

BUILDING ON EXPERIENCE

Reflections and recommendations from evaluations of the 2017 CVA Somalia Drought Response.

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1 Introduction

Improving our response to drought to avert crises through the use of cash and voucher assistance requires us to build on experience. This paper pulls together reflections and recommendations from a review of eight evaluation reports, reviews and studies that were conducted during or after the 2017 drought response in Somalia. The reports considered the use of cash and vouchers assistance (CVA) in drought related responses in urban and rural areas of Somalia; through a review of reports assessing short and long term responses by a variety of agencies using a variety of payment methods. This synthesis is intended to be used by agencies to inform the planning and delivery of CVA in Somalia going forward.

Background

In January 2017, an alert was issued by FSNAU that a severe drought in Somalia could escalate to famine unless there was a timely humanitarian response. More than 6.2 million people were considered to be in need of humanitarian assistance; over 3.1 million were facing acute food insecurity and the situation was assessed to be in the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) Crisis and Emergency Phases 3 and 4. The humanitarian community mobilized quickly when the famine alert was raised in an effort to prevent famine and save lives. A significant part of the overall response was delivered in the form of cash and voucher assistance.

To give a little context:

- The FSNAU issued an alert in January 2017 stating that a famine in Somalia was possible in 2017¹, following a severe drought, rising prices, continued access limitations, and dry forecasts.
- The Somalia inter-agency Cash Working Group (CWG) was re-formed in February 2017.
- Throughout 2017 and 2018 the CWG provided a forum to engage, share learning and coordinate CVA activities in Somalia.
- Over three million people per month received CVA in the first four months following the famine alert. The first target of the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) was met by CVA only.
- In early 2017, CaLP produced a summary of recommendations and lessons from the 2011 drought (CaLP 2017) which was discussed during events that brought CVA actors together. It is recommended that readers of this report, also review that document and the accompanying summary (CaLP 2017a).
- In 2018, as part of its work to share lessons and identify areas for CVA improvement, the CWG commissioned a joint evaluation. The evaluation involved more than 20 agencies and took a collective view of the CVA delivered in the 2017 response.
- As well as the joint evaluation, a number of other evaluations were conducted (in 2017 and 2018). As a result, the CWG Evaluation Steering Committee agreed it would be valuable to look at these alongside the joint evaluation to identify common themes to improve CVA response in Somalia. CaLP took on this task.

¹ FSNAU, SOMALIA Food Security Alert - January 2017

2 Limitations and caveats

- Other reports with useful recommendations may exist. This paper draws only on reports which were accessible via the CaLP resource library, from a basic internet search and from reports that were received from agencies when a request for information was shared.
- Not all recommendations from all reports are included. Recommendations were excluded if they were unclear or if they were so agency or time specific that they were deemed unlikely to have a wider application.
- In a few cases, reflections and recommendations have been slightly edited to reduce the use of acronyms and ensure ease of reading when taken out of the context of the initial report.
- Some of the reflections and recommendations are not CVA specific and would apply to most modalities, they are included where they were felt to have had a significant impact on the impact of CVA.

3 Reflections and Recommendations

3.1 The Use of Learning from the 2011 Response to Improve the 2017 Drought Response

1. “The scaling up of cash-based responses in 2017 humanitarian crisis in Somalia is considered positive in terms of timeliness, in comparison to the context of the humanitarian response during the famine of 2011 (which was very late), however respondents suggest that many other learning points from the 2011/12 response were not incorporated into the 2017 response.” (European Union, ASiST, 2018)
2. There was a “lack of investment in preparedness and a strategy for a more harmonized ‘safety net’ approach to cash based emergency response in between crises (i.e. between 2012 and 2017).” (European Union, ASiST, 2018)
3. There was “lack of a strategy to reach inaccessible areas and populations and in relation, the cost of encouraging further displacement, in the 2017 crisis, as people move to access resources;” (European Union, ASiST, 2018)
4. There was a “lack of a learning oriented M&E system for the 2017 response (the 2011 cash-based humanitarian response contracted ODI to develop and implement, with partners, a monitoring system).” (European Union, ASiST, 2018)
5. It was noted that “many areas that the CWG has been or is currently working on, were long overdue, for example in the review of MEBs, which had not been undertaken for many years.” (European Union, ASiST, 2018)
6. “Some felt that there could have been more attention paid to early warnings before the official alarm was sounded. Earlier awareness could have helped in better preparedness for both in-kind and CVA.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)

3.2 Appropriateness of CVA in the 2017 Drought Response

7. “Cash based programming has reached the maturity and scale to effectively and rapidly respond to humanitarian needs in large parts of Somalia.” (Peer 2 Peer, 2018).
8. “Claims being made about the pros and cons of cash versus voucher approaches in relation to efficiency, effectiveness and accountability need to be rigorously reviewed.” (DFID Somalia, 2018)
9. “The humanitarian system has utilized cash assistance substantially in the last decade as a means of delivery in Somalia and has solid experience to work effectively in insecure environments and hard-to-reach areas”. (Peer 2 Peer, 2018)
10. “Respondents repeatedly stated that they liked the cash transfer system and that it suited their needs but many also wanted long term livelihoods programs. People in IDP camps were particularly suited to be cash transfer beneficiaries as they lack the traditional safety nets, such as community financial and social support for those in crises, found in local communities across Somalia.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
11. “CBA is relevant as Somalia has a strong market economy and private sector, and a population accustomed to the use of cash and other forms of trade for basic needs and livelihoods inputs. CBA was widely used in the food and water sectors; there was also some use seen in shelter/non-food items (NFIs) and education.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
12. “CBA provided life-saving assistance to over three million people per month within four months of the famine alert being raised and contributed to meeting the Humanitarian Response Plan objectives. The 2017 response was generally considered more effective than during the prior humanitarian crisis in Somalia in 2011.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
13. “CBA was clearly a relevant and appropriate response to the drought in Somalia and for longer-term resilience activities. The strong market system, widespread acceptance of CBA, organizational expertise, and presence of service providers all meant that CBA was feasible and, where acknowledged, security and fraud risks and costs could be well managed.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
14. “There was broad acceptance that CBA reduced the risk of famine and thus saved lives – much better than 2011, though changed context helped.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
15. “Only a small amount of CBA was delivered towards restoring livelihoods and promoting basic services due to the alert of famine being raised and funds being channeled into emergency relief.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
16. “A better understanding of local coping strategies will enable the international community to maximise them in resilience-building programmers in the future. The practical feasibility of CBA was assessed, but broader challenges could have been considered earlier.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)

3.3 Transfer Values

17. “Reconsider transfer amounts, frequency and duration.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).

18. “Revisit the issue of need, preference and funding to bring amounts for similar objectives in each location back into harmony and consider adapting the frequency of instalments and their duration.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
19. “The data on beneficiary opinions varied, with some showing CBA was not enough and others that it was. Concerns were reported related to inconsistent amounts, but there is not enough evidence to really show either way if CBA amounts influence project impact.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
20. “There was significant variation in the CBA transfer amounts given for basic needs in different places and at different times, and sometimes in the same place by different organizations. This was partly due to differing local market prices, partly due to lack of agreement on appropriate amounts, and partly due to funding availability and donor directives – all factors that are related.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
21. Talking of the MEB, “Concerns of cost and validity from donors, implementing organizations and others led to a further series of debates and revisions of both the MEB and transfer amounts. This included variation by region and urban or rural, and variation by programmatic intent i.e. food only, food plus other basic consumption needs, or full multi-purpose cash. This process seemed very confusing to many concerned, especially those in the field expected to implement the guidance. Eventually, some of the donors who had earlier adhered to the CWG recommendations, created their own sets of agreed transfer amounts.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
22. “Despite community awareness, some beneficiaries stated in a focus group that they had been told to expect \$140 a month but only received that amount for the first month and now received \$60 a month. They seemed confused and wanted explanations from the focus group moderator about why the decrease had occurred.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
23. “The lack of consistency in transfer amounts was considered a problem by all informants, and by many beneficiaries. Organisations had to repeatedly explain different amounts being given, and households found it difficult to plan for use of the CBA. Just under half of beneficiary focus groups reported not receiving the same amount every month, most of which did not know why. Better communication would have helped this problem.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
24. “This was similar to the experiences of the beneficiaries interviewed in several other areas where the amount decreased after a few months. Yet, the confusion of beneficiaries on why this occurred differed from place to place, likely from differing levels of sensitization. It is important to note that all beneficiaries who stated the decrease in the cash transfer amount said that the second phase, the lower amount, was not nearly enough to cover their needs. One beneficiary, “The first phase was \$154 per household and that was enough and better than the second phase which was \$89 and it was not possible to cover the necessary needs anymore.” The difference in amounts is due to the drop in MEB mid-way through the project”. (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
25. “Also controversial in the food security sector was how much cash to give people. FSNAU analysis based on calculations around a minimum expenditure basket (MEB) recommended different rates for different parts of the country. DFID saw problems with the way these calculations had been made and argued for a flat transfer value of \$60 per month per household on the grounds of simplicity and equity (avoiding tensions from different regions receiving different amounts). It insisted on the flat transfer value for the organizations it was funding whilst other donors stuck with different rates..... Some of those interviewed felt that DFID’s insistence on a flat rate undermined a more coordinated approach to cash-based responses. Other felt that, given issues with the MEB calculations, DFID’s position was an appropriate one. A coordinated approach to transfer values has now been agreed for 2018 between DFID and ECHO”. (DFID Somalia, 2018).

3.4 Feedback Mechanisms and CVA.

26. “Feedback mechanisms are in place but inconsistent awareness and use of them. Third Party Monitoring appears to be increasingly requested by donors for its potential for objectivity.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
27. “Respondents had low awareness of formal feedback mechanisms for the project and many focus group participants wanted more information regarding the timing and amount than was provided. For some demographic groups such as older persons, this information may have been hard to retain from earlier sensitization campaigns.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
28. “These mechanisms were available at every project location and beneficiaries were made aware of these feedback mechanisms during the initial sensitization sessions. The majority of beneficiaries were not aware that feedback mechanisms existed, with only 9.6% reporting that they were aware of these mechanisms. This is lower than the post-distribution monitoring reports completed by the Cash Alliance. This may be due to beneficiaries being unaware of *formal* feedback mechanisms rather than feedback they may have given before through informal sources. These informal sources include through community leaders or random calls through the monitoring call center.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
29. “Interviews with project leads and project staff repeatedly indicated that these mechanisms were available. Even with the mechanisms available, one project staff member admitted, ‘We have a telephone number in the office which they can call anytime but they don’t use it all too much.’ This high availability but low awareness is most likely due to low levels of sensitization by organizations and may indicate a need for repeated messaging about the availability of these mechanisms and the expectations beneficiaries should have about the cash transfer program” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
30. “One report even recounted an ‘incredibly low awareness that feedback mechanisms existed’. This finding was reiterated by key informants, who confirmed the low usage of the feedback mechanisms in their agency. From the FGDs, it seems a larger proportion of women are unaware of the existence of feedback mechanisms than men.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
31. Fewer women than men “report knowing when to expect the CBA, fewer women report being asked about their safety concerns and more women report that CBA is being provided to the wrong people, all suggesting that women are less informed than men. A possible explanation for this may be due to community committees and organizations’ staff engaging with male household members more than women, as is considered culturally appropriate in Somalia.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)

3.5 The Impact of CVA and Culture of Sharing

32. “At the moment, the cash transfer amount is too small to have any impact beyond food security and resilience.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
33. “The impact of cash transfers in Somalia is itself challenging to determine. There is no doubt that cash-based programming is appropriate to the context and at the household food security and wider economic/market levels the use and impact of cash is well known and has been well documented in Somalia.” (European Union, ASiST, 2018).
34. “The cash transfer program has little influence over any social impact (health, education, and livelihoods). While not the intended goal of the program, beneficiaries specifically want more job trainings and livelihoods and opportunities to seek free or reduced-cost health and education services.

In almost all the areas where the Cash Consortium works, livelihoods, health, and education-focused projects exist. Connections should be made with these NGOs or projects so that referrals can be made to beneficiaries to fulfill more of their needs.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)

35. “Social impact, measured as health and education access, has not been achieved. Rates of school attendance and health-seeking behavior are still low and beneficiaries often said they would be unwilling to spend money on education or health for fear they would not have enough money for food.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018).
36. “Evidence shows that cash transfers are predominantly used by recipients to improve access to food (improving quantity and quality); reduce household debt (and therefore re-open credit lines); and improve access to other (non-food) household essentials, water and education. However, this positive impact is mitigated by a number of further issues:
 - The effectiveness of targeting processes, in particular in reaching the most vulnerable populations including marginalized and minority populations. This is not a specific concern for cash-based programming but affects all forms of aid distribution in Somalia and may contribute to limiting improved welfare outcomes to most vulnerable groups; and
 - the impact of cash on nutritional indicators; for example the current (2017) large-scale cash programme has been implemented while numbers of people in IPC 4 have increased; malnutrition levels for many IDPs have remained high in spite of IDPs being amongst the most (geographically) accessible population group to aid agencies and cash programmers in recent years; findings from the REFANI study².” (European Union, ASiST, 2018).
37. “Sharing with community members mainly happens when assistance only reaches a part of the community or a small number of people. Beneficiaries also share the assistance with other family members who are most of the time away taking care of any remaining small animal livestock.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
38. “Sharing allows assistance to reach non-beneficiaries, both supporting the community, but also building relationships and acting as a kind of ‘safety net’ for when they might be in need in future. While most informants recognize the cultural value of sharing, some are concerned of possible negative impacts on beneficiaries, or at least on meeting programme objectives when assistance is based on single household amounts. This fact of sharing was also recognized by organizations when evaluating their own projects.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
39. “Many beneficiaries and informants mentioned the need for CBA to be directed at drought affected communities before they are displaced which was done in a small number of programmes. Increasing assistance to rural areas would help to further protect productive assets in those areas, avert displacement and the risks associated with living in camps, and likely significantly contribute to the resilience of those communities”. (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
40. “In Somalia, and to some extent in Kenya, market-based interventions (cash transfers, cash vouchers, food vouchers) have been extensively used in the response, often enabling faster delivery of assistance to communities, though the size of transfers and number of distribution cycles have fallen short in terms of ensuring a general reduction in global acute malnutrition (GAM) which has shown an increase in several parts of Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia.” (DEC, 2017)
41. “In addition, there were a few concerning remarks made by those in IDP camps saying that they have become disincentivized to work due to the cash transfer. In addition, food security scores collected by Forcier after the cash transfer program were lower than food security scores collected during PDMs,

² <https://www.actionagainsthunger.org/refani/somalia-country-study>

possibly indicating that beneficiaries' food security and resilience had not sustainably improved.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)

42. “A somewhat concerning observation was made by beneficiaries in Baidoa that the cash transfer had stopped them from continuing to seek work: ‘We used to go to the market to seek any sort of informal job; as mothers, we used to clean and wash clothes to help our family’.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)

3.6 Risks

43. “Reconsider risks to reach more areas, possibly with mobile money expanding programmes to more areas while ensuring reasonable safety and accountability will likely require better risk mitigation. This will also require the acceptance of more ‘residual risk’ and increased costs on the part of organizations and donors.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
44. “While the problem of gatekeepers and taxation was recognized as a challenge in most areas and for all types of programmes, in Mogadishu there was an additional concern that humanitarian organizations focusing on newly displaced people possibly led to forced eviction of IDPs (and hence ‘new’ displacement) to attract more attention and thus more aid. It is unclear whether CBA might have exacerbated this problem.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
45. “Gatekeepers appeared to have a negative impact primarily in IDP camps where there were some reports of beneficiaries being charged \$5 by community leaders after each cash transfer.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
46. “If they did not pay, they were forced to leave the camp. Our enumerator reported that focus group participants said around 70 households had been forced to leave the IDP camp in Baidoa because of this. However, gatekeepers were not as prominent in host communities and there were no reports of them charging community members for nominating them as beneficiaries.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
47. “Organizations may need to adapt their policies and procedures to balance reach and accountability. The use of mobile money can assist in providing reach where network coverage exists, while e-cards provide stronger biometric identification.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
48. “The perceived risk of dependency may correlate directly with the duration of the emergency assistance i.e. the longer the emergency response, the higher the risk of dependency. In future to avoid this perception of dependency, the humanitarian community could consider a phased approach, with unconditional emergency response transitioning into IGA and other livelihood support.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
49. “There are other challenges that were not mentioned as much but do show up in other evaluations. A recent World Bank study pointed out what it called ‘staggering risks’ of mobile money due to weak regulation and a lack of ‘parity between e-money and cash in banks’. Because providers do not keep enough cash reserves, surging demand in pay outs or failure of the business could leave account holders or transferring organizations with no way to claim the balance of their money.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).

3.7 Multi-Purpose CVA and Cross Sectoral Linkages

50. “Sectors have had a mixed performance in integrating their food security interventions with nutrition programme in particular, along with WASH and protection. This was reflected in DEC members’

interventions as well – only a couple of member’s in Somalia attempted an integrated approach in their programming, incorporating good practices.” (DEC, 2017)

51. “...interviews with field staff confirmed that even within an organization, sectoral teams tend to work in isolation, with food security team taking the lead in independently determining targeting and beneficiary selection criteria, leading the Somalia country study to ponder if cash transfer programme which is taking up substantial organizational time and resources is coming at the expense of attention to other sectors. Evidence in support of this conjecture is thin in the country studies, but this may be an issue to look out for.” (DEC, 2017)
52. “From the SHF 2017 funds’ performance Indicator analysis; as cash assistance has been integrated into projects across multiple clusters, it is difficult to systematically track the cash components funded by the SHF.” (OCHA Somalia, 2017)
53. “For challenges with Multi-purpose reporting, an action for the SHF 2017 review was to utilize a systematic tracking mechanism for cash assistance funded by the SHF by assigning cash markers to be introduced to the CBPF GMS.” (OCHA Somalia, 2017)

3.8 Gender, Protection and CVA

54. “CVA seems to have contributed to the economic independence of participant women. In various KII and FGD it was pointed out that women opened up small businesses and were able to make their purchases with more discretion. While these are positive steps in the present, it is not clear to what extent these trends will follow into the future, how transformative they may have been on individual women, or whether this has resulted in any negative consequences at home, such as abuse from husbands or male relatives.” (CARE, 2017)
55. “Key findings from a recent rapid gender analysis in IDP settlements in Somaliland conducted by one of the DEC members confirmed that the effect of household food insecurity has caused intermittent household tensions and conflict resulting in domestic violence, though the cash support has contributed to a reduction in incidences due to improved food access.” (DEC, 2017)
56. “Though CBA was not considered to have contributed to general protection concerns more so than other modalities, some were concerned about the potential for household conflict or damage to relationships when women (of male headed household) received CBA. Only a few thought it would improve household relations. However, most of beneficiary focus groups (both male and female) reported satisfaction with who received the CBA in their household.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
57. “Analyze cash transfers’ different effects on men, women, boys, and girls. Capture and analyze protection issues in real time” (CARE, 2017)
58. “Respondents shared that decisions on how to spend the cash lie with the breadwinner, who is typically the male head-of-household; however, decision making varies between households. In some families, the husband makes decisions alone, while in other household’s decisions are jointly made by husbands and wives.” (ADESO, WRC, 2018)
59. “Potential risks of GBV associated with cash transfers were reported during consultations. Respondents were concerned about an increase in physical, verbal, and/or psychological violence between spouses and between parents and children around how transfers should be spent. Another risk reported was that tension and violence within the household around expenditure could lead to separation of spouses and perhaps divorce. While divorce in a case of domestic violence could be a favorable outcome, the

risks of GBV that a divorced woman might face when separated from the household were of concern.” (ADESO, WRC, 2018)

60. “Women and girls reported that cash assistance could potentially reduce their risks of GBV, including rape, physical assault, and sexual harassment, by reducing their care work and the associated risky distances they travel to collect water and firewood, or to perform domestic work for wealthy families.” (ADESO, WRC, 2018)
61. “Few beneficiary groups, regardless of gender, reported any household conflict because of who was registered to receive CBA or resulting from CBA use. In fact, when asked whether the CBA has had an impact on household relations, a third of the groups (both men and women) stated the CBA has improved their household relations by boosting morale and building capacity. Very few groups mentioned CBA causing power struggles. While there are perceived risks that CBA being given to women can cause household tensions, there are also documented protection benefits associated with CBA being given to women, both of which require careful consideration when designing a CBA intervention.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
62. “Few beneficiaries reported problems of selection, and very few said age, clan or gender mattered. It appears that men are better informed than women on CBA selection and delivery..... This suggests an area for further investigation coupled with more efforts in ensuring women’s participation in community consultation, especially if they are the preferred recipients of Cross sector integration with CVA.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).

3.9 Modalities, Mechanisms and Financial Services Providers

63. “Reconsider if restrictions are needed on beneficiary use of CBA.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
64. “Reconsider the distribution of vouchers in locations where markets can provide appropriate items to give beneficiaries more flexibility and take advantage of the large and diverse cash economy. Investigate alternatives to restrictions, including raising awareness, and supporting market chains. Continue to use vouchers to address very specific concerns of malnutrition or poor markets in remote areas, but also consider complementary approaches, combining vouchers with access to cash.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
65. “CBA modalities were chosen based on whether restricting use was considered important to programme objectives – usually a donor or agency mandate constraint. Mechanisms were chosen for whether they could ensure accountability and identity.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
66. “Mobile money is considered able to scale further. Concerns are beneficiary verification and traceability. E-Cards can use biometric ID, but coverage is more limited by network scale. Hawala can offer remote or insecure access because of local knowledge or acceptance.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
67. “There were two main approaches to the delivery of cash. The NGO consortia that DFID funded provided cash to people through mobile phones, with people getting transfers on their phone and being able to redeem that in cash with mobile money agents. WFP registered people biometrically on the SCOPE system and provided people with SCOPE cards that could be used with selected shops and traders to buy a set range of food items. Views varied on the effectiveness of these two approaches. WFP saw its system as providing an extra layer of accountability through the biometric registration system and ensuring that it met its food mandate because vouchers could only be spent on food items. WFP argued that an extensive network of retailers where the vouchers could be redeemed meant that people did not have to travel far to use the vouchers. Those using cash through mobile payments argued that this allowed more choice to recipients, was more efficient and that the extensive network

of mobile agents meant people had to travel less to redeem vouchers. Importantly, mobile cash also enabled people to send cash to relatives in areas that were hard for agencies to access and to send support in situations where households had been split". (DFID Somalia, 2018).

68. "It was beyond the scope of this review to make judgements about these sets of arguments and which method was most effective. However, given the scale of support given through cash and vouchers this is an important area for further rigorous independent investigation. A study like the BCG study in Lebanon is clearly called for. A rigorous review is urgently needed to test the relative merits of the two approaches." (DFID Somalia, 2018)
69. "Regulation of the financial sector is critical to many aspects of Somalia's efforts to recover from drought and increase resilience. Currently, the CBS is preparing a Financial Sector roadmap that outlines the necessary steps. A regulated financial sector will create more effective payment systems, which will help bring down the cost of cash transfer programs." (DINA, Somalia, 2018)
70. "Somalia's almost 75 percent mobile phone coverage and prevalence of mobile network operators have made it possible to deliver cash transfers through mobile phones. This development has changed the landscape of safety nets delivery in Somalia." (DINA, Somalia, 2018)

3.10 CVA Coordination

71. "Cash programming has been a mainstay of the humanitarian landscape in Somalia for many years, but the leadership and coordination of cash programming and the delivery modalities over the years have been inconsistent." (Peer 2 Peer, 2018).
72. "The Cash Working Group is a self-regulated and quasi-independent group of organizations that come together to discuss various modalities related to cash programming. It has a strong technical focus, is well-attended, inclusive and is composed of highly competent colleagues. However, the group is not formally connected to the ICCG or the HCT and operates in a manner that is isolated from the strategic decision-making and operational groups that steer the response. Although, there is informal engagement between the CWG and the ICCG. But, at the time of the peer support mission, the group seemed to be working somehow independently - or disconnected - from the leadership of the humanitarian operation (the HCT)". (Peer 2 Peer, 2018).
73. "There was a very effective and dynamic revival of the CWG at Nairobi level, a much-appreciated platform for discussing CBA operational and decisions across sectors. CWG has a strong strategic position with assigned advisory role, large stakeholder engagement and cross sectoral approach." (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
74. "There is some confusion on the role of the regional level CWG." (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
75. "There is a call for the CWG to finalize robust and effective guidance, standards and tools for CBA" (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018).
76. "Establish a clear connection between the Cash Working Group and the HCT.
 - Cash Working Group representatives present findings of the 2017 Joint cash evaluations and research
 - Initiate discussion between the cash working group and the HCT and ICCG on the strategic direction for cash-based interventions.
 - Cash Working Group representative(s) to participate as a standing and active invitee to the ICCG.

- Cash Working Group to revise the Terms of Reference of the group to expand membership, and encourage agencies and NGOs that are using cash to participate regularly, including development actors that are involved in cash and social safety net cash programmers.” (Peer 2 Peer, 2018).

3.11 Cash Based Assistance and Links with Social Safety Nets

77. “The HCT agreed that it would be strategically useful to organize a multi-stakeholder discussion between the humanitarian community, development partners, donors and the Federal Government on humanitarian cash programming and social safety net approaches to assistance based on cash-based programming.” (Peer 2 Peer, 2018).
78. “Having humanitarian teams talk with development teams is a first step, for example, to planning based on the importance of the local market to shaping the design and anticipating the potential impact of cash programming.” (DFID Somalia, 2018)
79. “The large-scale cash transfers provided and registration processes conducted in 2017 provide opportunities to develop a system better able to flex between medium-term support to chronically vulnerable populations and expanded short-term emergency support.” (DFID Somalia, 2018)
80. “The second set details recommendations related to creating a national social safety net in Somalia and steps that could be taken in the interim before a safety net program is operational. Steps to Safety nets
- Target Creation: Currently targets are set using regional or zonal level data, providing less accurate and often unattainable goals. Completing a baseline of the community before registration or before the announcement of the cash transfer program would provide more reliable and specific data for Cash Consortium communities. (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
 - Household Sizes: Household size greatly influences the impact of the cash transfer on food security, resilience, and social needs. Methods of cash transfer that take into account household size would achieve more equitable outcomes. However, household size may fluctuate with the introduction of the cash transfer. Therefore, determining household size should be done in the initial baseline, before notifying community members of the introduction of the cash transfer program. (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)
 - ID System: Biometric systems are being introduced throughout Somalia in a variety of different capacities. Iris scanners were used in the 2017 Somaliland elections and fingerprints are used in WFP’s SCOPE program and in the private sector’s Camel Cash program. While creating a national ID system may be several years off, collecting and using biometric data for current or new beneficiaries can be used for the coordinated generation of unique beneficiary coordination numbers. Beneficiary coordination numbers can then be used between actors to enable functional de-duplication and coordination systems.” (Somalia Cash Alliance, 2018)

3.12 Non CVA Specific Issues: Targeting and Registration

While the following points are not CVA specific, they are included as they routinely feature in CVA discussions.

81. “... agencies can over-claim their field presence, hence coverage exists on paper rather than in operations. Agencies were often limited to urban centres and their immediate environs with little access to more rural areas. Incentives still exist to over-claim presence in order to maximise funding; this points

to the need for a more honest and open conversation about actual capacity to respond in different areas and sectors (SAVE 2017).” (DFID Somalia, 2018).

82. “Some interviewees were concerned about an over-focus on areas categorized as IPC 3 and 4 and under-focus on preventing areas in IPC2 from worsening to 3 and 4. They saw a need to attend to acute food insecurity and chronic food insecurity in tandem. Whilst the decision to focus primarily on the worst hit areas was appropriate given the urgency, the scale of need and limited resources, how to better maintain support to areas that might still lapse into crisis does merit further consideration.” (DFID Somalia, 2018).
83. “The DEC review would suggest targeting IPC 4 and 5 areas, with focus on WASH and nutrition, using an integrated approach, if possible. Cash transfer, though has demonstrated its effectiveness in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia, is resource-intensive, and DEC funds will be too small to undertake a meaningful scale up of market-based response.” (DEC, 2017).
84. “The reliance of technology for cash transfer, however, could mean that older people are at risk of being excluded, as are populations in remote areas with limited access to technology. And the lack of trained social workers in the country means that the methods of targeting and supporting vulnerable groups will remain challenging.” (DINA, Somalia, 2018)
85. “Coverage in rural and remote areas was still a challenge, though coverage was better than in 2011 due to positive changes in security, better presence, and improved coordination. The targeting and selection of beneficiaries was also successful. No significant issues were reported with household or community tension from CBA or its predominant provision to women.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
86. “DEC members used multiple indicators of vulnerability to target households and made wide use of community-led processes in beneficiary selection. While this encouraged participation and facilitated accountability to affected population, in both Somalia and South Sudan, over-reliance by some agencies on community leaders, without adequate cross-checking and validation mechanisms, meant that sizeable amount of benefits (in-kind and cash) were cornered by those able to influence the process of beneficiary selection – more noticeable in Somalia than in South Sudan due to clan, sub-clan and political influences brought to bear on community leaders.” (DEC, 2017)
87. “... some said the urgency (and ease) of responding to nearby needs may have limited the reach to more remote areas. There were also some concerns of duplication and gaps, either from a simple lack of coordination, or from organizations claiming to ‘cover’ an area but only providing limited scale or breadth of assistance compared to the needs.” (Somalia CWG Evaluation, 2018)
88. “An overview study of the Beneficiary Registration and Data Management Practices of NGOs, UN and Government in Somalia commissioned by WFP found that none of the six registries the study looked at are interoperable.” (WFP, 2018).
89. “The World Bank report notes that there is no ‘citizenship act’ in place, which should inform and regulate ID issuance.” (WFP,2018).
90. “A key similarity between all the six registries that the WFP study looked at is that they are operational registries. Moreover, by definition and given their function, these registries a) collect data at individual and not at the household level; b) collect and store a minimal number of variables (name, surname, age and gender and mobile contact.” (WFP 2018)

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