



THE CASH LEARNING PARTNERSHIP



Regional Learning Event

**“Links between emergency cash transfer programming
and social safety nets in the Sahel.”**

Dakar, 8th-9th July 2014

Final report

An initiative supported by:



Introduction

Cash transfers are nowadays widely used in response to the food and nutrition crises that affect the Sahel. Since the crisis of 2012, many stakeholders (including governments, United Nations agencies, international or local non-governmental organisations) have made use of them – at scale, in some cases. Aside from emergency situations, cash transfers are increasingly being considered by governments and sponsors in national poverty reduction plans, often as part of national strategies and social protection policies. It seems the right time to consider the possibility of improving links between emergency cash transfer programmes and national social (cash) transfer programmes, with a view to strengthening the resilience of the Sahel’s populations. It is within this framework that CaLP¹, UNICEF and the European Commission, with financial support from OFDA², came together to organise a regional Learning Event on the subject. Echoing a recent case study commissioned by CaLP on the possibility of using national social transfer programmes to respond to humanitarian crisis³, the workshop’s **key question** was as follows:

To what extent is it possible and desirable to use national social transfer programmes in order to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of the Sahel?

The **primary objectives** of this initiative were twofold, namely:

1. to allow various regional actors involved in crisis response to **share expectations, viewpoints and perceived challenges** of using national social transfer programmes in responding to humanitarian crises, and;
2. to **lay the foundation for the development of a regional research and action programme** aiming to strengthen links between social protection systems and humanitarian response in the Sahel.

The **expected outcomes** for this two-day regional workshop on “links between emergency cash transfer programming and social safety nets in the Sahel” were as follows:

3. Participants will have **gained a better understanding of the concepts** of social protection, social transfers, social safety nets and emergency cash transfer programmes;
4. A **first analysis of the opportunities and challenges** associated with strengthening links between national social transfer programmes and emergency cash transfers in the Sahel is outlined;
5. **Areas for reflection** are identified and preliminary recommendations put forward with a view to building these ties;
6. The findings from this workshop are disseminated among the entire community of practise within the region.

¹ The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) is a consortium of humanitarian organisations aiming to raise awareness and improve the quality of cash transfer programmes throughout the humanitarian sector. More information may be found on CaLP’s website: www.cashlearning.org.

² OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) is the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) overseas office for assisting development.

³ Case study carried out as part of the “Fit For The Future” research project (<http://www.cashlearning.org/2012-2014/-fit-for-the-future->) and presented in Appendix 3 of the final report. (<http://www.cashlearning.org/resources/library/404-is-cash-transfer-programming-fit-for-the-future---annexes?sarched=1>).

This report seeks to give as accurate an account as possible of the opinions expressed by participants over the course of the workshop and in the workshop feedback forms.⁴ The workshop agenda, the list of participants, as well as participants’ evaluations of the workshop, are included in the appendices. All the documents and presentations shared at the workshop can be downloaded from the “West Africa” page of CaLP’s website: <http://www.cashlearning.org/afrique-de-l-ouest/afrique-de-l-ouest-1>.

Workshop proceedings

1. Participant diversity

The workshop brought together almost fifty actors from various backgrounds who were involved in the planning, funding and implementation of cash transfers in emergency and recovery situations, as well as in the area of policies and programmes which combat poverty and chronic vulnerability. The workshop was open to all, following an invitation which was widely circulated throughout the sub-region.⁵ A diverse range of participants (humanitarian, development, state actors etc.) was sought, so as to get a **cross-section of perspectives on the issues**.

Table 1 Participant profiles

Agency Zone	State institutions	Donors	United Nations agencies	International NGOs	Other	Total
Regional	1	5	7	5		18
Burkina Faso	2			1		3
Mali	1		1	5	1	8
Mauritania				2		2
Niger	1			1		2
Senegal		1	3		4	8
Chad	1		1			2
Other					3	3
Total	6	6	12	14	8	46

2. Workshop dynamics

A **framework document** had been prepared ahead of the workshop which aimed to help participants get a grasp on the issues. Above all, its aim was to provoke reactions and encourage reflection, and not to propose a standard framework. It puts forward an initial approach to the problems faced and invites the reader to think about the subject for themselves by means of a series of questions.

⁴ This report was prepared by Cécile Cherrier, with the help of Ramatoulaye Cissé, Vincent Trousseau and Yoann Tuzzolino. Participants were invited to comment on a first draft of the current report before it was completed.

⁵ It should, however, be noted that certain members of governmental agencies were personally invited in order to ensure state actors were represented.

Day one of the workshop had to allow participants an opportunity to get to grips with the main aspects of the problems faced and gain a comprehensive overview. This was done in three stages:

1. An introductory session sought to ensure there was a **basic understanding of the concepts** of social protection, social transfers, social safety nets and emergency cash transfers and to provide an overview of the status of national social transfer programme development in the sub-region;
2. During the second session, a “panel of experts” was invited to discuss the **opportunities and challenges** associated with increased use (whether at present or in the future) of national social transfer programmes in providing humanitarian assistance to the peoples of the Sahel;
3. Participants were then asked to reflect on and discuss the **progress made and limitations faced in current schemes** in the Sahel, with a view to consolidating ties between emergency cash transfers and national social transfer programming.

During **day two** of the workshop, participants were encouraged to consider what closer ties between emergency cash transfers and national social transfer programming would involve. Once again, the day was organised into three phases:

1. In light of the previous evening’s discussions, the aim of the first session was to outline a **collective vision** and identify several areas of work shared by those who use the “cash transfer tool”, with a view to building resilience in the Sahel;
2. During the second session, **practical issues** were explored more thoroughly in sub-groups of around 12 participants each, through four themes that were considered important:⁶
 1. Needs assessment and targeting;
 2. Funding: prepositioning and emergency appeals;
 3. Coordination and skills transference;
 4. Growth and innovation: contribution of humanitarian actors⁷ ;
3. Finally, for the workshop’s final session, participants were asked to identify some areas for reflection and volunteer some **proposals** for action and for research with the aim strengthening, in time, the ties between emergency cash transfers and national social transfer programmes in the Sahel.

3. What the workshop revealed

The diversity of the participants made for enriching debates. Nevertheless, the content of some of the discussions indicated that there was a lack, perhaps not of a common vision, but a shared language between actors in the humanitarian sphere and those working in the sphere of “social protection”, who all nonetheless use cash transfers as a tool. The first session aimed (as far as was possible in a two-day workshop) to overcome this difficulty. However, it is evident that whilst a one-hour introductory session on social protection may help clarify certain concepts for someone who is already aware of the issues, it would not be enough for anyone who was a complete novice in the subject. Given the typical (humanitarian) profile of those who participate in CaLP workshops, a specific presentation on emergency cash transfers had not

⁶ It was also expected the topic of “Early warning systems and contingency plans” would be dealt with. Unfortunately, not enough participants had a good enough understanding of the subject.

⁷ Here, the term “humanitarian actors” refers to operators who are working within the sphere of international humanitarian aid (national and international non-governmental organisations, United Nations agencies, donors, etc.). This term does not include national state authorities in charge of crisis response.

been planned. It does seem, however, that more time could have been spent specifically addressing the differences and the shared characteristics of “social cash transfers”(which are understood within the context of long-term, state-regulated national programmes and policies) and “emergency cash transfers” (which are understood as one-off humanitarian projects, supported by international donors and actors). Furthermore, not all participants had the same level of awareness with regards to the workshop’s key question. As such, the very issue on which the workshop tasks were based – the need to build up connections – was itself a revelation to some participants. Some conversations even conveyed a certain level of defiance with regards to state authorities.

The **lack of common ground and lack of awareness** concerning the workshop’s key question may have been an impediment to debate and to the development of concrete recommendations. These difficulties result from the lack of dialogue and exchange which has prevailed in recent years between humanitarian, state and development actors on the issue of using cash transfers (and, perhaps more generally, on the issue of combating food and nutrition insecurity) in the region. They are a reminder, should one be needed, of the pressing need to increase the exchange of information in future – particularly regarding the links between emergency and development work in crisis prevention and management, the handover between the two types of response and the role of government coordination in both kinds of response.

This workshop will at least give an introduction to basic concepts and, additionally, make certain participants (humanitarian actors) more aware of the responsibility governments must assume during systemic crises. These are the first vital steps towards strengthening links between emergency cash transfers and national social transfer programmes. While it is nothing new, as such, the issue is very much a pertinent one, given the growing power of state initiatives. This first initiative should allow momentum to build up within the region (first and foremost amongst the humanitarian community, which has little awareness of the social protection mechanisms established in intervention zones) with regards to this important issue.

Summary of discussions

4. Diagnosis of the current situation

In light of the priorities in terms of humanitarian assistance for the Sahel, exchanges were focused on the use of cash transfers in responding to food and nutrition crises. With regards to this topic, a **clear progression** has been noted over the past decade, with three particularly significant points to note:

1. Cash transfers are becoming the **norm where food aid is concerned**, whereas aid in kind is becoming the exception. This is consistent with a fundamental worldwide trend in food aid. Cash transfers are increasingly being used in humanitarian responses as much as in national social welfare programmes. In the Sahel, a marked acceleration in this trend was noted in the crisis of 2012.
2. Following a growing awareness over the past few years among regional actors, an increasing number of states have committed to **nationwide movements** aiming to establish permanent social (cash) transfer programmes, so that aid to the most vulnerable becomes reliable and regular, and therefore more effective. At the moment, state programmes are still in their infancy; their scope is restricted and the capacity of implementing bodies is limited. But now, the political will to establish them at scale, over time, seems assured.

3. In order to prevent, mitigate and ensure efficiency in crises, and in the absence of national response mechanisms that tackle chronic vulnerability, humanitarian actors have been led to extend their interventions beyond simply the climaxes of crises, especially with the development of seasonal cash transfer projects, thus substituting state actors. Within this setting, humanitarian actors have worked on **coordinating approaches** when it comes to rescue and recovery responses in recent years, with the recent implementation of several shared frameworks (whether those are platforms, consortia or simply tacit agreements), such as the Niger Alliance (l'Alliance de Niger) or the Shared Framework for Seasonal Social Safety Nets in Northern Mali (Cadre Commun sur les Filets Sociaux Saisonniers au Nord Mali).

These developments have led to certain **“anomalies”** when it comes to the current situation, with:

1. A **shift in responsibility** from state to humanitarian actors, who take de facto charge of households suffering from chronic vulnerability.
2. A **high dependence on humanitarian aid** – which, in terms of predictability (very short rounds of funding) and accountability (towards state authorities and citizens) all in all remains limited.
3. **Parallel social safety net initiatives** – those that are run by humanitarian actors on one hand, and those run by state actors on the other.

Without a doubt, the development of the situation has reached **a pivotal moment**. Today, there are opportunities to correct the anomalies and improve aid efficiency for the peoples of the Sahel, thanks to:

1. On one hand, the **wealth of knowledge** available among humanitarian actors, with almost 10 years of experience in using cash transfers in the region ; and
2. On the other hand, national and supranational initiatives⁸ aimed at implementing national social transfer programmes (with a focus on prevention) which are being developed and which offer a real **prospect of sustainability**.

5. Vision for the short, mid and long-term

The participants agreed on a **long-term** vision where governments would exercise their full responsibility and governance concerning assistance for vulnerable populations. With regards to transfers, the vision was outlined as follows:

1. A **national social transfer system** is established for the territory as a whole in order to respond to chronic vulnerability;
2. **Built-in mechanisms** for these programmes allow for responses to seasonal vulnerability by means of temporary expansion/contraction, according to peaks in demand;
3. **Contingency plans** are in place for responding to sudden disasters (whether these are food crises or not) and extended periods of stress during systemic food and nutrition crises.

⁸ Notably, towards the end of 2013, the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) launched the Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food (RAAF), whose mandate was to ensure the implementation of technical aspects of agricultural, forestry and pastoral programmes and investment plans in the region, and adopted the “Regional Social Safety Net Support Programme”, which will be monitored by the RAAF.

The realisation of such a vision requires, in the **mid-term**:

4. **Resolving several technical problems**, in particular:

1. Establishing long-term, flexible funding mechanisms to be able to cover varying responses to seasonal vulnerability;
2. Bringing reliable information and early warning systems into operation and reinforcing the connection between early warning and early action (unblocking contingency funds, performing needs assessments and (pre)-targeting, etc.);
3. Developing and scaling targeting mechanisms that are acceptable to local people, rapid, and effective in identifying (in a dynamic way) those who face chronic and temporary vulnerability;
4. Eliminating the bottlenecks which currently hinder the implementation of national social transfer policies (for example, in developing new modes of intervention in areas where access is difficult, or for nomadic peoples.)

5. **Building up the skills and reinforcing the responsibilities of state actors**, with a view to a progressive withdrawal by humanitarian actors from the management of chronic and seasonal vulnerability – on the understanding that technical and financial partners will continue to support states whose material, human and financial resources remain limited, particularly in large-scale crises where the capacities of national response operations are exceeded.

In the **short term**, getting started on projects such as these requires, first of all, **an increased awareness and a change in mentality**. At this key moment in the development of cash transfers in the Sahel, everyone must be fully aware of the responsibility of state authorities (central administration, decentralised services, locally elected representatives and local authorities) in assisting local people. It is vital to deal with the lack of knowledge which might still persist in the spheres of humanitarian, state and development work. This could be done by means of awareness-raising activities (e.g. training workshops) to ensure a better knowledge of the cooperative and legislative frameworks which regulate the interventions of humanitarian and development actors, and by increasing the number of opportunities for meetings and exchanges between various parties who use cash transfers, so that they may get to know and understand one another. However, *ultimately*, this has to happen through simple changes in behaviour (e.g. taking care to *involve* local authorities in the development, implementation and monitoring of operations, and no longer simply *informing* them). Everyone has a responsibility: the local authorities, to provide leadership; humanitarian actors, to respect the authority of local institutions and representatives (in accordance with legal texts) and to assist them in establishing their leadership.

6. **Initial pointers for reflection**

To answer the workshop's key question, if it does not seem to be possible at the present time to use national social transfer programmes (which are still under development) to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of the Sahel, it seems desirable to build ties between emergency cash transfers and national social transfer programmes in future (if only to ensure better care of populations facing chronic vulnerability). The discussions during the two days of the workshop brought a few points to the fore, with a view to developing a regional research and action programme aiming to strengthen links between social protection systems and humanitarian responses in the Sahel. These have been organised under three headings here: process of developing a shared project; structural measures supporting the realisation of a shared project; research themes to encourage reflections.

The workshop showed that sharing tools is not enough to bring different actors together. You have to go further and **draw up a shared project**. The term “shared project” refers here to a project (or roadmap) shared by state, humanitarian and development actors with a view to building ties between emergency cash transfers and national social transfer programmes to improve the prevention and management of food and nutritional insecurity on the Sahel. Some approaches to this effect were put forward:

1. **Increasing the number of forums for exchange**, at local, national and regional level, between state, humanitarian and development actors, in order to break down barriers, standardise discourse and encourage mutual understanding of the contexts in which others are working (it is important to get a good grasp of the realities facing others before trying to deal with common spheres of work):
 1. Inviting social protection actors to NGO forums dealing with cash transfers and vice versa;
 2. Ensuring that forums for dialogue exist at all levels (from national to local) for all actors involved – whether they are concerned specifically with cash transfers or not;
 3. Where applicable, establishing a specific consultation platform under the oversight of the State with technical and financial partners, NGOs, civil society actors etc. as a terms of reference for planning and coordinating transitions;
2. **Replicating this kind of workshop at a national level:**
 1. Mapping what exists in terms of cash transfer in each country, detailing the roles of different actors in each of the existing initiatives.
 2. Supporting the leadership of state actors in forging a mid/long-term vision;
 3. Changing the mid/ long-term vision into action in a national context, depending on the conditions in each country;
 4. Clearing up potential discrepancies between the socioeconomic vision and the policy of change underpinning national social transfer initiatives and the principles of humanitarian action (social transfers are not simply a technical issue);
 5. Putting cash transfers back into the centre of national socioeconomic policy and reflecting on strengthening ties by means of other mechanisms (e.g. entrepreneurship);
 6. Establishing roles and responsibilities according to the actors’ added value;
3. **Identifying areas of real synergy** (with the aim of/before encouraging more theoretical reflections):
 1. Determining which of the assorted tools and innovations which could have been tested in different contexts might be most appropriate, with a view to scaling up to national level (certain technologies cannot be transferred to national bodies at the moment since they are too expensive or complex);
 2. Reflecting on the role of NGOs as implementing partners for states;
 3. Making use of the private sector’s growing interest to support the country’s development (payment agencies, first and foremost);
4. **Establishing a long-term transition plan** detailing the integration of non-state initiatives, with a gradual assumption of responsibilities by state actors (in terms of the number of people being supported and allocation of national resources), that eventually leads to a situation where emergency workers step in only when the need exceeds chronic and/or seasonal fluctuations.

In a more systematic approach, it seems suitable to **engage in structural measures** in order to encourage the development and the realisation of a shared project. This could happen by means of incentives (donors in particular) or national capacity building activities. The following proposals were made:

1. **Encouraging a change in the approach of humanitarian actors**, especially those that are already involved in the management of chronic vulnerability;
 1. Encouraging a change of mentality by urging NGOs to “help governments help the people” as a kind of exit strategy (e.g. by reviewing performance indicators);
 2. Ensuring long-term, flexible funding for NGOs so that they can engage effectively in skills transference, but also so that they can achieve the best results in terms of durability, beyond vital “life-saving” aid;
 3. Pooling advocacy efforts so as to limit the number of representatives (platforms, consortium, CaLP focal points etc.) and increase their impact (e.g. visits by parliamentarians);
 4. Encouraging NGOs to come together so as to better capitalise on their experiences, with the purpose of coordinating approaches;
 5. Encouraging a change in the profiles of those who work within NGOs, with more people who have experience of national capacity development (and not just those from an “emergency worker” background);
2. **Supporting the building up of national capacities** in a much more structural manner:
 1. Encouraging skills transference as an exit strategy for humanitarian actors;
 2. Encouraging the secondment of domestic technicians to work on innovative projects;
 3. Supporting training models that are more “field-focused” (rather than the classical “classroom” model of training) with more practical experiments (e.g. in pilot zones where technicians can put tools to use), so as to start building the capacities of technicians/civil servants in place right away;
 4. Investing a lot more in the training of the next generation of national decision-makers, civil servants and technicians by working with schools and universities to ensure better understanding of the context, the actors involved and the new social support tools available (e.g. through partnerships with universities, with the private sector, etc. to ensure quality training that is centred on practise);
 5. Investing in assessing the processes and impact of cash transfers, whilst encouraging the involvement of national research workers;
3. **Improving modes of funding** for cash transfer initiatives:
 1. Securing mid/long-term national funding – with provision being made in national budgets;
 2. Planning for the creation of a shared fund to finance seasonal peaks in demand, as set out in the national programme;
 3. Looking into the possibility of alternative methods of raising funds through private sector actors, diasporas, crowd funding, insurance etc.;
 4. Ensuring funding for preventative measures (contingency plans) and assessments.

Finally, there should be an **escalation of research activities**. Several research topics, which apply equally to emergency cash transfers and national social transfer initiatives, have been suggested:

1. **Targeting** mechanisms: how can methods that are both effective and acceptable to communities (without any adverse effects on share capital) be developed? How can urban areas be targeted? How can links be established between socioeconomic targeting and targeting other forms of vulnerability (e.g. malnutrition)? How can tools (HEA, PMT, etc.) be coordinated with a view to upscaling programmes? How can an updated (refocused) national database which is appropriate for periods of peak demand be put together?
2. Effects of cash transfers on **share capital**⁹ (e.g. patterns of redistribution and cohesion still need to be better understood);
3. The use of cash transfers in the **prevention of acute and chronic malnutrition**, which is extremely prevalent in the sub-region;
4. Impact of cash transfers on regional and national **markets** in the context of the Sahel, characterised by food prices that are above the five-year average rate and marked seasonal variation: what has the effect of the massive expansion of cash transfers been?;
5. Identifying and eliminating **bottlenecks** in the implementation of social transfer programmes: what are they? What are the roles of local and international NGOs? What are the roles of private sector actors?

Immediate follow-up from the Learning Event

7. Next steps (confirmed)

The workshop was seen as a first step in a lengthier process of dialogue and discussion between humanitarian actors, state actors and others involved in using cash transfers to assist the vulnerable populations of the Sahel. As such, CaLP has committed to:

1. Ensuring the **dissemination of the workshop report** to the entire community of practice within the region;
2. Supporting the **production of a discussion paper** on the subject, in the hope of raising awareness and getting more actors involved;
3. Encouraging discussion on the subject among various **discussion groups** in the areas of humanitarian aid, food and nutritional security and social protection and, first and foremost, across CaLP's own discussion forum¹⁰;
4. Ensuring that **documents are translated**, with a view to discussing the issue with other regions, such as the Horn of Africa and southern Asia.

⁹ This echoes one particular study published recently by LASDEL (Laboratoire d'Études et de Recherches sur les Dynamiques Sociales et le Développement Local, or the Laboratory for Study and Research on Social Dynamics and Local Development), which presents evidence of the adverse effects of cash transfers on communities due to a lack of accountability within traditional structures, which could result in conflict. See "Les transferts monétaires au Niger: la manne et les soupçons": http://www.lasdel.net/resulta1.php?id_article=241

¹⁰ For further information regarding CaLP's discussion forum, visit: <http://www.cashlearning.org/information-sharing/d-group>.

8. Workshop proposals for further action (subject to funding)

To ensure that further reflection takes place and, in time, that concrete and detailed operational and research recommendations are produced, various monitoring activities have been recommended (provided financial and operational capacity is in place):

1. Making up an **inventory** of initiatives that use cash transfers in the context of humanitarian response or national social welfare policies (primarily in responding to food and nutritional crises and chronic vulnerability) and compiling a **directory** of cash transfer practitioners in the sub-region;
2. Carrying out detailed **case studies** of experiences within the sub-region, looking to link emergency cash transfer programmes more closely with national social transfer programmes (presently or in future): Shared Framework for Seasonal Social Safety Nets in Northern Mali; The Niger Alliance; gradual withdrawal by the WFP from school canteens¹¹;
3. Organising **national consultation workshops** on this same theme to facilitate exchanges between actors and successfully outline a shared vision and plan for cash transfer users seeking to build up resilience (potentially taking advantage of existing developments, such as the formation of the AGIR roadmaps¹² or the national processes for developing social protection systems);
4. Organising regional and/or national **technological workshops** on subjects that are important to the progress of this issue – first and foremost, for targeting;
5. Encouraging **discussion with other regions**, especially the Horn of Africa and southern Asia, through the CaLP network, for instance.

¹¹ To plan and coordinate its progressive withdrawal from school canteen projects based in several countries within the region, the WFP is using the SABER framework (System Assessment and Benchmarking for Education Results), which may prove useful in the creation of a dynamic for the handover of responsibility.

¹² Launched in Ouagadougou in December 2012, the Global Alliance for Resilience (l'Alliance Globale pour la Résilience or AGIR) – Sahel and West Africa – set itself the objective of “structurally and sustainably reducing food and nutritional insecurity by supporting the implementation of Sahelian and West African policies.” Placed under the political and technical leadership of ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS, the Alliance is supported by existing platforms and networks, notably the Food Crisis Prevention Network (Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaires or RPCA). A regional roadmap was adopted in April 2013. The process of drawing out National Resilience Priorities (Priorités Résilience Pays, or PRP-AGIR) from this regional roadmap, by means of inclusive national dialogues, is underway in different countries throughout the sub-region. More information is available on the Food Crisis Prevention Network website: <http://www.oecd.org/site/rpca/agir/>

Appendix 1: List of participants

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1	ABBA SANGARE	Ibrahima	National Directorate for Social Development and Social Protection Policy of Mali	Deputy National Director	abbasangare1963@yahoo.fr
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Appendix 2: Workshop agenda

Tuesday 8th July 2014

8:30	9:00	Welcome and participant registration
9:00	11:00	Introduction
9:00	9:30	Opening statement and review of objectives <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yoann Tuzzolino, Focal Point for West Africa, CaLP 2. Aïssata Fall, Social Policy and Advocacy Consultant, UNICEF Senegal
9:30	9:45	Presentation of workshop participants, programme and methodology <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Cécile Cherrier, Social Transfer Consultant, CaLP/European Commission
9:45	10:30	What is social protection? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Aïssata Fall, Social Policy and Advocacy Consultant, UNICEF Senegal
10:30	11:00	Evolution of social transfer policies in the Sahel <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Solène Rougeaux, Head of Social Protection Plan, World Bank
11:00	11:30	Coffee break
11:30	13:00	Linking emergency cash transfers and social safety nets: opportunities and problems
		Discussion panel:
11:30	13:00	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jan Eijkenaar, Resilience Technical Assistant and AGIR, ECHO 2. Victor Bushamuka, Regional Advisor, OFDA 3. Clare O'Brien, Poverty and Social Protection Consultant, OPM 4. Ibrahima Abba Sangare, Deputy National Director, National Directorate for Social Development and Social Protection Policy of Mali 5. Cheikh Thiam, Cooperation and Legal Affairs Director, National Social Security Fund of Mauritania 6. Hamado Koanda, Minister for Social Action and National Solidarity for Burkina Faso 7. Anaïs Lafite, Regional Representative for West Africa, Action Against Hunger
13:00	14:00	Lunch
14:00	17:00	Current schemes in the Sahel: progress made and limitations faced
14:00	14:45	Shared Framework for Seasonal Social Safety Nets in Northern Mali <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Vincent Boulardot, Technical and Advocacy Specialist, Oxfam GB Mali 2. Sabah Fara, Head of Monitoring and Evaluation for the Shared Framework, Solidarités Internationales Mali
14:45	15:30	Coordination of targeting methods within the Niger Alliance <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Laura Swift, Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Adviser for West Africa, Save the Children
15:30	16:00	Coffee break
16:00	17:00	Institutional framework and coordination mechanisms in Niger <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Karine Dyskiewicz, Chef de Mission, ASB Niger 5. Moctar Kango, Head of Division, Coordination Cell for Early Warning Systems and Disaster Prevention, Niger




Wednesday 9th July 2014

8:30	9:00	Participants arrive
9:00	10:00	What shared vision? What common ground?
9:00	10:00	Review of the previous day and identification of key aspects to explore 1. Facilitator: Cécile Cherrier, Social Transfer Consultant, CaLP/Commission Européenne
10:00	13:00	Market of ideas
10:00	11:15	Stand 1 – Needs assessment and targeting 1. Facilitator: Badjougué Dembélé, Food Security and Livelihoods Coordinator, Oxfam GB Mali
		Stand 2 – Funding: prepositioning and emergency appeals 2. Facilitator: Allegra Baiocchi, West African Regional Office, OCHA
		Stand 3 – Coordination and skills transference 3. Facilitator: Karine Dyskiewicz, Chef de mission, ASB Niger
		Stand 4 – Growth and innovation: contribution of humanitarian actors 4. Facilitator: Margie Rehm, Head of Regional Cash & Voucher Programme, WFP
11:15	11:45	Coffee break
11:45	13:00	Market of ideas (continued)
13:00	14:00	Lunch
14:00	16:45	Plenary discussions
14:00	15:30	Report on ideas suggested for each of the themes covered: 1. Needs assessment and targeting 2. Funding: prepositioning and emergency appeals 3. Coordination and skills transference 4. Growth and innovation: contribution of humanitarian actors
15:30	16:00	Coffee break
16:00	16:45	General discussion on the propositions made and the trends that emerge 5. Facilitator: Cécile Cherrier, Social Transfer Consultant, CaLP/Commission Européenne
16:45	17:00	Conclusions
16:45	17 :00	Topics for reflection, next steps and closing statement 6. Yoann Tuzzolino, Focal Point for West Africa, CaLP


Appendix 3: Participant feedback on the workshop

Only 16 participants (35%) completed and returned a workshop feedback form.


1. Overall impression of each of the workshop sessions




What shared vision? What common ground?




Market of ideas



Plenary discussions



2. Overall impression of the way the workshop was planned and organised



3. Extracts of comments and suggestions given by participants

Let me assure you that the diversity of participants brought together at this workshop and the level of questions exceeded my expectations (it really was a success).

The workshop was very useful – forums such as this should take place more regularly.

Very useful, and helped me to know more about the link between the concepts of cash transfers and social safety nets, to learn about the current situation and to prepare for problems, to understand the need for governments to take responsibility for systemic crises, with the support of humanitarians, of course, who are emergency workers first and foremost.

Perhaps too much discussion on [development as opposed to emergency work] and on issues of vocabulary which – in my opinion – took the place of debate and may have confused matters...

Too many gaps in the understanding of the concepts to be able to have effective discussions in such a short space of time. Issues were too broad for people who were approaching the subject for the first time.

Certain participants dominated discussions: comments were often too critical and not constructive (even if the facilitator tried to conduct a constructive and useful discussion).

Recommendations were not clearly established.

A good meeting, but the proposals require further exploration, so that they are more tangible and operational.

At the moment, we have not seen any real opportunities, but rather challenges, which seem much weightier than the [opportunities]. Reflection on potential opportunities should be continued.

The theme of cash transfers and social safety nets is a vast one. These two days of exchange have been very instructive and enriching from the point of view of each country's experiences. This kind of workshop should be rolled out again at regional and national level for better understanding of interventions and implementation of a common roadmap.

Perhaps there should be a national approach for each country to allow each party to take stock of their own situations and think about how to integrate lessons learned from emergency interventions into existing social safety net projects or how to put them into practise.