

EVALUATION OF ZIMBABWE'S EMERGENCY CASH TRANSFER (ZECT) PROGRAMME

Final report

Andrew Kardan, Ian MacAuslan, and Ngoni Marimo



Oxford
Policy
Management

CONCERN
worldwide



World Food Programme

July 2010

Acknowledgements

Many people from various organisations have contributed to this report with helpful comments on drafts and support to various aspects of fieldwork. From Concern Zimbabwe, the team would like to thank Country Director Mark Harper for overall direction and comments on an initial presentation and draft report, Elena Ruiz-Roman for support and advice throughout the evaluation, and comments on an initial presentation, Hitesh Dharod for support throughout the evaluation and extensive help on the costing analysis, Nicolette van Duursen for comments and advice, Tongesayi Rwapunga for assistance with costing, Nelly Maonde for help with fieldwork and comments on an early version of the presentation, Tineyi Hungwe for hospitality and assistance during fieldwork, and Godfrey Mapiko and Andrew Ndlovu for expert driving and navigation.

From the World Food Programme, the team would like to thank Simon Cammelbeeck for helpful comments on an initial presentation and draft report, Robert Samupindi for comments on an initial presentation and helpful information, Liljana Jovceva for comments on an initial presentation and draft report, and assistance with costing, and Vladimir Jovcev, Barbara Clemens and Irvine Madori for assistance with costing.

Mads Lofvall from the World Food Programme was present throughout the fieldwork and contributed enormously to the evaluation by doing interviews, providing very helpful ideas and direction, and constant constructive advice. Mads also provided very helpful comments on an initial presentation and draft report.

Fieldwork was greatly aided by our team of translators (Niasha, Cephas, David, Precious, Munyaradzi, and Phibeon) who not only contributed their language skills but also their knowledge of the districts in which fieldwork took place.

Many thanks to Anne Thomson (OPM) and Alex Hurrell (OPM) who have provided helpful comments on the structure and executive summary of earlier drafts of this report.

The team would like to offer apologies and thanks to anyone we have inadvertently omitted from this list, and a most important vote of thanks to those who participated in the research and gave their time during fieldwork. It is hope that this report will contribute to improvements in programming that will in turn repay their involvement.

Executive summary

Evaluation context

Concern Worldwide have been delivering food aid in three rural districts of Zimbabwe (Gokwe North, Gokwe South and Nyanga) since 2002 as part of the World Food Programme's (WFP) Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) programme. The VGF provided a monthly food bundle of 10kg staple, 1kg beans and 600ml oil per person to cover 80% of their monthly food needs, targeted on food insecure households (in 2009/10 approximately 40% of the population in selected wards) during the lean season (October-March) for a maximum of 6 months during the year.

In 2009, after the relative stabilisation of the Zimbabwean economic and political situation following hyperinflation and political stability, it was decided to make use of the introduction of the US dollar to pilot providing cash instead of food. This pilot project, called the Zimbabwe Emergency Cash Transfer programme (ZECT), lasted for 4-5 months and operated in two wards of each of the three Concern VGF districts. Within each district, in one ward Concern distributed cash, whilst in the other ward a mixture of cash and food was distributed. Concern continued to provide food aid in other wards in each district.

This evaluation assesses the benefits and costs of the three different transfer types. The principal test is whether households receiving cash and cash+food were able to meet their food entitlements as effectively as those receiving food, understood in terms both of obtaining sufficient staple foods, but also having adequate dietary diversity.

Costs

Costs were assessed for the three transfer types using programme budget and actual expenditure data. Costs were divided broadly into operational costs (transport, storage, staff time, etc.) and costs reflecting the value of the transfer (the cost of buying the commodities or the value of the cash). During the expansion period not surprisingly, operational costs were far lower for cash transfers (at USD2.1 per transfer made), than food (USD4.85 per transfer) or cash+food (USD4.14 per transfer). However, because the value of the cash transfer was calculated using the prices of maize, beans and oil at local prices, this value was higher than the cost of obtaining the food transfer at the international prices paid by WFP. This difference was due mainly to the high prices of beans in local markets (because beans are neither widely demanded nor widely available in rural Zimbabwe. This meant that the total transfer cost (operational cost + cost of the transfer value) was actually lowest for food (USD9.45), followed closely by cash (USD9.66) and cash+food (USD 9.69). However, if the food bundle had contained a protein source that was more widely available (and therefore cheaper) in local markets, the total cost of the food transfer would have been higher than that of cash. The operational cost per unit of transfer gives a better indication of the likely costs of expansion provided the amount of transfer remains the same and assuming that fixed costs are proportional to the number of beneficiaries. Lower operational costs per transfer imply lower costs for expansion at equal transfer values.

Impact on food consumption

Households interviewed obtain food from transfers (ZECT and sharing), their own labour (from *maricho* when paid in food), their own production (on their own farms and from gathering wild fruits and vegetables), and by purchasing from shops, markets, millers,

traders and farmers through barter or with cash (from sales, earnings, remittances or ZECT). For most households, the major effect of the ZECT transfer was a slight increase in consumption, and a reallocation of the sources used from *maricho* to transfer or purchase. This freed more time for recipients to work on their own fields, but its link to improved yields is less certain.

In general, cash recipients were able to obtain the goods they wanted from markets at stable prices. Traders reported substantial increases in their sales during the period ZECT was implemented, and had to restock more regularly than usual. This was not found in food wards. There were isolated but not substantial or widespread cases of price inflation. Recipients were not always able to obtain maize locally, as finding maize from local farmers was not always easy and local traders often preferred to sell in large towns rather than villages, but recipients were always able to obtain maize eventually, sometimes with some travelling or walking.

Where maize markets are functional, a family of five that receives ZECT cash transfers will increase their maize purchases by between 73 and 94kg per month. In some areas, however, recipients report not being able to obtain maize at market prices, so the increase in the weight of purchases is lower. Receiving cash reduces the amount recipients earn from *maricho* (since they chose to do less) during the transfer period by between 35 and 50kg per month (or less when maize markets do not function). This means that the net increase on consumption is probably around 20-40kg per month, depending on how much *maricho* recipients were doing. Barter prices are less favourable than cash prices. Cash transfers are not shared with non-recipients, and food bought from cash transfers is shared very little or not at all.

A family of five that receives VGF food will obtain more staple from transfers by between 37kg/month in Gokwe North and 45kg/month in Nyanga, once sharing with non-recipients (estimated at 5%) and using part of the sorghum for milling (25%) is accounted for. The amount from staple is higher in Nyanga because recipients receive more bulgur wheat there, which does not need milling. Receiving food also reduces the amount of food recipients earn from *maricho* (again because they chose to do less and work on their own fields instead). The net increase in consumption is probably around 10-15kg per month,

A family of five that receives ZECT cash+food will obtain more staple from transfers by about 24kg (on the basis that cash is used to pay for milling costs where relevant), and will obtain more maize from purchases by 27 to 30kg, totalling 51kg to 54kg per month in total. Again recipients earn less from *maricho*, and the food component only is shared with non-recipients. The net increase in consumption is probably about 10-20kg per month, depending on *maricho*.

Overall, given reductions in *maricho*, the net impact on consumption for households with labour options was much lower than the value of the transfer. However, for labour-constrained households, or where *maricho* is not regularly available, the transfers have a much more significant positive effect on recipients' consumption, since without transfers households would ration food in the absence of alternative sources.

Although indications from fieldwork were not entirely clear, and monitoring data suggest otherwise, fieldwork suggested that the impact of cash on dietary diversity of cash was less positive than food. This is because food recipients have more beans in their diet than cash recipients, who do not buy beans or other protein rich foods.

Other transfer impacts

Education and health

Cash and cash+food transfers were found to have a larger impact on education and health than food transfers, which is not surprising since the cash can be spent on school and clinic fees. However, this impact was not considered by recipients to be substantial. This was because education and health spending constituted a small fraction (5%) of the spending of the cash transfer, as recipients prioritised food spending. Food also has a small positive impact because respondents felt that children need to eat in order to attend school.

Basic goods

Cash and cash+food had small positive impacts on recipient households' ability to buy the basic goods they required. Markets were stimulated by the cash transfer, and traders were able to provide more goods on a wider range. There was no evidence for price inflation.

Community relations

Cash was found to have significant negative social consequences, raising social tensions already exacerbated by the targeting process. These negative consequences were considered important by both recipients and non-recipients, partly because good community relations are important not only to well-being but also the functioning of livelihoods systems in general. The negative consequences came because cash is not shared, unlike food, which increases jealousy and makes getting targeting correct more important. On the other hand, recipients in general felt that they were more confident in the community because they were able to provide for their families.

Intra-household relations

Cash, cash+food and food were all found to have positive impacts on intra-household relations. This was because the principal driver of poor intra-household relations is a lack of food at the household level, and all transfer types contributed to preventing this. Recipients not receiving cash were concerned that cash would generate tensions between men and women in households, as men would attempt to obtain the money to spend on beer. However, recipients in the cash wards did not report that this was a significant problem, and although there was evidence of increased spending on alcohol from beerhalls, this was not significant at the household level. Cash+food was considered the best transfer type for allowing all members of the household to satisfy their needs.

Operational issues

Targeting

The targeting process generated tensions in the community, and these tensions were exacerbated with cash because it was shared less. The current system of targeting is community based and relies on nominations and communities confirming the eligibility of nominated households. This system is able to select many food insecure households but is vulnerable to manipulation and elite capture. Next year, communities may expect cash to be distributed, and this will make targeting more complicated and the current targeting system is perhaps insufficiently robust to handle this.

Distribution and complaints

There were no major problems arising from the distribution of cash transfers. No security issues were reported. The major challenge identified was around communications: unhappy recipients and non-recipients felt unable to complain, because the complaints system included the village leadership who were often the reason for their complaint. The complaints mechanism was therefore not found to be an effective channel for recipients' and non-recipients' grievances.

Cost benefit

Costs and benefits can be compared in two ways. First, the amount of staple provided by the transfer (after sharing, milling, spending patterns and prices are accounted for) is compared with the total and operational cost of providing the transfer to give a measure of cost efficiency. Taking operational costs only, cash is twice as efficient at providing staples than cash+food, and three times as efficient as food (i.e. the cost of increasing recipients' ability to obtain 1kg of staple is three times lower with cash). Taking total costs, cash is 167% more efficient than food, and 134% more efficient than cash+food.

Second, the recipients' and non-recipients' impact scores can be compared with the costs of the transfer to generate an indication of effectiveness in cost per unit of perceived impact. Focusing on total costs, cash+food and food transfers are scored twice as effective as cash overall. Focusing in the cash ward only (where respondents have experience of cash and previously food transfers), however, the scores are more similar and cash ends up as slightly more effective. Focusing only on operational costs, cash is three times as effective as food according to respondents in cash wards.

Conclusions

The evaluation finds clear evidence that the ZECT pilot achieved its objectives of meeting recipients' food entitlements during the transfer in a cost efficient way. This suggests that it is sensible to consider scaling up this modality of providing support under the VGF programme. Cash+food was overall slightly preferred of the three types, but the lower operational cost of cash might make this a more feasible option for scaling up. However, the relative costs depend on food prices in Zimbabwe and at procurement.

In scaling up, the negative consequences of cash on non-recipients and communities need to be considered carefully. One approach to this is making greater investments in the targeting and communication systems, in order to inform communities better about the transfers.

The responsiveness of markets in new wards to cash also needs to be considered, with further market assessments sensible. One way of allaying fears would be to use a voucher system that guarantees prices to recipients.

It would be sensible to build on the reallocation of time from *maricho* to own production by support households to produce more, through livelihoods programmes and better market linkages. Surprisingly, cash was not reported to be spent on assets. Cash transfers could perhaps support productive investment if they came earlier in the agricultural season, and were perhaps made conditional on livelihoods investments, which could be achieved through providing input vouchers.

Table of contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Executive summary	iv
Evaluation context	iv
Costs	iv
Impact on food consumption	iv
Other transfer impacts	vi
Education and health	vi
Basic goods	vi
Community relations	vi
Intra-household relations	vi
Operational issues	vi
Targeting	vi
Distribution and complaints	vii
Cost benefit	vii
Conclusions	vii
List of tables and figures	xi
Abbreviations	xii
1 Evaluation context and methodology	1
1.1 Evaluation context	1
1.2 Evaluation sub-questions	1
1.3 Methodology	2
1.3.1 Fieldwork approach	2
1.3.2 Fieldwork questions	3
1.4 Limitations	5
1.5 Report structure	6
2 Introduction to ZECT	7
2.1 Why have a cash transfer programme in Zimbabwe?	7
2.2 Objective of the programme	8
2.3 ZECT summary	8
2.4 Intervention areas	9
2.4.1 Nyanga	9
2.4.2 Gokwe North	10
2.4.3 Gokwe South	11
3 Conceptual approach to the evaluation	13
3.1 Approach to evaluating impact on food consumption and dietary diversity	13
3.1.1 The entitlement and livelihoods approach	13
3.1.2 Hypothesised impacts on food sources and food availability	14
3.1.2.1 Impact on inheritance and transfer	14
3.1.2.2 Impact of transfer on own-labour	15

3.1.2.3	Impact of transfer on own-production	15
3.1.2.4	Impact of transfer on trade-based food entitlements	15
3.1.3	Hypothesised impact on food consumption	16
3.1.4	Hypothesised impact on dietary diversity	16
3.2	Approach to assessing other impacts	16
3.3	Assessing preferences for different transfer types	16
3.4	Approach to costing	17
3.4.1	Expenditure Flows	17
3.4.2	Scope of Costing	18
3.4.3	Methodology	18
4	Costs	19
4.1	Cost by Item and per Unit of Transfer	19
4.2	Cost of Commodity	24
4.3	Costing conclusion	26
5	The impact of different transfer types on food consumption and dietary diversity	27
5.1	Overview	27
5.2	Food from transfers	28
5.2.1	Food from ZECT	28
5.2.2	Food from sharing	29
5.3	Food from own labour	31
5.4	Food from own production	34
5.4.1	Household farms	34
5.4.2	Gathering	36
5.5	Food from purchases	36
5.5.1	The value of the transfer	36
5.5.2	Prices and availability	38
5.6	Net effect on food consumption and dietary diversity	41
5.6.1	Staple food consumption	42
5.6.2	Dietary diversity	42
5.6.3	Cash and food preferences	43
6	Other transfer impacts	46
6.1	Education and health	46
6.2	Basic goods	47
6.3	Community relations	47
6.4	Intra-household relations and gender	50
7	Operational issues	53
7.1	Targeting	53
7.1.1	Ward selection	53
7.1.2	Village selection	54

7.1.3	Recipient selection	54
7.2	Distribution and complaints	56
8	Comparing the benefits of different transfer types	58
9	Conclusions and recommendations	63
9.1	Assessing costs and benefits	63
9.2	Conclusions	65
9.3	Programme recommendations	67
9.4	Recommendations for further research	68
	References	69
A.1	Targeting	70
A.1.1	Geographical targeting	70
A.1.2	Village-level targeting	72
A.2	Relief or development?	73
A.3	Implications for future programming	73
D.1	Inheritance and transfer	84
D.2	Own-labour	84
D.3	Own-production	84
D.4	Trade-based	85
D.4.1	Price of food	85
D.4.2	Markets	86
D.4.3	Cash income	86
D.4.4	Proportion of income spent on food	87
D.5	Hypothesised impact on food consumption	87
D.6	Hypothesised impact on dietary diversity	88
E.1	Casual labour in Nyanga	89
E.1.1	Food ward	89
E.1.2	Cash+food ward	90
E.1.3	Cash ward	90
E.2	Casual labour in Gokwe North	91
E.2.1	Food ward	91
E.2.2	Cash+food ward	91
E.2.3	Cash ward	92
E.3	Casual labour in Gokwe South	92
E.3.1	Food ward	92
E.3.2	Cash+food ward	93
E.3.3	Cash ward	93
F.1	Interviews	94
F.2	Focus groups	96
G.1	Objective of the Evaluation	97
G.2	Evaluation questions	97

List of tables and figures

Figure 3.1	Expenditure Flow of Programme	17
Figure 4.2	Total Cost per Transfer	23
Figure 5.3	Importance of maricho and own production	32
Figure 8.4	Overall ranking of transfer types by recipients	58
Figure 8.5	Total scores, recipients and non-recipients	59
Figure 8.6	Recipients' weighted scores by category	60
Figure 8.7	Recipients' weighted scores by category, cash ward only	61
Figure 8.8	Non-recipients' weighted scores by category, cash ward only	61
Table 2.1	Cash transfer wards	7
Table 2.2	Variations in transfer value by month and location (1 person, 100% cash, actual design)	9
Table 4.3	Total Cost of ZECT & VGF by Item	21
Table 4.4	Cost Analysis by Unit of Transfer	23
Table 4.5	Cost Analysis Pilot and Expansion Period	24
Table 4.6	Local market Price per Metric Tonnage (US \$)	25
Table 4.7	Cost of Food from Source to Distribution	25
Table 5.8	Effect of ZECT transfer on recipient maize stock (family of five)	27
Table 5.9	Transfer entitlement hypothesis	29
Table 5.10	Benefits from sharing of different transfer types	30
Table 5.11	Sharing hypotheses	31
Table 5.12	Casual labour hypotheses	34
Table 5.13	Own production hypotheses	36
Table 5.14	Staple provided by different transfer types, expressed in % provided by food transfer	37
Table 5.15	% of food basket the cash and cash+food transfers would buy	38
Table 5.16	Market and price hypotheses	41
Table 5.17	Net increase in staple consumption	42
Table 5.18	Consumption and dietary diversity hypotheses	45
Table 6.19	Tensions hypothesis	50
Table 6.20	Gender hypothesis	52
Table 8.21	Impact by different transfer types	62
Table 9.22	Cost-benefit in terms of staple food provided	64
Table 9.23	Cost-benefit in terms of community perception of impact (total cost)	64
Figure A.1	Distribution of missing food entitlements	71
Figure B.1	Nyanga	75
Figure B.2	Gokwe North	76
Figure B.3	Gokwe South	77
Figure C.4	Food chain, ZECT districts	82
Table C.1	Average household cereal production and deficit, pilot districts	79

Abbreviations

DAC	Development Assistance Committee
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
IDI	In Depth Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFE	Missing Food Entitlement
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
TOR	Terms of Reference
USD	United States Dollar
VGf	Vulnerable Group Feeding
WFP	World Food Programme
ZECT	Zimbabwe Emergency Cash Transfer
ZIMVAC	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee

1 Evaluation context and methodology

1.1 Evaluation context

This section sets out why the evaluation of the Zimbabwe Emergency Cash Transfer (ZECT) programme is being conducted. The ZECT programme is a pilot cash transfer programme designed to test in three districts of Zimbabwe the possibility of replacing the provision of food aid under the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) programme with cash in some wards and a mixture of cash+food in others. The value of the cash transfer is calculated to allow recipients to purchase the same food bundle as the food aid provides. The evaluation aims to assess the differences in benefits and costs of the food, cash and cash+food modalities, with a view to informing the development of future relief programming in Zimbabwe and the region.

The overarching evaluation aims are:

- To assess the effectiveness of ZECT programme in meeting its stated objectives. These are:
 - “To enable approximately 1,900 households in Zimbabwe to obtain their Missing Food Entitlement (MFE) for a period of five months (Nov. 2009 to March 2010) by providing direct cash transfers.
 - To enable approximately 1,900 households in Zimbabwe to obtain their Missing Food Entitlement (MFE) for a period of five months (Nov. 2009 to March 2010) by providing 50% direct cash transfers and 50% food aid.
 - To better understand, demonstrate and document the market response to cash transfers in rural areas, and to draw lessons both for potential market enhancement programmes and for larger scale emergency cash transfer programming.
 - To better understand, demonstrate and document the community response to cash transfers in rural areas and to draw lessons for future years and potential scale up.”¹
- To assess the social impact the ZECT programme has had on its targeted population (household and community level).
- To identify the potential, and conditions, for replication of the modality for other interventions in Zimbabwe.

1.2 Evaluation sub-questions

The evaluation questions can be grouped by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact (sustainability is not considered in this evaluation). The original TOR are set out in Annex B), but the field team were asked to focus principally on comparisons between the three transfer modalities. The evaluation therefore seeks to answer the following sub-questions:

Relevance and appropriateness

¹ ZECT Project Proposal 5 11 09.

- Did WFP/Concern make the best use of available evidence and best practice in the programme design?
- Which transfer type (cash, food, and cash+food) was most appropriate to address the beneficiaries' circumstances?

Efficiency

- Which transfer type was the most efficient use of resources?
- What are the comparative cost-benefits of the different transfer types?

Effectiveness

- Has the programme been able to meet its objectives as detailed?
- Was the Market Survey accurate in its predictions of how the market would react?
- Did many households neglect their food needs in order to achieve other livelihoods needs (school fees, health costs, transport costs, clothing etc)?
- What was the scale of extravagant expenditure and how could this be reduced?

Impact

- What were the impacts of different transfer types on households in recipient communities?
 - Were households basic food needs met during the lean season?
 - Has there been an increase on household livelihood security?
 - Where there any changes in community productive activities
- Was there a general increase in liquidity in the pilot areas and how did this affect the terms of trade for the poor?

These questions are elaborated in more detail in the hypotheses presented below and throughout the evaluation approach.

1.3 Methodology

This section sets out the methodology that the evaluation uses to answer these questions.

1.3.1 Fieldwork approach

The evaluation answers these questions using qualitative data, and makes use of secondary data from the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) surveys and focus groups carried out by WFP and Concern and summarised in a series of monitoring reports.

Fieldwork was conducted in Gokwe North, Gokwe South and Nyanga. The field team visited each of the six pilot wards (three cash and three cash+food) and three food wards, totalling nine wards in all. One village was randomly selected for fieldwork in each of the nine wards, based on having sufficient recipients to conduct focus groups and interviews, and on not having been part of the routine programme monitoring.

The evaluation fieldwork consisted of in-depth interviews (IDI) and focus group discussions (FGD). The tools were piloted and refined with the assistance of Concern staff (and are briefly described below). The guides aimed for FGDs of no more than 2 hours, conducted in

Shona. Groups had between 5 and 12 participants, and were conducted by a facilitator with another researcher taking notes in English. IDIs were conducted by all three researchers (using a translator for English where necessary), and took around 1-1.5 hours, during which notes in English were taken.

Recipient interviewees and FGD participants were selected randomly from the recipient lists. Other research participants were selected through a process of snowball sampling once the research team arrived in the community. Snowball sampling involves selecting at random a non-recipient who was present during the programme and asking him or her to suggest other FGD participants. FGD groups were conducted in a neutral location (outdoors) and were kept private. There were no interruptions to the groups, and no authority figures present during the groups. This should have ensured a neutral research environment.

Concern assistance was extremely helpful in gaining access to the communities, but the research was not conducted with Concern staff present and the team travelled in unmarked Concern cars, since this would have risked biasing the findings (as participants may tailor their responses knowing that programmers are present). The evaluation team took pains to communicate that they were independent of Concern.

Two FGDs were conducted in each ward (1 with recipients, and 1 non-recipients), totalling 17 FGDs (one group of non-recipients in a food ward could not be assembled because they were harvesting cotton, and were substituted with interviews). Focus group participants were divided by gender at the end of the group to ask questions on gender impacts. At least four IDIs were conducted in each ward (with 1 male and 1 female recipient, where available and 1 male and 1 female non-recipient), totalling 36 IDIs. Traders in local markets and farmers were also interviewed, and focus groups with traders were conducted. The team also interviewed Concern staff in each district. See Annex C for details of fieldwork conducted.

1.3.2 Fieldwork questions

The focus groups sought to generate preferences of recipients and non-recipients for different types of transfer, by asking participants to score transfers on various categories and to discuss their ranking. This was done with the objective of generating scores for the different transfer types that could be used to generate an estimation of the benefits. The focus group participants also discussed programme operations.

The aggregation of preferences is notoriously problematic, and the subject of fierce debate. The ZECT monitoring report asks recipients which transfer type they prefer and why. This generates information on the percentage of recipients that prefer food, cash or cash+food, and reasons for doing so. While this indicates how many recipients prefer each type, it has a number of limitations. First, it does not reveal the strength of their preference or include their preferences for the transfer types they place second or third. Accounting for preference strength and the order of second and third placed transfer types yields a more nuanced picture and may change their eventual ordering. Second, it does not reveal how different transfer types perform on different issues. Third, it ignores the views of non-recipients, which matter both because any targeting process is likely to generate exclusion errors, and because non-recipients are affected by transfers and usually form the majority of communities in which ZECT intervenes.

This evaluation complements the ZECT monitoring by generating information to address these limitations. First, it generates scores from 0-10 from recipients and non-recipients for each transfer type on a range of issues, allowing each transfer type to be scored both overall

and for its performance on separate issues. Second, it asks recipients for their valuation of alternative transfer modalities in relation to their existing mode of transfer by ascertaining the quantity of food or value of money (or mixture of both) at which they are willing to choose an alternative transfer modality, therefore allowing comparison between different delivery mechanisms.

Recipients and non-recipients in each district and ward type (food, cash, and cash+food) are asked in group discussions to value different types of transfers overall and for several indicators based on the livelihoods and entitlement framework, and on data gathered by the existing programme monitoring system. For each indicator and each transfer type, groups are asked to discuss and provide a score from 0 to 10 that reflects the impact of the transfer type for that indicator, where 0 is no impact and 10 is a very positive impact. Groups are also asked to provide a score for each indicator that reflects how important it is (from 1-10).

Following discussions with Concern staff and piloting, and seeking to respond to questions on “which transfer type” is most effective to meet recipients’ food needs (the principal objective of the programme) and other needs, and which has the greatest impact on communities and markets, the indicators chosen for recipients are:

- Having enough food to eat.
- Having a diverse diet. A diverse diet implies eating at least four times a week staples, vegetables/fruits, beans/pulses/nuts/peas/meat/eggs/milk, oils, and sugar.
- Being able to obtain the education and health services desired.
- Being able to obtain the basic goods (soap, paraffin, utensils, etc.) desired.
- Being able to obtain the productive assets (chickens, goats, hoes, etc.) desired.
- The availability of goods desired in local markets
- Standing in the community from sharing
- Effect on others’ jealousy of you (a higher score means less jealousy)
- Effect on relations within your household
- Overall

The indicators chosen for non-recipients are:

- The amount received from sharing
- The effect on community relations (a higher score means a better effect)
- The availability of goods desired in local markets

Each group scores each transfer type for each indicator from 0 to 10. Performance on each indicator is analysed by adding together scores from different groups to generate overall totals for each transfer type on each indicator (i.e. cash scores X, food Y, and cash+food Z). Two performance scores are then derived for each transfer type. First, a percentage score is calculated – i.e. cash performance on having enough food is $100 \cdot (X / (X + Y + Z))$ – and compared across types. Second, an average score is calculated – i.e. cash scores on average $x/10$ – and compared across types.

Overall performance is assessed by aggregating scores for each individual indicator. Scores are aggregated by weighting the score given by each group by the importance they give to the indicator (from 1-10). If a group gives an indicator a 10, the scores for each transfer type are multiplied by 1. If a group gives an indicator a 5, the scores for each transfer type are

multiplied by 0.5. Scores for each category are then added together to produce an overall score for each transfer type. Scores are analysed by ward type and by district.

Focus group respondents were also asked about the impact of different transfer types on casual labour and their ability to cultivate their own fields.

In depth interviews sought to generate more precise information on the use of the transfer, its impact on the recipient or non-recipient household, and its impact on the community. Recipient and non-recipient respondents were therefore asked questions on a range of issues related to the transfer, including all those above, as well as more specific questions on programme operations and experiences. These respondents were not asked to compare transfer types except in a final single question, and were not asked to generate scores for the transfers.

Traders were asked questions on the effect of different transfer types on their businesses, on whether they had been able to supply and sell more goods, or change the prices of their goods as a result of the transfers. Concern and WFP staff were asked about the programme's operation and their assessment of impacts, and provided documents on costing and operations.

These responses were triangulated in order to develop a robust assessment of benefit and cost.

1.4 Limitations

There were some important limitations to the research. First, research was only conducted in nine villages and some business centres near to them in three districts, and there were only a small number of respondents. Findings presented here should therefore not be taken as representative of the pilot areas and certainly not of the entire VGF area. Second fieldwork was conducted in May 2010, after the transfer had finished. This meant that respondents were asked to recall what was taking place during the transfer, which can be problematic for the accuracy of responses, particularly when asked to recall targeting, which took place 7 or 8 months before fieldwork. Third, recent events in Zimbabwe have had clear effects on the preferences of many individuals and households. Specifically, the recent experience of hyperinflation (that ended only one year ago) and recurrent political violence (also ending only two years ago) made respondents nervous of their ability to obtain food from the markets at a stable price, because food had very recently either not been available or available only at very varying prices, and because the violence had made many markets inaccessible. This generates a strong tendency to prefer for having food in the household, and not being reliant on obtaining food from markets or through labour. In general, households in Zimbabwe tend to be very conservative and risk averse, partly because of the recent political and economic experiences. A fear of witchcraft often makes people unwilling to speak out against their peers. Fourth, there has already been reasonable extensive research in many of these communities, and respondents have reportedly become quite adept at dealing with researchers.

The evaluation is based on qualitative fieldwork and often relies on respondents' subjective assessment of different transfer types. Subjective valuations provide very useful indications of respondents' views, but are difficult to generate and interpret, largely because they are subjective. This has various limitations: First, some respondents are not able to answer hypothetical questions (*what would you prefer?*) and the explanation can be time-consuming and taxing. Not all respondents were therefore able to provide valuations. Second, respondents' assumptions about transfer types they are not receiving may be false: they may

have fears that are not justified. This point is particularly important in interpreting results on cash transfers, since many respondents have concerns about markets (derived from the recent experience of hyperinflation and because they rarely access markets) that may not be realised in practice. Third, the group work involves an aggregation already, as the views of ten or so respondents are turned into a single valuation. The focus group methodology encourages participants to express differences, but this valuation technique expects them to agree. The usefulness of this valuation exercise in a group comes from the fact that households are often reasonably similar and have similar views, and can usually be expected to agree on valuations with debate. However, while differences in opinion are recorded, the valuation requires consensus.

1.5 Report structure

The next chapter of the report briefly describes the rationale for, objective of, and design of the ZECT programme, and briefly introduces the intervention districts of Nyanga, Gokwe North, and Gokwe South.

Chapter 3 sets out the conceptual approach and key evaluation hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses the costs of different transfer types. Chapter 5 sets out findings on the impact of the transfers on food consumption and dietary diversity, drawing on fieldwork conducted. Chapter 6 discusses other transfer impacts, on education and health, obtaining basic goods, community relations, and intra-household relations. Chapter 7 briefly discusses operational issues and chapter 8 then compares the rankings of different transfers given by recipients and non-recipients. Finally chapter 9 concludes with an assessment of cost-benefits, and with recommendations for future programming and research.

2 Introduction to ZECT

2.1 Why have a cash transfer programme in Zimbabwe?

Zimbabwe has suffered food insecurity since 2001. The traditional humanitarian response to this has been delivery of food aid to affected households, in which Concern has been involved since 2002. Food insecurity in Zimbabwe has been driven by natural phenomena, such as droughts, and economic conditions. However “Post harvest food security assessments in 2009 showed that while there was still a small food deficit in country, this could be covered regionally by surpluses in neighbouring countries”.².

Following changes in economic policy and environment including the deregulation of the maize market and dollarization, Concern Worldwide in association with WFP carried out a pilot where 19,564 beneficiaries receive cash instead of food and as well as food. This recognised that it was poor access to food rather than absolute food shortage that was the major source of food insecurity.³ The pilot was introduced across 3 districts of Zimbabwe: Gokwe north, Gokwe south (Midlands province) and Nyanga (Manicaland province). In each district, one ward was cash only, and one a mix of food and cash, with others receiving food as normal. The project envisioned 1,900 recipients of cash transfers, and 1,900 recipients of a 50:50 mix of cash and food between November 2009 and March 2010. The transfer types were as follows:

Table 2.1 Cash transfer wards

District	Ward	Transfer type
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash only 5 months
	Chireya 3	Cash + food 5 months
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash only 4 months
	Nemangwe 2	Cash + food 4 months
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash only 5 months
	Ruwangwe	Cash + food 5 months

These wards were chosen as being food insecure, but next to wards with both functioning food markets and food surpluses.

The transfer programme was subsequently expanded, in January 2010, to cover 20 additional wards, bringing the total number of recipients up to 58,866.

²Concern, “Cash transfers in Zimbabwe 2009-10” pilot concept note

³ Following Amartya Sen’s entitlement theory. See Sen (1981).

2.2 Objective of the programme

The objectives of the programme have been set out above, but it is worth noting that like the VGF, ZECT's aim was to address short-term acute vulnerability and transient poverty, not long-term vulnerability and chronic poverty (which is why it is not providing long-term predictable and reliable cash transfers). It was expected that cash transfers would not only help households to meet their food entitlement but would also have multiplier effects resulting from cash spent in the local economy. Moreover, one objective of the pilot was to test the different costs and implications of cash compared to food and cash+food modality.

The principal hypothesis driving the programme design was that markets would respond to the provision of cash and that recipients of cash would be able to obtain food from these markets during lean periods. Some experience with cash transfers suggested that this would occur; set against this, however, was the risk that inadequate supply response would combine with the injection of liquidity to generate inflationary pressure on prices.

The second hypothesis behind cash provision was that cash transfers would generate multiplier effects on the local economy, having wider economic benefits. This may take place 'directly' through households spending on goods and services in the local economy, or indirectly as households use cash to make productive investments. Again, other programmes provided evidence that both of these could occur. Again, however, there was a converse risk (aside from the possibility of inflation): that households receiving the cash transfer (or the food transfer) might reduce their productive work and become 'dependent' on the transfer. This would have had negative effects on local economies. While there is very limited evidence from other programmes suggesting that this would happen, 'dependency' receives significant attention and concern in many policy circles, and so was important to assess.

2.3 ZECT summary

The pilot replaced food transfers with cash and cash+food. The food transfers provided approximately 80% of a person's monthly food needs: 10kg cereal, 1kg of beans until January⁴ and 1.8kg beans from February, and 0.6kg vegetable oil per person per month. This was translated into a cash equivalent for a household based on regularly monitored local prices and on household size. The need to have an accurate predicted budget for Concern Zimbabwe meant that initially prices were based on November 2009 prices and increased on the basis of projected inflation rates that had to be specified at the project inception, and it was decided to increase the November value by 5% in December and 5% in January, with a reduction of 5% in March to coincide with the price softening at the start of the harvest period. Due to the absence of USD coins in Zimbabwe, the transfer value was rounded to the nearest dollar. Cash+food recipients were provided with half the cash value and half the amount of food.

After the market assessment it was decided to vary the amount of the transfer based on assessments of local markets that would take place before distribution, after distribution, and 17 days after distribution. Following changes to WFP's budget, it was also decided to reduce the amount of cereal from 12kg initially to 10kg, and beans remained at 1kg and vegetable oil at 0.6kg. The variations in the market price of cereal (maize) were greater than the 5% initially budgeted, which indicates that the decision to vary by actual market prices was sensible. Price data set out in Table 2.2 indicate that the total cash transfer varied

⁴ Concern ZECT project proposal, 5th November 2009.

substantially by month and by location, largely driven by differences in maize prices (more expensive in Nyanga and sharply increasing everywhere in January (by 10% over November in Nyanga, roughly as predicted, but by 23% in Gokwe, above predictions). The substantial variations in these amounts were driven by 'lumpy' movements in the prices of commodities, which tend to move by USD1 due to non availability of lower denominations of currency.

Table 2.2 Variations in transfer value by month and location (1 person, 100% cash, actual design)

Location	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Total
Nyanga	6.20	6.20	8.00	7.90	8.30	36.60
Gokwe	5.20	5.22	6.42	7.20	7.20	31.24

Table 2.2 makes clear that there were significant variations between Nyanga and Gokwe in terms of prices, such that the transfer amount differed by USD1 in almost every month. Having a uniform amount as in design 1 would have meant greater purchasing power transferred in Gokwe.

2.4 Intervention areas

This section sets out briefly the key characteristics of the different intervention areas, drawing on information provided by WFP (2003), the ZIMVAC report, information from the Concern monitoring report, and fieldwork. Concern ran the pilot cash transfer in selected wards of Nyanga, Gokwe North, and Gokwe South. There are maps of each district in Annex B.

The programme was informed by a preliminary market assessment (GMI 2009) which provides some useful information about the intervention areas as a whole. This assessment found that there are very few maize traders since profit margins are negligible, that farmers were the major buyers and sellers in the maize market, and that the maize market is fairly localised and isolated in each ward. Farmers, and other key elements of the maize market value chain, the hammer mill owners and shop-keepers, retain stocks until prices rise in the lean season, but were found to have "the capacity to meet maize and maize meal demands if the margins are attractive," (GMI 2009: 2). More than this, they found that a range of forces had affected the rejuvenation of maize markets:

- Dollarization and lack of coinage has led to rounded prices in units of \$1, \$2 or \$3, etc.
- The Grain Marketing Board has kept prices depressed and limited the incentives of farmers to sell.
- Protracted humanitarian crises have damaged the maize supply chain and limited the trade in maize meal.

2.4.1 Nyanga

Nyanga is located at the north of Manicaland province, on the border with Mozambique. It contained 119,370 people according to the 2002 census, but this figure is likely to have changed substantially in the last 8 years as a result not only of population growth but also internal and international migration. Nyanga is an unusual district in that it cuts across all five agro-ecological regions, and this means that while some areas (in regions IV and V) have very poor soils and low rainfall, others (in region I and II) have excellent soils, high

rainfall, and are home to productive commercial farms that cultivate various cash crops throughout the year. The wards in regions IV and V have regular food shortage and the yield from the small grain crops is usually between 0.3 and 0.5 tonnes per hectare, with land-holdings between 0.4 and 1 hectare according to the WFP. Regions I and II have year round cultivation, including potatoes, and there are irrigation schemes in ward 12 that also afford year round cultivation.

Smallholder farmers face several constraints to production, including small land sizes and leached soils. While the 2003 WFP reports suggest that there are no irrigated fields or gardens, fieldwork indicated that in 2010, households in some areas were cultivating gardens, especially where they are nearer to mountains or rivers. Concern is also running livelihoods projects in some areas that encourage gardens and conservation farming.

In regions IV and V, good harvests tend to last 6 months, and poor harvests 2 months, according to the WFP. The ZIMVAC report for 2009/2010 indicates that the 2008/2009 harvest was poor, and would contribute 3 months consumption on average, and households would be able to obtain 3 months from other sources, leaving a deficit of 6 months on average in the district. The WFP assessments (2003) confirmed that poorer households in regions IV and V obtain most of their food from purchases, although maize prices were reported in the ZIMVAC to be amongst the highest in the country. Concern's monitoring data confirm that maize prices were between 50% and 100% higher than in Gokwe North and South.

The WFP assessment indicates that most households obtain income from casual labour (either locally in villages, or in plantations, commercial farms or Mozambique, where it is available all year), selling *masawu* (wild fruit), gold panning, and formal employment in Nyanga town. To this should be added sales of vegetable produce from gardens, shop-keeping, formal employment or in other institutions (such as schools or clinics), and remittances from relatives with formal employment.

When households are unable to earn sufficient income to meet their missing food needs, they resort to selling livestock, pulling children out of school, eating less, stealing, and eating a range of less preferred and less healthy foods (such as unripe bananas).

The pilot took place within two wards in Nyanga: Tombo (cash) and Ruwangwe (cash+food). Tombo is in ward 15, with a population of 8,151, and borders a food secure ward to the west and Mozambique to the East. It lies on a tarred road 25km north of Nyanga town and on which there are two business centres. Concern distributed cash to 1,776 recipients in this ward. Ruwangwe is in ward 4, with a population of 8,003. At the north of Nyanga district, it is close to Mozambique and the Nyamaropa irrigation scheme. Concern distributed cash+food to 3930 recipients in this ward.

2.4.2 Gokwe North

Gokwe North is more homogenous than Nyanga, covering agro-ecological regions III, IV and V. It is in Midlands province, with a population of 220,776 in the 2002 census, with the same caveats as above. The major crops are cotton, maize and groundnuts, and minor crops are sorghum, mhunga, rapoko and edible beans.

Very low income households in Gokwe North struggle to produce sufficient food for consumption because they lack draft power (though livestock ownership was more common than in poorer households in Nyanga), fertiliser and seeds, and rainfall is erratic. Those who cultivate cotton rely on good sales of the crop to purchase agricultural inputs for next year,

but in recent years (and particularly in 2008/2009) the cotton sale price was extremely low, which caused significant problems for farmers. The 2009/2010 sale price was also yet to be agreed at the time of fieldwork, causing some farmers to sell their cotton produce at distress levels in order to meet short-term food needs.

The WFP assessment indicates that very poor households derive only 5% of their food sources from their own production. The situation seems to have improved since this assessment was conducted. According to ZIMVAC, own production was expected to meet 5 months of cereal needs on average, with purchases making up 2 months, leaving a 5 month deficit. The ZIMVAC assessment reported some of the lowest grain prices in the country in Gokwe North and South, and this was reflected in the Concern monitoring data that found low prices in Gokwe North (though slightly higher than in Gokwe South).

Households' major sources of income according to the WFP assessment are the production of cash crops (mainly cotton), casual labour (which is either on larger cotton or maize fields, during harvesting, weeding and planting seasons, as well as later clearing of cotton stalks in the winter), livestock sales, trading, and gold panning. To this could be added remittances, which Concern monitoring data identified as significant, as well as formal employment in larger district towns, including the district centre, Nembudziya.

Households unable to obtain enough food engage in various coping strategies, according to WFP and Concern monitoring data, including eating smaller portions, fewer meals, and less preferred foods.

The pilot took place in two wards, Makore 1 (cash only) and Chireya 3 (cash+food). Makore 1 is in ward 11, with a population of 8155. It borders the Copper Queen small scale commercial farming area, which had a surplus in 2008/09. The Kuwirirana business centre is on the main road. Concern distributed cash to 3772 recipients. Chireya 3 is in ward 9, with a population of 5,953. It is surrounded by food insecure areas but is 10km from Nemangwe business centre in Gokwe South, and is not far from Nembudziya, the Gokwe North centre. Concern distributed cash+food to 2753 recipients.

2.4.3 Gokwe South

Gokwe South borders Gokwe North in midlands province, and falls within agro-ecological regions III and IV. Its population according to the 2002 census was 296,235, and there has again been significant migration and population change since then. The main crops are maize, cotton and groundnuts, and minor crops include sorghum, mhunga, rapoko and edible beans.

The main constraints to farming for poor households are similar to those in Gokwe North: lack of draft power and inputs. However, the higher quality of soil than in Gokwe North means that households are usually able to cultivate more maize, and the WFP assessment estimates that the very poor can obtain 15% of their food needs from their own production. Again this figure seems to have improved since this assessment, since the 2010 ZIMVAC report indicates that households on average could obtain 5 months worth of cereal from their own production, and 4 months from purchases, leaving a deficit of 3 months on average. Impressions from fieldwork confirmed this more optimistic outlook, as although some households have longer food deficits than 3 months, many did not. The price of maize in Gokwe South is the lowest of the three districts.

Fieldwork suggested that Gokwe South had better maize production and therefore lower dependence on cotton sales than Gokwe North, and so farmers were less affected by the

low cotton prices. Other sources of income include casual labour, selling vegetables, prostitution (according to the WFP assessment), and livestock sales, as well as remittances. Residents of Gokwe South had more access to large markets in Gokwe Centre (and to a lesser extent Nemangwe) than residents of other districts, and were able to walk to these centres.

As elsewhere, coping strategies include eating smaller and fewer portions, and eating less preferred foods. Although the WFP assessment listed prostitution and stealing and begging as common coping strategies in Gokwe South, fieldwork in the two cash-targeted wards did not find (or seek directly) evidence for these coping strategies.

The pilot took place in Nemangwe 1 (cash) and Nemangwe 2 (cash+food). Nemangwe 1 is in ward 13, with a population of 12,106. It is around 10km from Gokwe centre, which is a substantial town. Concern distributed cash to 3,765 recipients. Nemangwe 2 is in ward 12, with a population of 10,252. It is slightly further from Gokwe Centre, it does not border food secure wards but has a business centre and is on the main tarred road. Concern distributed cash+food to 3,349 recipients.

3 Conceptual approach to the evaluation

This chapter sets out the conceptual approach to the evaluation. The next section sets out the approach to the evaluation of impacts on food consumption and dietary diversity. Section 3.2 sets out the approach to evaluating impacts on other issues. Section 3.3 indicates how recipients' and non-recipients' preferences for different transfer types can be compared, and section 3.4 sets out the approach to costing.

The evaluation assesses cost and benefits of the three different transfer types based on primary data collection in recipient communities and an analysis of programme costs based on budget and expenditure documents. This assessment tests several hypotheses derived from the current state of knowledge on cash and food transfers in emergency contexts both globally and in Zimbabwe, and attempts to quantify benefits and costs where possible.

Costs are assessed by analysing programme budgets and actual expenditures. Primary data are used to estimate staff time and other resources used for each transfer type, and these are matched with costs from actual expenditures on commodity purchase, transport, storage, targeting, distribution and management to produce estimates of cost per recipient for each transfer type.

3.1 Approach to evaluating impact on food consumption and dietary diversity

3.1.1 The entitlement and livelihoods approach

A household obtains food by converting its endowments into food, as set out by Amartya Sen in 1981. Households have four legal sources of food, that Sen also calls entitlements: production-based (growing food), trade-based (buying food), own-labour (working for food) and inheritance and transfer (being given food by others).⁵ Sen's analysis with this framework showed that famines were often caused not by absolute food shortage but by people's inability to acquire food that was available (through lack of purchasing power, productive ability, etc.).

A household's ability to obtain food from these sources can be analysed in a dynamic livelihoods framework centred around different types of livelihood assets. Households use their assets within a vulnerability context (including shocks, trends and seasonality) and within the wider context of structures and processes (including laws, policies, culture, institutions, government processes, and the private sector), to develop livelihood strategies to improve incomes, well-being, and food security and reduce vulnerability. The framework is dynamic because ownership and access to assets are influenced by the contexts and by the success of livelihood strategies. Livelihood assets include:

- Social capital. This influences the help households can obtain, both in terms of direct transfers from friends and relatives (inheritance and transfer entitlement), and support with additional labour (contributing to production entitlement).
- Natural capital, such as land or livestock, that contributes to the production of food (production-based entitlement).

⁵ Critiques of Sen's entitlement approach are set out in Devereux 2001.

- Physical capital, contributing to production-based, and by generating incomes, trade-based entitlements.
- Human capital, contributing to production-based and own-labour based entitlements, and by earning incomes (through labour) to trade-based entitlements.
- Financial capital, contributing to trade-based entitlement.

This framework is set out in more detail in Annex C. The outcome we are principally interested in is food consumption, supported by the four food sources. Food for work programmes do not exist in these districts but casual labourers are often paid in food as well as cash, and other goods (soap, clothes, school supplies, etc.) Inheritance and transfer sources include ZECT and help from neighbours and are influenced by social relations. Household own-production is affected by a range of livelihood factors (set out in brief in 2.4), and contributes directly to food consumption and indirectly through sales that produce income that can be used to buy food, and to support livelihoods. Trade-based sources come from the market, which is also affected by a range of factors, particularly price and income (which in turn comes from livelihoods and labour).⁶

With this framework, we can consider the relative impacts of cash and food transfers on household food consumption. These transfers can affect any part of the framework, and this will translate through to effects on household and individual food consumption. The comparison will be between wards with food transfers, wards with cash transfers, and wards with cash+food transfers. The research will not consider wards where no support is given, but it will consider both recipients and non-recipients (since transfers will affect both groups).

3.1.2 Hypothesised impacts on food sources and food availability

The evaluation will attempt to trace effects on household food availability and consumption through the four food sources identified above. Below is the summary of the hypothesised impacts on consumption via the four food sources. These hypotheses and their economic rational are elaborated in Annex D.

3.1.2.1 Impact on inheritance and transfer

1. Receiving a food transfer increases inheritance and transfer entitlement by less than the value of the transfer (they sell part of the food received, but at poor terms of trade). A sub-hypothesis here is that selling the food received is at worse terms of trade than buying food using cash.
2. Receiving a cash or food transfer reduces private transfers from others and this is because of jealousy (not reduced need). There is no significant difference between food and cash in this regard.
3. Receiving a cash or food transfer increases the private transfers a household makes to non-recipients because the household has more resources. Food is shared more than cash.

⁶ Of course, even where households have sufficient endowments to obtain 'adequate' food (on a full calorific measure), they may not actually obtain adequate food, because households have other spending needs. Household decision-makers may choose to obtain less food than their household food needs, and instead prioritise expenditure on other goods, such as education. An individual's actual access to food therefore depends on the full range of inputs from the food chain, on their household's other spending needs and priorities, and on the intra-household allocation of food.

3.1.2.2 Impact of transfer on own-labour

4. Food and cash have an equal and negligible impact on eligibility for public or private employment paid in food.
5. Food and cash have an equal and negligible impact willingness to work in public or private employment paid in food.
6. Food and cash have a positive impact on recipients' ability to work, and cash has a greater impact.
7. There is no significant impact on non-recipients' eligibility, willingness, or ability to work, but there is an increase in the supply of work as both food and cash recipients employ more people.

3.1.2.3 Impact of transfer on own-production

8. Cash transfers have a greater positive impact on own-production than food transfers because households purchase more inputs. This impact is highly weather dependent but also small because cash was given after the planting season.
9. Neither cash nor food transfers have a significant disincentive effect on food production, though the disincentive effect of food transfers may be slightly greater.
10. Cash transfers lead to greater investments in productive assets than food transfers, leading to higher cash incomes, other factors permitting.

3.1.2.4 Impact of transfer on trade-based food entitlements

The relative impact of transfers on trade-based food entitlements is mediated by the terms of trade for food, the accessibility and food stock of food suppliers and markets, households' incomes, and the proportion of those incomes spent on food. As with own production, aspects of the trade-based entitlement need to be seen in seasonal terms, with prices and supply typically tighter in January, February and March.

Price of food

11. Cash transfers will have no direct impact on food prices because food supply will respond in cash wards.
12. Food transfers will have no direct impact on food prices because there is excess demand in all wards.
13. Cash transfer recipients will not face higher prices than food transfer recipients and non-recipients.
14. Cash transfer recipients will face more improved terms of trade for food purchases than food recipients or non-recipients.

Markets

15. Traders in markets used by cash transfer recipients will increase food supply, and this will be sustained through the lean season and after the programme.
16. Traders in markets used by cash transfer recipients will be more willing to sell food or to sell at a lower price because they can be paid in cash.
17. Market responses will not be the same in food transfer areas because households have liquidity constraints.

3.1.3 Hypothesised impact on food consumption

18. Households receiving food transfers will have higher household consumption (measured in portion size and meals per day) than households receiving cash transfers.
19. Where females receive food transfers or cash transfers, children will receive improved household allocations.
20. Recipients of food or cash transfers will have smoother consumption than non-recipients, but food recipients will have smoother consumption than cash recipients.

3.1.4 Hypothesised impact on dietary diversity

21. Cash transfers have larger positive impacts on dietary diversity than food transfers.

3.2 Approach to assessing other impacts

In addition to the impacts directly related to food, there are a range of expected social impacts from the transfers. These impacts are not treated with similar priority in programme documents, but are nonetheless important. These will be explored as set out in the questions above, which will be answered in terms of communities' perceptions of these impacts.

Hypotheses

22. Cash and food transfers may produce social tensions between recipients and non-recipients, but cash transfers generate greater tension than food transfers.
23. Cash transfers increase the confidence of women in the household and community more than food transfers.

3.3 Assessing preferences for different transfer types

Following from most of the above hypotheses and from evidence from other cash transfer evaluations, one would assume that recipients prefer to have cash rather than the equivalent food if they can easily spend cash and it is safe. Information is currently gathered by monitoring data on recipients' preference for cash and food. Preliminary indications from the M&E data suggest that cash is the least preferred support (23% of household heads reported preferring cash), largely because of high and unpredictable food prices. Since the transfer value is tied to the food price, this indicates that people retained a strong mistrust of markets. Recipients of cash only were more enthusiastic about receiving cash only, perhaps because they had developed more familiarity with markets (but perhaps also because they sought to reassure questioners that they liked receiving a benefit). Monitoring data indicate that recipients in cash wards, but also in cash+food and food wards have become more enthusiastic about receiving cash throughout the transfer period (Ruiz Roman 2010b: 19).

Hypotheses:

24. Recipients prefer cash because it is flexible and can be spent on a range of food types, other goods, and savings, unless
 - a. They believe markets are inaccessible
 - b. They believe prices are likely to move rapidly upwards
 - c. They believe markets will not provide their food needs.

3.4 Approach to costing


The overriding objective of the costing study is to determine the cost to the programme of delivering different aid modalities in the context of emergency humanitarian response to food insecurity. This section sets out the approach to obtaining the actual financial costs of implementing the Zimbabwe Emergency Cash Transfer Programme (ZECT) and the Vulnerability Group Feeding (VGF) programme through three separate modalities of food only, cash only and a mix of cash & food.

Unlike the benefit side of the evaluation where the evaluation focused on piloted wards, the costing here includes all costs associated with all transfers made by Concern under the ZECT and VGF for the period of September 2009 to April 2010.⁷

3.4.1 Expenditure Flows

The expenditure flow of the ZECT & VGF programmes is captured in Figure 3.1.. In the first stage funds are directed from donors to WFP. WFP transfers part of this fund to its implementing agency - Concern - to cover its operational and delivery costs together with the value of cash transfer under ZECT. The remainder of the funds are used by WFP to cover the cost of procuring and transporting commodities to Zimbabwe and other direct support and auxiliary costs in relation to design, management and oversight of the programme.

Figure 3.1 Expenditure Flow of Programme



Costs to Concern include direct and indirect administrative and operational costs of running this programme, secondary transport of delivering food from the central WFP warehouses to its own warehouses in the districts and the Food Distribution Points (FDPs), cost of

⁷ Costs for Concern are up to March. Figures for April and May not available at time of analysis.

delivering cash from banks to beneficiary and management fees of 5% of total cost of programme (excluding secondary transport of food) to Concern headquarters.

The Costs to WFP include the cost of procuring the commodities, costs associated with transporting the commodities from source to central warehouses in Zimbabwe, the Direct Support Costs (DSC) of managing and overseeing the programme together with management fees equal to 7% of total costs to both Concern and WFP.

3.4.2 Scope of Costing

This study compiles and analyses the actual financial costs of the programme incurred during its implementation by WFP and Concern. This includes all the expenditures incurred as a result of introducing and implementing this programme for the period of September 2009 to April 2010.

This study does not include the costs to beneficiaries of collecting the different transfers (e.g. transportation, cost of labour forgone, etc.) and nor does it assume any additional costs to donors for funding WFP.

Finally this study does not look at the economic costs of the programme. In other words this study does not impute the opportunity costs of using the ZECT and VGF programme resources instead of alternative programmes or purposes.

3.4.3 Methodology

The data for this study were given by Concern and WFP. Concern costs were derived from raw data given by Concern for actual expenditure during the period September 2009 to March 2010. These costs were allocated across food, cash and cash & food modalities based on weights derived through a number of assumptions such as staff time spent delivering aid under each modality and the respective number of beneficiaries under each aid mechanism.

The actual cost of commodities at sources were calculated based on the average price of the commodity delivered through Concern for the period of the programme and the actual per tonnage transportation costs were based on the period average of January 2009 – April 2010.

The management and administrative costs of WFP were extrapolated from total management and administrative costs of WFP for period September 2009 to April 2010 based on food tonnage delivered by Concern as a percentage of total WFP food tonnage delivered for that period from all sources.⁸

⁸ In calculating Concern's total food tonnage the cash elements of the programme were converted into tonnage and added to the food component. This was then divided by the total WFP food tonnage that was distributed during the total programme period.

4 Costs

4.1 Cost by Item and per Unit of Transfer

Table 4.3 provides the total cost of the programme by item. The total cost of the programme during the period September 2009 to April 2010 was \$7.3 million.⁹ The major cost drivers of the programme in order of magnitude are cost of commodity (36%), value of cash transfer (17.5%), local transport storage and handling (16.2%), WFP management fees (6.5%) and WFP administrative and operational costs (6.3%). These five items account for 82% of total costs of the programme.

Under the food only modality 47% of the total costs were due to the cost of the commodity and 21% due to local transport, storage and handling. Other costs include WFP management fees (6.5%), WFP administrative and operational costs (6.4%) and Concern staff costs (5.6%).

Under the cash only aid modality 75% of total costs were due to the value of the cash transfer itself. Other cost drivers under this modality include WFP management fees (6.5%), administrative and operational costs (6.2%), Concern management fees (4.2%) and Concern staff costs (3.9%).

The major cost drivers under the cash & food aid modality are the value of cash transfer (37%), cost of commodity (20%), the local transport, storage and handling costs (9%), WFP management fees and WFP administrative and operational costs.

These totals are divided by the aggregated number of beneficiaries during the period of the programme to get the cost of each aid modality per unit of transfer. The unit of transfer in the case of food only is the basket of food that on average included 10kg of maize, 1.8kg of beans and 0.6 litres of vegetable oil. The unit of transfer for cash is the cash equivalent of the food basket based on the local market price of the commodities. The unit of transfer for the cash and food mix is half of the normal food basket under food only together with half of the cash under the cash only modalities.

As shown in Table 4.4, overall the cash only aid modality costs \$9.66 per unit of transfer and the food only was lower at \$9.45. The cost of delivering one unit of food & cash transfer was \$9.69.

The total cost per transfer of the different aid modalities are very similar, therefore this is further broken down into operation cost per transfer and the value of transfer to beneficiary. As evident from Figure 4.2 there are discernable differences between the different modalities. Overall, the operational cost per transfer of cash is \$2.43. The operational cost of food on the other hand is more than double at \$4.98. The cash and food mix is in between and closer to food only, costing \$4.13 per unit of transfer. The reason why the operation costs are much higher for food and cash & food is the additional costs associated with transferring food from where it is procured to where the beneficiaries are, including the cost of storage and transportation.

⁹ This does not include any costs incurred during the month of April and May from Concern.

The high operational costs for food transfer is reflected in the operational costs as percentage of total costs which stands at 53% and is almost double that of cash transfer which stands at 25% of total costs.

Table 4.3 Total Cost of ZECT & VGF by Item

Item	Aid Modality							
	Food	% of Total	Cash	% of Total	Food & Cash	% of Total	Total	% of Total
Concern								
Staff Costs	293,475	5.6%	52,734	3.9%	38,966	5.8%	385,175	5.3%
Direct Staff	224,289	4.3%	38,703	2.8%	28,905	4.3%	291,896	4.0%
Support Staff	69,186	1.3%	14,031	1.0%	10,062	1.5%	93,278	1.3%
Warehouse Costs & Other Food related costs	24,126	0.5%	N/A	N/A	3,625	0.5%	27,750	0.4%
Cash distribution related costs	N/A	N/A	25,323	1.9%	15,299	2.3%	40,622	0.6%
Cash Security	N/A	N/A	20,482	1.5%	11,310	1.7%	31,792	0.4%
Cash Insurance	N/A	N/A	4,462	0.3%	3,318	0.5%	7,781	0.1%
Bank cash withdrawal fee	N/A	N/A	378	0.0%	671	0.1%	1,049	0.0%
External Advisors & Consultants - Fees	34,160	0.7%	7,468	0.5%	6,323	0.9%	47,951	0.7%
Monitoring & Evaluation - Fees	11,052	0.2%	4,087	0.3%	2,485	0.4%	17,625	0.2%
Distribution & transport rental costs	170,371	3.3%	N/A	N/A	26,122	3.9%	196,493	2.7%
Transportation costs	61,569	1.2%	12,282	0.9%	8,539	1.3%	82,390	1.1%
Administrative Costs	56,150	1.1%	9,994	0.7%	6,281	0.9%	72,426	1.0%
Total Cash Transfer (US\$)	N/A	N/A	1,018,390	74.8%	250,153	37.3%	1,268,543	17.5%
Management Fee (5%)	24,027	0.5%	56,514	4.2%	16,584	2.5%	97,124	1.3%
Sub-Total	674,929	12.9%	1,186,792	87.2%	374,377	55.9%	2,236,099	30.8%
WFP								
Cost of Commodity	2,476,640	47.4%	N/A	N/A	134,265	20.0%	2,610,905	36.0%
External Transport Costs	288,306	5.5%	N/A	N/A	15,630	2.3%	303,936	4.2%
Local Transport Storage & Handling	1,114,184	21.3%	N/A	N/A	60,403	9.0%	1,174,586	16.2%
Administrative and Operational Costs	333,812	6.4%	84,855	6.2%	41,372	6.2%	460,040	6.3%
Management Fee (7%)	342,151	6.5%	89,015	6.5%	43,823	6.5%	474,990	6.5%
Sub-Total	4,555,093	87.1%	173,871	12.8%	295,493	44.1%	5,024,456	69.2%
Total	5,230,022	100.0%	1,360,663	100.0%	669,870	100.0%	7,260,555	100.0%


The value of transfer to beneficiary is highest for cash at \$7.23 and lowest for food at \$4.48. The value of transfer for cash+food is \$5.56. The value of the cash transfer is set such that the recipient receives the cash equivalent of the basket of food at local prices. These prices have increased during the period of the programme and are reflected in the transfer amount given to beneficiaries. The total cost per transfer for cash is therefore highly dependant on the value of the transfer. Additionally since it is cheaper for WFP to procure and distribute beans and vegetable oil than recipients buying these directly from the local market, in value terms, beneficiaries receiving cash are better off than those receiving food if they purchase cheaper locally produced substitutes for beans. In some ways, incorporating the value of the transfer to beneficiary is misleading, because it makes food seem much cheaper because the commodity distributed (beans) happens to be very expensive in Zimbabwe (because it is rare). If the transfer provided protein through a different source that was more common in rural Zimbabwe (such as groundnuts), food would not seem as cheap as it does.

Table 4.4 Cost Analysis by Unit of Transfer

Item	Total			
	Food	Cash	F&C	Total
Cost of Commodity	2,476,640	N/A	134,265	2,610,905
Cash Transfer	N/A	1,018,390	250,153	1,268,543
Concern Costs	674,929	1,186,792	295,493	2,236,099
WFP Costs	4,555,093	173,871	295,493	5,024,456
Total	5,230,022	1,360,663	669,870	7,260,555
Number of beneficiaries	553,149	140,822	69,158	763,129
Total Cost per Transfer	9.45	9.66	9.69	9.62
Operational cost per transfer	4.98	2.43	4.13	4.43
Value of Transfer to beneficiary	4.48	7.23	5.56	5.19
CTR - Operational Cost as % Value of Transfer	1.11	0.34	0.74	0.85
Operational Cost as % Total Cost	52.65	25.15	42.61	46.07

The Cost to Transfer Ratio (CTR) which is the operational cost of the aid modality as a percentage of the value of transfer is lowest for cash at \$0.34 per \$1 of transfer and highest for food at \$1.11 per \$1 equivalent of transfer. The CTR for cash & food is \$0.73 per \$1 of transfer.

Figure 4.2 Total Cost per Transfer



The Programme has changed significantly during its implementation period. Looking at the costs of programme in total does not capture these variations and deriving monthly averages from this total will not provide a good proxy for monthly cost estimates in future programmes.

To account for these variations the programme can be divided into three distinct phases. Phase I (September-October) is the pre pilot phase where some beneficiaries received food in some of the districts. In addition to this some targeting and registration were also undertaken. Phase II (November-December), the pilot phase, consisted of one pilot ward per district receiving cash and another receiving a mix of cash and food and the remaining wards receiving food. Phase III (January-March) is the expansion period where the number of food beneficiaries declined and additional wards were given cash and cash & food instead of food aid.

Table 4.5 provides a summary of unit costs during the pilot and expansion periods. In the pilot period the monthly average cost per transfer is lowest for food at \$9.06 followed by \$9.44 for cash & food and highest for cash at \$9.51. During the expansion period the cost per transfer for food and cash & food increases to \$9.34 and \$10.53 respectively and remains constant for cash at \$9.56. The reason for increases in the unit cost of transfer for food during the expansion period is the decreasing number of food beneficiaries together with the slower decreases in total food delivered (the main cost driver) due to increases in the quantity of commodities given to beneficiaries From January onwards.

The main reason why the cost per unit of transfer has remained the same for cash is the increases in the local market prices of the food commodities. This has resulted in substantial increases in the value of transfer to beneficiary from \$5.47 during the pilot period to \$7.40 during the expansion period.

The expansion costs provide a clearer indication of the costs of transfers once the system is running, and will be used in the cost-benefit section of the report to follow. Given the reservations of using the value of the transfer to the recipient, the clearest indication of the relative costs of the transfer could come from the operational cost per transfer in the expansion period (USD4.85 for food, USD2.1 for cash, and USD4.14 for cash+food). The operational cost per unit of transfer gives a better indication of the likely costs of expansion provided the amount of transfer remains the same and assuming that fixed costs are proportional to the number of beneficiaries.

Table 4.5 Cost Analysis Pilot and Expansion Period

Item	Monthly Average - Pilot (Nov-Dec)				Monthly Average - Expansion (Jan - March)			
	Food	Cash	F&C	Total	Food	Cash	F&C	Total
Total Cost per Transfer	9.06	9.51	9.44	9.12	9.34	9.56	10.53	9.53
Operational cost per transfer	4.77	4.04	4.59	5.20	4.85	2.11	4.14	4.01
Value of Transfer to beneficiary	4.28	5.47	4.85	3.91	4.49	7.45	6.39	5.52
CTR - Operational Cost as % Value of Transfer	1.12	0.74	0.95	1.33	1.08	0.28	0.65	0.73
Operational Cost as % Total Cost	52.73	42.49	48.63	57.08	51.95	22.07	39.36	42.10

4.2 Cost of Commodity

The monthly average local market price during the period between November and March for beans and vegetable oil were \$1973 and \$2231 per ton respectively (Table 4.6). The cost for procuring and delivering the same commodities through WFP was \$1046 and \$2172 for pulses and vegetable oil respectively.

Table 4.6 Local market Price per Metric Tonnage (US \$)

Commodities	November	December	January	February	March	Average
Maize	233	210	310	253	267	255
Beans	2000	2000	2000	1867	2000	1973
Veg Oil	2000	2410	2410	2163	2170	2231

The weighted average cost of cereal delivered by WFP, which includes sorghum, maize and wheat is \$702. This is substantially higher than the average local market price of maize at \$255 per ton.

In addition to the cost of commodity at source there are other costs associated with delivering food to the beneficiaries including external transport, local transport, storage and handling, secondary transport and administrative and operational costs. As evident from Table 4.7 the total transportation and operational costs on average add an additional \$651 to the price of the commodity per metric tonnage

Therefore the cost efficiency of delivering food is highly dependent on the type and nature of the commodity and the capacity of the local markets in providing these commodities and the price at which they are exchanged. .

One possibility for food delivery in future is to only deliver beans and oil (where WFP currently has a comparative advantage) and provide a cash equivalent for purchase of maize at the local markets. This will result in lower costs for delivering food with the potential for stimulating the markets.

The current costing exercise does not allow for estimating the cost of this option since all the costs of delivering food that are based on per metric tonnage need to be recalculated to reflect the new estimated aggregate tonnage that forms the basis for deriving unit costs. A simple application of current unit costs to the adjusted tonnage after excluding maize will lead to substantial underestimation of costs of delivering food.

Table 4.7 Cost of Food from Source to Distribution

Commodity	Per Metric Tonnege	Total Cost
Cereal	258	1,477,304
Pulses	603	516,108
Veg Oil	1684	596,134
CSB	146	21,358
External Transport Costs	43	303,936
LTSH	166	1,174,586
Secondary Transport	28	196,493
Administrative and Operational Costs	208	1,473,542
Concern	91	643,447
WFP	117	830,095
Total Transportation and Operational Cost	653	4,622,100
Total*	820	5,759,462

*Total cost divided by total tonnage

4.3 Costing conclusion

The overriding objective of costing different transfer types was to determine the cost to the programme of delivering different aid modalities in the context of emergency humanitarian response to food insecurity.

The total cost of the programme during the period September 2009 to April 2010 was \$7.3 million.¹⁰ With the key cost drivers of the programme in order of magnitude being the cost of the commodity (36%), value of cash transfer (17.5%), local transport storage and handling (16.2%).

The total cost per transfer was found to be similar between the three aid modalities. In the expansion period, delivering cash to recipients cost \$9.56 per unit of transfer and delivery of food was lower at \$9.34. The cost of delivering one unit of food & cash transfer was \$10.53.

When the total cost per transfer is broken down into operation cost per transfer and the value of transfer to beneficiary, significant differences between the different modalities appear with the operational cost of cash being almost of half of that of food, and cash+food being cheaper than food.

For cash the total cost is highly dependent on the value of the transfer which varies based on the value of commodities at local markets. The choice of commodity and its use and availability in the local market price will have ramifications for the value of the transfer and whether it is the most cost efficient mode of aid delivery.

¹⁰ This does not include any costs incurred during the month of April and May from Concern.

5 The impact of different transfer types on food consumption and dietary diversity

5.1 Overview

This section sets out findings from fieldwork on the impact of different types of transfers on food consumption and dietary diversity, using the hypotheses and conceptual framework set out above.

Households interviewed obtain food from transfers (ZECT and sharing), their own labour (from *maricho* when paid in food), their own production (on their own farms and from gathering wild fruits and vegetables), and by purchasing from shops, markets, millers, traders and farmers through barter or with cash (from sales, earnings, remittances or ZECT). For most households, the major effect of the ZECT transfer was a slight increase in consumption, and a reallocation of the sources used from *maricho* to transfer or purchase. This freed more time for recipients to work on their own fields, but this does not necessarily translate into improved yields.

For a family of five, receiving ZECT cash increases recipients' maize purchases by between 73 and 94kg/month. Receiving cash reduces the amount recipients earn from *maricho* (since they chose to do less) during the transfer period by between 35 and 70kg/month. Cash transfers are not shared with non-recipients, and food bought from cash transfers is shared very little or not at all.

Table 5.8 Effect of ZECT transfer on recipient maize stock (family of five)

Transfer Modality	Increase in Maize Stock (KG)
Cash	73-94
Food	37-45
Cash + Food	52

For a family of five, receiving food increases recipients' staple from transfers by between 37kg/month in Gokwe North and 45kg/month in Nyanga, once sharing with non-recipients (estimated at 5%) and using part of the sorghum for milling (25%) is accounted for. The amount from staple is higher in Nyanga because recipients receive more bulgur wheat there, which does not need milling. Receiving food also reduces the amount of food recipients earn from *maricho* (again because they chose to do less).

For a family of five, receiving cash+food increases the amount of staple received from transfers by about 24kg (on the basis that cash is used to pay for milling costs where relevant), and increases maize from purchases by around 28kg. Again recipients earn less from *maricho*, and the food component only is shared with non-recipients.

Overall, given reductions in *maricho*, the net impact on consumption for households with labour options was much lower than the value of the transfer. However, for labour-constrained households, or where *maricho* is not regularly available, the transfers have a

more significant positive effect on recipients' consumption, since without transfers households would ration food in the absence of alternative sources.

The transfers' impact on aggregate food availability is important. At the household-level, all three transfer types reduce the time spent on *maricho* and therefore increase the time spent on their own farms. This may increase food obtained from own production in the following harvest, but has no immediate impact on food obtained. With the exception of some fertiliser bought with cash in Nyanga (arguably a result of poor ward-level targeting), no type of transfer contributes significantly to agricultural inputs, since the transfers usually arrive too late for planting and are spent on food. Moreover, most own farm production is highly dependent on rainfall, so additional time spent weeding and additional inputs may not have significant impact on own production.

However, this household-level analysis does not take account of the effects of transfers on food availability and prices at the aggregate level. This issue is complex, and the present analysis does not accommodate a detailed macro-level assessment. Available data present contrasting trends. On the one hand, if the assessment of absolute food shortage in Zimbabwe is correct, hirers of *maricho* and shop-keepers must obtain some food from external sources. One key source is food from the VGF, and without it, food shortages could become acute, and prices high. On the other hand, ZECT monitoring data (from pilot wards) suggest that prices were actually lower in cash wards than in food wards (Ruiz Roman 2010b: 23). This could imply that private traders are able to access external sources of maize, but it could also reflect the better market access and competition in cash wards. In order fully to understand the implications of food support for aggregate food supply and prices throughout VGF areas, more detailed investigation is required.

5.2 Food from transfers

This refers to sources of food obtained from direct food transfers to households: food under ZECT (cash is considered to support households' ability to purchase food and is analysed there), sharing, and other gifts. These are considered in turn.

5.2.1 Food from ZECT

Both the food and the cash+food transfers provide direct food transfers to households, but not by the full amount received, because part of the food is usually shared, and part of the food only transfer is used for milling. There was no clear evidence from fieldwork that households use the food received from ZECT for other bartering, but the monitoring report suggests that households use about 1.4% for bartering (Ruiz Roman 2010b: 14).

The food provided by the transfers was usually sorghum or bulgur wheat, with maize grain only provided in January and February in Nyanga during the pilot period. In Nyanga, bulgur wheat was provided in every month except January, and sorghum was never provided. In Gokwe North and South, bulgur wheat was provided only in December and January, with small amounts in February. These staples have two key characteristics. First, neither sorghum nor bulgur wheat are preferred staples: almost every household prefers maize, and bulgur wheat is particularly disliked. Indeed, some consider bulgur wheat principally 'breakfast food', and so seek to supplement their allocation by buying or working for maize. Second, unlike maize, bulgur wheat does not require milling, while sorghum can more easily be hand-milled.

Findings suggest that these characteristics of the transfer have various consequences. First, in Nyanga where bulgur wheat is more common, as expected fieldwork indicated slightly

higher sharing of food by food recipients (since bulgur wheat is not so highly prized) than in Gokwe North and South. Second, since food recipients do not consider bulgur wheat sufficient food, food recipients in Nyanga have higher work allocations in Nyanga than in Gokwe North and South, since they might seek to work for and purchase maize (so possibly slightly higher staple consumption overall), and would need cash to pay for milling of these staples. The possibility that since bulgur wheat does not need milling, food recipients in Nyanga might be expected to work less because they do not need to earn cash to pay for milling of their transfer was not confirmed in fieldwork.

Fieldwork indicates that recipients usually share about 5% of the staple and oil they receive, whether food or cash+food is received, though this figure was slightly higher in Nyanga – perhaps 10%. This is slightly higher than reported by the post distribution monitoring (PDM), which indicates 3.3% on average, but Ruiz Roman (2010b: 14) notes that qualitative monitoring suggests a higher proportion is shared, validating the higher estimate of 5%. Beans were shared slightly more than 5% - perhaps around 10%.

Fieldwork suggests that many food only recipients in Gokwe North and South (where sorghum accounts for 66% and 80% of the total food transferred) use part of their staple food transfer to pay in kind for milling. First, many food only recipients expressed preference for cash+food on the basis that they could use the cash for milling, instead of the food they were currently using. Second, relatively few food recipients (particularly in Gokwe North and South) had cash, since cash from cotton sales are usually exhausted by the time the transfers are made. In Nyanga, bulgur wheat was the main food transfer type (accounting for 75% of food transferred), and this did not need milling. Third, most millers (again in Gokwe North and South) report accepting payment in kind, at the rate of 1 gallon (5 litres) per bucket (20 litres).

After sharing and milling costs, therefore, food only recipients are left with between 7kg and 9kg (in Nyanga) of staple per person, rather than the 10kg initially transferred, 0.9kg of beans rather than 1kg (in the first months), and 570ml oil, rather than the 600ml transferred.

Cash+food recipients paid for milling costs using their cash, so their eventual transfers are 4.75kg staple, 0.45kg beans, and 285ml oil.

Table 5.9 Transfer entitlement hypothesis

Hypothesis	Conclusion
1. Receiving a food transfer increases inheritance and transfer entitlement by the value of the transfer (they do not sell food received).	Partly true – the entitlement is increased by less than the value of the transfer because recipients sell some and use some for milling (when the transfer is sorghum)

5.2.2 Food from sharing

Fieldwork did not yield clear results on changes to sharing with transfer recipients. It seems likely, however, that in many cases the jealousy generated by targeting significantly reduced sharing to recipients, probably to zero during the transfer period. Given that sharing usually

responds to context-specific needs, it is not possible to estimate the quantity of this reduction, since the amount shared would anyway vary significantly by year and household.

The transfer types did have a significant impact on food shared with non-recipients, however. Non-recipients were very clear that food transfers lead to much more sharing than cash transfers. As in most communities around the world, cash is not shared directly, although it is lent. In fieldwork communities, moreover, respondents reported that food bought with cash is shared much less than food given directly, largely because of the effort required to obtain food from markets. The focus groups bring this out clearly. Non-recipients considered the amount they receive from sharing to be very important (giving it a score of 9.6/10). Recipients themselves considered the respect they receive from sharing to be fairly important as well, giving a score of 8.6/10. Both groups gave food transfers much higher scores than cash transfers for their contribution to sharing, as Table 5.10 shows.

Table 5.10 Benefits from sharing of different transfer types

Respondent type Scores out of 10	Food	Cash+food	Cash	Importance weighting
Recipients (standing from sharing)	7.3	6.8	2.6	8.6
Non-recipients (amount received from sharing)	8.5	5.1	0.6	9.6

It was not possible to quantify the amount received from sharing by different transfer types, since sharing is extremely dependent on individual need and relations with neighbours. Nonetheless, the implication of this table is clear: that cash transfers leave non-recipients considerably worse off than other transfer types in terms of the amount they receive from sharing. Recipients, for their part, are made better off financially (though not socially) by the same token.

The sharing that does take place is usually within family or friendship networks, rather than generally. This is partly because there appears to have been some pressure (or perceived pressure) from Concern staff for communities not to share food or cash, with the aim of ensuring the targeting is respected by communities. While there had been a tradition in a number of communities of dividing food transfers equally amongst the community (organised by the headman), the injunction not to share generally seems to have been largely respected and this tradition appears to be dying out (although there are some examples of where it continues). Moreover, communities were very clear that this generalised form of sharing does not take place at all with cash.

Sharing through family or friendship networks only can lead to some non-recipients being excluded from receiving food from any source, and this should be a major concern for cash only transfers if there are errors from the targeting process. Fieldwork indicates that the current targeting process may lead to some exclusions, and because the current targeting process is based to some extent around the same social networks as sharing (see section on targeting), those excluded from the transfer may not receive food from sharing either, because they are marginalised from these social networks. This exclusion is exacerbated by the reduction in traditional sharing practices with food (encouraged by Concern staff), and

will be exacerbated further by providing cash. It implies a clear need to improve the targeting process if cash is to be transferred.

The low sharing of cash and sharing through social networks is reflected by interviews, as a few examples show.

In the cash ward in Gokwe South, recipients noted that despite an expectation to share, they never shared the cash, because they spent it on food, and they would occasionally share a plateful or cupful of maize with neighbours. This caused them problems in some cases as they failed to meet expectations. The headman noted that Concern had instructed them not to share, but that some recipients lent money to non-recipients. In Gokwe North, the headman again reported no sharing of cash or the maize they bought with it, but sharing of small portions of mealie meal that was milled from this maize. Recipients reported not sharing cash at all, but lending it and sharing food with neighbours and relatives. Non-recipients noted that there had been much more sharing when food was provided. In Nyanga, both recipients and non-recipients again report no sharing of cash or even the food bought with cash (usually mealie meal), despite a reported culture of sharing.

In food and cash+food wards, however, recipients and non-recipients report sharing food from transfers, although not as previously. Headmen in each district reported that Concern staff had instructed them not to share, and this had reduced sharing as they feared Concern might check on them and remove the transfer. In the cash+food wards, there is some lending of cash, but no sharing of cash since it is quickly used up on other needs, and some non-recipients felt that recipients shared more with food only. In some cash+food wards, the sharing/lending pattern was expressed by one non-recipient who “borrowed money from everyone, but [does not] pay relatives back.”

Table 5.11 Sharing hypotheses


Hypothesis	Conclusion
2. Receiving a cash or food transfer reduces private transfers from others and this is because of jealousy (not reduced need). There is no significant difference between food and cash in this regard.	Probably true, but probably more because recipients had less need rather than jealousy
3. Receiving a cash or food transfer increases the private transfers a household makes to non-recipients because the household has more resources. Food is shared more than cash.	True, but mainly for the food components of the transfer. Cash was never shared directly, and food bought from cash was shared far less than food transfers.

5.3 Food from own labour

This source of food refers to food obtained from *maricho*, when paid in maize. No “food for work” projects were available in research areas. *Maricho* payments also come in the form of goods, or cash, depending on the negotiation between the employer and employee, and on

the needs of the employee. Often, people do *maricho* because they need a particular item and lack the cash or other goods to buy it. Where there are many children in a household, recipients' main need for *maricho* is for school fees, and this can require substantial earnings (USD10 per child per term). The effect of the transfer on households' time spent *maricho* is critical to our understanding of the impact of the transfer on food consumption. Broadly, recipient households reduce the time they spend doing *maricho* by approximately the value of maize they receive. In other words, if a household receives 30kg maize/month, they will do less *maricho* so that their maize income from *maricho* reduces by 30kg/month. This is because *maricho* is typically seen by households as a livelihoods option they would prefer to avoid, largely because of a 'cultural' (for want of a better word) preference for cultivating their own field, and because workers perceive *maricho* wage rates as being low given the conditions of work. Figure 5.3 indicates that recipients and non-recipients give a low score for *maricho* relative to producing their own food. *Maricho* is more important for non-recipients because they rely on it more.

Figure 5.3 Importance of maricho and own production



The *maricho* market is complex, and varies by area and season. On average, the normal *maricho* wage rate is approximately one bucket (20 litres) for 2 days work, and a family of 5 would need to work for 8-10 days/month in order to obtain their food needs, in the absence of a transfer. Fieldwork suggests that recipients reduce their time on *maricho* by around half (4-6 days for a family of 5). This reduces their food obtained from *maricho* by between approximately 35 to 50kg maize/month. This reflects available monitoring data that suggest that non-recipients earned approximately twice as much as recipients from *maricho* in March.

There is a mild suggestion that cash and cash+food recipients reduced their *maricho* time by slightly more than recipients of food. This is because cash and cash+food recipients can meet, using the transfer, both their maize needs and their needs for other goods (by buying them), whereas recipients of food cannot obtain their basic goods from the transfer, and because cash recipients buy more maize than food recipients are given.

The reason for this reduction is purely related to the recipients' willingness to work on *maricho*. Fieldwork confirmed the hypothesis that being a recipient had no effect on eligibility

to work on *maricho*, but strongly contradicted the hypothesis that being a recipient had no effect on willingness to work on *maricho*. There was little evidence that receiving food and cash had an effect on recipients' ability to work. No effect was detected on non-recipients' eligibility, willingness, or ability to work.

The reduction in labour supply for *maricho* (from non-participation of recipients) might have been expected to increase wages if *maricho* demand remained unchanged, but this increase was not found in fieldwork. While there were changes in the wage rate over time, this was driven by changes in the overall economic situation in villages, which in turn is largely due to better or worse harvests overall. This tallies with monitoring report conclusions that "there is no evidence that the programme...was on a sufficiently large scale to cause an under-supply of labour," (Ruiz Roman 2010b: 25). The absence of under-supply of labour is despite the peak *maricho* season being in the period of the transfer (November-March), during the planting, weeding and harvesting seasons. Most respondents were able to undertake *maricho* when they needed to, but this often entailed travelling long distances and spending some time searching for it.

This overall picture should be nuanced in two main ways. First, labour constrained households cannot do *maricho*. These households rely on other sources of food (such as remittances or gifts), in addition to the transfer if they are recipients. Analysis of the monitoring data indicates that 90% of respondent household contained economically active members (91% of recipients and 86% of non-recipients).¹¹ Although these data are not representative of either the study villages or the country as a whole, this indicates that 10% of households would be unable to do *maricho*.

Second, *maricho* may not be always and regularly available, which means that households relying on casual labour for food may face periods where their food consumption is very low. The availability of *maricho* varies by time of year and expected harvest, with different patterns in each district. A more detailed analysis of *maricho* by district and type of transfer is provided in Annex E. Moreover, *maricho* may be available precisely because many transfer recipients are absent from the labour market. Employers did report significant problems in finding sufficient labour during the transfer. Given this, if those who currently receive the transfer were all to enter the labour market, *maricho* might no longer be readily available, or wages might reduce substantially. Further investigation is needed to understand the dynamics of the *maricho* market.

¹¹ Thanks to Elena Ruiz Roman for this analysis.

Table 5.12 Casual labour hypotheses

Hypothesis	Conclusion
4. Food and cash have an equal and negligible impact on eligibility for public or private employment paid in food.	Largely, true – but recipients also sought much less work whilst receiving the transfer so eligibility was less of an issue. A few non-recipients reported that they would not employ recipients locally.
5. Food and cash have an equal and negligible impact willingness to work in public or private employment paid in food.	False – recipients of all transfer types were much less willing to work in casual labour because they preferred not to engage in casual labour where it was not necessary
6. Food and cash have a positive impact on recipients' ability to work, and cash has a greater impact.	Not sustained by findings. Some indications that recipients were more able to be active, but this did not lead to more labour work
7. There is no significant impact on non-recipients' eligibility, willingness, or ability to work.	True – and no significant effect on wage rates.

5.4 Food from own production

Food from own production comes from two sources: production from household farms or vegetable gardens and gathering wild foods. There was little evidence that any type of transfer changed access to food from either source substantially for recipients or non-recipients, although recipients spent more time on their own fields (as they substituted away from *maricho*). This is principally because food from own production is driven more significantly by the weather and soil types, and by inputs at key times, than by average time spent on fields, and because gathering takes place outside the transfer period (in July-September).

5.4.1 Household farms

Transfers (of whichever type) encouraged recipients to do less *maricho* (by perhaps 4-5 days/month for a typical family) and spend more time on their own farms while they received the transfer. Since the transfer is given in the key staple production months (November to March), spending more time on the household farm might be expected to have a positive impact on yield in the next year. However, given the stronger correlation between yield and rainfall, soil type and input provision, the additional 4-5 days per month does not seem substantially to improve household production. Increases in yield could not be quantified through fieldwork, but recipients reported that this was less than they would have earned from *maricho*. This is not necessarily surprising because *maricho* employers often have more productive fields (with better soil and rainfall in agro-regions I or II, or irrigation, or better management practices) than those selling *maricho*.

Respondents' views of the impact of working further on their own fields were reasonably uniform. Some examples suffice: "I didn't do any *maricho* and worked in my field instead, but the harvest was not improved this year."¹² "I worked an additional ten days per month, and increased my sorghum yield by five buckets [and I would have earned fifteen buckets of maize from casual labour in the equivalent time]."¹³ "The cash had no impact on production, but I did spend more time on my field because I didn't need to do casual labour."¹⁴

What are the implications of this shift in labour time use? At the household level, it seems households obtain less grain. Nevertheless, households still prefer working on their own fields if they can meet household food needs by doing so. They give own production an importance score of 10/10 and *maricho* an importance score of only 2.6/10. This is because *maricho* is difficult, has high search and travel costs and is uncertain, and because cultivation has an important place in households' identity. At the aggregate level, it seems that given differences in fields' productivity, this shift in labour inputs will lead to lower aggregate production if *maricho* employers cannot find replacement labour. More information is needed on how the *maricho* market is affected by these changes in labour supply.

Some cash transfer evaluations have found that cash enables investments in agricultural inputs. These investments were not likely because the transfer began (in November) after the agricultural season had begun, and fieldwork found few incidents of spending the cash transfer on agricultural inputs. The exceptions were isolated examples of recipients spending cash transfers on fertiliser, primarily in Tombo ward in Nyanga, which generally did not appear particularly food insecure and should probably not have been selected to receive the transfer at all. Focus group recipients of each transfer type gave a score of zero to each transfer type for its impact on productive assets. In Nyanga, cash recipients reported that they could not afford to spend on livestock or assets because they spent the money on first food, and then school fees. In Gokwe North, they reported that the cash was not sufficient to buy more expensive items such as agricultural inputs.

In some areas, Concern has also been running livelihoods programmes which include the provision of seeds and fertilisers, and recipients of these programmes reported that these programmes led to an increase in production, but was sometimes offset by the poor soil quality of the fields, and principally by the low and erratic rainfall in these areas (falling largely in agro ecological regions III to V).

While the transfers did not have a detectable effect on production, they did affect consumption patterns. Recipients of any type of transfer tend not to consume green maize from their fields from February onwards, as some would otherwise have done. This increased the maize available for grinding in the next year. This was confirmed by the monitoring reports that indicated that cash and cash+food recipients typically had lower coping strategy index scores than non-recipients (including because of early consumption of maize, smaller food portion sizes, and relying on less expensive or less preferred foods).

¹² Male recipient, food ward, Gokwe North.

¹³ Female recipient, cash+food ward, Gokwe South.

¹⁴ Female recipient, cash ward, Gokwe South.

Table 5.13 Own production hypotheses

Hypotheses	Conclusion
8. Cash transfers have a greater positive impact on own-production than food transfers because households purchase more inputs. This impact is highly weather dependent.	Largely false – no recipients reported spending on inputs. Production is highly weather dependent.
9. Neither cash nor food transfers have a significant disincentive effect on food production, though the disincentive effect of food transfers may be slightly greater.	True no disincentive effects, and in fact the opposite as recipients worked more on their own fields, which is a preferred activity
10. Cash transfers lead to greater investments in productive assets than food transfers, leading to higher cash incomes, other factors permitting.	False – there was no reported investment in productive assets

5.4.2 Gathering

Households typically gather food to cover acute food shortages at times of the year when wild foods (fruits and vegetables) are in season. Since these tend to fall outside the transfer period (principally in the winter, and especially July – September), it is not surprising that the transfer has no discernible impact on gathering.

5.5 Food from purchases

5.5.1 The value of the transfer

Households obtain food from purchases depending on their income, prices, and the availability of goods in the market. The cash transfer element of ZECT was hypothesised to:


- Increase cash income directly
- Increase income through investments in productive assets
- Have no general upwards effect on prices because supply would respond
- Have no upwards effect on prices specifically for cash recipients (no opportunistic inflation)
- Give recipients better terms of trade than food recipients because purchasing in cash is better value than purchasing in food
- Increase the willingness of farmers and traders to sell food.

Households make purchases using income that they earn either from ZECT, *maricho*, other employment, remittances, gifts, or sales of produce or livestock. Ruiz Roman (2010b: 13) suggests that the ZECT programme is the main source of income for recipients, with *maricho* (including payments in kind) the second most common, and sales and remittances less common.

Fieldwork indicated that typically, cash only and cash+food recipients spent around 50% of the value of the cash they received on maize. This reflects monitoring report findings (Ruiz Roman 2010b: 14). For a family of 5, this would amount to cash recipients buying around 84kg of maize per month on average in Gokwe South and 69kg of maize per month in Gokwe North, and 54kg in Nyanga. Assuming the same proportion of spending on maize, cash+food recipients would buy around 40kg maize/month in Gokwe South, 35kg maize/month in Gokwe North, and 27kg maize/month in Nyanga, in addition to the 24kg provided by the food part of the transfer (once sharing is accounted for).

This calculation is based on taking the average value of the transfer for each district per person, dividing by the average price of maize in cash and cash+food wards gather immediately after distribution, dividing by 2 (for assumption that 50% is spent on maize), and multiplying by 5 for a family of five. The amount of maize bought is much higher than the amount provided for a family of 5 by food aid (37 - 44kg in each district once milling and sharing is accounted for) because recipients of food only typically spend ¼ of their ration on milling, and because recipients of cash transfers typically do not buy beans (which account for half the value of the transfer). This implies that the cash transfer provides 170% of the staple provided by the food transfer and the cash+food transfer provides 142% of staple than the food transfer in terms of staple consumption only (ignoring dietary diversity). This is set out in Table 5.14, which also indicates that by district, the additional value of cash is highest in Gokwe South and lowest in Nyanga (largely because the staple provision in Nyanga is higher because less is used on milling).


Table 5.14 Staple provided by different transfer types, expressed in % provided by food transfer



Most of the additional value of cash in staple terms is because cash recipients rarely buy beans. However, cash transfers would in any case be more valuable because of changes to prices once transfer values were calculated. Specifically, the post-distribution monitoring prices for maize (i.e. the prices actually faced by recipients) are usually fractionally lower than the maize prices used to calculate the value of the cash transfer in the cash wards, and a little higher in the cash+food wards. Finding lower prices after distribution for maize is slightly surprising, given fears about inflation (see below). However, monitoring data indicate

that this trend is also true for vegetable oil. The price of beans did not decrease, which are assumed to be the same (since they are rarely traded). Table 5.15 presents the % of the food basket that the cash and cash+food transfers would buy if they were spent on the same items (10kg maize, 1kg or 1.8kg beans, and 600ml oil), given the slightly lower prices after distribution in the different districts. Again, the additional values of cash and cash+food are highest in Gokwe South, and lowest in Nyanga. On average, cash transfers would buy 110% of the food basket, and cash+food transfers would buy 103%.

Table 5.15 % of food basket the cash and cash+food transfers would buy



5.5.2 Prices and availability

Most food purchases come from other farmers or traders (for maize), shops at the local 'growth point' or business centre (for basic groceries such as oil or sugar), or from larger settlements or district centres (for both maize and groceries). The availability and price of goods in larger settlements and district centres were not found to be affected by the transfer. The price and availability of goods were more closely related to payment days for civil servants (which often happened to fall on the same day as the cash transfer), to agricultural seasons, in particular the sale of cotton in May and June in Gokwe North and South, to general trends in wholesale prices (the wholesale price of sugar had increased during the period of the transfer due to supply problems), and to adjustments during the year to the use of the dollar (which most traders argued had a downward effect on prices). Some recipients therefore suggested that goods prices had changed slightly during the transfer period. However, this was not significant (beyond the trends noted here) or related to the provision of cash transfers. The finding that cash did not generate price inflation in large business centres in any month is confirmed by price monitoring data.

However, was the more serious concern that cash could generate general inflation in local areas borne out? We examine first maize (as the most important and commonly bought commodity) and then groceries (oil, salt, sugar, beans, soap).

As suggested above, monitoring data indicate that maize prices were (surprisingly) usually slightly lower (by a few USD cents per kg) in cash wards after the transfer than when calculated. Maize was fractionally more expensive post-distribution in November and December in Gokwe North and South, but slightly cheaper from January onwards. In Nyanga, the pattern was reversed, being more expensive from November to January, and

cheaper thereafter (fractionally more expensive overall). In cash+food wards, the picture is similar. Price monitoring data, therefore, present no evidence that overall prices of maize went up as a result of the transfer.

However, this finding is not entirely confirmed by fieldwork. Asked about prices maize faced in cash and cash+food wards during the transfer, recipients indicated that maize was not always available locally at the stated market price. The availability of maize differs in each village, depending on the surpluses available from each farmer and on the existence and nature of local maize traders. Given this, it is appropriate to take each district in turn.

In Gokwe North, the sampled village in the pilot cash only ward (Makore 1) was near to a business centre (between 30 minutes and 1 hour's walk at the most) that contained several shops, a mill (flour mills are reliant on electricity and the transformer has been broken for a year), and a maize trader. This business centre was next to the food distribution point (FDP). After a reasonable harvest, maize was available from farmers within the village, from traders (the fixed trader and others who came during the transfer), and sometimes from the miller. Obtaining maize from farmers in the village was time-consuming (it required shopping around) and uncertain (since farmers would sell maize in small quantities only if assured of a surplus and if they could not get a better price elsewhere, from traders or the GMB), so buyers typically preferred obtaining maize from markets.

However, recipients and the headman argued that market maize prices increased during the transfer by perhaps USD1 (around 25-30%) as traders were aware of the cash inflow. The maize trader in the business centre was asked whether they were able to increase maize prices in response to the cash and replied that "I would prefer not to talk about these things." The increase in maize market prices encouraged buyers to seek alternatives, which included buying locally and travelling to Nembudziya (which was costly). Although monitoring findings suggested maize was usually easily available locally except in February when 'supply declined', respondents argued it was not always possible to obtain maize from local farmers, probably reflecting the effort required to find it. Overall then, it seems reasonable to conclude that maize buyers did face slightly higher maize prices in the sampled cash village in Gokwe North, and that maize trade was slightly stimulated by the transfer, and that both phenomena were caused by the cash transfer.

In Gokwe South, the sampled village in the pilot cash ward (Nemangwe 1) was also very near a local business centre which had a mill and small shops. Again, local farmers sold maize, but principally to traders rather than individuals. Recipients bought some maize from local farmers, and some from local shops whilst they had stocks (until around February). However, after February and before the harvest, recipients would buy from Gokwe centre, where prices were not affected (as noted above). While there were no reports of increased maize prices, it was not clear that maize was always available to buy locally in February and March. In the pilot cash ward in Gokwe South, therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude both that cash did not stimulate much trade in maize during the transfer and maize prices did not rise significantly.

In Nyanga, the pilot cash ward (Tombo) was rather unusual in that it had been wrongly classified as vulnerable during the ZIMVAC assessment. Villages within Tombo were not all vulnerable and one village visited was in agro-region I with virtually no food insecurity as most farmers produced a surplus of maize and other goods. A second village visited in Tombo had much poorer climatic and growing conditions, and after a comparatively poor harvest in 2008/2009 there was a shortage of maize in the village. Recipients reported that it was difficult to find maize to buy in the village and that any found would be expensive (between USD8 and USD10/bucket, according to fieldwork and monitoring data). This was

because maize sellers from agro-region I areas nearby were able to sell in bulk to larger traders in Nyanga or Harare and kept little maize for sale in the village (but would occasionally pay for *maricho* with maize). Tombo business centre, though on the tarred road and close to the village, did not stock maize or mealie meal, as sellers believed there were no buyers (according to fieldwork and monitoring data).

Recipients therefore formed groups and each group would send a member to Troutbeck (a wealthy local town with a supermarket) or Nyanga (the district headquarters) to buy mealie meal. At USD4.5 or USD5 for 10kg and USD4 for travel costs (split between the group), mealie meal is worse value than buying maize at the market rate (at USD6-7 for 17.5kg including milling). Recipients chose this option because there was no maize market response and because maize prices were inflated, in even this well connected ward.

In terms of groceries, the balance of evidence suggests that there was no significant transfer-related price inflation. There was no detectable price impact of cash in larger business centres with good transport connections. However, there were conflicting reports on the effect on prices in smaller markets where supply response is expected to be slower and on a smaller scale. Many (but not all) recipients reported an increase in the price of groceries in their local shops, and some viewed this as opportunistic inflation by traders. Recipients in Nyanga also explained that shopkeepers had hidden this increase from Concern monitoring staff who (either themselves, sending proxies, or posing as customers) visited the traders on the day of distribution to ascertain prices and check inflation.

Monitoring data did not report any substantial increases in commodity prices after distributions. When interviewed, every grocery trader reported that their prices were based on the wholesale price, transport costs, and a markup, and vigorously denied changing prices for any other reason, including the transfer. In Gokwe South and North, some traders reported setting prices by discussing with each other (and it would not be surprising if this occurred in Nyanga too), so traders would not have lost business to each other through price inflation, although recipients could have travelled elsewhere for purchases if this occurred. However, the only changes to prices reported by traders were to wholesale sugar prices, which increased by between USD0.5 and USD 1 (a 50% increase) during the transfer due to increases in wholesale prices (which we know to come from problems with supply in Zimbabwe). Moreover, non-recipients did not report price increases. This may be because they purchase groceries less frequently (especially in Gokwe North and South where it is common to make bulk purchases for the year after cotton sales in June and not return to the shops), but nevertheless provides support to the views of traders and the monitoring data. On balance, therefore, the available evidence shows no clear transfer-related inflation of grocery prices in these wards (aside from possible isolated and brief incidences).

Cash transfer recipients did face higher prices when they had to rely on relatives or friends to collect the cash. This was often the case for older recipients or recipients with disabilities. In some of these cases, recipients quoted prices that their proxy had relayed to them that were clearly inflated. In other words, proxies charged a fee (often 100% of the value of the commodity) for travelling to local markets and buying goods.

The provision of cash also offered recipients improved terms of trade over bartering, principally because barter prices were typically offered at adverse rates. Moreover, many traders refused to accept any grain payments because they preferred cash (which was better for buying goods and paying costs). A comparison of barter prices and cash prices demonstrate improved terms of trade, and recipients expressed a consistent preference for paying in cash. A comparison of barter and cash prices gathered in Gokwe South (where barter prices were available in sufficient number to make a comparison) indicates 10% better

value from paying in cash than in bartering, with payments in maize. This is based on an average price of 20kg maize at USD2.625 (reported in interviews with traders). Common examples of the barter offered by traders included:

- 750ml oil for USD1.5 or 13.5kg maize (worth USD1.8).
- 1kg salt for USD1 or 8.75kg maize (worth USD 1.1)
- 1 bar of soap for USD1 or 10kg maize (USD 1.3)
- 2kg sugar for USD2.5 or 23kg maize (worth USD 3).

Table 5.16 Market and price hypotheses

Hypothesis	Conclusion
11. Cash transfers will have no direct impact on food prices because food supply will respond in cash wards.	True, although maize supply did not always respond within wards, cash recipients were able to obtain maize or mealie meal.
12. Food transfers will have no direct impact on food prices because there is excess demand in all wards.	True – food transfers had no discernable impact on prices.
13. Cash transfer recipients will not face higher prices than food transfer recipients and non-recipients.	Largely true, with some exceptions (as in recipients who relied on others to collect their transfers).
14. Cash transfer recipients will face better terms of trade for food purchases than food recipients or non-recipients.	True – it was slightly better value to pay in cash than grain, and many traders would not accept grain payments.
15. Traders in markets used by cash transfer recipients will increase food supply, and this will be sustained through the lean season and after the programme	Partially true – supply of groceries increased but not maize. It is not clear whether it will be sustained after the programme, especially in small local shops
16. Traders in markets used by cash transfer recipients will be more willing to sell food because they can be paid in cash.	True – traders preferred to receive cash, but often maize traders still preferred to sell to more profitable markets further away
17. Market responses will not be the same in food transfer areas because households have liquidity constraints.	True – markets did not respond in food areas as recipients continued to obtain other goods in usual ways (working for goods from <i>maricho</i> or buying in bulk)

5.6 Net effect on food consumption and dietary diversity

Overall, fieldwork suggests that cash has the highest impact on staple consumption, but the lowest impact on dietary diversity. Net increases in staple consumption are smaller than the

amount of the transfer because recipients do less *maricho*. Recipients in cash wards generally prefer to receive cash, but some cash recipients and recipients in other wards remain nervous about cash.

5.6.1 Staple food consumption

All transfer types increased net staple food consumption but cash increased it the most (see Table 5.17.) This difference arises because a high proportion of the cash transfer value is made up by beans (33-40% before January, and 45-50% from January to March when the amount of beans was raised from 1kg to 1.8kg), but cash recipients spend much less than 30% of the cash value on beans or any other protein source.

The net increase in staple consumption for each transfer type appears much lower than the 10kg of staple provided by the transfer. This finding comes from various pieces of circumstantial evidence (a more detailed consumption survey would be required to give a firmer basis).

First, monitoring data suggest that recipients and non-recipients consumed staples almost every day of the week at baseline and throughout the transfer period. While recipients of all types consumed more than non-recipients particularly in November and December, consumption was fairly similar from January onwards. However, this figure does not account for the number of meals eaten in a day, so is not a very good guide to actual consumption.

Second, the reduction in *maricho* leads to a reduction in staple obtained from this source of between 35kg and 50kg per month (with slight variations for district level differences in wage rates). However, further detailed research would be needed to ascertain this amount more precisely. Moreover, the net effect on consumption for labour constrained household who cannot do *maricho* will be much larger.

Table 5.17 sets out the probable net increase on consumption, once reductions in food income from *maricho* are accounted for.

Table 5.17 Net increase in staple consumption

Transfer type	Probable increase in staple consumption
Food	2-3kg/person/month
Cash	4-8kg/person/month
Cash+food	2-4kg/person/month

5.6.2 Dietary diversity

Findings from fieldwork were not entirely clear but suggest that cash performed badly on dietary diversity. Overall, recipients in focus groups felt that food and cash+food provided the most dietary diversity, but again this was driven by strong views against cash in the food and cash+food wards. In the cash ward, the view was much more balanced, with each transfer type having a similar impact. Monitoring data suggest that cash recipients had the

most adequately diverse diets (Ruiz Roman 2010b), because they were able to buy a range of goods and food types, including protein.

Fieldwork does not provide a strong indication. However, the impression was that cash recipients usually spent a larger proportion of their transfer on maize than was accounted for in the value of the food transfer. This implies that cash recipients' diets contained less protein than the diets of food and cash+food recipients, who consumed the beans given in the transfer. Respondents typically gave dietary diversity a lower importance score (under 8.5/10) than staple food consumption (10/10), which indicates that given a choice, they would prioritise staple rather than diverse diets. As cash+food recipients in Gokwe South pointed out, "enough food is better than a variety of food." Cash recipients usually spent their cash on oil, salt and sugar, rather than protein sources. Recipients in focus groups overall felt that food and cash+food had relatively high impacts on dietary diversity, with average impact scores of 6/10 and 5.7/10 respectively, while cash had a low impact (2.4/10), although in cash wards cash scored more highly (averaging 6.3/10).

The preference of respondents for more food rather than more diverse food highlights a potential trade-off between the flexibility offered by cash and nutritional objectives. Programmers seeking to optimise nutritional indicators may need to consider alternatives to cash only, such as a mix of cash and protein. However, the finding on dietary diversity was not clear, so more research on this topic is needed.

5.6.3 Cash and food preferences

In the focus groups, recipients tended to think that whichever transfer type they were receiving had the largest effect on food consumption. Overall, recipients felt that food transfers had the largest impact on their food consumption, but this was largely because recipients in the food and cash+food wards were extremely nervous about the possibilities of buying food with the cash they were given.

In the cash ward, focus group recipients thought that cash had the largest impact on their food consumption, with cash+food second. This preference for cash tallies with the analysis above.

However, the cash preference expressed in cash ward focus groups was not supported by recipients in other wards or by all individual interviewees in the cash wards. While cash recipients reported being happy to receive cash, much anxiety remained, with one cash recipient in Gokwe South saying "if you could guarantee the price of food, cash would be better."¹⁵ In Gokwe North, a cash recipient strongly preferred food because "the money might be spent on other problems [such as health costs] when food is the most important." In Nyanga, cash recipients were happier with cash than elsewhere, but still expressed a desire to have food because this would mean less travel. Another cash recipient in Nyanga preferred cash+food because this allows households to pay fees while having enough food to eat.

The preference for food among these cash recipients is surprising, given that the analysis above suggests that they were largely able to obtain sufficient food from the market, that cash recipients actually obtain more maize (which is preferred to sorghum and wheat) and given the focus groups' preference for cash (in cash wards). Here, we present three explanations for this surprising food preference:

¹⁵ Recipient, cash ward, Gokwe South.

Discount rates

One explanation for food preference is that members of these communities have an extremely high discount rate (i.e. they value actually having something now much above the possibility of obtaining it later), particularly where food is concerned. This discount rate is not driven by current problems with markets, since no cash recipient reported significant problems obtaining food from markets. Rather, it reflects past experiences of food not being available from markets, or being available at rapidly changing prices, and of political violence excluding them from markets entirely.

Spending on other items

Some recipients prefer food because they worry that they will spend the cash on “other problems”. This worry is probably because households will be compelled to spend on health and education when they have cash, although they would prefer to spend on food. Most households consider meeting food needs to be a first priority, and meeting other needs (such as health or education) to be lesser priorities. Households without excess resources will therefore rarely sell food to pay for health or school fees. Health workers and teachers usually allow payments to be made flexibly, so that households without cash can delay their payments and still receive treatment or attend school. However, when households have cash, they are expected to pay. Recipients therefore worry that they will have to pay for health or school fees because they are known (by the health workers or teachers, or by their children) to have cash, and having to pay these bills will reduce their ability to obtain food. If they were given food directly, this pressure would be reduced.

Markets

The market fears are real and important, as the food and cash+food wards were selected to have poorer market access than the cash wards. In food and cash+food wards, markets are more distant, less well known, and have less consistent supply and prices than those in cash wards. Recipients were aware of this. However, fieldwork indicates that markets would probably respond in these other wards. A market assessment of the type undertaken for the cash pilot could offset these doubts.

Table 5.18 Consumption and dietary diversity hypotheses

Hypothesis	Conclusion
18. Households receiving food transfers will have higher household consumption (measured in portion size and meals per day) than households receiving cash transfers.	False – cash transfer recipients probably had higher consumption as the cash enabled them to buy more staple, which they preferred
19. Where females receive food transfers or cash transfers, children will receive improved household allocations.	Not clear from fieldwork – parents of both genders reported feeding children
20. Recipients of food or cash transfers will have smoother consumption than non-recipients, but food recipients will have smoother consumption than cash recipients.	True that recipients have smoother consumption than non-recipients, but false that food recipients have smoother consumption than cash recipients
21. Cash transfers have larger positive impacts on dietary diversity than food transfers.	Probably false – the provision of beans in food transfers may have improved dietary diversity more

6 Other transfer impacts

This section sets out the impact of different transfer types on education and health, basic goods, community relations, and intra-household relations and gender.

6.1 Education and health

One of the commonly cited advantages of cash transfers is that their flexibility allows them to be spent on other important household needs, including on human capital development. As noted above, recipients are often concerned that cash transfers will be 'diverted' away from food and towards spending on health and education (USD 10 per child per term for primary school fees). However, other recipients reported being able to satisfy their food needs and also being able to meet their education needs, in particular, and cited this as an advantage of the cash and cash+food transfer types.

In focus groups, recipients gave obtaining the education and health services they need an average score of 9.7/10, the third highest score behind obtaining enough food and intra-household relations (both 10/10), indicating the importance placed on this area of impact by communities. Overall, recipients felt that the impact of the programme of any transfer type was medium, but largest for cash+food (4.6/10) and cash (2.9/10), with food scoring 2/10. The reason that cash+food scored higher than cash is that respondents felt that food was a priority, that learning cannot happen without food needs being satisfied, and that only once food needs are satisfied can money be spent on other items.

A clear impact on health and education should not be expected. Whether money was spent on education and health was dependent on the family structure and need at the time, and the limited sample interviewed for fieldwork does not provide a very clear indication. Monitoring data do not indicate substantial spending on health or education for either cash or cash+food groups, though larger spending on education (about 5% of the cash on average)¹⁶. This low spending on health is to be expected, since many respondents will have no health problems on which they spend during the transfer.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, service providers did not notice an impact of the transfer. Health workers did not notice a significant impact on attendance or payment from any transfer type. They reported often providing services for free, accepting barter payments, and that a major problem was that the population did not seek healthcare. One possible impact of cash is that those who do pay are now more able to pay in cash, which is preferred by health workers because they need to obtain stationery and other items using cash. Teachers similarly did not note a significant impact on enrolment or attendance, arguing that even those who have cash may lack grain.

Cash recipients had a more positive view than other recipients on the impact of cash. Focus group respondents in the cash wards noted an improvement from the transfer in their ability to send children to school and to go to hospital. In other wards, however, respondents were less convinced that cash would lead to improvements, fearing that food prices would increase and not enough money would be left for food. Respondents from food wards noted that children were better able to go to school as a result of the transfer because they are properly fed and (in Nyanga) can take bulgur for lunch. Interviewees reported some examples of paying for the year's school fees or buying school materials with the cash,

¹⁶ It must be noted that at the time of the programme many schools had not yet set their school fees

allowing children to attend. There were also examples of those with illnesses finding the cash useful to spend on medicines.

6.2 Basic goods

Another potential advantage of cash is that recipients have greater flexibility to obtain the basic goods that they need, such as soap, paraffin and utensils. These goods can usually be obtained from markets or by undertaking *maricho* and being paid directly in goods (this is most common for soap). Food transfers are not expected to have an impact on this directly, but they might free up resources to spend more on household goods. Fieldwork and monitoring data suggest that households did spend cash transfers on basic goods, but that food transfers had no impact.

Recipients in focus groups did not consider obtaining sufficient basic goods extremely important, giving this an importance weighting of 7/10. Overall, recipients perceived the effect of the programme on households' ability to obtain basic goods was low. Cash scored the highest, with an average impact of 3.7/10, cash+food with 2.9/10, and food was perceived to have no impact. Monitoring reports indicate that recipients spent around 5% of cash on basic goods during the transfer period. These low ratings come because households typically do not spend much of the cash transfer on these items, partly because of the food prioritisation noted above, and in some districts because of spending patterns on these items. In Gokwe North, those who farm cotton tend to make bulk purchases of these goods after selling their cotton. Food recipient interviewees in Gokwe North reported not visiting shops between October and April after their bulk purchases following cotton sales. In Gokwe South and Nyanga, however, most people made more consistent visits to shops as their incomes tended to be more spread throughout the year. The low spending of the transfer on these items may be because recipients prioritise food spending during the lean period.

6.3 Community relations

The impact of transfers on community relations is important. Food transfers have a positive impact, and cash transfers a negative impact. This is principally because cash is not shared.

Recipients and non-recipients both gave having good relations (or not having envy in the case of recipients) very high importance scores (9.4/10 and 9.9/10 for recipients and non-recipients respectively). It is critical to note that these scores arose not just because people prize having good relations per se with their community, but because those good relations with neighbours are critical to basic livelihood systems, which are often based around various forms of mutuality.

Respondents identified various ways in which good community relations sustain their livelihoods. First, many households deal with temporary food shortages by obtaining food from their neighbours through sharing. This sharing practice operates as a net transfer (from wealthy households to less wealthy households) that takes place throughout the year. It is also a complex and long-term system of mutual support, where households of similar wealth levels support each other when any household is short of food (e.g. because they have had to spend on health, or have not found *maricho*). This practice smoothes household consumption in a context of high risk.¹⁷ Second, households lend each other agricultural

¹⁷ However, where risks are covariant – i.e. affecting all households at the same time – this lessens the ability of the mutual support to address shortfalls because all households are struggling at the same time.

inputs, particularly livestock for ploughing fields. This is important because livestock are not equally distributed through the village, and some households have no livestock. The use of livestock for ploughing is important to households' agricultural production, and households who were unable to borrow livestock at the right moment felt that their production was much lower because of this. This lending takes place on a purely voluntary basis, so good relations are essential to underpin it. Third, households rely on their relatives and neighbours to care for their children when they travel to do *maricho*. Given the importance of *maricho* to livelihoods in these regions, and given that many respondents report that they need to travel for *maricho*, mutual childcare can be vital. Fourth, some communities engage in cooperative community work, and tensions in the community can mean that non-recipients leave this to recipients.

On the one hand, it might be expected that transfers of any type would strengthen these mutual systems in three ways. First, by making communities richer overall. Second, by providing those worst off with means to cope during the lean period. Third, by helping those worst off to repay those who lent to them in the rest of the year. On the other hand, targeted transfers that are not shared raise the risk of social tensions and the exacerbation of stigma attached to recipients or discrimination against them, and the erosion or destruction of those good relations that underpin livelihoods systems. Where do different transfer types fall on this scale?

The message from fieldwork is very clear: food transfers are considered to have a strong impact on strengthening these mutual systems, while cash transfers are damaging to them. Recipients in focus groups give food transfers an impact score of 7.3/10 on avoiding envy, and cash+food 6.8/10, with cash a distant third with 2.6/10. Unlike other impact ratings discussed above, this pattern is exactly the same in focus groups with cash recipients. Non-recipients in focus groups score food 8.1/10, cash+food 4.8/10, and cash 1.1/10 in terms of the positive effect on community relations. These scores present a clear hierarchy in terms of the effect of different transfer types on community relations: food>cash+food>>cash.

What explains these scores? The principal reason is that cash is not shared, as noted above. This has the consequence that instead of contributing to sharing systems, it erodes them, through jealousy and the tension caused by not sharing. There are several examples of this throughout the interviews and focus groups.

Recipients in focus groups in cash wards emphasised the jealousy caused by the provision of cash. In Nyanga, they noted that "when cash was given to beneficiaries, jealousy brewed easily because people did not like sharing cash, but there was no hatred when there was food." In Gokwe North, recipient respondents referred to increased jealousy from non-recipients as they wanted to be included in the cash programme, a jealousy that was less present when food was distributed. Non-recipients in Gokwe South noted that recipients "cannot share cash", and this causes social tension. Cash recipients in Gokwe South noted that there was still an expectation to share, but they did not meet this because they received cash.

There is a confusing element in these responses, since recipients felt a pressure to share, and recognised that not sharing would cause tension, and yet did not share. More investigation is needed to explain this more fully, but it seems possible that recipients were subject to competing demands on the resources they received from the transfer, from within and outside the household. In the case of food, the provision in a public place of large bags of grain lent itself to more sharing outside the household, and sharing within the community fit the historical pattern of sharing. Since cash itself is not shared, however, the scope and pressure for sharing within the household increased, before the cash was converted into

maize grain or mealie meal that could be shared. Some recipients referred to this directly: a (recipient) headman in a cash+food ward in Gokwe South noted that once recipients had shared the cash with other members of the household (including the husband for beer), there was not enough to share with others outside the household.

A second reason for the low score of cash is that it exacerbates tensions already caused by targeting. Respondents in all ward types noted that targeting (i.e. the process of selecting some and not others) caused community tensions, whatever the resource distributed. The tension from targeting itself is not related to cash (and indeed communities thought they were being targeted for food, whatever they eventually received). For instance, the headman in the food ward in Gokwe South claimed that non-recipients asked Concern staff to leave, such was the tension caused. Some respondents in other wards even suggested that these tensions led to deaths through witchcraft, as non-recipients would pay for spells to be cast on recipient households. The point here is not to claim that targeting causes death through witchcraft, but that the resentment caused by targeting leads, in the views of many in communities, to significant problems. When food is distributed, the sharing of this food reduces this tension and placates the non-recipients to some extent (although claims of witchcraft were still made when food was distributed). If sharing does not take place or takes place less, however, these tensions remain.

Sharing does not take place when the resource distributed is cash, or when generalised drought or other problems constrain households' abilities to share, or (in some cases) when recipients respect what is perceived as a Concern directive not to share. The latter problem is evident in responses from recipients and village leaders (particularly in Gokwe North and South) who perceive a tension in respecting Concern's wishes and in retaining good community relations. The case of drought is brought out in a response from a cash recipient in Gokwe South, who noted that there was tension when cash was distributed (because they did not share), but there was even more tension last year when food was distributed, because there was a higher level of food insecurity. In the cash+food ward in Gokwe South, the headman noted that there was tension during the distributions (which meant that non-recipients did not work on cooperative projects), partly caused by the provision of cash, and partly by the general shortage caused by the drought. A recipient in the same village argued that the tension was more related to drought than cash.

A third (and related) reason is that because in the cash wards cash is perceived as more attractive than food, and because recipients share cash less, non-recipients are more jealous of cash recipients than they would be of food recipients. This was pointed out by a headman in a cash ward in Gokwe North.

The negative impact of cash and targeting on community relations is an important issue for communities (recipients, non-recipients and the village leadership). Its importance was such that every respondent to fieldwork (recipients included) preferred an equal distribution of the resource throughout the village, even though this would mean a lower allocation for each. The challenge for programmers is that the cash pilot has created expectations that cash will be provided next year (whether or not it actually is), which will put additional pressures on the targeting process and on community relations. Given the importance of the issue for respondents, attention needs to be given to the targeting method and to its impact on communities.

Table 6.19 Tensions hypothesis

Hypothesis	Conclusion
22. Cash and food transfers may produce social tensions between recipients and non-recipients.	True – but these are substantially greater for transfers containing cash

6.4 Intra-household relations and gender

Since the transfers were targeted on women, it is expected that they provide women with additional standing in the community and household. The predicted effect on this of providing cash or cash+food transfers is slightly ambiguous. On the one hand, the additional flexibility of cash might afford women greater standing, as they are able to meet not only the households' food needs, but also the needs of others in the household (such as children's school fees). On the other hand, the attractiveness of cash, particularly to men in the households, might generate problems for women as they may be abused by men seeking to make use of the transfers.

Intra-household relations were considered very important by recipient respondents, who gave this category 10/10 on the importance ranking (along with only food consumption), reflecting the high value placed on family by community members in these areas. The focus groups with recipients also made clear that the transfer had a substantial impact on intra-household relations. The positive impact of food was considered to be the greatest, with an average impact score of 9.2/10. Cash+food was second, with 6.2/10, and cash third, with 2.7/10. Amongst recipients in cash wards, however, the scores were virtually identical. What explains these differences?

First, it should be clear that cash recipients felt that cash had a positive impact on intra-household relations (even if fractionally smaller than food). As female respondents in the cash ward in Nyanga pointed out, "people lived in harmony because there was enough food in the house." In Gokwe North, cash recipients also noted happiness in the household and greater cooperation between men and women, and in Gokwe South, cash recipients noted that giving the cash required discussion between men and women on how to spend the transfer.¹⁸

Moreover, there were almost no reports of cash transfers causing problems for women within the household. The only report of domestic violence came from a headman in the cash+food ward in Nyanga who had heard problems of domestic violence in surrounding villages but not his own. There were no reports of husbands stealing all of the cash to spend on their own priorities.

The reason that food scores highest on intra-household relations is that most focus group recipients considered that intra-household relations were best served by having enough food in the household. This reduces conflict and enables wives to talk to their husbands with no fear of retribution or criticism – with this impact largely because women are responsible for

¹⁸ This is consistent with findings in the draft 'Zimbabwe Gender and Cash Transfer Study', 5th June 2010.

the provision of food. Therefore, whichever transfer type contributed the most to having enough food would be likely to be the best for intra-household relations. As noted above, recipients in food and cash+food wards were extremely wary of their ability to turn cash into food, which explains the low scores accorded to cash transfers in these wards. Female recipients in these wards were also concerned that cash would cause tension from demands from husbands (though again this was not borne out in the cash wards).

In addition to concerns about whether food could always be obtained with cash, respondents in food wards feared the effects of cash on intra-household relations. In Nyanga, for instance, focus group respondents in the food ward suggested that “husbands usually want money to buy beer and it causes problems with their wives even to the extent of beating them up.” In Gokwe North and South, the female recipients in the food wards had the same view, suggesting that providing any cash would cause conflict as husbands will demand it. Respondents in the cash+food wards were more positive on their experience with cash, noting in Nyanga that in addition to the reduction in arguments because of greater food security, the provision of cash allows husbands and wives to have an understanding, and for women to play a greater role in household decision-making. With cash only, however, they felt there would be tension because husbands would want the money for alcohol, and women would want the money for food. Recipients in Gokwe North agreed that the cash+food mix was useful for intra-household harmony, but cash only would create a risk because husbands would seek to spend on alcohol.

Cash ward recipients consider the impact of cash on intra-household relations positive, but other recipients are concerned. How should these different views be interpreted? It is possible that recipients in the cash ward underplay the extent to which husbands use the money for alcohol in order to make the programme appear more positively to evaluators. Fieldwork did not indicate that spending on alcohol was a significant problem. Increases in beer hall sales were restricted to a few days around distribution and did not appear extremely widespread. It seems more likely that the preference for food reflects more generalised fears about cash for those not receiving it. For instance, a (very amicable) husband and wife interview in the cash ward in Gokwe North revealed that the wife preferred food, because she was concerned about prices of food in the market, while the husband preferred cash, because it would enable him to meet his own needs (he liked sugar). Female recipients’ preferences for food in the food wards should probably be interpreted in this light: as worries that cash would not be sufficient to go around all the households’ needs and therefore create tension. However, the experience of the cash wards suggests this need not happen.¹⁹

Female recipients in some areas also mentioned their improved standing in the community as a result of receiving the transfer, but this did not seem to be related to the type of transfer received. This is because they are perceived to be better able to address their households’ food needs, which is a key determinant of standing in the community.

¹⁹ Again, this is consistent with findings in the draft gender study.

Table 6.20 Gender hypothesis

Hypothesis	Conclusion
23. Cash transfers increase the confidence of women in the household and community more than food transfers.	False – cash transfers increase women’s confidence, but so do food and cash+food transfers. Confidence comes largely from meeting food needs

7 Operational issues

This section briefly sets out some operational issues with the programme, focusing on differences between providing food and providing cash, and cash+food. The section examines targeting and distribution.

7.1 Targeting

Targeting took place at three levels: the selection of wards, the selection of villages within wards, and the selection of recipients within villages. This section briefly examines them all from the perspective of comparing cash, cash+food and food.

7.1.1 Ward selection

Two pilot wards were selected to receive cash and cash+food in the three districts in which Concern was operational and where the WFP's vulnerable group feeding programme is running. The wards were selected using the information from the Interim ZimVAC report and Concern's local knowledge of the districts. Priority was given to wards located beside areas of surplus and which had access to functioning markets. Using the vulnerable group feeding (VGF) programme method, district stakeholders then confirm food insecure wards.

The theory of selecting wards next to surplus wards and with access to functioning markets was that cash injections into these wards could be used to purchase food without provoking food price inflation, and without imposing significant transport costs on recipients. This assumes that there is elastic food supply within easy transport reach. These assumptions can be tested by verifying:

- Whether there was a food or other essential commodity price increase in markets used by recipient wards that could be correlated with the cash transfer; and
- Return transport costs between recipient households and local markets, calculated as a percentage of the transfer.

As noted above, neither fieldwork nor monitoring data suggest that there were substantial increases in commodity prices that could be correlated with the cash transfer. Although maize was not always available to buy within the wards themselves at the prices used to calculate the transfer, recipients in the cash and cash+food wards were able to obtain maize, which suggests that the selection of the pilot wards was effective from the point of view of market accessibility.

However, return transport costs were higher than anticipated because households often had to travel outside the wards to buy their food. Again, as noted above, recipients found various mechanisms to reduce these costs. In Nyanga, for instance, cash recipients would have to pay USD4 return for transport to local markets in Troutbeck and Nyanga town (about 10% of the transfer value for a family of 5), but grouped together to share these transport costs, which meant paying only around 1%. In Gokwe North and South, maize was more easily available within walking distance, and recipients were usually able to use shared Scotch carts for transporting the maize, paying perhaps USD1 or 2 (3-5% of the transfer value). Although transportation costs reduce the value of the cash transfer it cannot directly be compared with other modalities since no questions were asked about the cost of transport for food and cash+food on the cost of getting their food from the FDPs.

Fieldwork indicated that the ward selection process generated some inclusion errors. The clearest example of this was in Nyanga, where the cash ward (Tombo) was selected based on the ZIMVAC assessment wrongly including them in their report. Fieldwork confirmed that while there were some vulnerable areas within the ward, there were areas that were clearly not in need of support (including part of the ward in agro-region 1 with large surpluses). In other districts, the ward selection process was less problematic, although various Concern staff noted that the process that relied on the views of district stakeholders had a tendency to over-estimate the food shortage in their ward. This idea was confirmed by fieldwork that suggested that reports in ZIMVAC of a 6 month average cereal deficit in Nyanga and a 5 month cereal deficit in Gokwe North was exaggerated, since this would imply that within the most vulnerable villages the average deficit would be more than this. Given the transfer was only designed to cover deficits for 4-6 months, it seems that the design of the transfer did not fully follow this implication, which was appropriate.

7.1.2 Village selection

In planned village selection process, a ward assembly was to prioritise the villages that require food. However, this process was not followed, because ward assembly members were not willing to say which villages were better and worse off. Aid was therefore distributed to villages on the basis of their population, rather than their vulnerability. This contributed to the process of inclusion of villages that were not vulnerable. The most notable of these were villages in agro-region I of the cash ward in Nyanga (Tombo) which had been selected for the cash pilot. Inclusion errors in village selection were to the extent that respondents in one of these villages found it surprising that they were receiving the transfer, given their wealth and agricultural surplus.

7.1.3 Recipient selection

The recipient selection exercise was conducted as if for food, since it had not been decided to provide cash at the time of targeting, so it is not possible to compare a cash targeting process with a food targeting process. The targeting exercise followed the community-based VGF method where “the community themselves meet to define household vulnerability criteria and identify and agree on the most vulnerable households as per these criteria defined.”²⁰

The evaluation did not set out to examine the validity of the targeting process, but various complaints were raised to researchers about targeting, and particularly when cash was transferred because it was shared rarely. As noted above, some of these complaints were related to the targeting in general. – both recipients and non-recipients felt that selecting some people and not others generated discord. These complaints are not examined in detail here.

Problems in targeting were exacerbated when cash was provided. It is therefore worth exploring these problems to consider whether the present targeting process is sufficiently robust to be used when communities known in advance that cash is provided. This consideration is important whether or not cash will be provided in 2010/2011. Communities that received cash or cash+food last year will expect cash to be provided again, even if they are told the targeting process is for food. This is because they were told food would be provided last year, and only found out later that cash was provided.

²⁰ ZECT Pilot project report November and December 2009.

Fieldwork revealed a number of concerns about the present targeting process, and these reflect the indications in the monitoring reports. In the November-December monitoring report, 81% of recipient and 60% of non-recipient households were satisfied with the selection criteria. Of the 11 households reporting dissatisfaction, 45% (all non-recipients) cited favouritism, 27% cited too many deserving cases left out (exclusion error), and 18% (all non-recipients) cited undeserving cases included (inclusion error).

The inclusion errors were concerning. Although fieldwork does not allow an estimation of these errors, they appear worthy of attention from programmers in reconsidering the targeting process. For example, village leaders had been included in the recipient lists for every village covered by fieldwork (and while some leaders are vulnerable, this is certainly not the case for all of them). In one village, interviews with village leadership revealed that all the leadership in this village were on the recipient list. In some cases, both recipients and non-recipients reported inclusion errors with which they were concerned – and felt that inclusion errors generated exclusion errors in a context of general food shortage.

The principal driver of the inclusion errors was a process that relied on community selection of the recipient lists but did not have much oversight from Concern staff. This meant that while some recipients were selected on the basis of agreed need, there was also scope for other recipients to be selected by garnering enough votes, and non-recipients in various villages complained that some recipients had canvassed for support before the targeting process, such that recipients with large social networks had a higher probability of being selected than others. The village leadership were often able to gain access to the list in this way, and in other cases gained access through more direct influence over the list-writer (usually the secretary of the village). In some cases, Concern staff validated these lists by visiting communities. Even where this happened, however, the targeting process still appeared not to select all of the most vulnerable households.

Cash transfers raise particular problems for targeting. Monitoring reports indicated that during final verifications of recipient lists households were informed that they would be receiving cash instead of food. “Households then realized that with cash distribution there would be less sharing of cash as compared to food, and the number of inflated households reported at help desks increased. For example after verifications in Gokwe North, the average household size dropped from 5.2 people per household to 4.8.”²¹ The communities’ reduction of the average household size was in order to ensure that more households in the community would have access to the transfers (since transfers were distributed to a fixed number of people in each village). Had communities known in advance that cash was to be distributed, they might have made this reduction from the beginning. On the other hand, targeting may have been more contested as more households would want to receive cash.

Respondents indicated clearly that next year’s targeting process would be more challenging, for two reasons. First, wealthy households would be more interested in cash than in food, and would therefore seek to influence the selection process more and use their networks more. Second, since cash is shared less, it is far more important to get the targeting process right, and inclusion and exclusion errors in the current system would be magnified. This magnification is made more problematic because transfers tend to be redistributed through the same social networks through which targeting takes place. Interviewed non-recipients who were not in these social networks (for instance because they were relatively recent arrivals to villages) were particularly concerned about this.

²¹ ZECT Pilot project report November and December 2009, p 3.

7.2 Distribution and complaints

The distribution of the transfer took place through the same Food Distribution Points as were used for the VGF distribution. Since neither SMART card technology nor mobile phone coverage were available in the wards selected, the transfers were delivered using a 'cash in envelopes' system. Cash was distributed in envelopes prepared by a local security company and distributed in the same way as food, through the same distribution points, with additional help desks set up to respond to queries.

The evaluation examines whether there were any differences in recipients' experience of the distribution process for cash and food. The monitoring reports provide some indication that there were relatively few problems with distribution, and problems were largely resolved fairly easily by staff. In January, there were two distributions in Gokwe North where beneficiaries had to go to the distribution point twice for lack of commodities. While 99.8% of recipients were able to collect their entitlements, 26 recipients in Gokwe South and 3 in Gokwe north did not come to the distribution point, and others did not bring their national ID card. In Nyanga, 27 recipients did not receive cash because they did not have their national ID card. In Gokwe, distribution teams allowed community leaders to vouch for households without an ID card.

Fieldwork also indicated that the delivery mechanism had few problems, and there were no significant differences between transfer types. Most recipients had no complaints about the food or cash distributions, and no problems of insecurity with cash or food were reported as recipients were able to travel in groups from the distribution point. The food distribution took longer than the cash distribution on average, so opportunity costs for food recipients were slightly higher. However, recipients did not mention this as being a significant problem. An interesting consequence reported in Gokwe North is that because of this longer duration, food recipients would return home with maize unmilled (since they would not have time to wait). This generated more pressure to share because sharing unmilled maize is more common than milled maize. Cash recipients, on the other hand, could be able to spend their entitlement more quickly.

The (few) problems in delivery are not specific to any transfer type. They relate to poor communication rather than anything more serious. One recipient interviewed in the food ward in Gokwe North was told that there was no food for her to collect in November, December and January, and she accepted this because she was afraid to complain to Concern staff. This need not indicate malpractice. The more concerning aspect is the implied weakness of the communications and complaints mechanism in the transfer. Although this was not raised as a major issue by many respondents, the recipients who mentioned complaints felt that it was very difficult to complain and that their complaints were not heeded. They were also worried that complaints might lead to their exclusion from the programme. Non-recipients felt similarly – that it was hard to complain to authorities in their village (who were often the subject of the complaint), and that Concern staff were inaccessible.

Monitoring reports reflect similar findings, and contain information on people's knowledge of the programme and complaints. According to the January PDM, 92% of people knew their monthly entitlements (due the public address) and 88% knew where to report complaints. 80% of people who complained did so at a help desk, 10% at the police, and 8% with Concern staff. In December, this was "44% of those expressing dissatisfaction with targeting complained to Concern staff (33%), to community leaders (8%) and to the help desk." In January in Gokwe South, 24% of respondents were unsure of where to complain. In Nyanga, 36% would rather complain to the police, but 61% used the help desk.


According to the January report, people reported administrative problems with targeting (too many needy people left out) to the help desk, and reported favouritism and political interference to Concern staff. Some households noted that the presence of the local councillor and leaders at the help desk compromise its neutrality. This indicates a weakness in the system of complaints that involves individuals bringing their complaints to a desk staffed by local authority figures, and highlights the difficulty in making programme staff accessible to complainants.

8 Comparing the benefits of different transfer types

This section sets out an overview of the benefits of different transfer types. The subjective assessment combines the categories discussed in the assessment of impacts above: where respondents in focus groups are asked to score the impact of different transfer types on a range of categories out of 10, and then score the importance of these categories. This generates scores for each transfer type, not just orderings as was given by the monitoring report. It also adds the views of non-recipients.

The first presentation is of the overall ranking, where recipients were asked to score each transfer type out of 10 overall. This is presented in Figure 8.4 which indicates that recipients preferred whichever transfer type they were receiving. Respondents in the food and cash+food wards had very negative views of cash, as was noted above. On this overall ranking, therefore, cash comes a distant third, with 37 marks, behind food with 52 and cash+food with 66. If food is taken as the benchmark, cash scores 71% and cash+food 127%. However, this overall assessment is misleading because of the marked and largely unjustified fears of cash in the food and cash+food wards. A more significant finding is that in the cash ward, recipients preferred cash and cash+food, as the left hand column indicates.

Figure 8.4 Overall ranking of transfer types by recipients




When considered across districts, Gokwe South displays by far the strongest preference for cash+food, and Gokwe North has a slight preference for food. Cash performs best (but is still narrowly third) in Nyanga, perhaps reflecting the inferior quality of the food basket in Nyanga (with more bulgur wheat) or the relative wealth of some of the recipients (especially in the cash ward).

A second summary presentation of the results combines the score from each category for recipients and non-recipients into an total score, which reflects the scores given for impact in each category and the importance given to each category. This is presented in Figure 8.5, which indicates that amongst recipients, the overall ranking is preserved (remembering that

this is a slightly different measure). This indicates the robustness of the preference for cash+food and food over cash amongst respondents in all ward types. Again, however, recipients and non-recipients in the cash ward are more enthusiastic about cash under this second scoring system. Cash ward respondents score cash above food, but below cash+food. This provides fairly robust evidence for a preference amongst respondents for cash+food. Non-recipients have a strong preference for food, over both cash and cash+food, which results from the lower sharing of cash discussed above. Amongst all respondents (recipients and non-recipients) aggregated across each ward type, food and cash+food have similar scores, and cash performs poorly. As a percentage of the food score, cash+food scores 99%, and cash scores 57%. This pattern is fairly robust across districts.


Figure 8.5 Total scores, recipients and non-recipients



The ranking of these benefits can be broken down by category. Starting with recipients, Figure 8.6 shows their views on the impact of the transfer on different issues. The figure presents scores multiplied by importance, so a longer bar reflects more impact on a more important issue. Food consumption and intra-household relations were the most important categories (with 10/10 scores), with education and health, productive assets and envy close behind. The striking feature of the table is the large impact on intra-household relations, community relations, and sharing, with cash performing very badly in all three important areas. The impact on the transfer on food consumption and dietary diversity was also significant, with a greater impact of food and cash+food than cash.

It is striking that impact on other aspects was considered to be relatively low. Contrary to expectations of cash transfers having positive impacts on education and health, and obtaining basic goods and productive assets, the impact on these categories was zero or fairly small (a maximum of 3.7/10 for obtaining basic goods). The impact of cash on the supply of goods was considered to be greater (6.2/10), but this category was not considered particularly important (7.1/10).

Figure 8.6 Recipients' weighted scores by category



Given the fear of cash only for recipients in the food and cash+food ward, it is important to test which of these findings is robust in terms of having similar rankings in the cash ward only, and this is presented in Figure 8.7. This figure shows that the findings that cash has a worse impact on food consumption, dietary diversity and intra-household relations may not be robust, as noted above, but that the other findings on the worse impact of cash on sharing and community relations do seem robust.

This would suggest that we can conclude that cash has worse impacts on community relations and sharing, and this is reflected by the findings presented above. However, the suggestion from the food and cash+food wards that cash has a much lower impact on food consumption and dietary diversity is not valid, and this reflects the findings from fieldwork.

The perceptions on the supply of goods, sharing and community relations were further corroborated by non-recipients, who gave similar scores to recipients. The views of non-recipients' from the cash wards provides a clear indication, as set out in Figure 8.8, which shows that non-recipients, like recipients, felt that cash had a positive impact on the supply of goods, and a very poor impact on community relations and sharing (which non-recipients considered important). The small column for community relations reflects a perceived small impact of the transfers on community relations, since non-recipients felt that all transfer types (but particularly cash) caused problems for community relations.

Figure 8.7 Recipients' weighted scores by category, cash ward only





Figure 8.8 Non-recipients' weighted scores by category, cash ward only



Overall, therefore, we can construct the following table setting out the rank of the impact of different transfer types of impact, with more important impacts at the top. This table is subjectively constructed, taking into account not only the perceptions of recipients and non-recipients, but also findings from fieldwork.

Table 8.21 Impact by different transfer types

Impact type	1	2	3
Food consumption	Cash+food	Cash	Food
Intra-household relations	Food	Cash+food	Cash
Community relations	Food	Cash+food	Cash
Education and health	Cash	Cash+food	Food
Sharing	Food	Cash+food	Cash
Productive assets	-	-	-
Dietary diversity	Cash+food	Food	Cash
Supply of goods	Cash	Cash+food	Food
Obtaining basic goods	Cash	Cash+food	Food
Overall	Cash+food	Food	Cash

9 Conclusions and recommendations

9.1 Assessing costs and benefits

This section sets out the key conclusions on costs and benefits. It first presents headline cost conclusions, and then calibrates these findings with different quantifications of the benefits (amount of staple provided and community perceptions of impact).

One of the commonly cited advantages of cash transfers is that they are cheaper than food transfers. The costing analysis indicated that this was not the case. The cost to deliver one unit of food transfer (i.e. one person's monthly food bundle) was cheaper than the cost to deliver one unit of cash and one unit of cash+food. This was strongly driven by the high value of the transfer to the recipient, which reflects high food prices in the districts where cash was delivered. This can be seen by comparing the value of the transfer per recipient in the pilot phase (November to December), with the expansion phase (January-March). Comparing these figures, the value of the transfer per recipient for cash only increased from USD5.47 to USD7.4 (see Table 4.4). This increase was driven by the increase in local food prices and by the increase in the amount of beans in the bundle from 1kg to 1.8kg in February. This point is important because it is this high value that makes cash more expensive than food.

However, cash transfers and cash+food transfers were cheaper to deliver than food transfers. Purely considering the operational cost, cash is much cheaper than food (comparing USD2.1 per transfer with USD4.85 per transfer), and cash+food is in between (USD 4.16 per transfer). Thus the relative cheapness of food transfers is highly dependent on the price of commodities being greater in local markets than in procurement markets. The finding that cash is cheaper in terms of operational cost is important in terms of considering the cost of a scaled up programme.

These costing conclusions can be compared with benefits in terms of meeting the programme's principal objective (ensuring households meet food entitlements). Table 9.22 presents the gross staple provided by different transfer types (accounting for milling, sharing, and actual market prices, and assuming recipients can always obtain food at market prices, which was not necessarily the case) and compares this with the operational cost and total cost of the transfer. Taking purely the operational cost, cash emerges as twice as effective as cash+food and three times as efficient as food. Using the total cost (i.e. accounting for the variation between procurement prices and local prices), cash performs less well, but is still 167% more efficient than food and 134% more efficient than cash+food.

Note that this conclusion should be taken extremely carefully. First, the comparison favours cash because it does not value the beans provided in the food basket and does not account for dietary diversity. Second, there are many assumptions in calculating the staple provided by the transfers that are not always true – notably that cash recipients can obtain food from the market at market prices – although usually true. Third, this takes no account of other impacts.

Table 9.22 Cost-benefit in terms of staple food provided

	Staple provided (kg)	Operational cost (USD/transfer)	Operational cost per kg (USD)	Total cost USD/transfer	Total cost per kg (USD)
Food	8.1	4.9	0.6	9.3	1.1
Cash	13.9	2.1	0.2	9.5	0.7
Cash and food	11.6	4.2	0.4	10.7	0.9
Average	11.2	3.7	0.4	9.8	0.9

A second cost benefit assessment compares the costs of the transfers with the benefits as estimated by the respondents in focus groups. This provides an indication of cost effectiveness – of cost per unit of perceived impact, but note that there is no real unit for this indication, since impact is assessed across several different categories by both recipients and non-recipients. Table 9.23 sets out these indications. It is calculated by dividing the sum of the scores given by recipients and non-recipients in each category of impact (weighted by the importance given to each category) by the total cost and operational cost to deliver the transfers. This shows that in terms of total costs, cash is indicated as less cost effective than food and cash+food, but this is strongly driven by perspectives in the food ward and cash+food ward, where as noted above respondents are very wary of cash. In the cash ward, cash and cash+food are equally cost effective, with food less cost effective. In terms of operational costs, cash is slightly more effective overall, and according to recipients in the cash ward, cash is twice as effective as cash+food and three times as effective as food.

Table 9.23 Cost-benefit in terms of community perception of impact (total cost)

	Cash ward		Food ward		Cash+food ward		Total	
	Operational	Total	Operational	Total	Operational	Total	Operational	Total
Food	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.011	0.02
Cash	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.38	0.04	0.20	0.008	0.04
Cash+food	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.10	0.03	0.07	0.009	0.02

Overall, therefore, the cost benefit analysis generates the following conclusions:

- Food is cheaper than cash and cash+food when taking the total cost of the transfer (operational cost + cost of buying the commodities)
- Cash is much cheaper taking only the operational cost
- Cash is 167% more efficient than food and 134% more efficient than cash+food at providing staples (considering the total cost)

- Food is twice as cost effective than cash and cash+food in terms of cost per unit of perceived impact, but this includes the views of recipients in food and cash+food wards.
- Cash is more cost effective than food according to respondents in cash wards.

9.2 Conclusions

This section sets out the evaluation conclusions in summary, referring back to the evaluation hypotheses and the TOR. The objectives of the evaluation were:

1. To assess the effectiveness of ZECT programme in meeting its stated objectives.
2. To assess the social impact the ZECT programme has had on its targeted population (household and community level).
3. To identify the potential, and conditions, for replication of the modality for other interventions in Zimbabwe.

The ZECT programme met its stated objectives, and did so in an effective manner. This is confirmed by the preference of cash recipients for cash and of cash+food recipients for cash+food, by the fact that recipients were able to obtain sufficient staple food for the duration of the transfer (indeed more than provided by food), and by the fact that the costs of providing cash and cash+food were not substantially higher than those of food (and operationally they were lower). The only slight concern is whether dietary diversity objectives were met by the provision of cash, but fieldwork findings are not robust on this point.

The social impact of cash transfers provided by the ZECT was negative at the community level. The lack of sharing of cash exacerbated tensions in the community caused by targeting and by scarce resources, and non-recipients were made worse off by the provision of cash because they received less from sharing. The negative social impact should be taken seriously because good community relations are highly prized in these communities, partly because of conservatism and risk aversion against a history of political violence, but also because good social relations are critical to livelihood systems for most households. At the recipient household level, however, the impact of ZECT was positive, with recipients reporting improved intra-household relations as a result of their ability to provide more food.

Given that ZECT reached its objectives in a cost efficient manner, the ZECT programme shows good potential for scaling up and replication. Most recipients were comfortable with the use of cash and appreciated its benefits. In scaling up and replication, however, substantial attention must be paid to making the selection process less susceptible to elite capture and better able to anticipate, manage and reduce community tensions. Given fears about market failures in food wards in particular, attention should also be paid, as it was in the pilot, to checking that those in cash wards have adequate access to markets. More attention to issues of scaling up and replication is given in Annex A.

The conclusions on the evaluation sub-questions and hypotheses are as follows (following the structure of the TOR given in Annex B:

Relevance/ design

Concern made good use of available evidence and best practice to design the programme. A very significant potential danger of cash (that it would cause inflation and food would not be available) was identified and addressed through the selection of pilot wards to have good access to surplus areas and functioning markets. Regular monitoring ensured that this

problem was checked and did not occur, and monitoring system was effective for this. Although fieldwork found some evidence of inflation above that detected by the programme monitoring, it did not find evidence that this was widespread or substantial. The variation of transfer amounts by household size (following the VGF methodology) was fair and perceived as fair by respondents (who were used to this method from VGF). The variation of transfer amount by market prices was sensible and there were significant changes to market prices by district and month that would have substantially eroded the value of the transfer had these variations not been made.

Appropriateness of the intervention

The provision of cash, cash+food and food were all appropriate to recipients' circumstances in their different wards. Recipients used most of the cash to cover their staple food needs, but were also able to respond to other needs, such as those for school fees and health costs. In general, a mixture of cash and food was considered the most appropriate modality, since this allowed recipients to cover their food needs easily and pay other costs. A non-conditional transfer was appropriate in the Zimbabwean context in terms of leading to improvements in staple consumption, and recipients reported a strong preference for spending on food rather than school or health needs. However, this non-conditional transfer (of any type) led to reallocation of time for able bodied recipients from casual labour (which they disliked) to their own fields, which may not have been optimal in terms of food production at aggregate level.

Efficiency

In terms of total cost, food was slightly cheaper than cash that was cheaper than cash+food. In terms of operational cost, cash was less than half the cost of the other modalities, because of lower transport and storage costs. It was efficient to provide cash, both in terms of the benefits of staple provision in terms of perceived impact in the cash ward.

Effectiveness

The programme met its objectives, as noted above, ensuring recipient household food security and stimulating markets for basic commodities. Cash recipients prioritised food, tending to neglect non-food needs to meet food needs. While fieldwork identified slightly more extravagant expenditure by cash recipients than was evident in the monitoring surveys, this was not of a scale that was particularly concerning and attempts to reduce it seem unlikely to be cost effective. However, the targeting methodology did not appear particularly effective at minimising inclusion and exclusion errors, and did not always select the most appropriate wards in terms of being the most food insecure. Suggestions for changes to the targeting process are contained in Annex A.

Impact

Recipients of food, cash and cash+food were largely able to meet their basic food needs in the lean season. Most able bodied households spent more time cultivating their own fields after receiving the transfer, and less time doing casual labour. However, this did not appear to improve household livelihood security because farm yield was very dependent on rainfall and soil quality, so additional input days were rarely perceived to generate substantial additional yields. Surprisingly, cash recipients did not report spending their transfers on productive assets. Overall, therefore, the long-term impact on household livelihoods was limited and the transfer seems unlikely to leave recipient households substantially better off next year than they were this year. Recipients, including women and the elderly, felt that they were accorded additional respect within and outside the household from their ability to meet household food needs.

The negative social impacts of the transfer were greater than anticipated. Non-recipients were worse off with cash being provided than food because cash is not shared, and this is concerning when there are exclusion errors from the targeting process. Cash was reported to exacerbate community tensions caused by targeting, and this erodes community support systems and shared productive activities, which is concerning given the importance of these activities to livelihoods. The 'social multiplier' of the cash transfer was therefore very limited, although economic multipliers were larger (see Staunton 2010 for details).

Cash transfers stimulated markets, particularly for basic food goods (oil, salt, sugar), and commodities (soap, vaseline, clothes, etc.), as shopkeepers in cash wards tended to respond to the provision of cash by increasing their supply, rather than prices. This response was not detected in the food wards. Increased liquidity gave cash recipients better terms of trade, as prices in maize are more expensive (by value) than prices in cash. It was not clear whether increased liquidity had wider effects, but these are likely to have been limited because due to the cash ward selection, most cash recipients spent in large business centres where liquidity was already reasonable.

9.3 Programme recommendations

The TOR ask "can, and should, this programme delivery modalities be expanded from a limited term emergency programme to a wider medium term livelihood support/development programme?"

The cash and cash+food modalities can be expanded to a wider medium term development programme, subject to careful assessments of the capacity of markets to respond. Cash and cash+food transfers could also usefully be scaled up in the emergency response context. However, if either type of scaling up is to take place, changes to the design of the programme should be made, and alternative modes of transfer could be considered in areas where scepticism about markets is high.

Issues around transitioning from emergency programme to medium term development programme are discussed further in Annex A, but it may be helpful to note here that in order to make this transition with cash and cash+food, there would need to be changes to the design of the programme. First, in order to contribute to food security on a sustained basis, the timing of the cash transfer could be brought forward to enable recipients to purchase agricultural inputs at an earlier time in the season. Second, thought could be given to providing the cash through vouchers rather than through cash itself, in order to reassure recipients about market response and to encourage spending on inputs. This would involve setting up a system of voucher redemption at guaranteed prices with maize traders and sellers. Some of the vouchers could be input vouchers, set up with agricultural traders. Third, the transfers could be combined with livelihoods projects in order to assist recipients to derive the maximum food security benefits from reallocating their time from *maricho* to their own fields. Concern is already engaged in many livelihoods projects, including conservation farming and establishing market linkages, which could be built upon.

Any replication or scaling up of the cash transfer modality needs to give thought to how to manage the negative social consequences of the provision of cash. Recipients of cash will certainly share less, which puts greater strain on the targeting process, which will also come under strain as wealthier households in the village will probably make more efforts to be selected. This additional strain will be evident from next year, when areas receiving cash in 2009/2010 will expect cash and adjust accordingly. More detail on targeting is available in Annex A. Fieldwork indicates that more detailed consultations with communities about the

sort of aid they would like to receive would contribute to acceptance and manage tensions, but this needs to be considered carefully.

Thought could also be given to the composition of the food transfer. Given that maize and oil appears increasingly available to buy in many areas, and given the usefulness of cash for local markets, if the social consequences can be managed it might make sense to limit the provision in the food basket to beans, which are much cheaper externally than locally and which contribute to dietary adequacy by providing protein. Unfortunately, since the transport costs are given as a per tonnage rate, it is not possible to separate out the individual cost of distributing beans with the data currently available. Conducting this analysis would be worthwhile. Thought could also be given on how to stimulate greater protein consumption and production locally, building on households' current production and consumption of groundnuts, which grow relatively well in many areas with low rainfall and sandy soil.

9.4 Recommendations for further research

Fieldwork revealed a number of areas that need further understanding in order to inform future programme changes. First, the indication from fieldwork that recipients tend to reallocate time from *maricho* to their own production suggests that research on the capacity of the *maricho* market to respond to additional job-seekers without reducing wage rates or worsening conditions would be useful to inform longer-term developments in aid in Zimbabwe. Second, given this time reallocation it would be interesting to assess the effect of food aid on households' own production. Food aid is often criticised for disincentivising own production, but this suggests the opposite, and a quantification of any improvement in own production as a result of receiving food aid would make an important contribution to debates about food aid. Third, the surprisingly strong feeling of communities on the negative social consequences of cash should be explored in more depth in order to fully understand how these can be managed if cash is to be scaled up.

References

- Devereux, S., (2001) 'Sen's Entitlement Approach: Critiques and Counter-critiques', *Oxford Development Studies* 29.3:245-263
- Great Minds Investment in Zimbabwe (GMI), (2009), 'Concern Worldwide in Zimbabwe Maize Market Assessment Draft report', Great Minds Investment: Harare.
- Ruiz Roman, E., (2010a), 'ZECT M&E November-December Report', Concern Zimbabwe, Harare.
- Ruiz Roman, E., (2010b), 'ZECT M&E Consolidated Report', Concern Zimbabwe, Harare.
- Sen, A., (1981), *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee, (2009), 'Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee Interim Rural Food Security Assessment, May 2009', Harare.

Annex A Programme-level analysis

This annex discusses issues at the level of the programme, and goes into more detail around targeting, both geographically and at the village level. It is hoped that these suggestions will inform debate on future relief policy in Zimbabwe.

A.1 Targeting

A.1.1 Geographical targeting

This section argues that the methodology for selecting households involves an over-estimation of food shortages for some households (who obtain food from other sources, principally *maricho*, and could obtain more without the transfers), and an underestimation of food shortages for others (the 10% of households who are labour constrained and cannot obtain food from *maricho* or many other sources).


The targeting process at district, ward, village and household level generates some problems for some of the assumptions on missing food entitlements. ZIMVAC and CFSAM identify a period of months for which a district and ward is food insecure by comparing aggregate food harvest with the population's calorific requirements. Aid is then provided to each village based on its population (because ward leaders and village heads rejected targeting villages by vulnerability), largely based on the ZIMVAC assessment (and using to some extent Household Economy Assessments conducted by Concern). On average, 37% of the population in ZECT wards receive aid (Ruiz Roman 2010b: 10).

Assume a district has a reported cereal deficit of 3 months (as Nyanga does in 2009/10, according to ZIMVAC). Wards within a district are selected by the local Drought Relief Committee in partnership with ZIMVAC based on agro-regions and food security, and conventionally this amounts to usually slightly over half the rural wards. This should imply that the average cereal deficit in selected wards is more than 3 months – assume 5. Within a ward, every village is selected, with village-level allocations based on their population, such that roughly the same proportion of households in each village receives aid. For ZECT, this was 37%. These households are provided with their 'Missing Food Entitlement' (MFE) for 5 months.

However, if targeted correctly (i.e. the most food insecure households in the village), these households will have MFEs for more than 5 months. Even if all villages in a ward are equally food insecure (which is unlikely and not supported by fieldwork findings), all households within a village are certainly not. It is reasonable therefore to assume that the most food insecure households in a village will be food insecure for 9 months, and the least not food insecure at all, leaving an average of 5 months (so around half the households in a village are food insecure for 5-9 months, assuming a normal distribution of food insecurity in the village). The ZIMVAC methodology leads to underestimation in this way.

Displayed graphically, the distribution of food insecurity in select villages might look something like Figure A.1. 50% of people have missing food entitlements for more than 5 months, and 50% for less than five months, once their harvests are accounted for. Even with perfect targeting, a transfer for 5 months to 37% of the population would still leave missing food entitlements for recipients and non-recipients, assuming the assessment of food security is correct.

Figure A.1 Distribution of missing food entitlements



If the food security assessment is correct, the remaining missing food entitlements should be on average 60% of 5 months (since 40% is covered by ZECT), which is 3 months on average, but up to 5 months for some households (and none for others). Do recipients and non-recipients meet their missing food entitlements, and if so, how? While monitoring reports and fieldwork show that recipients and non-recipients consume fewer or smaller meals when food is short, including during the transfer period neither monitoring reports nor fieldwork suggest that households lack 5 months worth of food. We argue that most of these households could or do meet most of their food entitlements, because ZIMVAC overestimates food shortage at the household level.

To what extent do other sources of food cover households' food entitlements? Consider four types of households. First, relatively wealthy households who are, according to the harvest analysis, food insecure for a short period (those at the right of Figure A.1), have large grain harvests and probably large cotton or vegetable harvests too. These households cover any food shortages with purchases from produce sales (and may also receive the transfer due to poor targeting). Second, households with reasonable harvests (lasting up to 7 months) have enough food to last until the *maricho* season, who can supplement their harvest with some purchases from other sales and then through *maricho* if necessary, or who receive the transfer. Third, ZECT target households whose harvest does not last until the transfer, but who can cover shortages with *maricho*, sales of produce or small livestock, and remittances. Fourth, ZECT target households who cannot do *maricho*, and who do not produce good harvests of maize or cotton, and who lack reserves of livestock. There will be households between types three and four.

At the household level, monitoring data and fieldwork indicate that the first three categories of households are largely able to cover missing food entitlements, possibly with some reduction in food consumption if *maricho* is unavailable during the shortage. If the demand for *maricho* could accommodate the additional supply of labour without decreasing the wage

rate, it is possible that ZECT transfers to these types of households could even be reduced without generating severe food insecurity at the household level. *Maricho* demand appears likely to respond in Nyanga, and may respond in Gokwe South and North if cotton sales are reasonable. For the ZECT target population in these categories, alternative supports to agricultural production (such as conservation farming or input distribution) could be considered, perhaps initially with a reduced transfer, provided the responsiveness of the *maricho* market was tested.

Households in the fourth category undoubtedly need relief support. These households are labour constrained (possibly containing many older persons) and do not produce enough grain or other produce to cover food needs throughout the year. Their missing food entitlement is up to 9 or 10 months. The withdrawal of ZECT/VGF support from these households could be catastrophic (although of course it is likely that many villages in wards that are not targeted contain households of this type who do not receive ZECT/VGF, and who survive). One challenge for future programming is to focus and strengthen targeting to ensure that these households are included.

A.1.2 Village-level targeting

The analysis above suggests that labour constrained households will continue to need support. However, the tensions generated by targeting suggest that changing the targeting methodology may be important, particularly if cash is to be provided.

Fieldwork indicated that inclusion and exclusion errors are reasonably common in current targeting. As an indication of this, the headman of every village visited was a recipient, and while some may have been food insecure, not all were. Inclusion errors are not unexpected in the present community based targeting system which relies on community members to nominate and confirm vulnerable households, using a series of categories suggested by Concern. The major weakness in this system is that in a communal setting, it is very hard for marginalised households to speak freely, and relatively easy for powerful households to secure nominations and validations from those in their social network. This does not indicate that no vulnerable households are selected: to the contrary, many are. It does suggest, however, that some non-vulnerable households will be included, and some vulnerable households will be excluded because they are vulnerable not only economically but also socially and politically. This is even more likely to be the case where villages are strongly divided along political lines, as was the case in one fieldwork village. In other cases, the village leadership may be able directly to influence the eventual listing to include their names. In the half day allocated to targeting for Concern staff, it is virtually impossible to prevent these inclusion and exclusion errors from happening, since Concern staff are unlikely to know the village and may not be able to detect this. Respondents were generally agreed that providing cash would exacerbate this.

Moreover, the current targeting system appears to create a substantial amount of resentment in villages, with the negative effects of this resentment expressing themselves through witchcraft (of which many people are afraid) and less cooperation. Note that this occurs whether food or cash is provided. When asked what system of selection would be better, every respondent replied that it would be better to give everyone in the village the same amount (of food or cash). When clarified that this would mean everyone receiving 40% less than they currently do, all respondents (recipients included) maintained that this would still be better. This very strong preference for equality probably reflects the political and economic history of the last decade and previously, but gives a clear indication of communities' perception of how they would like aid to be distributed. Recommendations on improving this targeting will be presented after a discussion of the programme overall.

A.2 Relief or development?

Various indications from fieldwork suggest that it is worth considering moving from emergency relief response towards longer-term livelihoods and development programming. Note that these indications are based on a small sample size and only three districts.

The first indication comes from the response of most households who were not labour constrained to move from *maricho* to own production when given transfers, while non-recipients continued to do *maricho* with no obvious changes to the wage rates or competitiveness. This suggests that in the absence of the transfer, households would respond by doing more casual labour, rather than by not having enough food. Second, the clear message of all respondents (including recipients) to provide them with lower transfers but to provide them to everyone suggests that transfers at current levels are not critical, in the views of these households, to their survival. Third, fieldwork indicated that there are non-recipients who were not selected for the transfer who are food insecure, and even in a context of almost no sharing from the transfer (in cash transfer wards), these non-recipients were able to cope during the year. Fourth, the cash recipients were able to obtain food, suggesting that there was not a cereal deficit in these areas.

Taken together, these indications provide reasons to reconsider the rationale for providing assistance to these households through emergency food aid. Note that this is not to suggest that households in these communities are not vulnerable: they are in many ways. However, it does suggest that food aid may not be critical to their survival, and that therefore resources used for food aid could be deployed more effectively to support sustainable livelihoods, especially if these resources are currently causing tensions in communities.

The suggestion to move from food aid to alternatives is not new. Arguments that food aid runs the risk of harming markets and does not contribute to sustainable livelihoods have been made before. A Joint Donor (EC/ECHO, USAID and DFID) review of food aid in 2007 recommended that “Given the low acute malnutrition levels, general food distribution (GFD/VGF) should be scaled down or phased out at the earliest opportunity; reserving it only for legitimate humanitarian purposes (e.g., mitigation of severe nation-wide disasters) but strictly targeted to the needy food economy zones, being confined to the hunger period and, where possible, maximizing on local/regional purchases to avoid harmful effects on production and efficiency of local/regional markets,” (Sumbureru et al 2007: ix). It argued furthermore that the “persistence of food aid in the Zimbabwean context runs into two main risks: firstly, creating an irreversible dependency syndrome among the working poor; and secondly, masking the urgency of policy reforms in agriculture. It will therefore be *“better to teach and help people to fish rather than to give them fish,”* (Sumbureru et al 2007: x). The review argued that given that there are a large number of promising alternatives to food aid (such as input distribution, livestock vouchers and fairs, and conservation farming) that deliver the same benefits at a lower cost, “donors should therefore urgently strengthen and up-scale these [alternatives to food aid],” (Sumbureru et al 2007: x). Moreover, these recommendations have already been adopted by several donors, including DFID and the EU.

A.3 Implications for future programming

This final section sets out very brief indications for future programming. Fieldwork conducted for this evaluation endorses the findings of the report cited above and would recommend an increasing shift towards livelihoods-based programming in these areas. This shift should probably be accomplished through a gradual scaling down of emergency support, ensuring

that households who will remain vulnerable (the labour constrained) continue to receive support, and ensuring that communities have opportunities to make use of livelihoods opportunities. This should also be gradual to ensure that other livelihoods, such as *maricho*, should have the capacity to respond to higher demand. Note that this suggestion covers cash transfers as well as food – the rationale for providing cash transfers is currently the same as that for food aid.

This section will not elaborate on which livelihoods programmes are most appropriate, as this is well beyond the scope of fieldwork. Concern's current livelihoods programmes on conservation farming, inputs, and market linkages seem a good basis. This section will briefly consider the role of transfers in supporting livelihoods improvements, and what changes to targeting might be required.

Cash and cash+food transfers could certainly support livelihoods, and this has proven effective in many other contexts. However, the current timing of the transfer does not allow recipients to spend on agricultural inputs since they arrive after the planting season and are largely spent on food. One response to this might be to deliver the cash transfer earlier in the year, and in a larger amount, so that recipients can spend on inputs. A second way of achieving this would be to provide part of the cash in a voucher form to be redeemed for agricultural inputs. This would address a worry that recipients' response to receiving transfers would be to stop doing casual labour and spend the cash all on food, which would not necessarily lead to sustainable livelihoods.

What do the suggestions in the sections above imply for future targeting? If the communities' apparent wish for providing everyone with a smaller amount of aid is not considered feasible, there are various other options:

- Targeting only the labour constrained, and taking pains to inform communities of the rationale for this. This could be undertaken as part of a phased reduction of support, rather than in a single year, in order slowly to test the responsiveness of the *maricho* market to additional job-seekers. Thus while a focus on the labour constrained is retained, the size of the transfers to other members of the community is gradually reduced.
- Invest more time in the targeting process, in order to ensure that exclusion errors (in particular are minimised). This would probably involve a much longer and more intensive process that takes place in the village itself rather than at the district centre (as is followed, for instance for the Hunger Safety Nets Programme in northern Kenya, where NGO staff spend up to a month targeting a cash transfer programme in a highly food insecure context – in large villages of up to 200 households). This would allow more verification by Concern staff and lower exclusion errors. This would be more costly, and add to the USD2.1 operational cost in the cash transfers, but would be important if the plan to transition to cash or cash+food remains in place.

Annex B District maps

Figure B.1 Nyanga




Figure B.2 Gokwe North





Figure B.3 Gokwe South



Annex C The entitlement and livelihoods approach

This annex sets out the theoretical framework used in the study to analyse access to food at a household level. This framework draws two approaches – Amartya Sen’s entitlements approach and a livelihoods approach.

Food entitlements here refer to the calorific and nutritional intake of each member of a household that will enable them to live healthily.²² An adequate food entitlement will both provide sufficient calories and diverse diet with an appropriate range of vitamins and minerals. Food entitlement should be measured at the level of the individual, not the household. Whether each individual in the household meets their food entitlement depends on the aggregate food availability at the household level, the distribution of food within a household, and whether individuals receive additional food directly.²³ Enabling households to meet their food entitlements means that all individuals within the household can meet their food entitlement in the short-term but also in the long-term (i.e. households do not sacrifice future consumption to achieve adequate current consumption levels). Food entitlements should be smooth through time. Aside from violating human rights, inadequate or non-smooth individual food entitlements will lead to a range of nutritional problems (acute or chronic malnutrition, vitamin deficiency diseases, etc.) with significant negative consequences on current and future well-being, health and productivity. These shortages are particularly dangerous for young children. It is important to note that while adequate food entitlements are necessary to avoid nutritional problems, they are not sufficient. Good health, sanitation, hygiene and care are all necessary too.

A household obtains food by converting its endowments into food, as set out by Amartya Sen in 1981. Households have four legal sources of food, that Sen also calls entitlements: production-based (growing food), trade-based (buying food), own-labour (working for food) and inheritance and transfer (being given food by others).²⁴ Sen’s analysis with this framework showed that famines were often caused not by absolute food shortage but by people’s inability to acquire food that was available (through lack of purchasing power, productive ability, etc.).

A household’s ability to obtain food from these sources can be analysed in a dynamic livelihoods framework centred around different types of livelihood assets. Households use their assets within a vulnerability context (including shocks, trends and seasonality) and within the wider context of structures and processes (including laws, policies, culture, institutions, government processes, and the private sector), to develop livelihood strategies to improve incomes, well-being, and food security and reduce vulnerability. The framework is dynamic because ownership and access to assets are influenced by the contexts and by the success of livelihood strategies. Livelihood assets include:

- **Social capital.** This influences the help households can obtain, both in terms of direct transfers from friends and relatives (inheritance and transfer entitlement), and support with additional labour (contributing to production entitlement).

²² This terminology comes from the ‘missing food entitlement’ used in programme documents and refers to overall food entitlement, and is a slightly different idea to entitlement as meant by Sen. See below.

²³ Of course, individuals within the household may choose not to consume food, but they have a sufficient entitlement.

²⁴ Critiques of Sen’s entitlement approach are set out in Devereux 2001.

- Natural capital, such as land or livestock, that contributes to the production of food (production-based entitlement).
- Physical capital, contributing to production-based, and by generating incomes, trade-based entitlements.
- Human capital, contributing to production-based and own-labour based entitlements, and by earning incomes (through labour) to trade-based entitlements.
- Financial capital, contributing to trade-based entitlement.

In the pilot areas, the principal livelihoods strategies are casual labour, own food crop production, vegetable production, livestock ownership, petty trade, and begging. According to the May 2009 ZIMVAC rural food security report, own cereal production in 2008/2009 will cover on average 5 months of 2009/2010 consumption in Gokwe North and South (where 2008-2009 rainfall was good), and 3 months of consumption in Nyanga (where production was affected by a prolonged dry spell in February 2009). Based on subsequent analysis in the Market Assessment, this estimate from ZIMVAC appears over-cautious, particularly for Gokwe South where foodstuffs were more available than expected.

Own-production clearly leaves large food deficits, and households rely on other livelihood strategies to obtain adequate food. According to the ZECT January monitoring report, casual labour is by far the most commonly reported strategy, with nearly 70% of non-recipients and 80% of food recipients engaging in casual labour. Other sources of income will contribute on average 4 months of 2009/2010 consumption in Gokwe South, 2 months on Gokwe North, and 3 months in Nyanga (see Table C.1). However, obtaining food using other sources of income (i.e. trade-based entitlements) depends on market access and functioning.

Table C.1 Average household cereal production and deficit, pilot districts

District	Average Contribution of 2008/09 Own Cereal Production to Household consumption (in months)	Average Contribution of other income sources to Household consumption (in months)	Average household cereal access deficit in 2009/2010 (months)
Gokwe South	5	4	3
Gokwe North	5	2	5
Nyanga	3	3	6

Source: ZimVac Interim Rural Food Security Assessment May 2009.

The maize market structure in these districts is therefore critical. The market assessment of the three districts made in preparation for ZECT indicates that the maize value chain is:

- Constricted with very few traders due to insignificant profit margins.
- Localised with negligible external trade
- Isolated with most maize flow at the village level
- Largely supplied by farmers.

According to the market assessment, in Gokwe North, farmers sourced from neighbouring wards, especially Chireya 3. In Gokwe South, most households could access maize within the ward, despite the ZIMVAC assessment had suggested supplies may be exhausted. In Nyanga, an estimate two thirds of farmers had exhausted their cereal supply. Dollarization affects the value chain because foreign currency is scarce, leading to bartering and rounded off prices. Grain Marketing Board (GMB) prices are depressed, and some farmers are retaining maize in anticipation of price rises. Humanitarian crises and the subsequent widespread distribution of food have contributed to the destruction of links between shops and milling companies, so trade in maize meal is very low.

Farmer to farmer sales account for 55-60% of maize transactions, usually through barter trade, and 15-30% of maize produced is marketed. Hammer millers (local grinding mills) buy between 20 to 30% of maize traded, and often accept a maize payment for milling services due to lack of liquidity, but are starting to reject this given high cash electricity bills. Shop owners accept payments in kind. The GMB had received 1/5 of a normal harvest delivery, but farmers have stopped delivering because most maize is not paid for. Internal buyers (schools, hospitals) buy maize directly from farmers, especially in Nyanga, in small quantities. External buyers buy on an ad hoc basis.

The maize market in 2008/09 was characterised by maize shortages as a result of a poor 2008 harvest, which meant households exchanged livestock for maize with mobile traders at highly adverse prices as local shops were unable to meet demand, especially with hyperinflation. The grain market assessment indicated that the 2009 harvest was better and the economy is more stable, so absolute shortage problems are expected to be less. Fieldwork provided no indication that this was incorrect.


Potential hazards to food access identified in the report include increases to costs of other essential goods and services, post-harvest crop loss through pests, heavy policing of illegal activities used to generate income (such as gold panning, hunting, and some sorts of petty trade), and for households dependent on livestock for food access, adverse changes to the livestock:grain terms of trade (through poor livestock marketing, threats to grazing conditions and livestock disease access. The predicted deficit in each district and potential further hazards underlie the need for transfers to support food consumption.

The food chain is set out in Figure C.4. The outcome we are principally interested in is food consumption, supported by the four food sources. Food for work programmes do not exist in these districts but casual labourers are often paid in food as well as cash, and other goods (soap, clothes, school supplies, etc.) Inheritance and transfer sources include ZECT and help from neighbours and are influenced by social relations. Household own-production is affected by a range of livelihood factors (set out in brief above), and contributes directly to food consumption and indirectly through sales that produce income that can be used to buy food, and to support livelihoods. Trade-based sources come from the market, which is also affected by a range of factors, particularly price and income (which in turn comes from livelihoods and labour).

Of course, even where households have sufficient endowments to obtain 'adequate' food (on a full calorific measure), they may not actually obtain adequate food, because households have other spending needs. Household decision-makers may choose to obtain less food than their household food needs, and instead prioritise expenditure on other goods, such as education. An individual's actual access to food therefore depends on the full range of inputs from the food chain, on their household's other spending needs and priorities, and on the intra-household allocation of food.

With this framework, we can consider the relative impacts of cash and food transfers on household food consumption. These transfers can affect any part of the framework below, and this affect will translate through to affects on household and individual food consumption. The comparison will be between wards with food transfers, wards with cash transfers, and wards with cash+food transfers. The research will not consider wards where no support is given, but it will consider both recipients and non-recipients (since transfers will affect both groups).

Figure C.4 Food chain, ZECT districts



Economic theory provides some suggestions for the likely relative impacts of food and cash transfers on such a system. The traditional policy response to household food shortages has been to provide food transfers ('inheritance and transfer'), which means buying food from some groups and giving it to others. The alternative we are considering here is to provide cash transfers (allowing households to buy food, or anything else they choose). Both these transfers are interventions in the food or money markets that have *income effects* (increased purchasing power as a result of receiving a transfer) and *substitution effects* (changes in the relative price of goods). The implications of these transfers for households' actual food entitlements flow from these consequences through various channels that affect households' four sources of food. The choice of whether to provide cash or food (or a mix) should depend on the immediate effects on prices and distribution, their consequences (for food entitlements if this is the primary objective), and the relative cost of making the transfers.

Annex D Theoretical considerations of the hypotheses

This annex sets out the theoretical underpinnings of the hypotheses set out in the report. It first outlines the theory behind the hypothesised effects on the four sources of food (inheritance and transfer; own labour; own production; and trade-based). It then briefly discusses the theory behind net effects on consumption and dietary diversity.

D.1 Inheritance and transfer

Providing a food transfer will certainly improve the inheritance and transfer entitlement of recipients by the amount transferred provided households do not resell the food (and convert it into income) or give it away. Even if the full amount is consumed, this need not translate into an improvement of the same amount in total food consumed, since households may choose to obtain less food from other sources as a result of the transfer. In our framework, providing a cash transfer has no direct impact on this entitlement (it affects income, and therefore trade-based entitlements).²⁵

However, there are possible indirect effects of two sorts. First, receiving a cash or food transfer may cause jealousy and reduce private transfers to recipients from others. Second, receiving a transfer may increase sharing by recipients and so benefit others in the community. In many areas, sharing food is more common than sharing cash. The PDM data suggests that 'borrowing food or relying on help from friends or relatives' has reduced slightly amongst cash, food and cash+food recipients, and increased slightly among non-recipients. This does not confirm either hypothesis (it is not clear whether a reduction is because of jealousy or reduced need or whether an increase is because of increased need or increased supply) but is an interesting indication. The data suggest receiving cash reduces borrowing more than receiving food.

D.2 Own-labour

Food and cash transfers are not normally expected to have a direct impact on food obtained through own-labour (food for work programmes or payment in kind from private employers). It is possible that receipt of food or cash transfers will affect eligibility for food for work programmes or private employment, but whether the support is given in cash or food is irrelevant. It is also possible that receipt of food or cash will affect willingness to work, as individuals reallocate their time towards capital development, other types of work, or leisure. In both cases in these districts given the level of food insecurity it seems unlikely that the effect in either case will be large. Indirectly, receipt of food and cash could improve nutritional status and health, enabling household members to work more. Cash, with its additional flexibility, may be more effective in this regard.

D.3 Own-production

Households grow food and consume some of it. The amount they consume represents their own-production entitlement. The rest contributes to trade-based entitlements through income (see below). Here we consider the impacts of food and cash on the amount produced and on non-price related reasons to sell food (e.g. lack of storage). We consider price-related reasons under trade-based reasons below.

²⁵ This is slightly different from Sen's approach.

Food production depends on a combination of inputs (labour, seeds, water, land, tools and extras, such as livestock or fertiliser) occurring at the right time. Inadequate amounts of any input (or too much in the case of water), or its unavailability at a crucial junction, can reduce yields significantly. Cash transfers can improve the availability and timing of any of these inputs as households can buy or rent labour, seeds, irrigation or land and would therefore be expected to have a positive impact on own-production if input markets are functional. Both sorts of transfers can also contribute to a healthy workforce, by feeding them and by paying for medical bills to keep them healthy at critical times (particularly cash). Food transfers have an income effect that may allow households to spend more cash on own-production, but this is likely to be smaller because we assume that households consume more of the food they are given than the equivalent amount of cash (see consumption section below). On the other hand, both types of transfers (particularly food) may have a disincentive effect on own-production as households know they can obtain their food needs more easily than through intensive and arduous own production and could invest their time more profitably elsewhere. This hypothesis is not well supported by empirical evidence. Finally, however, rainfall has such a significant impact on yield in the rainfed agriculture systems used in these districts, and input markets are so poor, that impacts on yields of either transfer are not likely to be easily detectable. Moreover, since cash transfers started in November, after the planting season, the impact on this season's harvest is likely to be minimal.

In terms of the proportion sold, the effects are ambiguous, but food may have a stronger net positive effect than cash. Cash and food transfers could permit households to invest in storage facilities that would permit households to conserve more grain. On the other hand, cash transfers could allow households to cover milling costs, so households might be expected to consume more. Moreover, the availability of food from the transfer might allow households to sell more of their own produce (or some food aid) when prices are high, knowing that they have a guaranteed food income. This seems more likely with food than cash transfers (since cash transfers rely on the same market).

D.4 Trade-based

The relative impact of transfers on trade-based food entitlements is mediated by the terms of trade for food, the accessibility and food stock of food suppliers and markets, households' incomes, and the proportion of those incomes spent on food. As with own production, aspects of the trade-based entitlement need to be seen in seasonal terms, with prices and supply typically tighter in January, February and March.

D.4.1 Price of food

The (food) price effects of food and cash transfers are often ambiguous and depend on the elasticity of food demand and supply and the competitiveness of the food market. With inelastic food demand, adding food would tend to decrease the price of food (with positive consequences for net food buyers and negative consequences for net food sellers). With inelastic food supply or monopolistic markets, adding cash would tend to increase the price of food (with negative consequences for net food buyers and positive consequences for net food sellers). If both are elastic, transfers of either sort should have negligible price effects. In the ZECT districts, the high cereal deficit implies that we can assume that food demand is elastic – i.e. that households are not saturated with food and will attempt to obtain more from the market if they have adequate incomes. The market assessment indicates that food supply is also elastic in many places, with traders reporting that they would sell more maize if prices were more favourable (i.e. higher). It also seems to be relatively competitive, in the sense that there are many food suppliers who do not collude. Moreover, cash distribution wards have been deliberately selected to be those that are near functioning markets, and

wards receiving food transfers should have less market access. If this selection is correct, the price effects of transfers are likely to be negligible. Initial PDM data (collected from traders themselves) suggest this is correct except for a slight increase in maize prices in Gokwe South (though some households dispute this and argue that prices have increased).

Generalised prices rises would affect both recipients and non-recipients. For recipients, this would reduce the value of the transfer. For non-recipients (who may also be food insecure), this would be a negative shock, which might increase their food insecurity. In some cash transfer programmes traders charge recipients more than non-recipients, knowing that they are receiving cash transfers and have disposable income. However, Concern staff have spoken with traders to obtain assurances that this will not happen.

Cash transfers may have an impact on actual food prices by improving liquidity. The concept note suggests that rural Zimbabweans barter crops for non-food items at half or a quarter of their cash value (for instance with the mobile traders), and hypothesises that the cash transfer will improve these terms of trade. The small denominations should improve the efficiency of exchange. This would not be the case with food.

D.4.2 Markets

One of the principal potential benefits of cash transfers is that they stimulate markets. This report does not examine the multiplier effects of cash on the wider economy (Staunton 2010 assesses the multiplier effect of the ZECT). However, it does examine effects specifically relevant for food entitlements: the possibility of cash transfers stimulating market supply of food (of various types). The impact on local markets at the early stage of the transfer seemed to be positive for both traders. Traders reported much faster turnover and more frequent restocking as a result of the transfer. Monitoring reports suggest that markets are responding to increased demand. This suggests a number of avenues for investigation: whether this market supply response was sustained through the lean season without price increases, and whether these market responses seem likely to be sustained beyond the programme period. The second potential impact we will examine is on willingness to sell food through improved liquidity. For example, hammer millers have been rejecting barter sales because they need cash to pay for electricity bills. Cash transfers may improve their willingness to sell. Recipients also spent on other items such as household goods and milling that would have contributed to local markets (November-December pilot update, table 3).

To the extent that food transfers ease households' income constraint (and we suggest this will not be to the same extent as cash), they should have the same effect, provided households have no liquidity constraints. However, it appears that households do have liquidity constraints. The difficulty with testing these hypotheses is that food transfer wards and cash transfer wards use the same markets, so the assessment will have to be made by obtaining the perceptions of market providers.

D.4.3 Cash income

Both cash and food transfers have an income effect by making households richer. Cash directly increases cash income, and food transfers increase cash income if households sell the food they are given. Both sorts of transfers can also indirectly contribute to higher incomes when part of the cash transfer is invested in improving livelihoods (in productive assets, for instance, or in hiring in labour that contributes to household income), or when the food transfer allows households to spend less on food and more on investment.

Moreover, both food and cash transfers also allow households to safeguard future incomes by avoiding the need to engage in livelihood strategies that produce immediate incomes (necessary for consumption) but that jeopardise future well-being, consumption or production. These strategies include casual labour (seen as less productive in the long-term than working on own farms), harvesting immature crops, and borrowing at adverse rates. Recipients of cash transfers may engage less in these activities than recipients of food transfers because food transfer recipients still need to sustain other purchases (such as education). The monitoring reports available (November-December and January) present some indications on impacts of the transfers. The proportion of recipients engaging in casual labour (*maricho*) declined between November (43%) and December (22%), where the proportion of non-recipients increased from 37% to 63%. Communities reported engaging in *maricho* only when they needed to, and not engaging in *maricho* allows them to work on their fields and households. Borrowing patterns remained constant overall (29%) but those receiving cash borrowed much less (19%) than those receiving cash and food (35%) or food only (31%), for a variety of reasons (food, health spending, maize milling – with positive spillovers for millers). Cash recipients are using all coping mechanisms less than at baseline, but it is not immediately clear what this means because a) non-recipients are also using most coping mechanisms less (with the exception of limiting meal size and borrowing from friends which have increased among non-recipients), b) cash and food recipients are using some coping mechanisms more (limit portion size, relying on less expensive food, reducing adult consumption), and c) food recipients are using some coping strategies more (limiting meal size, relying on casual labour).

D.4.4 Proportion of income spent on food

Of course, not all income is spent on food. Does receiving cash or food transfers affect the proportion of income spent on food? Broadly speaking, one might expect households receiving food transfers to spend a smaller proportion of their other income on food (because a proportion of their food needs are met by the transfer). Cash transfers might also lead to a lower proportion of income spent on food.

D.5 Hypothesised impact on food consumption

The overall food entitlement objective can be considered from the point of overall food consumption, and a measure of dietary diversity.

The hypotheses and pathways set out above are relevant to us because they contribute to food consumption. The overall hypothesis is that receiving food or cash transfers will increase household food consumption overall. In addition to the pathways above, household and individual food consumption is mediated by decisions first on the allocation of household resources (how much to spend on food) and second on the allocation of food within the household. First, the effect on household food consumption of transfers is captured by households' marginal propensity to consume food (MPC_f) that describes the proportion of their additional income they spend on food. MPC_fs vary with context and with whether the transfer is food or cash, with much evidence suggesting that MPC_fs are higher for food transfers (see Ahmed et al 2009: 11 for a summary), so that (remembering that households do not convert their full endowments into food) if the objective is to improve household food consumption, food transfers may be more effective. If, however, the objective is to alleviate poverty or vulnerability (by supporting other livelihoods, as set out above), cash transfers may be more effective. Economic theory suggests that the overall effect on household consumption patterns (relative to a cash transfer) depends on the amount of the transfer. If the transfer is less than what would normally be consumed without the transfer (inframarginal), or households can freely sell the ration they receive, then there is no

substitution effect at the margin (and the transfer has the same effects as a cash transfer on consumption behaviour). If the transfer is greater than what would normally be consumed without the transfer (extramarginal) and households cannot sell the food transferred, there is a substitution effect, and households will consume more complementary goods and fewer substitutes (Ahmed et al 2009). Policymakers have sometimes tried to change household consumption behaviour to increase food consumption (arguing that households do not value food consumption fully because they do not fully understand the long-term negative consequences of malnutrition) by providing food transfers.

Second, who in the household receives the transfers influences the eventual distribution within the household (with females appearing to distribute food more fairly and to focus on children). In some societies, women control food and men control cash, meaning that the effect on children's nutrition is likely to be improved most through distributing food to women. However, where cash transfers are emphasised as being for food, and where women are relatively powerful in the household, cash transfers distributed to women may have the same impact as food on children's nutrition, or perhaps a better impact since food transfers are not specifically designed for children.

Food consumption typically varies seasonally, with consumption lower in January, February and March. Recipients of the transfers should have smoother consumption patterns, but recipients of food transfers may have better smoothing as cash recipients may prioritise other spending when food prices are high.

Overall food consumption cannot in this study be measured by a consumption module, but could be proxied by whether households or individuals reduce the number of meals per day or limit meal sizes.

D.6 Hypothesised impact on dietary diversity

Dietary diversity has important consequences for nutrition. Overall, food transfers seem less likely to contribute to dietary diversity than cash transfers that improve income (that can be spent on anything). PDM monitoring supports this. Dietary diversity seems to have increased amongst groups receiving cash (but possibly related to the festive season in December).

Annex E Casual labour in the three districts

This annex sets out in more detail than above findings on the effects of transfers on casual labour.

E.1 Casual labour in Nyanga

In Nyanga, *maricho* is demanded throughout the year by commercial farms in agro-region 1 who grow crops outside the rainy season. The WFP's 2003 district profiles indicate that formal employment in Nyanga town and permanent employment in estates and commercial farms are available throughout the year. These farms have high *maricho* demands and many respondents reported doing *maricho* on commercial farms for weeks at a time, requiring them to travel and to be away from their families, who might need childcare from neighbours or relatives. Some of these farms would provide food to the worker for the duration of their stay. Occasionally people may travel to Mozambique for *maricho*. There is also *maricho* available in many villages, as wealthier individuals (those with large farms or salaried jobs) employ others to work on their farms (in the rainy season) or do odd jobs (such as collecting firewood, fetching water, or unskilled construction work). Payment for *maricho* is either in maize, other produce (from the commercial farms), in goods (soap, sugar, or whatever is negotiated), or cash.

E.1.1 Food ward

Respondents in the food ward in Nyanga noted that casual labour was not always easy to find. The headman reported that non-recipients do *maricho* on nearby irrigation farms, earning 20kg of maize in 2 days throughout the year, but limited jobs were available. From October to March, the availability of *maricho* improves as there are more weeding jobs available, including in the village, for either payment in groceries, food or cash. The headman reported that recipients do not do *maricho* except to obtain a few grocery items. Recipients in focus groups and interviews were less positive on the availability of *maricho*, suggesting that insufficient *maricho* was available in the village, and it could take up to a week to find enough. However, work was available on a local irrigation site (in Nyamaropa) that takes half a day to travel to and pays in food, or further away (Tombo) that costs USD4 to travel there and back and pays USD2 per day. The conditions of work had not been affected by the programme, since supply remains limited, but "if they are given food there won't be any need for them to do *maricho*."²⁶ A second male recipient agreed that *maricho* opportunities are not always available, but suggested that while he does less *maricho* now, he needs to continue to look for work in order to obtain cash to pay for school fees or other grocery items. Focus group recipients noted that while wage rates had not changed, they did not engage in casual labour during the programme, preferring to spend time with their families and working at home on the farms or gardens, and looking after their livestock. They worried that with cash, they might have to do more casual labour because of time spent looking for food.

Non-recipient interviewees agreed that *maricho* within the village is limited but there is *maricho* available outside at Nyamaropa, and suggested that recipients do less *maricho* than non-recipients. One non-recipient noted that local opportunities this year are poor since the harvest is poor, but there remain opportunities in the irrigated farms at USD2/day. Those in

²⁶ Male recipient interview, food ward, Nyanga.

focus groups had a similar view, and suggested that recipients did less casual labour, but did not employ non-recipients within the village.

E.1.2 Cash+food ward

The headman in the cash+food ward in Nyanga also reported that recipients do less *maricho* than non-recipients, and again this was easily available at irrigation sites but not easily available locally. Recipients in the focus group suggested that they would do less casual labour during the programme, but continue to do some casual labour in order to supplement their basic commodities, such as salt and soap, and to pay for school fees (although even this was difficult to obtain). They believed that they would do more casual labour if food or cash only had been provided, since they would need to obtain basic goods with food, and need to obtain food if they were receiving cash (although this seems counter-intuitive). Recipient interviewees noted that casual labour was available at irrigation sites in Nyamaropa, accessible for a bus fare of USD4, where they can earn a bucket of maize in 2-3 days, gold panning and stone cracking (for which they earn USD1.5 per day), and in Mozambique (for younger workers).

Non-recipients in this ward reported travelling to Nyamaropa where opportunities were usually available because of the different crop types and intensive work throughout the year, but needing to pay the bus fare of USD3.5-4 return or walking. Workers are paid in kind (a bucket after 2 days but sometimes more depending on negotiation). It is much more difficult to find *maricho* locally because of the poor harvest last year (2008/09 harvest), although there are some opportunities to earn cash or in kind payments (such as a hen) through small tasks such as thatching, and there are more opportunities during the planting and harvest seasons (at a bucket every two days). In focus groups, non-recipients noted that recipients were able to stay at home when they would usually do casual labour, and look after their families, although they would on some occasions look for work when their food had run out. They suggested that if everyone had been given cash, casual labour opportunities might have improved as recipients might have employed others. Against this, however, there was no evidence of recipients employing others as a result of receiving the transfer.

E.1.3 Cash ward

The cash ward in Nyanga (Tombo) was divided into areas of food surplus in agricultural region one, and food deficit areas. Wealthy respondents in the surplus area expressed a preference for employing migrants, since they accept lower wages than locals (of whom 5-10% seek casual labour). They also noted that at some points of the year it can be difficult to find enough casual labourers. In the deficit village, the headman noted that casual labour was available both inside and outside the village, though wage rates were higher outside. The headman thought that recipients did less *maricho* than non-recipients.

One recipient interviewee reported doing *maricho* from July until the transfer started, but not at all during the transfer, when they would work on their fields instead (about 10 days extra). Another claimed she was too old for casual labour, and obtained all her needs from the transfer, and had obtained her needs from remittances from her son the year before. Recipients in the focus group confirmed that they did not do *maricho* during the transfer period, and did not employ others. They felt that they would do more *maricho* if they received food, because they would need the cash to obtain other commodities.

Non-recipient interviewees in the deficit area were able to find casual labour within the village during the transfer period, but not easily, and wage rates are around 5 litres/day or USS2.5 per day. They did not report any changes to the labour market as a result of the programme

(which is instructive since the programme is new in this area). They also noted that recipients would still seek casual labour towards the end of the month as their food ran out. In the focus group, non-recipients noted that there were no changes to wage rates during the programme, and that though recipients would go much less for *maricho*, the competition for jobs remained.

E.2 Casual labour in Gokwe North

In Gokwe North and South, the pattern appears rather different from Nyanga. WFP district profiles from 2003 note that the very poor in Gokwe North earn around 45% of their income from piece work, hired by wealthy households, and from gold panning, which is illegal. , but both fieldwork and monitoring reports found strong evidence of extensive use of casual labour in Gokwe North and South. In these districts, *maricho* tends to be more seasonal (on cotton or maize farms between November and May), aside from occasional odd jobs outside the rainy season and the short period clearing cotton in August/September. Again, payment can be in maize, goods, or cash, depending on negotiations. While some travel for *maricho*, this is less common than in Nyanga, and distances travelled are often shorter.

E.2.1 Food ward

In the food ward in Gokwe North (Chireya 8), the headman felt that recipients did less *maricho* than non-recipients. *Maricho* in this village was typically paid in maize, but was rarely available in the village outside the agricultural seasons, as workers would travel to Nembudziya or Copper Queen, where wage rates are around 5 litres per day. During planting, and harvest seasons, work was available locally, again typically paid in food at one bucket for 1-2 days work, with some opportunities for specific tasks (such as grass cutting for roofs).

Recipients in the focus group confirmed that they did not go for *maricho* this year, but expressed concern that with cash or cash+food they might have to go for more *maricho* because they feared (probably unreasonably) that they not be able to obtain food with the cash, and that wage rates might decrease for them because they were recipients. One recipient interviewee confirmed that they did no *maricho* when they were receiving the transfer this year, but earned everything from *maricho* last year and before the transfer, earning a bucket in two days. The second interviewee reported being too old for casual labour, and received remittances from her daughter. A third female recipient reported doing some casual labour to pay for school fees.

Non-recipients in the focus group reported doing casual labour in Nembudziya, but noted no changes to wage rates or availability as a result of the programme. Interviewees reported finding casual labour locally, and that some recipients were able to employ others locally.

E.2.2 Cash+food ward

The headman suggested that *maricho* is always available for cash or kind, and the switch to cash+food from food had had no obvious effect on the demand for or availability of casual labour. However, other respondents noted that there was not always enough *maricho* available in the village, but that there is also *maricho* available at local business centres.

Recipients in the focus group reported doing much less casual labour during the programme, but noted no discrimination against them or changes to wage rates, perhaps because they sought casual labour outside the village where employers did not know they were recipients.

Recipient interviewees also obtained casual labour from outside the village, but did less after receiving the transfer.

A non-recipient interviewee had not noticed any change in the wage rate for casual labour. In the focus group, respondents went further, arguing that they are now more able to find casual labour as a result of the programme, as recipients were able to employ others and sought casual labour less.

E.2.3 Cash ward

Again the headman reported that recipients did not do *maricho* and worked on their farms instead, but non-recipients continued to. Wage rates have improved this year from 15 lines per bucket to 10 lines per bucket. There are some opportunities in the village, but others on nearby cotton farms. There have been increases in the amount of *maricho* demanded by workers, due to drought this year forcing people to work more. This is not related to the transfer, however.

Recipients in the focus group reported doing less *maricho* than usual during the transfer period, and in some cases no *maricho*, and that this would be the same whatever type of transfer they were receiving. They noted no discrimination in wage rates. Both recipient interviewees confirmed doing casual labour before the transfer, but less during the transfer.

Non-recipients did not note any changes to the availability of casual labour. They did not perceive wage rates as driven by the amount of labour supply, but by the demand for maize. They agreed that recipients did less casual labour.

E.3 Casual labour in Gokwe South

The profile for Gokwe South does not mention *maricho*, except to say that better off households use casuals (page 1). Broadly, however, fieldwork indicates that casual labour opportunities are similar to Gokwe North, working on cotton or maize fields with some specific jobs available locally, and more jobs available at large business centres.

E.3.1 Food ward

The headman reported that recipients did less casual labour than non-recipients, which they typically found outside the village, including in Gokwe Centre, as few villagers were offering casual work.

Recipients in the focus group reported that *maricho* was not easily available, but that they reduced their search for *maricho* and work more in their fields. One elderly recipient interviewee who did not do *maricho* himself agreed that recipients did less *maricho*, but that their wage rates improved (this was not confirmed by labourers). Another recipient interviewee was too old for *maricho*, but noted that recipients still did *maricho* to pay for grinding.

Many non-recipients in the focus group reported relying on *maricho* for food, seeking work depending on their food needs, and usually finding it outside the village. They noted no change to *maricho* related to the programme, but felt that there was less *maricho* available this year due to drought, with longer search times. They did not feel that casual labour would change with different transfer types.

E.3.2 Cash+food ward

The headman reported that *maricho* was available within and outside the village, on cotton and maize fields or on odd-jobs. Wages are negotiated for each specific job, and paid either in kind or cash. Recipients did less casual labour than non-recipients, but there were no changes in the wage rates or availability of work, and earnings were usually around 1 bucket for about 3 days of work (working on 1 acre).

Recipients in the focus group reported working less on *maricho* as a result of the transfer, but noticed no changes to eligibility or payment rates. They felt that receiving cash only would require them to do more *maricho* as they would need to earn food, but receiving food only would prevent them from doing any casual work. Both recipient interviewees reported normally doing *maricho*, but not during the transfer, when they were able to work on their fields. One recipient said they were sometimes able to employ others.

Non-recipients in the focus group noted that recipients are seeking *maricho* less, but that they still need to find *maricho* because they share some food and have other needs. If they offered casual labour, they would prioritise non-recipients because they are needier. They felt that when the recipients received food only, it was easier to find casual labour because no recipient needed to work. Providing cash only would not affect *maricho* at all because recipients would still lack food (this market fear was not borne out in the cash ward). One non-recipient interviewee reported no changes in wage rates or availability, because even though recipients seek work less, there are only a few recipients. Recipients cannot usually afford to hire others as *maricho*, although some do. A second non-recipient noted a slight improvement in wage rates from 20 lines per bucket to 17 lines, but it was not clear that this was as a result of the transfer.

E.3.3 Cash ward

Maricho is available within the village and outside, for around one bucket (or the equivalent in commodity, such as 2kg sugar) per acre (2-3 days work).

All recipients reported working less when they were receiving the transfer. In the focus group, recipients reported that they no longer undertake casual labour, and instead work in their own fields. This was not because of discrimination, but because they needed to work less.

Non-recipients in the focus group felt that recipients did less casual labour than non-recipients. They would not employ recipients because they are better off (because they receive the transfer), although since recipients sought less casual labour this was not a substantial threat.

Annex F Fieldwork conducted

F.1 Interviews

District	Ward	Transfer type	Respondent	Gender
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Headman	
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	miller	
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Non-recipient	Female
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Recipient	Female
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Recipient	Female
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe North	Chireya 3	Cash+food	Headman	
Gokwe North	Chireya 3	Cash+food	Non-recipient	Female
Gokwe North	Chireya 3	Cash+food	Recipient	Female
Gokwe North	Chireya 3	Cash+food	Recipient	Male
Gokwe North	Chireya 8	Food	Clinic	
Gokwe North	Chireya 8	Food	Headman	
Gokwe North	Chireya 8	Food	Non-recipient	Female
Gokwe North	Chireya 8	Food	Recipient	Female
Gokwe North	Chireya 8	Food	Recipient	Female
Gokwe North	Chireya 8	Food	Recipient	Female
Gokwe North	Chireya 8	Food	teacher	
Gokwe North	District		DA	
Gokwe North	Nembudziya		Trader	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Assistant Headman	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	miller	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Non-recipient	Female
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Recipient	Female
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Recipient	Female
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Recipient	Female
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Trader	

Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Trader	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 2	Cash+food	Headman	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 2	Cash+food	miller	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 2	Cash+food	Non-recipient	Female
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 2	Cash+food	Non-recipient	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 2	Cash+food	Recipient	Male
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 2	Cash+food	Recipient	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 2	Cash+food	Trader	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 5	Food	Headman	
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 5	Food	Non-recipient	Male
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 5	Food	Non-recipient	Male
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 5	Food	Recipient	Female
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 5	Food	Recipient	Male
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 5	Food	Recipient	Female
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 5	Food	Trader	
Gokwe South	District		Distribution manager	
Gokwe South	Gokwe Centre		Trader	
Gokwe South	Gokwe Centre		Trader	
Gokwe South	Gokwe Centre		Trader	
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Beerhall	
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Clinic	
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Headman	
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Headman	
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Non-recipient	Female
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Non-recipient	Male
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Recipient	Female
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Recipient	Female
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Recipient	Female
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Recipient	Female
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Trader	
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Trader	
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Trader	
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Trader	
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Headman	
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Miller	
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Non-recipient	Male
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Non-recipient	Female
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Recipient	Female
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Recipient	Female

Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Recipient	Male
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Trader	
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Trader	
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Trader	
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Trader	
Nyanga	Gurumathanu	Food	Headman	
Nyanga	Gurumathanu	Food	Non-recipient	
Nyanga	Gurumathanu	Food	Non-recipient	Female
Nyanga	Gurumathanu	Food	Recipient	Male
Nyanga	Gurumathanu	Food	Recipient	Male
Nyanga	Gurumathanu	Food	Trader	

F.2 Focus groups

District	Ward	Transfer type	Group
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Recipients
Gokwe North	Makore 1	Cash	Non-recipients
Gokwe North	Chireya 3	Cash+food	Recipients
Gokwe North	Chireya 3	Cash+food	Non-recipients
Gokwe North	Chireya 8	Food	Recipients
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Recipients
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 1	Cash	Non-recipients
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 2	Cash+food	Recipients
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 2	Cash+food	Non-recipients
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 5	Food	Recipients
Gokwe South	Nemangwe 5	Food	Non-recipients
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Recipients
Nyanga	Tombo	Cash	Non-recipients
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Recipients
Nyanga	Ruwangwe	Cash+food	Non-recipients
Nyanga	Gurumathanu	Food	Recipients
Nyanga	Gurumathanu	Food	Non-recipients

Annex G Terms of reference

G.1 Objective of the Evaluation

1. To assess the effectiveness of ZECT programme in meeting its stated objectives.
2. To assess the social impact the ZECT programme has had on its targeted population (household and community level).
3. To identify the potential, and conditions, for replication of the modality for other interventions in Zimbabwe.

G.2 Evaluation questions

Relevance/ design

- Did the organization make the best use of available evidence and best practice in the programme design?
- Comment on the relevance and quality of the ZECT monitoring system, was this relevant to the running of the programme and to meeting programme objectives?
- The cash transfer varied according to household size to selected households. Is this a fair and equitable approach; and was it perceived to be fair and equitable?

Appropriateness of the intervention

- Appropriateness and relevance of the various ZECT transfer modalities: cash only; cash and food or food only. Which was most appropriate to address the beneficiaries' circumstances? Was a non conditional cash transfer appropriate to the Zimbabwe context?
- What, if any, is a more appropriate approach for future cash transfers in Zimbabwe in both emergency and development contexts?
- Was the decision to vary the cash amount according to market price of maize and this impact on household economy the most effective and equitable methodology?

Efficiency

- Comparative cost-benefit analysis of cash and cash and food with food only distributions
- The type of transfer utilised – was the transfer chosen the most efficient use of resources?
- The type of delivery modality used – was this the most efficient use of resources with reference to the programme objectives?

Effectiveness

- Has the programme been able to meet its objectives as detailed?
- Has it been “effective” in any way not anticipated during planning?

- Targeting. Was the targeting methodology effective at minimising inclusion and exclusion error? Were the wards selected the most appropriate ones²⁷? How can targeting be improved in the future?
- Were relevant stakeholders at national, district and local level involved in the programme planning and implementation?
- Was the Market Survey accurate in its predictions of how the market would react?
- Did many households neglect their food needs in order to achieve other livelihoods needs (school fees, health costs, transport costs, clothing etc)?
- What was the scale of extravagant expenditure and how could this be reduced?

Impact

- With the data collected by the monitoring system and the evaluation focus group discussions, comment on the impact for individuals, community, non beneficiaries.. Specific reference to be given to direct impacts on food and livelihood security at a household and community level.. Comment on the impact on specific groups e.g. People Living with HIV/AIDS, female headed households etc...
 - a. Were households basic food needs met during the lean season?
 - b. Has there been an increase on household livelihood security?
 - c. Changes in community productive activities
- Was there a general increase in liquidity in the pilot areas and how did this affect terms of trade for the poor.
- Was there a “social” multiplier effect of the transfer, if so how did this operate and who benefited?

Issues

- Can, and should, this programme delivery modalities be expanded from a limited term emergency programme to a wider medium term livelihood support/development programme.
- What was Government perception of the programme at national, provincial, and district levels.
- Lessons learned

²⁷ As stated in the programme document “wards have been chosen as being food insecure, but next to the wards with both functioning food markets and surpluses”.