different sectors in different provinces. IP and WFP participation in the local *Comité de Pilotage* (Steering Committee) for the RRMP helps ensure more rapid response as well as non-duplication of efforts.

conflict or localized rebel activity that causes people to flee, the RRMP process picks it up and begins an assessment process. Based on assessed levels of vulnerability at household level (often 50-70 percent of households vulnerable) – and depending on needs and location – follow up in terms of interventions could be by WFP or one of the IPs in the area.

Two of the IPs participating in this review have annual FFP/ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funding that allows them to respond with food and other assistance to localized population movements such as those experienced by the people interviewed for the Life Histories 1-3, later in the report. They also engage with the RRMP through participation in the local *Comité de Pilotage* (Steering Committee), which has a number of members, including NGOs like the IPs participating in this review that are not part of the RRMP project. The IPs make use of the RRMP's Multi-Sector Assessments (MSAs), which are a core component of its work, but add some additional market, food security, beneficiary and conflict sensitivity analysis (CaLP, 2017). One of the IPs indicated that over the three phases of funding from FFP/OFDA for their rapid response work with internally displaced populations they have improved their collaboration with the RRMP.

Whether it is WFP or an IP responding, targeting is now based not on status (e.g., “displaced”) but on vulnerability. This means that whoever is vulnerable, whether members of a host community or IDPs, is targeted when there is need. However, it was also indicated that this approach is taking some work in terms of sensitization of the local population and also government/local authorities since it differs considerably from the blanket approach used in the past.

“CFW (as a conditional transfer) can help local communities and those who don’t qualify for general food distributions, regardless of the modality, but it is important that the activities undertaken are useful to the local community.” ~IP staff

“The new phase of funding from FFP will allow for a combined approach to targeting – look at vulnerability of members of the host community and also the status of the others (the displaced) – this should help to avoid any discontent at the level of the host community.” ~IP staff

STAKEHOLDER PREFERENCES: On the whole, there seemed to be a clear preference ordering with cash preferred to vouchers and vouchers preferred to in-kind. However, that ranking was not universal and also varied according to people’s experience with the actual implementation of the various modalities.


In Butembo, for example, there was a strong preference for a voucher fair over in-kind for most people – although cash has not been an option with the IP in the area. On the other hand, since the voucher approach was new, some who had low levels of literacy had difficulty with it and initially indicated a preference for in-kind goods over vouchers. However, they also indicated that, based on their experience, they would know to bring someone to help them the next time. This impacted their ordering of preferences as they also indicated that they would choose vouchers over in-kind if the problems were solved. Beneficiaries in both FGDs indicated that they appreciated the voucher fair approach because it allowed them to get food that met their preferences (in contrast to an in-kind distribution that might not). However, this was only in comparison to the option of in-kind aid and not

the option of cash, because beneficiaries had not had this experience. At the same time, some beneficiaries would have liked to see some cash included with the vouchers to meet other urgent needs.

FGD participants in another community (Kalemie) were less enthusiastic about the voucher fair because they observed that prices in local currency at the voucher fair were higher than local market prices in the town. They also indicated that the dollar-denominated voucher was confusing even with the availability of a paper that showed the local currency equivalent of various dollar amounts. The Life History 1: Sifa below illustrates this point. For this reason, there seemed to be a strong preference for cash over vouchers – and to a lesser extent, for in-kind over vouchers. However, it is unclear whether the preference ordering would have been the same if there was not the issue of prices or the issue of a dollar-denominated voucher. What is clear is that beneficiaries appreciated the choice that vouchers gave them in contrast to in-kind distribution.

Life History I: Sifa

Poor, female-headed household struggles to recover in IDP camp; food voucher helps but has challenges



*Name has been changed. Note: the graph for this case study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team.

Sifa has had a difficult life marked by poverty and the loss of loved ones. She was born in 1977 in Tanzania. At a very young age, both of her parents died. She was sent along with her four brothers to live with an aunt. Neither Sifa nor her siblings attended school; instead her youth was spent earning income for the household. She married at age 20 and had two children. Her husband died when the children were young, and their life in Tanzania living in her aunt's compound was intolerable, so they moved across Lake Tanganyika to live near relatives in Miketo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In DRC, Sifa met her second husband. Together they had six children. She earned income to buy food for her family by doing day labor for wealthier households. This work included drawing water, washing dishes and laundry, and working in the fields. For nearly a decade they lived in Miketo, but then her second husband died. Sifa also became ill and was taken to a traditional healer.

In November 2016, fighting reached them and their village was burned to the ground. Sifa fled with her eight children to a camp for internally displaced people (IDPs). In the camp she was provided with health care, water and sanitation services by NGOs. Occasionally she has found day labor carrying water or making bricks but re-establishing a livelihood in the camp setting is difficult, especially since she is not always paid promptly for her work. One of her daughters received a voucher from an IP that could be used for food items. Sifa explained that the voucher was difficult to use because they did not understand the value of the dollar in which it was denominated and its conversion to local currency where the prices of some products seemed very high to them. Also, the quality of the food, such as the corn flour from a participating vendor, was not always good. Sifa felt like the vendors had short-changed them because the quantity they received was not enough to meet their needs.


Still, the food they managed to buy with the voucher was very helpful. Their household has many needs beyond food and without livelihoods or any assets, even the smallest of shocks can set back any recovery progress they have made. "While I am thankful for help received, I am also thinking of the coming rainy season and wondering about [whether] our housing situation [will withstand the rain] in the camp."

Another IP indicated that their evaluations have shown that MBEP has resulted in higher levels of satisfaction among beneficiaries because people can access food that aligns with their preferences. With in-kind distributions, people sometimes sold food items because they either did not like the food or needed cash to pay for other urgent needs.

Although one IP indicated that beneficiaries generally prefer the flexibility of cash, varying contexts require different modalities. IPs indicated that some beneficiaries prefer in-kind aid (e.g., women who will be pressured by her husband to give him some cash), and in-kind may be a bit safer in IDP camps where it is easier to “tax” cash distribution recipients. It should be noted that vouchers share features with in-kind assistance that allow them to be used in unintended ways (e.g., selling or trading). Finally, WFP indicated that, while they feel that the population at large has a strong preference for cash which offers the most flexibility compared to vouchers and in-kind assistance, context needs to be the determining factor. Life History 2: Matayo and Furaha, below, provides another example of a couple that benefitted from voucher fairs with food and non-food items (NFIs) but still needed cash to pay for essential household expenses.

Life History 2: Matayo and Furaha

Couple struggles to recover livelihood after conflict, receive food, other support



*Names have been changed. Note: the graph for this case study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team

Matayo and Furaha are still in their younger adult years, but have already been together for nearly 17 years. They started off well in their life together, with both involved in farming and petty trade. Matayo sold reeds used in house construction, and his wife, Furaha, sold palm oil. They had their first child within the first year of becoming a couple; the second child came two years later; and the third child was born three years after that. Although the family experienced a year of hardship due to sickness, their household well-being was improving for the most part. In 2007 they decided to officially get married, and then their fourth child was born.

The years that followed, though, became increasingly difficult. Their youngest child died tragically, and inter-tribal fighting began. In November 2016, they fled to the Kivira Valley region, leaving their plot of farmland and the few assets they owned. There, life was really difficult. The local community tried to help them with food and provided them with some day-labor jobs. They were hungry, often suffering from illness, and they lacked adequate shelter and access to land.

In June 2017, they were able to move to a village in North Kivu and could start farming again, though erratic weather conditions have made farming difficult. Restarting their livelihood has been challenging for various reasons: they no longer have trading capital for the small business activities that they did before; they have to rent farmland; and they have outstanding debts for their children's school fees.

They are thankful for the help they have received from the IP. They received both food vouchers and non-food items (NFIs) from a voucher fair organized by the IP. At the fair, local vendors brought locally and regionally-procured commodities. The family is now eating well with the food received, and the NFIs were very helpful because they included clothes for the children and hygiene items. This has provided them with a measure of stability to get re-established. While they are on the road to recovery, assistance in the form of cash would give them the means to pay bills and invest in some form of economic activity. The family still needs cash to pay household expenses and invest in livelihood activities.

CHANGES TO THE DESIGN: Two of the IPs participating in this review have annual funding from FFP/OFDA that allows them to respond to emerging circumstances as they develop (CaLP, 2017; CRS, 2017a; Samaritan's Purse, 2017). Samaritan's Purse, in the USAIDizi project, has organized voucher fairs using local vendors (i.e., vendors in a town are invited to participate in a fair in that town) as well as locally-purchased in-kind distribution, with the modality decision for a particular intervention based on a prior market analysis. CRS, in the Displaced and recent Returnee households Invite Recovery (DRIVE) project has been using a multi-sector assessment approach (MSA) similar to the one taken by the RRMP but with additional modules related to food security, markets, beneficiary preferences and conflict sensitivity. USAIDizi and DRIVE were designed to be able to implement either in-kind distributions or vouchers with relatively equal ease (CaLP, 2017). Initially most food assistance was provided through voucher fairs, but more has been provided through direct distribution lately. The deciding factor is the market assessment. Both IPs indicated that their approach has improved over successive one-year phases of FFP/OFDA funding. Essentially, these projects allow for modality decisions to be made within the life of the project as circumstances change.

IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS/ISSUES: CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES

ACCESS/SECURITY: When asked about what communities need to do to meet their own food needs, vendors who participated in some of the voucher fairs indicated in KIIs that the most important thing was security – without security, people are reluctant to leave the village to farm and thus have limited prospects for earning income or rebuilding their assets. FGD participants also indicated that security concerns caused some people to hesitate to register as beneficiaries even though they met the vulnerability criteria. Some displaced persons were afraid to be registered on the beneficiary list due to security concerns. Only when they saw the food assistance arrive did they believe that they were not in danger and then wished they had come forward to register.

One IP noted that security was a deciding factor for several aspects their work. They avoided using cash because of security concerns where they operate. That is not to say that security concerns are only an issue where cash is concerned. The IP works with local authorities when deciding where and when to have a voucher fair and to ensure that it is safe when people gather for the fair.

With in-kind distribution, the IP is responsible for the security of the trucks and their load as well as for people at the distribution point. For a voucher fair, security is also an issue – just different. Each IP worked with local authorities to ensure security for fairs or for in-kind distribution.

It should also be noted that the nature of displacement due to violence is changing. At one time, most refugees and IDPs went to camps, some of which have existed for over 10 years. The camps in eastern DRC were originally set up for refugees but now house IDPs. However, that has changed too and most are now going to host communities due to a new element of conflict, which is land. Much of the conflict in eastern DRC now is related to both natural resources and control over land, which is expressed in inter-tribal/inter-ethnic conflict with fairly localized displacement of communities and villages rather than wide-spread civil conflict. Two of the IPs are responding to this set of circumstances with their FFP/OFDA MBEP funding.

Some KIIs noted that mobile phones may be excellent in volatile security contexts because there is no obvious transfer of money or goods to attract attention and potentially put people at risk. Even so, the problem of whether beneficiaries will have access to the money as cash persists, as they may or may not have a phone or network access, and the local agent may lack cash when beneficiaries want to redeem their electronic cash transfer for physical cash.

Finally, WFP's P4P (Purchase for Progress) program is trying to address some of the underlying issues through the way in which they are implementing the program. When initiating P4P in an area, WFP conducts an initial study of local context, which helps to identify issues such as conflict over resources, gender-related issues, and marketing and production issues and then works with community leaders to consider what to do and how to work with local partners to sensitize and train people in the relevant subjects. In terms of conflict, WFP helps build the capacity of local institutions and reduce latent conflict as part of their market strengthening work by collaborating with a local NGO addressing conflict issues.

“A voucher fair is less risk for security than a cash distribution since there is a lower risk of theft – all the same, ongoing insecurity could get in the way of a voucher fair too” ~Vendor

PARTNERSHIPS: Two of the IPs have worked with local vendors quite extensively, both for LRP of food for in-kind distribution and for the provision of food via vouchers. When cash has been distributed one of the IPs as well as WFP have worked through local banks to actually handle the cash and associated security issues.

LOGISTICS: Given the state of the roads in DRC – and the proliferation of armed groups – logistics can present serious challenges for any type of assistance. These challenges are highlighted in recent reports on value chains, staple food markets and food security in DRC (FEWS NET, 2015; Murphy et al. 2015a; Murphy et al., 2015b; O'Donnell et al. 2015). Probably the most important take-away is that the situation is highly heterogeneous and variable, meaning that one cannot assume that what would work in one time or place would work in another.

GENDER: This review observed and ascertained from program documents that all IPs carefully consider gender dynamics in households when deciding who should represent the household, for example, at a voucher fair. In most cases, in a household with a male and female head, the woman is given the voucher, because they are the most involved in decisions about meeting household food needs. The majority of FGD participants reported similar modality preferences and concerns for men and women. Vendor key informants made the observation that both men and women beneficiaries benefited from the peace of mind that came from having a stock of food in the house as a result of participating in the voucher fairs, which freed up both to attend to other activities to provide for their families.

TIMELINESS: Two of the IPs have projects that are jointly funded by FFP and OFDA (CaLP, 2017; CRS, 2017a; Samaritan's Purse, 2017). As mentioned above, this approach is similar to the UNICEF-led RRMP, except that it includes a food assistance component. Because it consists of pre-positioned annual funding, this FFP/OFDA approach enables rapid response to evolving localized situations where people become displaced and need various types of assistance. The three OFDA sectors are NFIs, shelter, and CFW whereas the FFP sector is food. While market-based approaches are the preferred option, it is clear that each IP makes every attempt to base modality decisions on an objective context analysis. In the case of these interventions, U.S.-sourced in-kind food is not an option, and in-kind food is locally or regionally purchased.

INVESTMENTS IN CAPACITY

CAPACITY: Each IP has experience implementing emergency food security responses in the DRC and have taken both in-house training on their own tools and have participated in training by other agencies. IPs have monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning (MEAL) systems that include feedback and complaint response mechanisms, post-distribution monitoring (PDM), and baseline and end-line surveys.

PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION: Each of the IPs, including WFP, are active in the relevant coordination mechanisms where they exist. These include the following:


- The Food Security Cluster
 - WFP is the cluster lead in eastern DRC
- The *Comité de Pilotage* (Steering Committee) of the RRMP
 - The IPs interviewed as well as WFP participate even though they are not part of the RRMP project itself
- Cash Working Groups (CWGs)
 - UNICEF and WFP co-lead the CWG in North Kivu Province
 - not working well in Kasai or Katanga
 - a CWG has been restarted in Tanganyika Province.

In each of these groups, NGOs and other actors (e.g., WFP and UNICEF) share information related to context monitoring and assessments as well as planning for action where needed. This helps to avoid overlap and ensure that gaps are covered.

The coordination and joint programming between FFP and OFDA is quite good at providing both food and non-food needs. In the DRC case, FFP and OFDA jointly programmed resources that were awarded in single projects to IPs. This is a very efficient and effective approach to meeting the needs of beneficiaries as evidenced in the Life History 3: Cephas and Zawadi, below.

Life History 3: Cephas and Zawadi

Couple committed to rebuilding after war makes the most of LRP/NFI support



Names have been changed. Note: the graph for this case study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team

Cephas and Zawadi were married in 2001. Cephas, 24 years old at the time, was a teacher in a small town when he first met 19-year-old Zawadi, who was a farmer. They were poor yet happy together. Within a year they celebrated the birth of their first child. As a young family they faced serious financial stress. At times it was difficult to put food on the table and to pay rent. They didn't own a plot of land and teacher salaries were often unpaid by the government. Cephas was a dedicated teacher and would continue the work without his salary depending on the parents of his pupils to provide some fees. Their second child was born in 2006 and third in 2008.

With a growing family, they decided to move back to Cephas' native village. In 2012 they purchased a parcel of land in the village, built a house, and bought another plot of land outside the village for farming. Life was good, overall, though tragedy struck, when their fourth child died shortly after birth.

Then inter-tribal conflict broke out. They recalled that the fighting reached their village on 22 November 2016, and they were forced to flee into the bush where they struggled to survive for six months. Their house was looted; they lost everything they had built up together. They faced sickness and many difficulties during this time. But their strong family bond and persistence to rebuild together has helped them move forward. Cephas remarked, "Life is difficult, and if we did not get along well together there would be problems."

After the war, the couple decided to return to their village to rebuild their lives. The IP provided them with timely assistance. They received non-food items (NFIs) to replenish basic household goods, and they participated in a voucher fair where local vendors brought regionally procured food commodities. With this assistance covering their basic needs, they have been able to focus on restarting their livelihood activities. Today, the couple commented, they are filled with joy because of this support.

FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES


All of the IPs (as well as WFP) indicated that they are tracking one or more of the standard food security indicators such as Coping Strategy Index (CSI), Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS), Food Consumption Score (FCS), and Household Hunger Scale (HHS). For example, ACTED measured and reports on the FCS⁸ and CSI⁹ among the local and displaced populations (ACTED, 2017a, b). In terms of outcomes, Samaritan's Purse has seen very clear food security improvements (FCS, HHS, CSI) as a result of a cycle of food assistance in its areas of intervention for the USAIDizi project (Samaritan's Purse, 2017). When reporting on the FCS results, they stated that across the 11 sites that received food assistance during the life of the project they succeeded in raising the average status of all beneficiary HHs from the "poor" to "borderline" categories (see Figure 4) – and saw similar results for other food security measures (i.e., the HHS and CSI).

Similarly, CRS has seen clear and quick improvements in key food security indicators (e.g., FCS) in the various intervention areas throughout the three years of DRIVE (CRS, 2017a). For example, as a result of one intervention due to displacement arising from conflict in Nyunzu Territory in Tanganyika province, 73.5 percent of the beneficiary households (HH) improved their food consumption score after the intervention with the average HH

FCS increasing from 24.7 percent before the intervention to 41.8 percent after the intervention.

IPs felt that MBEP programming is more effective at improving food security since it helps meet needs better. One IP noted that in addition to any direct impact on food security, it helps the economy and employment more generally, which feeds back into food security indicators. Another indicated that, apart from reducing immediate hunger, the voucher fairs also give people a sense of peace of mind that is important for getting on with life as well as engaging in productive livelihood activities.

Figure 4: Increase in Food Consumption Score of Beneficiaries, by HH status



Source: Samaritan's Purse, 2017

⁸ Score de Consommation Alimentaire (SCA) in French

⁹ Indice de Stratégies de Survie (ISS) in French

Other steps taken by some IPs to maximize the food security and nutrition benefits of their interventions included the following:

- By explaining the reasons for the choice of different foods available in the food basket or at the fair (or even for the different NFI items) it appears that people have been encouraged to make some changes in nutrition and hygiene practices
- By providing a combination of NFIs and food in close succession, IPs give an immediate injection that addresses the most basic needs for food, clothing and shelter all at once
- When deciding on the food basket for in-kind distribution or the commodities to be available at a voucher fair, attention is given to dietary diversity

MOST EFFECTIVE MODALITY FOR IMPROVING FOOD SECURITY: When asked whether or not one modality is better than another in terms of the impact on food security, one key informant responded by reminding meeting participants that all projects reduce hunger and food insecurity by definition, regardless of modality, and they monitor food security indicators to be sure that this takes place. In fact, the modality choice criteria are intended to find the most effective way to improve food security in various circumstances. The main goal of the response analysis/assessment process is to choose the most effective approach for a particular setting. For this reason, to ask which modality is most effective (biggest bang for the buck) is really the wrong question as not all modalities are appropriate in all circumstances and a specific modality is chosen for specific reasons. In a certain DRC setting, cash may have a greater impact on food security simply because markets are more developed and the vulnerability status of people is better to start with than in those places where cash would not be selected as the modality anyway. Similarly, where in-kind is used in this context, the net effect might not be significant, but cash would not likely have produced significant results either; and a randomized control trial would also not be appropriate to determine such a difference. A modality is selected for a specific context because the response analysis indicates that it should support the best results and may be more efficient – and the results reflect that. One should also be careful about attributing other benefits to a modality without specific research to do so since it is quite possible that the side benefits to any modality (such as impacts on local market functioning and so on) may very well arise due to characteristics unique to the specific setting and not to the modality itself.

4. COST-EFFICIENCY TRENDS

Direct cost per beneficiary is one dimension of efficiency; indirect benefits should also be factored in. In terms of comparing actual costs, WFP has developed the OMEGA tool which compares all three modalities (cash, voucher, in-kind) for their relative costs and efficiency in a specific context. The OMEGA tool has the flexibility to handle varying local circumstances (e.g., prices for transport that differ significantly for isolated communities within a given area). That being said, quantitative results should be triangulated with qualitative data, as the tool cannot capture everything that might be relevant.

One IP stated that MBEP is more cost-effective than U.S.-sourced in-kind food due to the reduced time required to get MBEP in place, ease of management, and further downstream benefits, which include strengthened markets stemming from increased local purchases, and increased dignity resulting from people being able to choose from foods better matched with local preferences. Similarly, another IP has found that even with locally sourced food, the cost of transporting commodities for in-kind distribution is higher than the cost of organizing a voucher fair.

All modalities entail certain overhead and learning costs. Once supply pipelines and infrastructure are established, market-based options can be implemented more quickly and at lower cost. However, initial setup takes time, effort, and learning.

With the availability of MBEP options, IPs have had to think about what needs to be in place for an agency to have the flexibility to take advantage of the various options. Multi-modality programming means that pivoting is possible, provided that funding permits this sort of pivot and the implementing organization has the necessary institutional knowledge and resources (human and financial) to do so. With the flexibility to use different MBEP modalities, it is also important to have budget flexibility to be able to pivot (i.e., change modalities as needed) during implementation, rather than having to spell everything out during the proposal stage. This was highlighted as one of the most important features of the FFP/OFDA funding that both CRS and Samaritan's Purse had access to.

5. DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS

CASH & VOUCHER IMPACT ON LOCAL ECONOMIES/MARKETS/VENDORS: The food voucher modality positively impacts the local markets and suppliers connected to the participating vendors, and the capacity and resilience of the vendors is improved. The IPs have found that MBEP has both helped them to safeguard against harming local economies and enabled them to inject funds closer to the communities that they are trying to help. At the same time, because of the way they have set up the voucher fairs, another lasting impact is that it helps to bring vendors more into the formal economy. While they have not measured it, two IPs indicated that local purchase through voucher fairs or for in-kind distribution has had a positive impact on local merchants. For example, in one week a local merchant at a voucher fair can sell what they normally would in a month or two. This was supported by the meetings with vendors as well. While vendor key informants reported that they appreciated both LRP and vouchers, they did not indicate a strong preference for one over the other. Similarly, vendors interviewed felt that cash was a good approach but did not indicate a preference for cash or vouchers. This is possibly because those interviewed did not have direct experience with both modalities.

Even in a larger community like Kalemie where the market is large, it might seem that a voucher fair would not be a big source of additional business for merchants. Nevertheless, key informants reported that they appreciated the additional business of a voucher fair held somewhere other than their normal place of business. Additionally, the vendors indicated that they were glad to help those in need, and it was important for vendors to be involved for that reason.

Another potential benefit of voucher fairs is that, if repeated, they may help develop regular markets in an area. However, to do this they need to be more than a one-off event. By repeating the fair over a period of time, vendors may get used to going to an area for a regular market and continue to do so after the program ends. WFP has seen some evidence of success at this in Equateur Province – there seems to be a regular market where one did not exist before regular voucher fairs took place.

LRP IMPACT ON LOCAL ECONOMIES/MARKETS: LRP benefits the local economy in numerous ways. WFP is certain that its use of local purchase helps the local economy, but key informants reported that they are also aware that they have worked mostly with larger traders, and there is a need to understand how they are linked to local traders and producers. This is a reason behind the WFP P4P program. In addition to helping to strengthen the local capacity to store and market staple food crops, P4P also aims to help smaller local producers engage with the market.

IPs' local purchases for in-kind distribution also support local and regional markets. When working with local vendors, IP key informants report that vendors have been able to access sufficient quantities locally. In part, this is because local vendors also import from neighboring regions or countries when needed.

OTHER IMPACTS: A psychosocial impact described by beneficiaries is the feeling of dignity and peace of mind in using the voucher in their recovery. Beneficiaries indicated that there is a peace of mind that comes from having a stock of basic, preferred local food, being freed from worry about what to eat so that they can think about earning a living, and from having the means to pay off debt, access medical care, or invest in livelihood activities. Key informant vendors participating in voucher fairs noted that the food helped beneficiaries a lot as it freed them from worry over what to eat so they could get on with working in their fields, engaging in income earning activities.

Key informants at each of the IPs noted that longer-term developmental impacts are difficult to assess – even if they exist – due to the short term nature of funding and, more specifically, monitoring associated with food assistance programming (whether market-based or not).

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES THAT SHOULD CONTINUE

- Continue to conduct high quality, timely, and context-specific market analysis and use it to inform modality decisions
 - Local conditions and the market context, function, and access are highly heterogeneous both over time and geographically, with idiosyncrasies within provinces, territories, and even localities
 - Each NGO consulted made the point that a current, context-specific market analysis was essential to any modality decisions
 - It is good to map out markets and related supply chains and contextual factors ahead of time to have an idea what modality options might be available
- Continue to conduct good vulnerability and related analysis of local needs and context as a basis for targeting
 - Base targeting on a vulnerability assessment when appropriate, rather than targeting a specific group of people
 - This is particularly an issue when displaced people are located in host communities, where many people are also extremely poor and vulnerable
 - A similar targeting process should be used for cash, vouchers and in-kind assistance
 - Assessments need to include market, food security, beneficiary preference and conflict sensitivity analysis
- Continue to develop and maintain capacity to implement multiple modalities
 - It is important to have all MBEP modalities as options, including electronic and paper vouchers and cash transfers
 - Each modality has its place, so on one modality should not be emphasized at the expense of another
 - This is especially true in the DRC, given the very low Human Development Index ranking and the frequently changing context, which indicate a high level of need for support through interventions that can adapt to local contexts

- This flexibility is important, as having multiple MBEP modalities helps implementing partners respond better¹⁰

APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES TO MODIFY

- Expand and consolidate analyses used to design and modify programmatic approaches. Market, context, political considerations, conflict-sensitive risk, and gender analysis should all be considered under a rubric of “response analysis.”
- Consider how to eliminate observed and reported challenges in voucher programming: low literacy levels, higher prices at voucher fairs, and dollar-denominated vouchers.
- Consider, perhaps through operational research, how cash and vouchers might be combined.
- Consider how to more intentionally leverage short-term assistance to achieve longer-term goals.
- FFP should gather lessons learned from the IPs that are able to pivot quickly from one modality to another to help develop capacity among other IPs in the DRC and in other countries, where appropriate.

¹⁰ For WFP and other IPs that have experience with the various modalities, the flexibility to pivot from one modality to another is highly valuable. Effective pivoting requires organizational competence in each of the modalities.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: SUMMARY OF FFP PROGRAM IN DRC

Table I: Summary of FFP DRC emergency food assistance funding (EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced), FY2010-2016

Implementing Partner & award No.	Project Name	Province	Date awarded	Original Budget (US\$)	Key Planned Activities
WFP AID-FFP-IO-12-00005	PRRO 200167	North and South Kivu	12/13/2011	\$5,000,000	Support to DRC IDPS: LRP and food vouchers
World Vision AID-FFP-G-13-00046	DRC Emergency Food Security Program	South Kivu	9/2/2013	\$2,604,213	Food vouchers and agricultural inputs for IDPs, returnees, and vulnerable host-community households
WFP AID-FFP-IO-14-00006 AID-FFP-IO-15-00030 AID-FFP-IO-14-00033-02 202e: 895-XXX-660-2015	PRRO 200540: "Targeted Food Assistance to Victims of Armed Conflict and other Vulnerable Groups"		1/10/2014, 8/14/2015, 10/28/2015, 202(e)-enhanced in FY15	\$500,000,000 \$1,750,000 \$5,000,000 202(e)-enhanced: \$11,000	LRP (incl. int'l procurement) for IDPs and refugees
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) AID-FFP-G-14-00022	unknown		5/7/2014	\$1,200,000	Food Vouchers
WFP AID-FFP-IO-15-00007 AID-FFP-IO-16-00008	EMOP 200799	Orientale	2/6/2015 3/18/2016	\$5,554,287 \$4,500,000	Support to CAR refugees in DRC
ACTED AID-FFP-G-15-00019	Emergency food assistance to highly vulnerable conflict-affected households in Katanga Province	Katanga	2/20/2015	\$530,000	Food Vouchers

Implementing Partner & award No.	Project Name	Province	Date awarded	Original Budget (US\$)	Key Planned Activities
WFP AID-FFP-IO-15-00027*	Special Operation (SO) 200661: "Strengthening Food Security Cluster Coordination in DRC"	Katanga, Kinshasa, N. and S. Kivu; Orientale	7/31/2015 8/29/2016*	\$1,250,000 \$650,000	Food Security Cluster (2016: road construction)
WFP AID-FFP-IO-15-00028	SO 200864 "Emergency Road Infrastructure Repairs in Support of WFP Operations in DRC"	Eastern DRC	7/31/2015	\$2,000,000	Road access
WFP AID-FFP-IO-16-00006 and one modification	PRRO 200832: "Targeted Food Assistance to Victims of Armed Conflicts and other Vulnerable Groups in DRC"	Katanga, N. and S. Kivu; Orientale	3/7/2016 8/29/2016	\$17,750,000 \$2,350,000	LRP
WFP AID-FFP-IO-16-00008	EMOP 200799		3/18/2016	\$4,500,000	Cash transfers for CAR refugees
CRS (Joint FFP-OFDA) AID-OFDA-A-16-00051	Displaced and recent Returnee households Invite Recovery in DRC (DRIVE DRC)	Eastern DRC	9/28/2016	\$2,280,149	Local Procurement and food voucher
ACTED (Joint FFP-OFDA) AID-OFDA-G-16-00174	Immediate and multi sector assistance to highly vulnerable populations affected by conflicts in South Kivu	South Kivu	9/30/2016	\$2,058,804	Local Procurement
Samaritan's Purse (Joint FFP-OFDA) AID-OFDA-G-16-00168	Emergency Response and Economic Recovery for Eastern DRC	Eastern DRC	9/21/2016	\$3,149,997	Food Vouchers

*Per FFP data, updated Aug. 2017, AID-FFP-IO-15-00027 allotted \$650,000 to WFP SO 200661 for road construction, but 2015 FFP data and program documents indicate that SO 200661 is for Food Security Cluster capacity development.

ANNEX 2: REFERENCES

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ANNEX 3: INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS

Table 2: Stakeholders interviewed during the DRC field mission July 14- July 30, 2017 and/or via Skype prior to the field mission

Organization	Name	Stakeholder type/title
Individuals		
ACTED	Moukhtar Mahamat	Area Coordinator, Kalemie
CRS	Elie Murhula	Kalemie Field Coordinator – DRIVE Project
CRS	Giulia Frontini	Lake Chad Basin Emergency Coordinator, Humanitarian Response Department, London
CRS	Katherine Overcamp	Head of Programs, Eastern DRC
CRS	Kathleen Gordon	Emergency Coordinator, DRC
CRS	Sylvain Duhau	Deputy Country Representative, Eastern DRC
SP	Maurice Omollo	Chief of Party, USAIDizi Project
SP	Onesmus Langat	M&E Manager, Bunia
UNICEF	Steven Michel	Spécialiste Urgences, Coordinateur National du Cluster AME (Articles Ménagers Essentiels) / 'NFI' (Non-Food Items) et Abris
WFP	Jesse Muzalia	VAM Manager, Kalemie
Small groups		
FFP	Marcel Ntumba	Food Aid Specialist
FFP	Stanley Stalla	Food for Peace Officer
SP	Annie Khana	Food Supervisor
SP	Arthur Tshileo	Emergency Response Coordinator
SP	Claude Asimwe	Operations Manager, Beni
SP	Edgar Kamaliro	M&E Coordinator, Beni
SP	Edward Swaray	Programme Manager
SP	Freddy Mwema	NFI Supervisor
SP	Jacques Habyarimana	Food Supervisor, Ex Province Orientale
SP	Linda Yoloki	Database Officer
SP	Noah Obatja	Area Coordinator
SP	Onesmus Langat	M&E Manager, Bunia
USAID	Kendra Schoenholz	Deputy Mission Director
USAID	Richard Kimball	Acting Deputy Mission Director
USAID	Scott Hocklander	Acting Mission Director
WFP-Goma	David Chalila	Head of Supply Chain, Goma
WFP-Goma	Joel Siku	Programme Officer/ VAM-M&E, Goma
WFP-Goma	Taban Lokonga	Head of Programme, Goma Area Office
WFP-Kinshasa	Agbessi Amewoa	Country Coordinator Smallholder Value chains (P4P) & Resilience Programme
WFP-Kinshasa	Celestin Mulumba	Senior Programme Officer (Prog)
WFP-Kinshasa	Kai Roehm	Programme Policy Officer
WFP-Kinshasa	Pembe Lero,	National Programme Officer (VAM)

Organization	Name	Stakeholder type/title
Individuals		
WFP-Kinshasa	Rodrigue Givule	Procurement Assistant (Supply Chain)
WFP-Kinshasa	Roger Tulkuka	National Logistics Officer (Supply Chain)
WFP-Kinshasa	Theo Kapuku	National Programme Officer (M&E)
World Vision International	Davies Bishi	Operations Manager, Eastern Zone Office, Goma
World Vision International	Stephania Noel	Food Assistance Manager, Eastern Zone Office, Bukavu

Table 3: Summary data for focus groups/interviews conducted in DRC: locations, number, and type of participants

Location	Focus group (FGD) or interview	# of participants	Type of participants
Rwahwa Village, Butembo	FGD	20+	IDP women
Rwahwa Village, Butembo	FGD	20+	IDP men
Kahite Localité (quartier), Kalemie	FGD	5 + chief of Locality	IDP women and men
Kahite Localité (quartier), Kalemie	FGD	7+	IDP women
Kahite Localité (quartier), Kalemie	FGD	8+	IDP men
Beni	FGD	6	Female vendors
Beni	FGD	6	Male vendors
Oicha	FGD	20 (4 m, 16 f)	Male and female vendors
Kalemie	FGD	7 (4 m, 3 f)	Male and female vendors
Rwahwa Village, Butembo	In Depth Interview	1 on 1	IDP husband and wife
Rwahwa Village, Butembo	In Depth Interview	1 on 1	IDP husband and wife
Kahite Localité (quartier), Kalemie	In Depth Interview	1 on 1	IDP woman

ANNEX 4: APPROACH

This country case study is part of a larger study by a Review Team. Field work was conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo from July 14-30, 2017, during which time the team leader interviewed stakeholders from 8 organizations, and conducted interviews and focus groups (supported by a local researcher) with over 60 beneficiaries and participating vendors (25 women, 14 men). A systematic review of project documents and technical reports was also conducted.

The primary data collection utilized a qualitative and participatory approach including key informant interviews (KII) with donors, government, implementing partners, and focus group discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries and vendors. The schedule included:

- FGDs and KIIs with one IP, beneficiaries and vendors in Beni, Butembo, and Oicha, July 17-19;
- KIIs with WFP and one IP in Goma, July 20;
- FGDs and KIIs with WFP, two IPs, beneficiaries and vendors in Kalemie, July 21-25; and
- KIIs with UNICEF and WFP, debrief presentation with USAID and discussion with FFP in Kinshasa, July 27-28.

Life Histories come from in-depth qualitative interviews conducted using methodology adapted from ODI (Scott and Diwakar, 2016).