

# Philippines Haiyan Response – A multi-sectoral review of the use of market analysis and the design and implementation of CTPs

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
BFAR	Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
CCG	Community Cash Grants
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfers
CFW	Cash for Work
CRM	Complaint Response Mechanism
CTP	Cash Transfer Programming
CWG	Cash Working Group
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
ERLC	Early Recovery and Livelihoods Cluster
FFV	Fresh Food Vouchers
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FSAC	Food Security and Agriculture Cluster
FSP	Financial Service Providers
GOP	Government of the Philippines
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HEA	Household Economy Approach
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
MSA	Multi Sector Assessment
OCHA	Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
P&G	Procter and Gamble
PDRF	Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation
PHLP	PhilPost
PRC	Philippine Red Cross
RAM	Rapid Assessment of Markets
RAY	Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda
SC	Save the Children
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
UCT	Unconditional Cash Transfers
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
VFM	Value for Money
WFP	World Food Programme

# BACKGROUND

## A. OVERVIEW OF CASH IN THE HAIYAN RESPONSE<sup>1</sup>

Following Typhoon Haiyan, which hit the Philippines on November 8 2014, at least 45 aid agencies chose to implement Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) to assist the more than 16 million people affected. Cash transfers were a logical approach in a country with developed market systems, strong financial services, and with experience of CTP in previous emergencies. The Government of the Philippines (GOP), having implemented a conditional cash programme to poor households called the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) since 2008, approved and supported (?) the use of cash transfers as a form of assistance during the emergency response.

It has been estimated that a total of USD 338 million, or 40% of the response, was delivered through CTP. Agencies used a variety of cash modalities to respond to the emergency including Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCT), Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT), Cash for Work (CFW), vouchers and hybrid transfers (combinations of in-kind materials and cash). UCTs, vouchers and CFW were provided primarily for food assistance, whereas CCTs were provided to cover mostly shelter and livelihood needs. Due to the high volume of remittances in the country, agencies had many options to deliver cash including large banks such as LandBank, PHLPost<sup>2</sup>, pawnshops such as M LHuillier<sup>3</sup> and rural banks; and some agencies also implemented e-transfers (e.g. Mercy Corps through Banko<sup>4</sup>).

For the first time during an emergency of this scale, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) swiftly assigned an emergency Cash Coordinator within a month as soon as the typhoon hit to strengthen coordination amongst agencies using CTP. The coordinator was able to link aid agencies to service providers, set standards and guidelines across agencies (such as transfer values) and set up regional cash working groups. However, given the novelty of this role and the geographical scale of the disaster, there was difficulty in managing and sharing information coming from different agencies, which affected timely operational coordination.

In previous responses, the GOP had been reluctant to endorse UCTs because of dependency concerns, but lack of funds for the emergency and effective advocacy by WFP and UNICEF to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) meant that UCTs were adopted rapidly and at scale. The first organization to implement CTP was Tzu Chi, a Taiwanese Buddhist INGO, starting on 24 November 2013. Independent of OCHA coordination mechanisms, Tzu Chi provided over 50,000 people with CFW shifts at 500 PHP per day (almost double the official minimum wage rate in the affected areas of Eastern Visayas – kindly verify) and UCTs from PHP 8,000-12,000 depending on family size.<sup>5</sup> This approach was highly appreciated by beneficiaries for its speed and scale, and by fellow NGOs for its speed (which was in part linked to the absence of targeting criteria), although concerns were raised regarding lack of coordination with other actors and the high rates of CFW. Other organizations that had cash preparedness mechanisms in place were able to deliver UCTs within a month of the typhoon. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) provided UCTs by topping-up the government's 4Ps programme starting in December 2014 while the Philippine Red Cross (PRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) delivered UCTs to over 46,000 families (or households - kindly verify) by having agreements in place with LBC, a Filipino courier service, and Globe G-cash, mobile phone money transactions operated by Globe Telecom.

Another very commonly used modality was CFW (recognized by the government as a cash intervention that discourages dependency and involves the community in the relief effort), which was

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<sup>1</sup> The figures in this section are mainly extracted from the DfID VFM report – Philippines case study, February 2015

<sup>2</sup> The Philippines Postal Corporation

<sup>3</sup> Pawnshop and financial service provider in the Philippines

<sup>4</sup> Mobile banking system in the Philippines serviced by Globe Telecom and Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)

<sup>5</sup> By January 2014 Tzu Chi's in-kind and cash and cash assistance had exceeded 22.5 million USD or 1 billion PHP (see <http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/tzu-chi-foundation-exceeds-1-billion-pesos-material-aid-typhoon-haiyan-survivors>).

used primarily to clear coco debris from roads and restore public infrastructure. Initially, the government set CFW rates at 100% of the minimum wage rate of the region to encourage self-targeting. The GOP had rules in place that any public service program had to provide health insurance and vaccinations for workers and employees had to pay taxes on the wages earned. There was some coordination with the government to reduce the requirements for CFW during the Haiyan emergency response. However, because the wages paid in villages prior to Haiyan were below the minimum wage, some government and private employees didn't return to their normal jobs because they were paid more or saw CFW programmes easier than their regular jobs. CFW programmes were criticized by some communities for distorting the labour market and inflating prices by increasing incomes.

Section I below will review SC's CTP relative to the rest of the response.

## **B. RATIONALE FOR REVIEW**

This study was jointly commissioned by Save the Children (SC) Philippines and by SCUK's Humanitarian Technical Unit, to review SC's use of CTP and market-based responses in the Typhoon Haiyan response. The main objectives for SC Philippines were to review the design and implementation of CTPs across the response – focusing specifically on the use of market analysis; the timing and complementarity of activities; the choice of CTP modalities; and the use of CTP as an integrated programming tool.

The objectives above contribute to SCUK's global agenda on markets, specifically: the use of market analysis in response analysis and throughout project implementation; and evidence on the role of market-based programming in supporting market recovery. The study is also intended to contribute to learning on the design, implementation and monitoring of multi-sector CTP, and the potential Value for Money (VFM) gains of this approach.

# **METHODOLOGY**

## **A. FIELD VISIT ONE**

Based on the rationale for the review, 3 main research themes were jointly agreed upon by the SC Philippines office and the lead SCUK FSL adviser (Isabelle Pelly). These were: 1) The use of market analysis in programme design; and the impact of programmes on market recovery; 2) The transition from siloed CTP to integrated CTP; 3) The efficiency and effectiveness of CTP implementation.

The SCUK FSL adviser travelled to the Philippines for 10 days between 24<sup>th</sup> November and 4<sup>th</sup> December 2014, and was accompanied by the CTP research officer (Camila Inarra). The aims of this visit were to engage with the country team to define specific ToR based on the three research themes (including components to be outsourced to an external consultant); document information already available (e.g. from PDMs or other agencies) and identify additional data collection needs to answer the research questions. The initial research framework developed during this visit (Annex 5) includes detailed sub-questions - linked to OECD/DAC evaluation criteria and sectoral benchmarks – and proposed methodology and informants for each.

## **B. SECONDARY DATA REVIEW**

In order to evaluate the appropriateness of the CTP activities used during the Haiyan response, secondary data was collected from the three field sites. Data collected and analysed includes baseline and endline reports, grant proposals, Complaint and Response Mechanisms (CRMs) and Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) Reports (see Annex 4 for a complete list of internal secondary data reviewed).

The baselines, endlines and proposal documents were used to determine the original objectives of the CTPs, and whether or not these were met. CRMs and PDMs were used to analyse beneficiary satisfaction with the programmes, their perception on programme appropriateness, and programme outcomes. Findings from all the secondary data analysed have been placed in relevant sections throughout the report to complement the findings from the researchers' second field visit.

## C. FIELD VISIT TWO

The SCUUK FSL adviser and David de Wild (Markets consultant) returned to the Philippines from 1<sup>st</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> February, accompanied by the CTP research officer. Data collection plans for all pending research questions were developed prior to the visit (see Annex 4), and formed the basis for the development of semi-structured questionnaires for all key informants (internal and external) and FGD templates. The visit covered all three Haiyan response field bases and concluded with a presentation of preliminary findings to key staff in the Country Office on 16<sup>th</sup> February. The full list of informants is contained in Annex 2.

## D. SCOPE OF REVIEW AND LIMITATIONS

As the use of CTP in the Haiyan response was extensive and varied across sectors and field bases, the scope of the study was also broad, and limited in depth analysis of the effectiveness of interventions in meeting their specific sector outcomes. The review has covered CTPs implemented between January 2014 and February 2015, though the primary focus of the conclusions and recommendations is on interventions in the first six months of the response.

The research piece was initially intended to be based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to provide statistically valid conclusions. However, the methodologies actually used were primarily qualitative because it was not possible to identify control groups, sample sizes (e.g. for Fresh Food Voucher traders) would have been too large, and existing PDM data was generally not statistically representative.


Another limitation was the lack of consistency in programme documentation across grants, sectors and field bases, which limited comparability. Specifically, it was difficult to find clear information on programme objectives or a theory of change against which to measure relevance and effectiveness. There is also a potential for bias in the locations selected for some of the key questions (namely integration) as the research team primarily visited areas where SC had a large operational presence across sectors, and thus was likely to be well perceived as an organisation. Overall, the time-frame of the research meant that coverage was not extensive and a selective approach had to be taken for some programmes with considerable variety (e.g. evaluation of the support to community associations). Wherever possible however, the research team has cross-checked conclusions with relevant programme staff to ensure the findings are reflective of the programme as a whole.

This experience highlighted the critical importance of strong baseline information on markets and households to demonstrate any causal attribution between programmes and outcomes, particularly in a constantly changing recovery environment.

## I. SUMMARY OF SC CASH AND MARKET-BASED PROGRAMMES

SC started its intervention by providing in-kind food aid (as an implementing partner for WFP) and NFIs, such as household kits, dignity kits, and shelter kits, to beneficiaries in the islands of Leyte and Panay. It began its CTP in December 2013, initially with community cash grants for irrigation canal clearing in Eastern Leyte and from two months after the typhoon onwards, with UCTs in Western Leyte and Panay. Later in the response, SC provided CCTs to support both shelter and livelihoods recovery. In July 2014, for the first time in the Philippines, SC's Eastern and Western Leyte offices moved towards an integrated approach to CTP intended to provide beneficiaries with a complete package of cash-based assistance for Shelter, WASH and FSL. There has been much interest among other members of the organization and donors to better understand the efficiency and effectiveness gains of a multi-sector approach.

Overall, for the Haiyan Response, SC distributed approximately PHP 380 million worth of cash assistance (equivalent to USD 8.5 million) in Eastern and Western Leyte and Panay.





The types of CTPs reviewed for this research are:

- **Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCTs)**
- **Fresh Food Vouchers (FFVs)**
- **Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) for livelihoods inputs**
- **CCTs to sari-sari store owners (small convenience stores)**
- **Community Cash Grants (CCGs) to associations**
- **CCTs for Shelter (as an integrated approach with unconditional cash for immediate needs and conditional cash for latrines)**

Annex I contains a detailed summary of each programme by location with the number of beneficiaries reached, total cash disbursed, timeframe of the distributions and a short description of the program.

The following tables give an overview of the cash distributed by SC for the Haiyan response per field site, sector and modality from November 2013 to December 2014.





As of December 2014, for all field offices, the FSL sector distributed around USD 6 million (PHP 267 million) through UCTs and CCTs and CCGs for livelihoods, whereas the shelter sector distributed USD 2.3 million (PHP 100 million) in CCTs and WASH distributed USD 180,000 (PHP 8 million) through CCTs. Most of the CTPs distributed were UCTs for immediate needs USD 3.3 million (PHP 149.6 million), followed by CCTs for shelter USD 2.2 million (PHP 98 million) individual CCTs for livelihoods USD 1.8 million (PHP 83 million), and CCGs for livelihoods 1.4 million (PHP 62 million). Overall, 79% of the money used for CTP was grant money and the remaining 21% came from Appeal funds.

The three timelines presented in Annex I give a general overview of the timing of CTP activities in Eastern Leyte, Western Leyte and Iloilo from when Haiyan hit on November 8 2013 to February 2015, when the CTP research was finalized. Despite programmes across sites having similar objectives, the delivery of projects differed as a result of timing of grant funding, timing of needs and market assessments, timing of targeting and program managers' individual designs. For example, despite food and boat market assessments being conducted in Eastern Leyte one month after the typhoon, UCTs for food needs weren't distributed until January 2014 and CCTs to fishermen weren't distributed until October 2014, even though Appeal funds were approved to be utilised in June 2014. Funding cycles emerge as an over-arching constraint to CTP effectiveness across modalities; as do internal operational constraints, which will be specifically reviewed in section 5. These timelines will be referred to throughout the report to better analyse the design and timing of the CTPs.

## 2. NEED AND USE OF MARKET ANALYSIS IN RESPONSE DESIGN AND MODALITY USE

The need to understand markets when planning and implementing Cash Transfer Programmes (CTPs) is widely acknowledged among humanitarian actors. CTPs depend on relevant markets being able to respond to an increased demand for commodities. An organisation planning CTPs should be able to answer the following questions:

- Are markets able to deliver the commodities people need?
- At what prices are the markets able to deliver the commodities people need?
- What impact is the CTP likely to have on the local economy?<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Does not include cash amounts for WASH or alternative marine livelihoods.

<sup>7</sup> See also ICRC & IFRC (2007).

A lack of understanding with the markets may hinder organisational decision-making around CTPs, potentially reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes. It also increases the risk of programmes that may harm the local economy. To answer the above questions, a market assessment needs to be carried out before any CTP is implemented.

Once a CTP is implemented, markets must be monitored to see if the assumptions about the markets being able to meet demand remain appropriate. In the aftermath of a sudden-onset disaster the situation in the markets often changes quickly as traders and customers adapt to the new situation. Consequently, market assessment information has a limited period of relevance. Monitoring is important because it is usually not possible to predict how markets evolve.

## **2.1. External Availability of Market Information**

While markets should always be considered when implementing CTPs, this does not mean that SC itself must always conduct the required assessments. If appropriate assessments conducted by other actors are available, SC can refer to them. The following discusses some assessments that could have been relevant to SC's programmes and explains how they were or could have been used by the SC staff implementing the CTPs. Using secondary information can speed up programme implementation and should always be considered.

A central external market assessment was conducted by WFP and published in December 2013.<sup>8</sup> The assessment was intended to serve as an operational tool for initial decision making and planning of CTP for all humanitarian actors. Noteworthy is the information on market catchment areas that SC could have used to plan market assessments for its various CCTs. It provided a good initial overview of how markets were functioning immediately after the typhoon, how they were likely to develop in the near future and what type of CTP programming might be appropriate.

In January 2014, the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) presented a secondary data review with a separate section on market analysis.<sup>9</sup> The document presented an overview of the different market analyses conducted in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon and summarized the respective findings for various market types. It contained useful information for the different sectors soon after the typhoon and provided a good basis decision making and planning of CTP. Essentially, most assessments stated that markets were recovering quickly and CTP was appropriate if implemented at a moderate pace.

Though the mentioned sources provided rather general information, they could have been used more effectively by SC sector teams to conduct their response analyses and devise their CTPs accordingly. This is particularly true in cases where sector teams did not conduct their own market assessments but it would have also been advantageous in cases where they did as a way of crosschecking assumptions and conclusions. The interviews with SC staff did not allow the research team to determine if and to what extent secondary market information had been used to design the different CTPs and the available programme documentation did not make these references. Only the Eastern Leyte FSL team mentioned the use of secondary market assessment information. A member stated that they refrained from conducting their own market assessment to implement UCTs because the ACAPS summary clearly stated that markets were recovering quickly and CTPs could be implemented at a slow pace.

Market monitoring information can usually also be obtained from different sources. In the context, WFP and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) monitored several markets on a regular basis. While WFP was mainly monitoring prices of key commodities, DTI was monitoring the prices and

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<sup>8</sup> WFP: Rapid Market Assessment, Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 10 November – 10 December 2013.

<sup>9</sup> ACAPS: Secondary Data Review – January 2014, Philippines Typhoon Yolanda.

the number of traders for key commodities in different markets.<sup>10</sup> In a context where most statements on price developments were based on general impressions, having this information would have been valuable. The Eastern Leyte FSL team is the only team that mentioned having used secondary price data (from WFP) to analyse the market situation. None of the sector teams seems to have contacted DTI to obtain price information.

It is felt that the market information available in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon would have been sufficient to start most of SC's programmes. Examples include SC's various UCT programmes and the Fresh Food Voucher (FFV) programme in Eastern Leyte.<sup>11</sup> Whilst the information would have been sufficient to start the programme, close monitoring of the markets relevant for the respective programmes would have been necessary to continuously assess if these markets remained able to meet demand. For some programmes the available information may have been insufficient to start them. SC considered this to be the case for their fishermen support programme and therefore decided to conduct a detailed assessment of the market for boat repair materials (see section 2.2.1 below).

While monitoring the markets relevant to their programmes, SC should have also followed the ongoing assessment and monitoring activities of other actors in order to stay informed about market developments. The Cash Working Group (CWG)<sup>12</sup>, the OCHA Cash Coordinator, the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC), and the Early Recovery and Livelihoods Cluster (ERLC) were good potential sources of this information. SC actively participated in the CWG, FSAC, and ERLC at the field level and asked OCHA's Cash Coordinator for secondary information to support its programming decisions. However, it is not clear what information was gathered from these sources, how it was used, and whether it was shared with all relevant staff to create an internal common understanding about the situation and evolution of the markets relevant to their programmes.

SC regularly participated in the meetings of the CWG in Manila and Tacloban. The CWGs in Roxas were much less functional and the distance between Estancia and Roxas made regular participation difficult. In future emergencies, SC should ensure consistent attendance at national and regional CWG's, taking a leadership role where possible (as was the case with the Early Recovery Working Group in Roxas, which SC's FSL manager initially led). Cash coordination should not be sector-specific; rather SC should appoint a focal person for cash coordination within the PDQ team. The CWG should more systematically be used as a forum for standard-setting and coordination on cross-sectoral market analysis (rather than this being limited to specific sector working groups).

## **2.2. Market Analysis Conducted by SC Programmes**

Market assessments can take different forms and scopes. As mentioned above, in the context of CTP, their purpose is always to inform the assessor on whether local markets are able to deliver the commodities the people need and to determine the prices at which they are able to do so. At times answering these questions takes a comprehensive assessment; at times it just takes a few key informant or focus group discussions, with the choice of approach depending on the context and the scope of the intended CTP. With this in mind, the following discusses the need for and use of SC's market assessments.

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<sup>10</sup> The evaluation team asked DTI for the market monitoring information and obtained price-monitoring data for a few regional marketplaces (Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Guimaras, Iloilo, and Negros Occidental). While these market places were not of direct interest to SC, the price information would have provided valuable reference points to compare price developments in the target area with the general price developments in the region.

<sup>11</sup> Considering the WFP assessment would have allowed to forgo or at least significantly streamline the market assessment that was conducted in February 2014 to prepare the FFV programme.

<sup>12</sup> On the role and usefulness of the CWG see G. Smith: Cash Coordination in the Philippines: A Review of Lessons Learned during the Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan, February 2015. The CWG made an effort to gather information on market developments both from the humanitarian and the private sector and then share it with all actors interested. It is likely that OCHA will institutionalise this service.

### 2.2.1. Food Markets Assessment for Leyte and Panay

SC conducted two rapid food market assessments on Panay and Leyte Islands. Both assessments were conducted shortly after the typhoon had hit the region and provided a general overview of the rice and vegetable markets. The assessment for Panay was finalised by 28 November 2013 and the one for Leyte by 6 December 2013. The available reports are titled *Food Markets Rapid Assessment Summary Panay* and *Food Markets Rapid Assessment Summary Leyte*. While both documents contain useful information on the status of the two markets, they do not explain how the information was collected or what it was collected for. In this sense they appear incomplete.

None of the interviewed staff reported that the two assessments had been used in programme design and no respective references could be found in the available programme documents, so it is difficult to demonstrate the link between market analysis and response analysis. This had been attributed in part to rapid staff turnover over this period. Had the market assessments included a few more basic commodities they could have been used to inform the timing and value of UCTs. The evaluation found that the Western Leyte FSL team had in fact planned to conduct a multi-sectoral Rapid Assessment of Markets (RAM), but that this was not carried out, for unclear reasons. This seems like a missed opportunity as the RAM would have been ideal to inform initial CTPs, particularly UCTs.

### 2.2.2. Boat Inputs Market Assessment Eastern Leyte

SC considered the available secondary information to be insufficient to start its fishermen support programme and thus decided to conduct a detailed assessment of the market for boat repair materials. It was felt that a potential intervention would generate a particularly large increase in the demand for very specific inputs and wanted to make sure the respective markets could meet potential demand. SC brought in a senior FSL advisor from SCUUK to conduct the assessment. Due to the dynamic nature of the markets, SC also decided to implement a market monitoring system to follow prices of boat repair materials during the initial phase of the response.

SC's market assessment of boat inputs, conducted in November 2013, was by far the most complete and highest quality assessment and very timely. It was clearly focused on preparing the ground for a CTP to support vulnerable fishermen in re-starting their livelihoods. The assessment provides a detailed analysis and argues convincingly that CTPs are an appropriate option to support vulnerable fishermen. It also proposes values for an eventual cash grants: PHP 9,000 – 15,000 depending on boat size. The FSL team decided to set the grant value at PHP 15,000 to make sure people were able to restore their boats.<sup>13</sup>

The assessment provides a detailed overview of the markets for boat inputs in Iloilo and Leyte and was used by the FSL teams to devise their fishermen support programmes. The assessment helped to shape the interventions according to regional specificities: SC took different approaches in Panay and Leyte due to issues around illegal logging of hardwood used to make hulls. Conducting such a detailed market assessment takes a significant amount of time and requires skilled staff (such as the SCUUK FSL specialist who led on the food and boat market assessments). Because time and skilled staff are scarce in emergency situations, a decision on which assessments to prioritise should be cross-sectoral. Whilst the boat markets assessment was of high quality and contributed to livelihoods programme design, it does beg the question as to why a comparative assessment was not prioritised for shelter and WASH commodity markets.

Specifically for the boat inputs market assessment, it is difficult to demonstrate how much of the information coming from the assessment was actually needed and used (see section 3.5 on CCGs versus Individual Livelihoods CCTs). Yet, in the future every effort should be made to keep such assessments as streamlined as possible, and to ensure findings are disseminated and applied widely. SC did disseminate its boat input markets assessment through the CWG and it was much appreciated by other humanitarian actors.

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<sup>13</sup> It must be noted that the CTPs for fishermen were not part of the evaluation.

It is interesting to note that the CWG agencies abandoned initial plans of conducting a joint Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA) early on because they felt it was too heavy a process with respect to the rapidly changing markets (remember the EMMA provides a snapshot). One could argue the same for the boat inputs market assessment. Some short discussions with local input providers and a little assessment on the cost of repairing or rebuilding different types of boats might have been sufficient (followed of course by market monitoring once the programme was implemented).

### **2.2.3. Fresh foods market assessment in Eastern Leyte**

The Eastern Leyte FSL team did not judge the rapid food market assessment for Leyte sufficient to justify its Fresh Food Voucher (FFV) programme and conducted a more detailed fresh food market assessment that focused on the fruit, vegetable, meat, chicken, and egg markets. The assessment estimates the typical pre-typhoon monthly fresh food consumption of average households in the different locations. It also determines the number of vegetable, fruit, fish, and meat traders (wholesalers/retailers and retailers) in the threemunicipal markets, their trade volumes, and the regions from which the different products are procured. Yet, it does not analyse whether the traders would be able to cover the potential additional demand the FFV programme might generate.

The assessment was also used to identify traders that could potentially be accredited to participate in the programme. These traders were required to attend trainings on the FFV schemes and self-assess their capacity to participate in the programme. Some of the identified traders backed out after the training because they were concerned whether the programme would actually work and be beneficial for them (see also section 3.2.2).

The assessment estimated the pre-typhoon monthly fresh food consumption for average households. Yet, the respective results appear odd: While the monthly consumption for average households in Tanauan and Tolosa was estimated at PHP 1,423 and PHP 1,506 respectively, the monthly consumption for average households in Palo was estimated at PHP 3,475 – more than twice as high. The assessment does not provide any explanation for the big discrepancy and it does not make any recommendation regarding the voucher value. The actual value of the voucher appears to have been decided upon in November 2013 – before the assessment had even been conducted. While the voucher was intended to complement rice and other food items being distributed at the time, the justification for its value remains unclear.

In this respect a less comprehensive assessment would have been sufficient to support the decision to implement the FFV programme – particularly, because the programme was of quiet moderate scope (see section 3.2 on FFV below).

The FSL team in Eastern Leyte put a simple price monitoring system in place to see if the programme would drive up fresh food prices in the local marketplaces. Early into the programme SC received complaints from beneficiaries that traders were overcharging them opportunistically. SC addressed the issue directly with the trader but did not document the event. The actual price data that was collected and entered into excel spreadsheets does not appear to have been analysed and was thus only of limited use.

### **2.2.4. Market price monitoring in Iloilo**

In January 2014, SC Iloilo started monitoring prices of food commodities, boat construction materials, and shelter construction materials on a monthly basis. In June 2014, it increased the monitoring frequency and collected the prices bi-weekly – on market days and on non-market days. In September, SC then returned to a monthly price-monitoring scheme. It is usually recommended to choose a high monitoring frequency in the immediate aftermath of a shock (i.e. weekly or bi-weekly) and lower the frequency (i.e. monthly) when prices begin to stabilise.

In its Market Price Monitoring Report issued in November 2014<sup>14</sup>, SC states that the scope of the price monitoring is insufficient to allow in-depth analysis. However, the report states that prices are very stable and the different graphs support this statement. The statements on the availability of commodities are hard to interpret because it is not clear how the assessment team has come to the respective conclusions.

The price monitoring report recommends among other things that the scope of the market assessment be increased and technical assistance (e.g. from backstops) be requested to help with the proper analysis of the data. The report suggests that the assessment team had only limited experience in monitoring prices and markets and is in need of respective capacity building. It is not clear to what extent the available price data has been used for programming purposes but it is felt that both use and usefulness were limited. Price monitoring should have been implemented with clear-cut questions in mind and designed accordingly (e.g. sufficient number of traders to monitor, clear product descriptions, focus on most important items, use of minimum expenditure baskets to follow developments etc.). It is however recognised that this requires strong capacity building of local staff, and the initiative to implement a price monitoring system should certainly be praised.

### **2.2.5. Lack of shelter material market monitoring**

The Eastern Leyte and Western Leyte shelter and WASH teams made only a limited effort to assess markets or monitor prices. While the Iloilo and Eastern Leyte shelter teams felt that a potential CTP supporting fishermen to repair their boats could generate a problematic increase in the demand for very specific inputs and wanted to make sure the respective markets could meet potential demand the mentioned shelter and WASH teams do not appear to have had similar concerns and paid much less attention to the markets capacity to deliver and to the possibility of the programme causing harm to the local economy.

Rather, the shelter and WASH teams in Eastern Leyte and Western Leyte conducted some ad-hoc market assessments talking to a few traders in the markets that were of interest and trying to get a general idea of their capacity to provide shelter materials and the prices of these materials. The assessments were not structured and the results were not presented in a report. It is thus impossible to judge the quality, appropriateness, and usefulness of the analysis.

Since the shelter markets had largely recovered by the time the shelter programmes in Western Leyte and Eastern Leyte were implemented (see Section 3.3), and several external sources were pointing this out, the ad hoc assessments may have been sufficient. However, the shelter and WASH teams should still have implemented a price monitoring system to follow up on how the market was evolving. As mentioned earlier price monitoring provides some information on whether the grant values remain appropriate and whether the programme might cause harm to the local economy. The ad hoc assessments and spot-checks conducted by the Eastern Leyte and Western Leyte WASH and shelter teams were insufficient, and the development of market behaviour should have been monitored more closely.

The Western Leyte shelter team had a concern regarding price monitoring of shelter materials. The team feared that such monitoring could drive traders to establish standard prices and reduce the possibilities of the beneficiary households to negotiate better conditions. This risk, however, was limited and could have been easily prevented by choosing an adequate monitoring approach.

## **2.3. Market analysis by SC operations/ logistics**

Eastern Leyte logistics was implicated in identifying the shelter materials traders for the Eastern Leyte WASH team's voucher programme in MacArthur and Mayorga that intended to support households with materials to build latrines. The assessment was conducted like a normal procurement job looking mainly at getting the best value for the money. The main objective of this assessment was to obtain the best deal for in-kind procurement of WASH materials to deliver to

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<sup>14</sup> SC: Market Price Monitoring Report, July – October 2014.

beneficiaries, rather than any intention to support the market. In the end, logistics identified only one supplier.

In a similar way the Eastern Leyte finance team was implicated in the Fresh Food Voucher programme. They selected the traders that were to be accredited for the voucher programme based on a competitive bid analysis. Here too the idea of supporting the market was of no direct concern since it was reported as early as December 2013 that markets were already working.

Logistics in Western Leyte and Iloilo did not have any role in assessing markets or monitoring prices for any of the CTP programmes, missing the opportunity to use the skills and contacts of the team. Logistics was almost exclusively implicated in the in-kind programmes and conducted respective market assessments in Cebu, Davao, and Manila. SC even established a logistics hub in Cebu to facilitate the in-kind requirements in the three programme areas. Logistics' market assessments and analysis could have provided additional valuable information for the response analysis and programme design of the different sector teams in the programme areas.

## 2.4. Conclusions

Market analysis should always be part of the response analysis. Before planning and implementing a CTP, the functionality of relevant markets must be assessed. This does not mean that an organisation has to conduct a market assessment by itself; it may just as well refer to secondary sources for its analysis. The analysis should be spelled out and be part of the programme description. It should reveal the reasoning behind the choice of modality and eventual critical assumptions it is based on.

The two rapid food market assessments SC conducted for Panay and Leyte should have been replaced by a more general rapid market assessment such as the RAM.<sup>15</sup> Such an assessment could have provided information about the situation of some key markets to inform SC's early programming decisions – notably the possibility to implement UCTs. It is felt that such an initial assessment could have helped to focus SC's attention on the general state of the markets and serve as basis to identify information gaps and further needs for analysis and assessment.

The boat market assessment was of very good quality providing all the necessary information to launch a respective CTP. The shelter and WASH teams planned and implemented their CTP programmes without respective market assessments. The teams based their programming decisions on general observations and ad hoc assessments and did not conduct a systematic analysis of their respective findings. While this does not seem to have caused any major problems, the approach was insufficient with respect to the scope of the programmes. The teams should have analysed their findings and spelled them out as part of their programme description (possibly using secondary sources to support their arguments).

Market and price monitoring activities and respective analyses were generally insufficient to validate the appropriateness of its CTP programmes and to verify they were not causing harm to the local economy, and, where monitoring was done, this was not translated into analysis. The price monitoring system the Iloilo sector teams implemented is a good example to illustrate the latter. While putting a market monitoring system in place was the right decision, the way in which markets were monitored and the data was analysed reveals a lack of technical capacity (which was also pointed out by those who conducted the work). There is thus a need for technical guidance and capacity building on market monitoring and analysis. Market and price monitoring system should be conducted in a way that allows proper analysis. They should be focussed on a few specific questions and provide a timely analysis allowing a continuous validation of the appropriateness of a programme. The choice of the market-related factors to monitor depends on the programme, its objectives, and any contextual factors that may need close attention (e.g. government policy, tax

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<sup>15</sup> Rapid Assessment for Markets (RAM), Guidelines for initial emergency market assessment, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 2014.

rates etc.). The most common factors to monitor are prices, commodities (availability, quantity, and quality), and those relating to trader engagement (for example, number of active traders).<sup>16</sup>

Market analysis and monitoring is intrinsic to the role of logistics. They know how to communicate with large traders and they are used to gather and work with price data. Consequently it would make sense to have them participate in the market analysis and monitoring activities required to implement and run CTPs. A working relationship needs to be established and clearer SOPs distinguishing the role of programmes and logistics teams, and jointly develop <sup>17</sup> assessment and monitoring tools.

## 2.5. Recommendations

1. **Identify and use available market information to save time and prevent duplication (e.g. WFP market assessment).**
2. **Identify and use available price monitoring data to analyse the development of markets to save time and prevent duplication (e.g. DTI price monitoring data).**
3. **Focus market assessment on closing specific information gaps if and where necessary and streamline assessments respectively (full market assessments are nice to have but not always necessary).**
4. **Clearly present the assumptions and conclusions of the market analysis and the sources they are based on in programme descriptions (this serves as reference for monitoring and evaluation).**
5. **Implement a market monitoring system to ascertain that the programme remains appropriate and does not cause harm to the local economy.**
6. **Implicate Logistics in the design and implementation of market assessment and monitoring systems**

# 3. APPROPRIATENESS AND RELEVANCE OF SC'S CTPs

## 3.1. UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS

### 3.1.1. Response analysis and choice of modalities

The FSL teams in Iloilo, Western Leyte, and Eastern Leyte decided to implement Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCTs) as a first response to support vulnerable households to cover basic needs. In all three locations the response was based on the findings of SC's Multi Sector Assessment (MSA) identifying food, shelter, and the restoration of livelihoods as the main priorities. In all three locations, food needs seem to have been the main intervention priority. Initially, in the absence of quantified information on the value of food needs, SC coordinated its proposed value with other NGOs. SC aligned the value of its UCTs with Action Contre la Faim (ACF) with whom it was in a consortium. Only eventually were these values more or less mirrored by the WFP food basket value.

SC conducted a food market assessment in Panay and an assessment of the market for boat building supplies in mid-late November 2013. Both assessments indicated that the respective markets were functioning sufficiently to allow CTPs. There was no specific market assessment or analysis for the UCT programme. The FSL teams seem to have based their decisions on the results of the mentioned assessments as well as their general observations.

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<sup>16</sup> Market Analysis Guidance (MAG), International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 2014.

<sup>17</sup> The development of a joint logistics/programmes approach to market analysis is planned globally across SC in 2015

In all three locations UCTs were chosen because they allowed households to spend the cash on the needs they deemed most pressing and because of their potential to revive local markets. The choice of the modality was appropriate because there was only limited specific information on household needs and because the available market assessments and the general observations indicated that food markets were able to supply goods.

### 3.1.2. Relevance

#### Value of transfers

The FSL teams in all three locations based the value of the grant on the monthly food requirements of an average household of five people. The Iloilo team had set the value to PHP 4,100, the Western Leyte team to PHP 4,000, and the Eastern Leyte team to PHP 3,700 (and later adjusted to PHP 4,000-5,000). The Eastern Leyte team initially opted for a lower UCT value because they considered the grant to be a top-up for the on-going food distributions. Alas, none of the FSL teams devised a document explaining the composition of the consumer basket that was used to determine the value of the grant. It is therefore not possible to determine the underlying causes for the differing grant values.

In comparison, WFP recommended PHP 4,300 – 4,500 to cover the monthly rice and non-rice food needs of an average household of five people in Region VIII (Eastern Visayas).<sup>18</sup> However, when WFP initiated its UCTs in December 2013, it provided households with only PHP 2,600 per month because they were simultaneously receiving in-kind food assistance. In this respect the early UCTs of Eastern Leyte's FSL team, which were distributed while food distributions were still going on, were generous with respect to the objective of increasing access to food.

Without knowing the exact objectives of and the reasoning behind the different UCT programmes, it is difficult to assess their appropriateness. However, since the monthly food needs depend on household size the FSL teams could have considered adapting the grant value to the family size. Tzu Chi's intervention suggests that this can be done without significantly compromising on implementation speed – they distributed cash grants of PHP 8,000, 12,000 or 15,000 depending on the number of household members.

A question that arises when discussing the value and appropriateness of the grant is the potential to design UCTs as multipurpose grants, intended to allow households to cover their most urgent immediate needs. Consequently, their value should be based on a Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) adapted to the context. Such a MEB needs to be defined and calculated – and should include a variety of food and non-food requirements<sup>19</sup>.

During the response to Haiyan donor requirements forced SC to focus its UCTs on food assistance. Whilst donor constraints are acknowledged, it is felt that this restriction should have been an advocacy point, linked to the broader global discussion on unconditional cash which donors are participating in.

Harmonisation of UCTs between different humanitarian actors was a topic discussed throughout the response to Haiyan. An ECHO-funded evaluation of cash coordination during the response<sup>20</sup> states that actors desired greater harmonisation of CTP approaches including through sharing and using joint tools. The only way to discuss and define the appropriate value for UCTs is to define what the respective grants are intended for. A Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB), agreed upon at inter-

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<sup>18</sup> See J. Mayans: Food Security and Livelihood Rapid Assessment in inland municipalities of Leyte, Solidarités International, January 2014.

<sup>19</sup> In the Philippines, the minimum wage rates could be an alternative to a MEB. Taking the minimum monthly wage rate for non-agricultural work for Region 8 (260 PHP) and following the official formula of the Department of Labour and Employment for calculating the equivalent monthly wage rate for a person that is not paid on rest days and Sundays (i.e. working 313 days per year) this would mean a monthly UCT of 6,780 PHP.

<sup>20</sup> Smith (2015)

agency level is the ideal tool for this purpose. The availability of an MEB would prevent multiple assessments by different actors and allow a unified monitoring approach. If certain actors decide to design a more comprehensive basket they can still do so by explaining why the MEB is not sufficient for their approach. In future, if an MEB cannot be established jointly with other actors, SC should define one on its own and advocate for its general use.

Of course the discussions around the timing of UCTs and the value of the grants are also influenced by the availability of funds and the size of the target population. Implementing a UCT programme will typically lead to discussions around the extent of the individual support and the outreach of the programme. These questions will be further addressed in the Conclusion and Recommendations section and the section on the Optimal Timeline.

### **Selection Criteria**

The Iloilo and Eastern Leyte FSL teams<sup>21</sup> used a similar set of simple general vulnerability criteria to select beneficiary households for its UCT programme, and the Western Leyte FSL team used community based wealth ranking. While nothing speaks against different criteria and selection processes in different locations, the evaluation revealed no obvious reasons for such differences. Moreover, sectoral and MEAL advisers had recommend respective harmonisations.

In the absence of in-depth household assessments, targeting was a general challenge for all humanitarian actors. While communities generally accepted SC's selection criteria, it appears that they were not really understood. This seems to be confirmed by PDM results stating that sizeable shares of beneficiary households reported that the programme had led to tensions in the communities (Iloilo over 30%<sup>22</sup>, Western Leyte over 15%, and Eastern Leyte over 10%). During several interviews staff noted the targeting process had not identified the most vulnerable.

Coverage varied notably between locations: the Eastern Leyte FSL team included all barangays of the two municipalities targeted (Dulag and Mayorga) in their UCT programme and selected almost their entire population (9,453 HH) as its intervention was intended as a top-up of the on-going blanket food distributions; the Iloilo FSL team included 37 of the 183 barangays (20 %) of the four municipalities targeted (Batad, Concepcion, Iloilo, and San Dionisio) and selected around 19 % of the respective population (5,250 HH); the Western Leyte FSL team included 15 of the 183 barangays of the four municipalities targeted (Ormoc, Kananga, San Isidro, and Villaba) and selected around 3 % of the respective population (2,303 HH). The high coverage attained by the Eastern Leyte team is likely to have contributed to the fact that fewer households reported tensions in the communities.

In the immediate aftermath of the typhoon households' needs were highest and it was difficult to say who was more and who was less vulnerable. Moreover, needs varied significantly from one household to another. It would have been the ideal situation for blanket UCTs as Tzu Chi had implemented them in Leyte (see section 7.2) allowing all households to cover their different immediate needs.

Targeted UCT programmes require information on the vulnerability of households and time to implement. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster both information and time are scarce. Moreover, there are typically a multitude of other actors simultaneously implementing similar programmes further complicating targeted approaches. Under such circumstances it is more appropriate to consider coordinated geographically targeted UCT programmes with blanket coverage. Starting with respective programmes would provide SC and other actors with time to gather the information necessary for switching to targeted programmes (see also section Optimal Timeline).

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<sup>21</sup> In addition, the Eastern Leyte FSL team used a few exclusion criteria. The following categories of households could not be included in the programmes: Households with members that are government officials, salaried members, businessmen, pensioners, large land property as well as households that receive regular remittances to support their basic needs or have a non-affected or already recovered business.

<sup>22</sup> In Iloilo there had been a re-targeting after the initial targeting which seems to have been one of the main reasons for the mentioned tensions.

### **Complementarity with other interventions**

Humanitarian actors that used UCTs shortly after the typhoon noted that household spent the cash on a wide variety of products and services illustrating the wide variety of needs. Significant shares of the disbursed cash were spent on shelter repair illustrating that people had a strong preference for addressing their housing situation soon after the typhoon. Whilst several comments by key informants and beneficiary households suggested that the values of SC's grants were not large enough to conduct substantial shelter repairs they were nonetheless providing a welcome respective support – particularly in a situation where shelter support programmes were late.

In situations where there is little information about specific needs and/or actors are already implementing a variety of programmes, UCTs are a good modality. UCTs allow beneficiary households to use the cash for whatever needs are not or not sufficiently covered. In the integrated MAC2 programmes implemented by SC Western Leyte and Eastern Leyte the respective FSL teams used UCTs exactly in this way: the grants were to allow beneficiary households to cover essential expenditures so that they could use the conditional cash grants as intended – to restore shelters, latrines, and livelihoods. The UCTs were adapted to the general context whether they were disbursed as part of an integrated programme or as an independent intervention, and as described in the integration section below (section 4), they were often a pre-condition for successful outcomes in other sectors.

### **Availability and price of inputs**

The rapid market assessment SC conducted in December 2013 states that the rice market was not yet fully functional. However, because WFP was distributing rice through its implementing partners access to rice was not an issue (for more on the impact of the in-kind distributions see section 7.3). SC's rapid market assessment also stated that other food markets had not been adversely affected by the typhoon. According to the traders interviewed, fresh food would have been available as early as January 2014. The UCT programme implemented by the Eastern Leyte FSL team to top up the WFP's on-going rice-distributions was an ideal intervention and allowing people to buy fresh foods as well as to address other immediate needs.

A key informant mentioned that while supermarkets and other large stores in Eastern Leyte had been looted in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon, people set up small shops around town selling items they had collected. This was the way in which many markets worked during the first weeks after the typhoon.

Tzu Chi and Samaritan's Purse started implementing sizeable CTPs as early as December 2013 and there have been no reports of limited availability of products or price increases. PRC and IFRC distributed UCTs to almost 49,900 households in municipalities on Panay and Leyte Island from February to mid-March 2014. The PRC PDM reports for the intervention suggest that beneficiary households were able to find what they needed in the local markets.

Markets had sufficiently recovered by the time SC implemented its UCTs. In all three locations almost all beneficiary households said they had managed to find what they were looking for in the local markets. Some households seem to have preferred larger municipal markets to the markets closest to them because they offered a larger choice and lower prices. Most beneficiary households assisted by the Iloilo and Eastern Leyte FSL teams did not believe that traders had increased prices due to the UCT programme. In Western Leyte however, around 20% believed that traders had done so. Without specific price monitoring data, these statements cannot be verified.

### **Use of the cash**

The SC PDM reports offer only little information on the utilisation of the cash transfers and the information available is not comparable between all locations. The PDM for Iloilo's initial UCT programme shows that most households used a significant part of the cash to start restoring their livelihoods or to buy food; the PDM for its second UCT programme on the other hand suggests that the cash was mostly spent on food and led to a significant improvement of the food consumption score. This illustrates the flexibility of the approach. The PDMs for Western Leyte's and Eastern

Leyte's UCT programmes suggest that beneficiary households spent the largest share of the cash on food products and the second largest on shelter repairs. In all locations, households used part of the cash to cover various minor but important expenses (e.g. school fees, health expenditures, debt services etc.).

Most beneficiary households in the three locations mentioned that cash had been the most appropriate form of assistance. However, some households mentioned they would have preferred in-kind food and shelter materials. Discussions during the field visits suggest that this is linked to transport costs.

### **3.1.3. Timeliness**

The Iloilo FSL team implemented its first UCT programme in the second half of February 2014 and its second one in the second half of May 2014; the Western Leyte FSL team implemented its UCT programme in May 2014; and the Eastern Leyte FSL team implemented its UCT programme from mid-January until the end of April 2014. As mentioned earlier, UCT programmes could have been implemented in all places as early as January 2014.

UCTs were implemented by other agencies as early as November 2013. In this respect all of SC's UCT were rather late. Moreover, even once the first distributions started, subsequent ones were not very timely. The Iloilo FSL team was the quickest: it took them about one month to distribute UCTs to 5,250 households. The Eastern Leyte FSL team was the slowest: it took them almost three months to distribute UCT's to 9,376 households. The largest contributing factor to these delays was the time taken to set up the necessary operational processes for CTP (delays see section 5). Despite these delays however, the programmes managed to cover a large number of households, delivering a total of PHP 150 million for UCTs.

In all three locations, limited human resources, time consuming assessments/selection processes, and delays in the set-up of the partnership with PHLPPost (see section 5) prevented the teams from implementing the UCT programmes quicker. In Western Leyte, the human resource problems appear to have been more pronounced than elsewhere – however, the implementation was also delayed because the partner organisations – The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and The International Labour Organization (ILO) – were very slow to deploy their activities. SC needed to coordinate the targeted barangays with them in order to be able to start their programmes. Yet, in February FAO and ILO had not been on the field yet. SC eventually took the decision to go ahead on its own.

### **3.1.4. Conclusions**

While originally intended to help bridging the food gap of households, the PDMs in all locations showed that households had diverse needs and spent the cash on a large variety of products and services. The UCT programmes proved a useful modality to address the immediate most pressing needs of vulnerable households. Cash grants empowered beneficiary households and provided them with dignity. The fact that households spent the cash on a large variety of products and services also meant that individual markets experienced less pressure as a consequence of cash transfers.

As the Iloilo PDM concludes, the UCT programme was only a temporary solution and people require livelihoods support to improve their situation sustainably. The UCT programmes were intended to be followed by CCT to support livelihood recovery – however no clear respective exit strategy and indicators were formulated. As a result of funding limitations, most UCTs were one-off (or two months of support in the case of Iloilo), which limited the potential for support to longer-term recovery.

Key informants mentioned that a higher amount would have allowed people to start restoring their shelters and their livelihoods earlier. An interesting way of checking this would be to look at the Tzu Chi programme and see what its beneficiary households spent their cash on and how this affected their recovery compared to households who had not benefitted from such generous support.

The GOP had recommended that humanitarian actors offer households basic UCTs enabling them to cover their typical monthly expenses. For a household with five members the grant should amount to PHP 7,000 – 8,000 and be delivered monthly over a period of three months to provide predictability. The GOP set the amount to cover monthly food expenditures at around PHP 5,300.<sup>23</sup> While these grant values were too high with respect to the available budgets, SC could have used them for advocacy and should have referred to them when establishing the value of their grants. This would have inevitably led to a re-allocation of resources from other activities, but the evidence for the value of early economic recovery (supported through UCTs) is compelling (as detailed in Section 4 on Integration below).

According to OCHA's Financial Tracking System, three quarters of the cash transfers disbursed by the humanitarian actors had been conditional. In this respect it would also be interesting to see how UCTs compare to CCTs with regard to households recovery. To assess whether UCTs can attain similar results as CCTs would require carefully devised respective pilot programmes and thorough impact evaluation. If UCTs prove to be as effective in helping households to recover as some of the CCTs, this would be an argument for increasing the share of the UCTs that require less administrative effort and cost to implement.

### **3.1.5. Recommendations**

- 1. Ensure that SC's internal accountability and financial mechanisms are in place.**
- 2. Consider blanket UCT's if they can be implemented shortly after the disaster, when it is difficult to determine who is affected to what extent and needs to vary a lot between households.**
- 3. Devise and cost-out a Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) - including food and non-food needs- and determine the objectives of UCTs relative to this MEB**
- 4. Devise and implement a price monitoring system to follow the cost of the MEB in case the programme runs over an extended period of time.**
- 5. Consider implementing a pilot programme where a number of households receives a substantial UCT designed to cover shelter, livelihoods, and other needs (i.e. high grant value) and compare the outcome of this programme with livelihood and shelter CCTs to see whether there are situations in which "cheaper" unconditional programmes might be suitable to substitute conditional programmes.**

## **3.2. FRESH FOOD VOUCHERS (FFV) PROGRAMME**

### **3.2.1. Response analysis and choice of modalities**

The FSL team in Eastern Leyte implemented a Fresh Food Voucher (FFV) programme to support the efforts of SC's Nutrition team, which had been implementing two nutrition interventions – the Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (BSFP) and the Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) programme – to address malnutrition among children in the municipalities of Palo, Tanauan, and Tolosa in Leyte. While there was an overlap with the UCT programme mentioned earlier, it is not clear how significant this overlap was. The objective of the FFV programme was to support the nutritional needs of households with 6 – 23 month old children by improving their infant and young child feeding practices as well as their financial access to micro-nutrient rich foods. The programme was not conceived to support the fresh food markets.

In December 2013, SC conducted a rapid assessment of the rice and vegetable markets. The assessment states that most vegetable traders had taken up their trading activities again and sales

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<sup>23</sup> See Recommendations of the Special Meeting of the National Advisory Committee (NAC), Humanitarian Agencies' Cash Transfer Programming for Typhoon Haiyan Survivors (<http://foodsecuritycluster.net>).

were normalising and had already almost reached pre-typhoon levels. It also mentions that small traders had lost their typical suppliers – small local vegetable producers – and were depending on larger wholesalers to procure supplies. These wholesalers were procuring the vegetables mostly from markets in Davao and Cebu – as they had before the typhoon. The assessment concludes that a voucher programme could be a viable option to support vegetable traders but recommends that it should consider how small traders, who had been particularly affected by the typhoon, are to be best integrated.

In addition to the market assessments above, in February 2014, SC conducted a more detailed market assessment to prepare the implementation of the FFV programme in the municipal markets of Palo, Tanauan, and Tolosa (see Section 2.2). The assessment does not manage to come up with a consistent estimate for the pre-typhoon average monthly fresh food consumption and fails to recommend a voucher value. Based on the observed trade volumes, the assessment team judged that the fresh food markets were able to cover the additional demand the FFV programme would generate. Yet, they failed to explain how they came to this conclusion, leaving the report incomplete.

### **3.2.2. Relevance**

#### **Value of transfers**

Households received one voucher of PHP 1,200 per month for three consecutive months. Each voucher consisted of eight coupons with a value of PHP 150 and each coupon had to be spent in full when used. A justification for the actual value of the FFV could not be found. The results of the fresh foods market assessment reveal that the value is slightly lower than the monthly fresh food expenditures of an average household from Tanauan or Tolosa and about one third of the respective expenditures of an average household from Palo. Without specifying a fresh foods consumer basket that people are supposed to be able to access, it is difficult to judge the appropriateness of the value of the transfer. It can only be said that the vouchers did allow households with restricted financial means to buy fresh foods for three months during a period when prices for these products were said to be higher than normal.

A problem with vouchers is that they are not divisible: If a household decided to use a PHP 150 coupon to buy a large fish for 130 PHP and the trader did not want to hand out the change in cash and could not provide it with 20 PHP worth of fish, the household ended up giving the entire 150 PHP coupon for 130 PHP worth of fish. Of course the problem only occurred in cases where the produce bought was not divisible at will – respective cases have been reported for fish and chicken. It is not clear how often the problem has occurred for these products but the PDM for the FFV programme states that traders only provided change for “underutilised vouchers”. However, coupons of a smaller denomination could have been a solution. When the vouchers were designed, a compromise was made between having smaller denominations and the reduced cost of printing voucher booklets with larger denominations, which may not have been appropriate. Another problem raised was that traders increased prices for households paying with vouchers. Some cases have been followed up by SC staff and appear to have been solved.

#### **Selection Criteria**

Two types of selection criteria were used to implement the FFV programme: the criteria to identify the beneficiary households and the criteria to determine the accredited traders to deliver the produce.

Identifying the beneficiary households started with selecting the barangays that were to be targeted by the FFV programme. Out of the 102 barangays in the three municipalities, 50 were selected to join the programme. The barangays were selected based on (i) the number of children 6 months to 24 months old, (ii) the number of reported cases of underweight and malnourished children, and (iii) the extent of damage the barangay had suffered from the typhoon (based on the knowledge of the municipal officers). Within the 50 barangays, households were selected if they had children 6–23 months old, had been included in the Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (BSFP) and Young

Child Feeding Programme (YCFP), and had a vulnerable livelihood profile. Based on these criteria 2,300 households were selected to join the programme.<sup>24</sup> While the beneficiary selection criteria were generally accepted, they were not entirely understood. Some of the women interviewed mentioned that they did not understand why not all breast-feeding women had been included in the programme.

The traders to join the programme were selected in the municipal marketplaces of Palo, Tanauan, and Tolosa (as well as some wholesalers in Tacloban in case the municipal marketplaces couldn't deliver). To be accredited they had to be legally operating their business, have a stable supply of produce, and offer reasonable prices. Initially some traders did not want to join the FFV programme. According to the FSL team this was because they did not know the concept and doubted it would work. However, the key informants met also mentioned that many traders lacked the financial capacity to bridge the gap between the fresh food sales to FFV beneficiaries and the reimbursement of the vouchers by SC. While the programme was open to all 184 traders that had been identified during the market assessment, in the end only 30 traders (16%) decided to join.

A trader who had not been accredited for the FFV programme said he had seen his sales go down as a consequence of the programme. The trader added that some non-accredited traders had been jealous of the accredited traders, who were able to increase their sales through the FFV programme.

### **Complementarity with other interventions and longer-term objectives**

As outlined above, the FFV programme was intended to supplement the concurrent BSFP and the YCFP in improving the nutritional status of the households' 6–23 month old children for three months. The PDM results suggest that the programme led to a slight improvement of the households' nutritional status for the duration of the programme. However, there is no indication that the three-month fresh food support will have any longer-term consequences on the nutritional status of children, and the nutritional status of the programme was not tracked beyond the end of the programme to test this.

### **Availability and price of inputs**

Only during the first weeks after the typhoon there were reports of poor availability of fresh foods. By the end of December most fresh food traders were said to have been trading again. At that time, supplies were limited because demand was low. Households lacked the means to buy fresh foods. However, wholesalers reported that fresh foods were available and local supply could have been easily scaled up. Indeed, one trader reported that the unconditional cash grants disbursed by Tzu Chi and Samaritan's purse in December 2013 motivated many traders to re-store their businesses in order to benefit from the increased purchasing power of households. Most traders stated that fresh food supply and prices had normalized between March and April 2014. That is, fresh food markets had recovered to a large extent before the FFV programme started (see also Section 3.4).

The FFV programme targeted 2,300 households. This corresponds to less than 8% of the three municipalities' total population – suggesting that the additional fresh food demand generated by the programme should not have exceeded the markets' capacity to supply. As most suppliers of fresh foods had not been affected by the typhoon, all that local traders needed was access to working capital to re-start their businesses. For some, this working capital was hard to come by. Traders with access to financial means through relatives, creditors, or other sources recovered quicker than those who did not have these possibilities.

Fresh food prices were said to be higher than before the typhoon because transport costs and fuel prices had increased. According to some traders transport costs had increased by about 20% and they had increased their prices to cover the additional costs. A look at some buying and selling prices and transaction costs suggested that the profit margins of local traders remained moderate: A

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<sup>24</sup> A total of 185 households that had been assisted through the FFV programme, were enrolled in the CAM programme, and had problems to help their malnourished children, were later assisted with three.

fish trader for example reported that she made PHP 500 of profit on a box of fish worth PHP 9,000. This corresponds to a profit margin of around 5%.

Delays in the payment of accredited traders seem to have caused problems for beneficiary households. Traders were said to be not particularly fond of customers paying with FFVs. They preferred customers paying cash and gave them preferred treatment. SC addressed the problem by closer monitoring and talking to traders. It must be noted that the traders' behaviour is understandable since for each voucher provided in one round, they had to wait one month until they were paid. This delay was caused by the rules and regulations of SC's Finance department. Quicker payments could have reduced these problems and would have allowed more traders to join the programme.

### **Conditionality**

All beneficiary households interviewed endorsed the conditionality element of the FFVs. Focus group discussions revealed that beneficiary households had appreciated the vouchers because they allowed them (i) to reduce their fresh foods expenditures and use the cash for other necessities instead, (ii) to increase fresh food consumption temporarily, and/or (iii) to buy fresh foods they would not normally buy (e.g. apples, more expensive types of fish and meat etc.). The households interviewed mentioned that they returned to their previous consumption patterns once the programme had come to an end. Several of the accredited traders reported that the FFV programme had caused their sales to peak for the duration of the programme and that once the programme had come to an end the sales had dropped back to their normal level again also indicating that the programme has not led to any lasting changes in consumer behaviour. It seems unlikely that the programme led to lasting changes in consumer behaviour.

During the mandatory one-day nutrition training beneficiaries were motivated to use the coupons of their vouchers as follows: two coupons for fruits, two for vegetables, two for fish, one for meat, and one for chicken and/or eggs. Yet, households were able to use the coupons for the fresh foods they desired. The PDM results indicate that 47 % of the vouchers had been used to buy meat, fish, chicken and eggs while the remaining 53 % had been used for vegetables and fruits.

The FFVs were not always used as intended. Interviews with traders as well as the PDM results pointed out that beneficiary households tried to convince traders to exchange FFVs for other products – often by accepting a discount on the voucher value. Accordingly, some beneficiary households stated during the interviews that they would have preferred cash grants allowing them to take their own consumption decisions.

### **3.2.3. Timeliness**

Fresh food traders suggested the FFV programme could have already been implemented in December 2013 and added that this would have helped fresh food traders to recover earlier. Discussions with traders confirmed that it was possible to procure sufficient quantities of fresh foods from usual sources and suppliers in non-affected locations. The FSL team implemented a first FFV programme from April to June 2014 and a second one from September to November 2014. Since there were no nutritional arguments for the specific timing and duration of the intervention, it is not possible to judge the timeliness in this respect.

From a market perspective both FFV programmes are considered late. Interviews and secondary sources suggest that the first programme could have been already implemented in January 2014 and the second should have been implemented in its immediate aftermath because the situation of the beneficiary households had not significantly changed. An earlier and interruption-free implementation of the programme would have allowed beneficiary households to use their FFVs to complement the food relief they were receiving at the time and use eventual cash to cover other basic needs (e.g. shelter repair, livelihood recovery).

### 3.2.4. Conclusions

Beneficiary households appreciated the FFV programme as support to cover their food needs as well as the nutrition training that came with it. However, they also stated that the programme had not really changed their consumption habits. The FFVs were intended to support the nutritional needs of households with 6 – 23 month old children by providing them with financial access to micronutrient rich foods until they can do so by themselves. The PDM does not reveal whether beneficiary households were able to access micronutrient rich foods by themselves once the FFV programme came to an end. However, the interviews with beneficiary households suggest that their fresh food access situation before the implementation of the FFV programme was not very different from their respective situation after the FFV programme had come to an end.

A voucher programme requires a lot of preparation and causes a lot of administrative costs. The modality should only be chosen if the purpose of the programme justifies these efforts. In the case of the FFV programme it is felt that this was not the case. An early UCT could have produced similar or better results. It would have allowed beneficiary households to cover the needs they deem most pressing (i.e. basic foods, fresh food, shelter repair, livelihoods etc.) and would have had the additional advantage of giving all traders the same chances to benefit from the injected cash (i.e. less market distortions). Indeed a later programme was using UCTs to attain the exact same objectives as the FFV programme and the respective PDM suggests satisfying results.<sup>25</sup>

### 3.2.5. Recommendations

- 1 Ensure the purpose of the programme justifies the choice of the modality (i.e. its cost).**
- 2 Devise a consumer basket adapted to the programme to determine the value of the cash transfer.**
- 3 Monitor the price of the consumer basket to make sure the transfer value remains appropriate.**
- 4 Devise your programme inclusive so that all traders can (afford) to join it and market distortion is limited.**
- 5 Discuss the time requirements for administrative procedures and time requirement of transfer modalities with finance before designing a programme**

## 3.3. CCTS FOR SHELTER

### 3.3.1. Response analysis and choice of modalities

The shelter teams in Iloilo, Western Leyte, and Eastern Leyte decided to use Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) to support the most vulnerable households in the hardest hit and least assisted barangays in their target areas to reconstruct their shelters. The vulnerable households in these barangays were identified based on a community-based selection process. In parallel, the WASH teams in the three locations used different approaches providing the most vulnerable households with materials and/or CCTs to build latrines. The WASH team in Western Leyte opted for the delivery of in-kind materials to build latrines because it feared the needed quality and quantity of specific construction materials would be hard to find in the local markets (e.g. metal mesh and good quality toilet bowls). Yet, motivated by the success of the shelter programme the team is preparing to switch to a CCT approach (see section 6 on value for money). The difference in the uptake of cash grants sits mostly in the way the respective practitioners are embracing it. So far, it appears that WASH practitioners have been less exposed to CTP.

Both the shelter and the WASH teams had taken their decisions to intervene based on SC's MSA, which showed that the majority of houses had been either totally, severely, or moderately damaged

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<sup>25</sup> See SC's PDM report for the UCT programme in support to the Community-based Management for Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) programme. In fact 185 of the 192 households included in this programme had already been part of the FFV programme. They were included because they had not managed to improve the nutritional status of their malnourished children.

and vulnerable households lacked the means to rebuild or repair their shelters. In all three locations the teams had to decide whether they should follow an organisation-led or a community-led approach and in all three locations a community-led approach was chosen. Moreover, all teams decided to pursue a “build back better” approach and added skill-building trainings to their programmes to teach beneficiary households techniques to build quality shelters and latrines that are more resistant to earthquakes and typhoons (DRR component) as the shelter cluster had recommended.

The Eastern Leyte shelter team’s initial shelter programme (implemented in mid-April 2014), as well as other non-SC shelter programmes revealed that beneficiary households had often used part of the cash they had received to restore their shelter to cover other essential needs thus reducing the impact of the programme. To address this issue, the shelter, WASH, and FSL teams from Western Leyte and Eastern Leyte decided to go for an integrated approach addressing beneficiary households’ shelter, WASH, and food security and livelihood needs jointly and simultaneously (see section 4 on integration for more detail). The shelter team in Iloilo started with a stand-alone shelter programme and later opted for a partially integrated approach, meaning that the FSL and WASH teams included a small part of the shelter beneficiary households in their respective programmes. Even if most households supported by the Iloilo shelter programme did not receive integrated assistance, the PDM results show that they spent only a limited amount of the cash for other purposes. This indicates that conditionality, or payment in several instalments, and close monitoring can also lead to good results.

The Iloilo shelter team started monitoring the shelter material market on a monthly basis in January 2014. In addition they conducted a stand-alone assessment of the market for shelter supplies because they had been asked to do so by a donor. The team came to the conclusion that the shelter material market had no problems providing appropriate supplies of shelter materials for beneficiary households of a shelter programme. Reports presenting the market assessment results or an analysis of the monthly market and price monitoring could not be obtained.

The Western Leyte shelter team conducted an ad hoc market assessment before starting their shelter programme and based its decision on general observations and came to the conclusion that shelter materials markets had the capacity to provide their beneficiary households with materials. There is however no written report detailing the analysis. There was also no systematic price monitoring system allowing the shelter team to assess whether the programme was doing harm to local markets. The Eastern Leyte shelter team did not conduct a market assessment. It based its decision to go for a CTP approach on its experiences with its initial in-kind programme and general observations indicating that the shelter material market was working and supplying plenty of actors.

### **Box I – CASE STUDY: Eastern Leyte Loan Repayment Approach**

The HVCA and needs assessments conducted in Eastern Leyte prior to the shelter phase 2 intervention showed that approximately 20-25% of the 3,000 households interviewed had re-built shelters to a pre-Haiyan standard, or below, using funds borrowed from lending cooperatives, financial institutions, family, or informal lenders (loan sharks). The loans identified had high interest rates, up to 20% fixed rate or 5% compound interest, per month. No shelters inspected in this group met all of SCI’s minimum safety and durability standards and required repair. Although having repaired their homes with loans made these beneficiaries ever so slightly less shelter vulnerable, the debt increased the households’ livelihoods vulnerability. Alleviating some of the household’s shelter related debt, following the completion of an SCI supported retrofitting program proved a good way to incorporate these vulnerable households into the shelter programming. The programme is essentially a micro-finance shelter programme in reverse since SC is assisting people after the debt was taken on. Furthermore, by making debt vulnerability criteria the shelter programme was able to better adapt to the local context and reach a more varied group of vulnerable households.

### 3.3.2. Relevance

#### Value of transfers

The shelter cluster estimated the amount for a shelter repair kit including CGI sheets, timber, cocolumber, cladding, fixings, and sealing at PHP 5,000 to 10,000 for a 18sqm living space. SC's experiences show that this amount was far too low to conduct significant quality repairs.

The value of the CCTs given for shelter repairs and reconstruction varied strongly between the different locations. The Western Leyte shelter team had calculated the value of its grants so that beneficiary households would be able to reconstruct a shelter meeting Sphere minimum standards. Correspondingly, the team set the grant value to PHP 20,000 for a household of 3-4 people (9 SQM house), PHP 30,000 for a household of 5-9 people (13 SQM house), and PHP 60,000 for larger households (18 SQM house). The grants were disbursed in three instalments of 40%, 40%, and 20% respectively and exclusively intended for rebuilds. Occasionally the shelter team also supported shelter repairs with grants based on the estimation of one of its engineers.

The Eastern Leyte shelter team ran two different types of shelter programmes. The first programme decided to support vulnerable households to rebuild or repair their shelters by providing them with CCTs corresponding to the extent of damage their shelter had experienced. The programme differentiated three categories: Households with a shelter requiring a complete rebuild received a PHP 42,000 grant, households with a shelter requiring major repairs received a PHP 22,500 grant, and households with shelters requiring minor repairs received a PHP 14,500 grant. Moreover, the programme supported vulnerable households who had indebted themselves to repair their shelters – they too could qualify for a PHP 22,500 grant. The second shelter programme supported vulnerable households with a PHP 15,000 grant to repair their shelter – just enough to conduct minor shelter repairs (see before) – the shelter team members considered this amount too low to produce substantial results – the beneficiaries and key informants who were interviewed confirmed this. The grants for both programmes were disbursed in three instalments.

The shelter team in Iloilo provided vulnerable households with PHP 10,000 – 14,000 grants to repair or rebuild their shelters depending on the extent of damage of their shelter. According to SC's experience the grants were far too low to rebuild durable safe shelters meeting Sphere standards and barely sufficient to conduct minor repairs. The value of the grant had been restricted by the donor (ECHO II) and could not be increased. Interestingly, the shelter team devised several case studies indicating that the true cost of rebuilding or repairing a house are significantly higher than its grants. This raises the question of whether this information was shared with the donor.

The experience with the shelter programme in Iloilo shows the importance of clearly defining the shelter programme and setting grant values sufficiently high to allow constructing or repairing shelters to a certain quality standard (e.g. Sphere).

While most beneficiary households in the three locations mentioned that cash grants had been the most appropriate form of assistance, some mentioned they would have preferred in-kind materials. Discussions during the field visits suggest that this is mostly linked to transport costs. Some people mentioned that it would have been easier if they had received the materials at their doorstep. Some households in Leyte mentioned that they would have preferred the high quality CGI delivered during the first shelter programme in Leyte that was unavailable on the local markets.

#### Selection Criteria

The shelter and WASH teams of all three locations focused their programmes on the underserved barangays in their target areas. To select the beneficiary households they all used community based targeting approaches. The shelter and WASH teams in Iloilo and Eastern Leyte provided community selection committees with a set of criteria and ask them to come up with a beneficiary list. The shelter team in Western Leyte asked community selection committees to conduct a wealth ranking and list the poorest households. The Eastern Leyte shelter team later also opted for the wealth ranking approach. The beneficiary lists established by the communities were crosschecked by the shelter teams and publicly posted to allow community members to voice eventual concerns. Once

the beneficiary list was established and checked community-based assessments were conducted to determine the extent of the shelter and latrine needs of the selected households. The experiences of the shelter and WASH teams in Western Leyte and Eastern Leyte suggest that the wealth ranking based approach lead to a higher acceptance within the assisted communities but required more time to implement.

The need for a convincing targeting process generating acceptance within communities increases as the value of the support programmes for beneficiary households increase. While people may accept targeting criteria they do not understand when SC plans to distribute fresh food vouchers valuing PHP 3,600, they are much less likely to accept it when shelter, latrines, and livelihood support valuing more than PHP 40,000 are handed out. SC should follow a standard approach throughout the country and it should make sure staff is trained to apply it properly. A good targeting process however is no guarantee against tensions in the assisted communities – the Western Leyte shelter team mentioned tensions in some communities despite the use of the community-based wealth ranking approach.

Coverage varied notably between locations: the Iloilo shelter team planned to rebuild and retrofit shelters for 1,400 households; the Western Leyte shelter team planned to do so for 3,000 households; and the Eastern Leyte shelter team planned to do so for 3,500 households (two different programmes). There is a trade-off between wide coverage and close follow-up of the programme. The Western Leyte shelter team mentioned that they were able to visit all houses and follow-up on the progress the house owners made – whilst this is commendable, it is not a scalable approach to monitoring conditionality. All shelter teams should therefore be able to follow their beneficiaries' progress. The Western Leyte WASH team on the other hand had about 10,000 beneficiaries and they said that for them it was not possible to visit all of them to control the quality of the work. Accordingly, the shelter teams focused on the household level and the WASH teams on the community level. Joint monitoring (WASH & shelter) could increase the teams' capacity to follow up on projects, given that in the integrated approach, shelters are provided with latrines. These efficiency gains are explored further in the section 4 on integration.

## Box 2 – CASE STUDY: Best Practice – Ensuring Quality Through Shelter CCTs

Compared to SC's other field locations that implemented shelter CTPs, Western Leyte's shelter CCT programme had the most control over the design and construction process and high levels of community participation. The result was higher quality completed shelters.

Beneficiaries received a certain amount of cash for repair based upon household damage or an amount for rebuilding based on Sphere specifications (PHP 20,000 for a household of 3-4 people, PHP 30,000 for a household of 5-9 people, PHP 60,000 for more) given in tranches of 40%/40%/20%. Furthermore, the Western Leyte field office ensured they were able to visit every household before completing the programme to make sure beneficiaries were applying Disaster Risk Reduction standards in their construction. The amounts provided to beneficiaries, as well as quality control by staff, proved to be sufficient to complete resilient, permanent housing.

### **Complementarity with other interventions and longer-term objectives**

The shelter and WASH teams in all three locations complemented their shelter programmes with trainings to teach beneficiary households techniques to build quality shelters and latrines that are more resistant to earthquakes and typhoons (DRR component) as the shelter cluster had recommended. The training and close monitoring by shelter engineers were introduced to make sure the reconstructed or rebuilt shelters would attain certain minimum quality standards. This initiative was important with respect to the intention to "build back better". As the shelter cluster noted, the self-recovery efforts that took place throughout the affected areas were of worse construction quality.

In this respect it must be noted that the Western Leyte shelter team made particular efforts to control the design and construction process in discussing and deciding upon the conditions for the cash grants. They agreed on the quality of the construction materials that should be purchased, the shelter design, the construction methods to be applied, and the required characteristics of construction site. The close cooperation with the beneficiary households and the close monitoring of their construction efforts had a significant positive impact on the quality of the shelters repaired and rebuilt.

An issue with the shelter programmes implemented by the Eastern Leyte shelter team was that the second programme was more complete than the first one. This led to a logical inconsistency: the first programme had targeted the most vulnerable households in the target area and the second – more encompassing programme – had targeted the remaining less vulnerable households who had not benefited from the first round of assistance. So in fact the less vulnerable households received a more comprehensive assistance (also referenced in section 4 on integration).

### **Availability and price of inputs**

The owner of Home Depot, the largest construction material wholesaler/retailer in Eastern Leyte, reported that his stocks were back to normal by the end of February 2014. Yet, because demand was exceptionally large, the turnover of many basic products was bigger than usual at times creating bottlenecks and supply shortages. He said that by May the shelter market was back to normal and products could be delivered continuously. In the rural areas, shelter material traders reported a normalisation between June and July 2014. Before that time, shelter materials were available but more expensive and sometimes in short supply so that people needed to wait for the products to come in. In the absence of market and price monitoring data it is not possible to say how pronounced these issues were. Price differences and delivery delays do not seem to have prevented the people from buying shelter materials on the rural markets. The CCTs for shelter materials were thus still an appropriate way to support households and the local market.

Due to the large increase in demand for shelter materials the number of traders in some of the municipal markets actually increased. Entrepreneurs seized the moment to make a profit and got into the business of bringing shelter materials to the people. One of these traders was met in MacArthur. She reported that she was able to supply shelter materials on a regular basis as of March 2014 albeit with occasional delays. As of September 2014, she mentioned supplies were continuous and prices normal. In many cases these new traders disappeared again once the demand for shelter materials had started to go down again. This illustrates the entrepreneurial qualities of the people and the flexibility markets – it also suggests competition.

That it took quite a while for markets to go back to its normal operation is common. Even before the typhoon, shelter materials would not have been available to the extent they were needed after the typhoon. This was a very exceptional event and market could not have prepared for it. This also means that it was very difficult to judge whether markets had been able to supply sufficient materials to go for CTP. However, it must be noted that large wholesalers procure internationally and are likely to obtain the materials at least as quickly as INGOs. This was confirmed during the initial in-kind shelter programme implemented by the Eastern Leyte shelter team. The team was experiencing significant delivery delays – just as the local commercial traders. The bottlenecks were a logical consequence of the enormous demand and all actors faced them. In this respect it should be considered that humanitarian actors come together and merge their cash and demand for certain materials and jointly contact private sector actors providing these materials.<sup>26</sup> This can help private sector providers to understand aggregate demand and adjust their procurement process. Additionally, it may help humanitarian actors to obtain a steadier supply and better prices.

The traders of the municipal markets appear to have benefited significantly from the shelter programmes implemented by the different humanitarian actors. In the interviews traders mentioned

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<sup>26</sup> See also Smith (2015).

that during the month the cash was disbursed 30 % – 70 % of their business appeared to come from beneficiary households. Specifically in Eastern Leyte, there was a noticeable increase in the amount of traders, even if not all new traders were registered, which increased competition and possibly decreased prices.

Although some of the beneficiary households mentioned that traders had tried to take advantage of the situation, it appears that what traders tried to do is to pass on increased transport and transactions costs. However these price increases do not seem to have caused any major problems for households. Household members just noted them when asked about how the prices had developed as a consequence of the typhoon. Without price monitoring data it is not clear how large the price increases actually. If price monitoring data would have been available and indicated a significant price increase, SC could and should have increased the grant value in that specific location accordingly.

In some locations, beneficiary and non-beneficiary households actually reported that the prices of shelter materials decreased when SC disbursed the cash for its WASH programmes. They explained that the traders were competing for the business of the beneficiary households. In the absence of systematic price monitoring data, it is hard to say how and by how much prices really changed, and a retrospective detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this assessment.

The fact that no systematic price monitoring was conducted not only limits our possibilities to assess the programmes impact on the local markets it first and foremost means that the different SC teams were not aware about the appropriateness of the values of their grants and about whether their programmes were causing harm to local markets. Beneficiaries in Western Leyte suggested that when prices are monitored, the findings should be shared with them so they know whether traders are raising prices opportunistically or if the fluctuations in prices come from increased costs to the supplier.

What can be said is that by the time SC's teams started implementing the CCTs for shelter materials, the respective markets were sufficiently functional to support the programmes. The beneficiary households interviewed reported that they had had no problems to obtain shelter materials – although some mentioned they had to wait a few days until the materials had been delivered.

The SC teams had not always informed traders in the areas they worked about the programmes and the schedule for the cash instalments. Informing trader about the scope and schedule of the programmes would have made sense because it would have allowed the traders to prepare. It is felt that this was a missed opportunity.

### **Conditionality**

Beneficiary households across programmes and locations accepted the conditionality of the programmes and recognized that they had been put in place to ascertain that the programmes would produce quality results. While some beneficiary households said that they had appreciated the conditionality because they would probably have diverted some of the cash to other uses, others said that they would have spent the cash in the same way if it had been provided unconditionally. Through all locations and programmes there have been reports of people diverting some of the conditional cash to other uses. It is felt that this is not a problem as long as the intended objective (i.e. shelter, latrine, or livelihood project) ended up being met. This can and should be enforced through close monitoring and support.

The shelter teams tried to motivate beneficiary households to buy high quality shelter materials to repair or reconstruct their shelters by agreeing ahead of the programmes on the materials that should be bought (soft conditionality). The idea was to improve the quality of the materials available so that even households that were not benefiting from the programme would benefit from a better supply. A PDM conducted in one of the municipalities where the Western Leyte shelter team implemented its programme showed that less than half of the beneficiaries had indeed bought the high quality shelter materials. The shelter traders interviewed largely reported that the availability

and the sales of high quality shelter materials had not changed as a consequence of the programme, but without baseline information on product quality, this was not possible to assess retrospectively.

### 3.3.3. Timeliness

The Iloilo and the Western Leyte shelter teams started implementing their shelter programmes in May 2014; the Eastern Leyte shelter team started its programme in mid-October – however, at that point the Eastern Leyte shelter team had already finalized its initial in-kind shelter programme which had been delayed due to late delivery of internationally procured shelter materials.

With respect to the markets' capacities to provide shelter materials all programmes could have started earlier. While markets were not functioning perfectly, they were able to provide shelter materials – sometimes with some delays. All programmes should have started at the earliest possible moment to provide households with appropriate shelter, protecting them from the elements.

The Western Leyte and Eastern Leyte shelter programmes are still on-going meaning that there are still plenty of households who – more than one year after the disaster – are still without an adequate shelter. An earlier and quicker implementation would have been desirable and most likely possible. The shelter team decided in December 2013 to launch a CCT programme but the proposal had not been submitted until the end of March. It seems that valuable time was lost.

The Iloilo shelter team reported significant issues regarding the timelines of the disbursements - while some beneficiary households received their grant in April 2014, others only received them in October 2014 – almost one year after the typhoon had struck. The target for Iloilo was 5,000 beneficiaries and the shelter team had a staff of 20, which caused delays in organizing community selection committees, targeting, distribution, and other standard processes.

Shelter material traders interviewed in the areas assisted by the shelter and WASH teams of Western Leyte and Eastern Leyte said that the shelter programmes had been rather late and that many people had already bought materials to repair or rebuild their shelter by the time SC started its programmes. Many people chose to take on loans to cover the costs of materials, which usually led to building back shelters to pre-Haiyan standards, a vulnerability covered by the most recent phase of the shelter programme in Eastern Leyte (refer to box 1 on the Eastern Leyte Loan repayment approach).

The late implementation of CCT shelter programmes appears to have been mainly caused by delays in the deployment and recruitment of the shelter teams and a lack of operational preparedness for CTP (see section 7 on operational set-up).

### 3.3.4. Conclusions

CTP is an appropriate and appreciated way of implementing shelter and WASH programmes. With respect to the importance of shelter the programmes should be launched and implemented as quickly as possible. While focusing on the quality of the shelters is absolutely justified, implementation speed is critical too. Shelter material markets deliver the product households demand and can afford – in an emergency context this should be considered the existing standard – the materials to work with. If the existing standard can be improved without compromising the implementation speed of the programme, it is worth doing so. There is an on-going discussion about the potential for using CTP in the WASH and shelter sectors while upholding quality standards.<sup>27</sup> Combining shelter programmes with trainings on building back better, closely working with the community, providing technical advice and support, and close monitoring proved to be good ways of assuring quality in SC's programmes. Finding the ideal approach to ensure quality will take time and careful evaluation and documentation. SC's experience and beneficiary feedback in Philippines demonstrates the importance of conditionality as a means of ensuring quality.

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<sup>27</sup> See Julliard & Opu (2014).

Experience clearly shows that minimum standards should be used when determining the value of the CCTs (e.g. Sphere). The cost of the attaining the intended outcome should be summarized in a programme document so that they can be presented to donors as minimum requirements. SC's demonstrated that it makes a lot of sense to take the household size and the extent of damage into account when designing a shelter approach.

The Western Leyte shelter team made an effort to prepare support materials and cost estimates for each of the shelter types it planned to implement. It would have been worth putting all of this information in a document outlining all aspects of the programme and completing it with a simple market monitoring system to follow the programme's appropriateness and impact on the local markets. A respective document would have been a good tool to communicate the programme to donors, staff, and beneficiaries and could have served as a reference manual for shelter and MEAL staff.

### 3.3.5. Recommendations

1. **Consider minimum standards, household size, and the extent of damages when setting the value CCTs.**
2. **Combine the CCTs always with training on minimum quality standards to be followed (complemented by respective descriptive hand-outs).**
3. **Devise a monitoring system that allows SC to closely monitor the development of the construction process in order to assure that quality standards are upheld and provide technical advice and support.**
4. **Where necessary, consider combining shelter and wash activities with FSL activities for those who do not benefit from shelter and wash programmes in order to prevent tensions within the communities.**
5. **When implementing integrated programmes consider whether the assistance provided to your target group is proportionate with respect to the non-assisted groups in the same community.**

## 3.4. MARKET SUPPORT TO SARI-SARI STORES

### 3.4.1. Response analysis and choice of modalities

The FSL teams of Iloilo and Western Leyte decided to use CCTs to support small traders (*sari-sari* store owners) in re-starting their business. The primary objective of both programmes was to improve market recovery, and thus the population's access to food products, with a secondary objective of supporting livelihoods recovery for the *sari-sari* store owners. This point however, does not seem to have been entirely clear as FSL staff members in the two locations stated different objectives for the programme.

The FSL teams did not conduct any specific market assessments to plan and implement the trader support programme. It appears that SC's rapid food market assessments conducted in Panay and Leyte were used to justify the *sari-sari* support programmes. The assessments recommended that small retailers and petty rice traders be supported with small grants to ensure that local level market functionality is restored in a timely manner. However, there are no programme descriptions outlining the exact reasoning behind the programmes, their objectives, and the way they were supposed to function. It is thus difficult to understand the exact chain of reasoning.

While the programme implemented by the Iloilo FSL team focussed its intervention on a small coastal area around Iloilo where most small traders had lost most of their stocks when the typhoon hit, the Western Leyte FSL team targeted remote locations ('*sitios*'<sup>28</sup>) in selected vulnerable barangays. The Western Leyte team intended to support the small traders in these remote areas of the barangays in order to allow people living in close vicinity of these traders to buy their groceries close-by and save them long trips to the barangay centre or to municipal markets.

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<sup>28</sup> A subdivision of a barangay in the Philippines

While the Western Leyte FSL team had no access to specific market assessment or price monitoring information, the Iloilo FSL team could refer to a price monitoring system that had been put in place in mid-January 2014 and provided a general impression on how the food market was evolving. In general, however, it seems that both teams based their decisions on general observations about the state of the local markets.

In both programmes CCTs were complemented with business skills trainings to improve financial literacy of the supported traders, which suggests the objective shifted to support the livelihoods of these individuals. The training was mandatory and was conducted before the first instalment was disbursed.

### 3.4.2. Relevance

#### Value of transfers

While the Western Leyte FSL team set the value of the grant to PHP 14,000, the Iloilo FSL team set the value of its first traders support programme to PHP 15,000 and the value of its second respective programme to PHP 10,000. Both teams decided to disburse the grant in two instalments and made the second instalment dependent on the compliance with the programmes' conditionality. A justification for the selected amount could not be obtained.

In comparison, the Western Leyte FSL team had calculated the value for livelihood grants based on the cost of a small livestock production using Household Economy Approach (HEA) findings: As the price for a swine was PHP 8,000– 9,000 they figured that PHP 12,000 would suffice to run a respective programme. The Iloilo FSL team set the value livelihood support grant even lower at PHP 10,000.

Why did *sari-sari* store owners receive more than people receiving grants to start income generating activities? There appears to have been no analysis to determine the amount a typical *sari-sari* owner required to restart his business. Interviews with beneficiary households of both the livelihood and *sari-sari* store support programmes revealed that many beneficiary households of the livelihood support programme actually started *sari-sari* stores suggesting that the livelihood support grants would have been sufficient to support store owners. When designing specific livelihood support programmes it is of utmost importance to determine how much cash is needed to successfully implement the programme. No respective analysis for the *sari-sari* store support programme could be found.

#### Selection Criteria

The first trader support programme implemented by the Iloilo FSL team included all 65 traders of the *Kapehan* Association. The selection criterion was thus membership in the mentioned association – thus providing an 'easy' way to assistance to a pre-registered group (see section 3.5 on CCTs vs. Community Cash Grants). The second trader support programme in Iloilo included 50 vulnerable *sari-sari* store owners in the three barangays Bancal, Cawayan, and Carles. The selection process is not entirely clear but there were rumours that barangay captains had changed the names on the beneficiary lists. It is also not known how many other traders there were in the targeted markets. FSL staff mentioned however that the trader support programmes had created tensions between supported and non-supported traders.

Interviews with non-supported fresh food traders in a marketplace in Iloilo that was close to the location of the supported traders revealed that the latter did not understand at all why they had not been included in the trader support programme. They had been affected by the typhoon too and their market had burned down twice lately. The non-supported traders were seriously upset and their situation raises a concerning question on exclusion.

The trader support programme of the Western Leyte FSL team required that the people joining the programme had run a *sari-sari* store before the typhoon had hit and that they had not yet taken up business again. In addition, beneficiaries had to be located in remote areas of the targeted barangays.

This was because the justification for the programme was to improve access to food and non-food products for remote households. The programme focused on remote *sitios* and on stores with around 20 customers. This was because most *sari-sari* stores in the centre of the barangays had already taken up business – which is unsurprising, given that the programme in Western Leyte started one year after the typhoon.

The Western Leyte FSL team found it difficult to find traders fitting the criteria. Consequently, it reduced the number of *sari-sari* store owners to be supported from 750 to 500. However, even finding 500 traders fitting the criteria proved difficult because by the time the programme was implemented most traders had already recovered on their own.

While traders who had been supported by the Western Leyte FSL teams programme appreciated the programme, small traders who had not been supported did not understand the logic behind the programme. Most of the latter had borrowed money to restart their business and they mentioned that the supported traders had an advantage over them because they had significant funds to buy supplies and no debts. In this respect, one could argue that the programme supported those less motivated to restart their business.

The Western Leyte FSL team did not always apply the remoteness criterion in a very strict way. Some of the supported traders interviewed were only a few minutes away from the barangay centres where traders were not allowed to join the programme. And in one location (Tagbubunga, Leyte) most supported traders were along the main street connecting the barangay to the municipality – remoteness and market access were clearly no argument. It is felt that the criteria had been loosely applied because the FSL team found it difficult to identify the targeted 500 traders.

A trader support programme should not distort local markets. It is felt that to a certain extent (i.e. in some locations) the programme implemented by the FSL team in Western Leyte did just that. Ideally such programmes are as inclusive as possible supporting all traders rather than a small selected group – after all, the aim of the intervention is to increase the overall supply for customers.

The trader support programme implemented by the Western Leyte shelter team disadvantaged vulnerable small traders who had made an effort to restart their businesses. This is mainly due to the fact that the programme was implemented late – at a time when markets had mostly recovered: The trader support programme provided supported traders with a comparatively large amount of working capital creating a significant discrepancy with small traders that had restarted their businesses on their own – possibly by incurring debt. Ideally debt should have been taken into account. However debt is very difficult to observe. A possible approach would have been to focus exclusively on traders in remote *sitios* and provide them all with the same cash grant. This would have been more appropriate and easier than just reimbursing debt. If their debt would have been higher than the grant there would have been no justification to reimburse it all and if it had been lower, it would have probably meant that they would have been disadvantaged compared to those who had waited to re-open their stores.

### **Complementarity with other interventions and longer-term objectives**

USAID in cooperation with Procter & Gamble (P&G) and Coca Cola aimed to support 500 *sari-sari* stores that had to have been in business for at least two years. The concept is that USAID would provide a grant through a local implementing partner that would allow the store owner to rebuild his store and a business skills training; P&G would provide PHP 5,000 worth of stock through its implementing partner Dranix<sup>29</sup>, which would regularly monitor stocks and sell more products if necessary; and Coca Cola would also provide PHP 5,000 worth of stock. The programme looked promising but experienced significant implementation delays because no sub-contractor could be

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<sup>29</sup> Dranix is a distribution, trading, and importation company in the Philippines.

identified and because it coincided with typhoon Hagupit<sup>30</sup>. At the time of the evaluation P&G and Coca Cola had only managed to identify 100 *sari-sari* stores.

P&G had also implemented a trader support programme on its own in Iloilo. They had provided *sari-sari* store owners with store signage, glass cabinets to display their goods, and PHP 2,000 worth of products to replenish their stores. In addition, P&G organised a business skills training that was provided by a micro finance institute. Apparently, P&G supported all traders in a well-defined target area, which was clearly less problematic in terms of potential market distortions.

In both locations the FSL teams also ran CCT programmes to support livelihoods. These programmes should have been aligned with the trader support programmes. Not only should the grant values have been coordinated but also the criteria. While the trader support was only given to people who had operated a *sari-sari* store before the typhoon, the livelihood support programmes implemented in the same areas allowed all beneficiaries to open *sari-sari* stores. This raises the question why *sari-sari* store traders who had not yet been able to restart their business were not just assisted through the livelihood support programme.

Interviews with *sari-sari* store customers revealed that it was only for some that the programme had made access to food and non-food products easier. For most of them the programme had at best increased the number of *sari-sari* stores in close proximity. One positive consequence of the programme that customers mentioned was the fact that it had increased their access to credit. It appears that the supported traders could more easily provide credit as they had more financial means and no debt.

### **Availability and price of inputs**

The Iloilo FSL team reported that markets were functioning at all times and that the supply of products had never been a problem. This was in line with OCHA's statement that markets in Panay were recovering quicker than in other affected areas (see Cash Coordination Update of December 2013). SC's price monitoring revealed the prices were close to normal and stable.

In the immediate aftermath of the typhoon, the supply of food and non-food products was limited and prices were higher than before the typhoon. Large local traders supplying the smaller ones were back operating shortly after the typhoon and started to procure products in locations that had not been affected by the typhoon (e.g. Cebu). Prices increased slightly due to higher transaction and transportation costs and supplies were restricted for a while. One owner of a large store reported that during the months of January and February 2014 he had to ration some of the food products he sold so that he could offer them to all of his customers. According to this trader by June 2014 markets and prices were back to normal.

By the time the Western Leyte FSL team started implementing its trader support programme the supply markets for *sari-sari* store owners had largely normalized. The *sari-sari* store owners back in business reported that the local markets had normalized around March 2014. Discussions with customers confirmed this. This raises the question whether it had not been too late for the trader support programme. Yet, the evaluation team visited only a few barangays and the situation may have been different in other places.

### **Conditionality**

While beneficiaries accepted the conditionality of the programme, PDM results and discussion with supported and non-supported traders revealed that many of the supported traders had diverted some of the cash to cover other expenses. Apparently this mostly happened with the cash that was disbursed in the second instalment. This suggests on the one hand that the monitoring and the threat of not being considered for the second instalment had an impact on compliance; on the other

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<sup>30</sup> Typhoon Hagupit (known in the Philippines as Ruby) made landfall on 6 December 2014 in the municipality of Dolore, Eastern Samar Province.

hand it shows that the beneficiaries considered other expenditures more important than investments in their stores.

### 3.4.3. Timeliness

The Iloilo FSL team implemented its first trader support programme in February 2014. The programme could have been implemented earlier. The traders mentioned they would have needed the support already in November. Nonetheless, beneficiaries appreciated the timing and some of them even decided to take credits to further improve their businesses. The team implemented a second support programme in October 2014 – this was definitely too late with respect to general market recovery.

The traders in Iloilo mentioned that the demand had fully recovered after only three months. This is confirmation of the general statement that markets recovered quicker in the west than in the east.

The Western Leyte FSL team implemented its programme from November 2014 to January 2015. The team mentioned that by the time the trader support programme was implemented it was difficult to find traders who had not yet re-started their business. The majority of traders had been able to get back on their feet on their own and were trading at the time the programme was implemented. This was a clear sign that the programme was implemented too late. It also raises the question whether there was a true need for such a programme.

The FFV programme (see Section 3.2.2) showed that the UCTs distributed by Tzu Chi shortly after the typhoon had motivated fresh food traders to reopen their stores in order to benefit from the households' increased purchasing power. That is, early UCTs might render trader support interventions obsolete.

### 3.4.4. Conclusions

The trader support programme implemented by the Iloilo FSL team focussed on a very small particular group, which is a limitation of this research. However, the programme seems to have worsened the relationship between supported and non-supported traders. It is felt that the fresh food traders in the market next to the supported traders should have been included or supported in another way.

The Western Leyte FSL team definitely implemented its programme too late to meet either a food access or a livelihoods support objective. Moreover, it is felt that the need for such a programme had not properly been established. There was no assessment proving that households in remote areas considered their market access to be problematic. Although the programme targeted *sari-sari* store owners, it was the needs of their customers that should have been the focus of the programme. Their customers' situation was not really assessed. It is felt that these households might have had more pressing needs and thus preferred other forms of support.

The decision to reduce the number of traders to be supported through the programme was definitely appropriate. SC Western Leyte could have even considered to cancel the programme altogether and to assist the vulnerable traders that had been identified through its livelihood support programme.

Trader support programmes transfer money to people who have an existing livelihood and are thus often not among the most vulnerable. This can create incomprehension among non-supported groups and potentially create tensions within communities. SC should try to think of ways to support traders that do not consist of providing them with grants. One possibility could be access to credit. Community revolving funds initially reserved to provide traders with interest-free credit could be one way of doing this. The community would receive the capital (instead of the traders) and would be obliged to give credit to traders for a certain period of time. Once this period is over, the community could use the cash for projects of their own choice. The community would thus have an interest to make sure traders pay back the money they borrowed.

### 3.4.5. Recommendations

1. **Design your programme inclusively, so that all traders of similar type in an area can join the programme.**
2. **Determine how much cash the average traders need to successfully restart their business.**
3. **Assess the situation of the true beneficiaries of your programme – i.e. the customers of the traders to be supported – to determine if there is a need to support traders to improve customers access to commodities**
4. **Consider trader support programmes in the immediate aftermath of a disaster when all traders in a local marketplace are equally affected and can be included in the programme (to prevent market distortions).**
5. **Consider if a CTP stimulating demand is not more appropriate than a trader support programme.**
6. **Coordinate and align different programmes implemented in the same area to prevent logical inconsistencies.**
7. **Make sure the impact of programmes is monitored by addressing the true target population – i.e. the customers of the supported traders.**

## 3.5. COMMUNITY CASH GRANTS VS. INDIVIDUAL LIVELIHOODS CCTS

### 3.5.1. Response analysis and choice of modalities

Livelihoods support in the Haiyan response took the form of three different modalities: Community Cash Grants (CCGs) to local associations; Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) to individuals within a selected association; and CCTs to individuals targeted by SC and not members of associations. In parallel, as described above, teams in Western Leyte and Iloilo also provided CCTs to *sari-sari* traders. A total of 57 associations were supported with about PHP 62 million through CCGs and approximately 8,238 households were supported with approximately PHP 83,031,275 million through CCTs for livelihoods. The nature of each programme varied between locations, linked to funding availability, management decisions and contextual specificities (e.g. related to the function of associations).

The option of CCGs to associations was principally limited by the number and nature of associations in SC areas of intervention (see Annex 2 with programme descriptions). To be eligible for support, associations needed to have a clear management structure and a bank account. Provided an association meets these conditions, SC can provide CCGs, under the framework of a simplified partnership agreement.<sup>31</sup> Initially, in Eastern Leyte where the approach was piloted, internal lack of clarity regarding the necessary compliance requirements for CCGs delayed the payments (whereas they were intended to provide rapid community-based assistance. Support to community associations effectively had two different objectives. In some cases, associations provided an effective

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<sup>31</sup> The key components of this partnership vary by association but include requirements for the members of the association to:

- Participate in an HVCA workshop and other trainings provided by Save the Children
- Develop a project proposal by the association
- Implement the project with adequate supervision and monitoring
- Submit a project report and expense report to Save the Children quarterly or after the project is complete
- Hold elections to choose association leaders and hold monthly meetings
- Retain money between credit cycles as start-up savings for the next cycle (for farmer associations)
- Provide non-members in the community with access to credit (for farmer associations)

Save the Children's role in the partnership is to conduct an HVCA workshop to barangay key stakeholders and children, provide technical support throughout the project cycle, review and approve the project proposal, conduct monitoring and provide funding for the project.

means of disbursing individual CCTs for livelihoods recovery (e.g. with fishermen's associations in Eastern Leyte), whereas in other cases, particularly in Iloilo, CCGs were intended to provide complementary livelihoods support at a community level, generally with a longer-term objective (e.g. environmental protection; improvement of community post-harvesting facilities).

SC's CCTs for individual livelihoods recovery were mainly targeted where associations were not sufficiently formalised to be eligible for CCGs and/or were non-existent. These were designed based on livelihood-specific recovery requirements (e.g. poultry, rice farming, pig rearing, fishing, trading) and were based on varying understandings of market functioning, starting with the boat input market assessment conducted in November 2013 (See Annex 1), although no other market assessments were documented for other forms of livelihoods activities. A livelihoods needs assessment, however, was conducted in Western Leyte in September 2014 and a baseline assessment was conducted in November 2014 prior to the programme starting in Eastern Leyte. Eligibility for CCTs required individuals to be practicing that specific livelihood prior to the typhoon, although programmes are increasingly promoting livelihoods diversification.

In practice, in Eastern Leyte there was little difference between CCTs for individual livelihoods recovery and CCGs through associations, as individual CCTs were often combined to purchase common assets (e.g. nets for fishermen), whilst CCGs were often sub-divided (e.g. CFW payments for irrigators). The reality for SC in Iloilo is that a blanket decision was made to accelerate programme delivery that some communities would receive CCGs whereas others would receive CCTs.

### 3.5.2. Relevance

#### Value of transfers

Value of CCTs through associations and/or to individuals differed between livelihoods activities from PHP 6,000 to PHP 450,000. Occasionally, such as in Iloilo, there was also some inconsistency in value of livelihoods transfers provided for the same objective (e.g. for support to traders, ranging from PHP 6000, disbursed pre-grant closure as result of an underspend, to PHP 15,000).

Whilst it is appropriate to provide different value transfers to support recovery of different livelihoods, the costs of supporting the recovery of fishing livelihoods was under-estimated overall. As seen in the VFM section of the report (Section 6), the average overall support for members of fishermen's associations was over PHP 44,000 (1000 USD) per individual (including group assets and CCTs to association members). Of this, PHP 15,000 was for individual boat inputs, which in Iloilo was delivered through individual CCTs whilst in Eastern Leyte was delivered through the associations. Whilst the PHP 15,000 provided did equate to the value recommended by the boat markets inputs assessment, it only covered costs for small un-motorised boats and did not enable the purchase of motors which are essential for maximising fishing activity. The endline report of a multi-sector grant in Iloilo (ECHO II) conducted in some of the same barangays as the researcher's FGDs showed that beneficiaries of individual livelihood CCTs in Iloilo thought the cash was insufficient and livelihood earnings were not enough because cash had to be allocated towards other needs such as food and schooling. This points towards the value of the integrated approach implemented through MAC 2 and DEC 2.2 (see section 4 on Integration). It also highlights the need for livelihood-specific analysis on recovery needs, and the significant cost of supporting effective livelihoods recovery where group and individual assets need to be replaced.

FSL staff in Iloilo explained that they expected the assistance to be complemented by in-kind support from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), but in reality this complementary assistance was inconsistent (e.g. in Abong barangay where SC supported the reconstruction of 69 boats, BFAR only provided inputs for two boats, plus PHP 1,500). In Abong, Iloilo, informants said that that they would have rather received the full set of inputs in-kind than an insufficient amount of cash which has prevented them from purchasing additional necessary inputs (e.g. nets). Likewise, in Manlot, fishermen said the amount given wasn't sufficient to pay for boat materials and carpenters for the boat repair. As a result of this incomplete package, reported fishing income amongst the Iloilo associations interviewed is currently half of its pre-typhoon value.

The distinction between the two forms of CCGs (as outlined above) is important in evaluating their relevance. CCTs disbursed by the association can be an effective form of recovery assistance if the value of the grants is sufficient (see section above). The second form of support (for community assets) will only be effective if other forms of livelihoods assistance are provided in parallel (as with the dual components of association support provided to fishermen's associations in Eastern Leyte). In evaluating the relevance of CCGs, it is also important to highlight that associations will not usually form when the activity only provides 'small-scale' income and does not rely on common assets as the development of a formalised structure (including share-holders and distribution of profit) is perceived as a challenge.

Staff and community members unanimously concurred that as different livelihoods require different value inputs, it is acceptable to provide different value CCTs within one community and, as long as the activity was practiced by the individual prior to the disaster, this would not cause tension. This suggests more flexibility is needed at proposal level to adapt to different types of livelihoods, and supports the case for more community involvement needed in development of packages, as well as the use of HEA-type information to gauge specific recovery needs by livelihoods activity.

### Box 3 – CASE STUDY: Support to two neighbouring fishing associations (Tanauan, Eastern Leyte)

- CIFFA: The association members reported they were effectively using SC's support to purchase fingerlings, various fishing materials and a freezer as planned, thus enabling their full recovery. The success of this support was heavily dependent on prior support from Oxfam through CFW to support boat repair, and vouchers from ACF for boat engines, in addition to UCTs provided by Tzu Chi. Hence the delayed implementation of SC's support (which only began in October 2014, due to funding delays) did not hinder their recovery.
- BISCAFFA: This association reported they had not received livelihoods support from any other organisation (although the FSL team reported this was untrue); nonetheless they had not received unconditional cash assistance to support with initial household recovery. Hence the CCT per fishermen (circa. PHP 6,000) intended to support fish pond rehabilitation and the purchase of nets was grossly insufficient and, as a result, fishing activity has not yet fully resumed as they cannot afford fingerlings for the ponds and more than 50% of boats have not yet been replaced. SC should have considered providing a more complete support package (including cash for fingerlings and boat repair) to associations that didn't receive support from other organizations to speed up the recovery process.

#### **Complementarity with other interventions and coordination with other actors**

The effectiveness of CCGs was heavily dependent both on the value of transfers and on what other forms of support the association members were receiving, from SC and other actors. Independently, the support provided to associations was not sufficient to ensure livelihoods recovery, especially if the associations didn't receive other forms of assistance (see box 3). However, FSL staff insisted it was not intended to, though the inconsistency in provision of inputs and cash-based support from BFAR and other organisations was a major constraint to the effectiveness of SC's support. Unsurprisingly, feedback in barangays (e.g. in Carles municipality, Iloilo) where multiple forms of livelihoods support were provided (CCTs for *sari-sari*; individual CCTs and CCGs) was very positive.

Multiple informants reflected that the collective impact of livelihoods interventions across agencies risks creating additional competition within certain livelihoods activities. This lack of coordination between agencies was particularly noted in Eastern Leyte where there are reportedly more fishermen in each association; and up to 40% more fishermen overall according to association

members interviewed. Another concern is the increased proliferation of illegal fishermen who use small nets, and are often armed. This was however less of an issue in Iloilo where, as a barangay captain stated “there are plenty of fish in the sea”. However, this is purely anecdotal and was not systematically cross-checked with different informants. These findings (as well as those in Box 2) suggest a lack of coherence in targeting of associations within SC and across humanitarian actors. Fishing and Irrigators Association members insisted Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and/or National Irrigation Administration (NIA) should be held responsible for this coordination. Differences between locations also highlighted the key influential role of barangay captains in facilitating coordinated support to associations and the administration of CCGs, and the importance of managing this relationship effectively.

### **Availability and price of inputs**

Across all livelihoods activities reviewed, there were limited reports of poor availability of inputs. Where this was a concern (e.g. poultry and pigs), SC provided inputs in-kind. However, there were reports of opportunistic behaviour by suppliers who increased prices of items, which the CCTs were intended to purchase (e.g. PHP 500 increase on boat engines in Iloilo feeder port). Fishermen’s associations in Eastern Leyte reported that as of February 2015 prices for fishing inputs still remain higher than pre-typhoon, particularly with large suppliers (e.g. Lucky Hardware store in Eastern Leyte) who are linked to NGOs through CCTs or vouchers. In Iloilo, prices were reported to have stabilised by July 2014, and to have never increased in Roxas, Panay. This was not verified at market level but does corroborate overall reports of opportunistic price-setting behaviour, which should be mitigated through improved monitoring and spot-checks.

### **Conditionality**

The conditionality element of livelihoods support provided by SC was universally endorsed by beneficiaries across interviews in all field sites, irrespective of whether they had received CCTs or CCGs. All recognised that had the support been received unconditionally, they would not have invested it in livelihoods. This is a recurring theme across locations and programmes with quotes such as “good that it was delivered in tranches, or else all money would have been spent on basic needs” and “receiving money in tranches is right so people can budget” commonplace.<sup>32</sup>

### **Training**

The complementary training provided by SC to beneficiaries of individual livelihood CCTs and CCGs was strongly welcomed by beneficiaries, particularly the financial management/business development training. Where training was not provided (e.g. fishermen’s associations in Eastern Leyte), it was clearly requested. For some associations, like the oyster culture association in Bayuyan, Iloilo, training was only given to the leaders of the association missing the opportunity to give technical and financial training to more members of the community. A suggestion was made to extend this training to non-direct beneficiaries and/or to equip certain beneficiaries to deliver trainings themselves. It should be noted that both Fishing and Irrigator’s association members in Eastern Leyte, and oyster culture association members in Bayuyan in Iloilo, cited the lack of activities for women as a downside of the support from SC.

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<sup>32</sup> Although not observed in this review, the Baihanuiyan approach whereby conditionalities are enforced as a group could be worth considering for SC.

## Box 4 – CASE STUDY: CFW through CCGs to Irrigator’s Associations (Eastern Leyte)

Whilst SC did not directly implement CFW activities as part of the Haiyan response, the support to irrigator’s associations was effectively a public works programme, which proved to be very effective in meeting dual objectives of encouraging irrigator’s to clear canals, whilst providing additional household income (of PHP 2600 on average). The association’s leadership on targeting as well as the direct link between the CFW activities and the livelihoods of individual association members are two strong learning points from this approach. Feedback from beneficiary FGDs was however that the duration of the support could have been extended to fully complete the cleaning of the canals (though the provision of machinery by SC did enable the association to continue this work without the cash subsidy). Even with this association-led approach, it is necessary to be realistic about the ability of households to engage in CFW early when they have other rehabilitation priorities. In this case, cash payments were mainly used for basic needs as association members had not received UCTs. As a result, cash payments were not invested in additional livelihoods needs so some association machinery has not yet been replaced.

### 3.5.3. Timeliness

CCGs were initially intended to be disbursed rapidly in Eastern Leyte to facilitate community-based recovery whilst other basic needs were being met. However, internal operational delays were a major constraint to the timely implementation of CCGs as a result of perception of risk from compliance team in Manila. A full partnership approach was not feasible, as this would have required an open tender process, which would not have been appropriate given SC’s limited funding for CCGs. The fastest delivery of CCGs would have been through a CCT model, delivered in tranches. However, the simplified partnership approach was adopted as a compromise (see response analysis section above), which needs to be notarised for CCGs above PHP 100,000. This template agreement should be systematically used for future CCGs in new emergencies to reduce future delays. However, even where operational processes are rapid, it is important to consider that support to associations isn’t feasible immediately post disaster as they are likely to be weakened.

Targeting also contributed to implementation delays – whilst careful targeting is vital (particularly for individual CCTs which have the potential to change the wealth group structure), there is a need to review the effectiveness of the process and the need for 100% validation of CCT beneficiaries that was conducted in many implementation areas. This builds a case for the added value of individual CCTs through associations.

Delays in availability of funding had a significant impact on the effectiveness of CCTs and CCGs for livelihoods. The first nine CCGs to Irrigator’s Associations in Eastern Leyte (funded through SC seed funds) were provided in December 2013 and January 2014, in time to support the first rice season of the year (March), which is very positive. However, additional funding was not made available until May 2014 thus missing the rice season for the irrigator’s, and meaning that assistance to fishermen’s associations in Eastern Leyte was first delivered in September 2014, thereby also missing the main summer fishing season. The lack of prioritisation of funding for livelihoods recovery effectively maintained a significant recovery gap for nearly a year (as documented in the HEA), this in spite of the feasibility of CCTs for livelihoods from December 2013 (See Annex I for complete timelines).

Timeliness issues also arose within SC interventions, despite the availability of funding, and were partly attributed in Eastern Leyte and Iloilo to internal disagreements on the partnership documentation with associations. Specific implementation delays include boat carpenter training in Iloilo which was delivered three to four months after CCTs for boat repairs. As a result, none of the training beneficiaries have been able to put their skills to use, and some CCT beneficiaries had to buy finished boats at a higher price in Roxas markets as they were unable to use local skills.

### 3.5.4. Conclusions

Beneficiary preference across locations emerged as CCGs to associations, where these are strong and representational, and where the value of the CCG provided is sufficient to support individual livelihoods recovery.

Where associations do not represent the livelihoods and needs of those most in need of recovery assistance, there should be a clear distinction between the objectives of CCTs and CCGs. Specifically, household CCTs (specifically designed for each livelihood activity) should be provided for livelihoods recovery and diversification, whereas CCGs should benefit the whole population (e.g. post-harvest facilities or irrigation) and aim to improve the sustainability of the activity. In all cases, the effectiveness of livelihoods support is intrinsically linked to the timeliness of funding availability and implementation of activities, particularly in relation to the seasonal calendar, and the essential complementary provision of assistance for basic needs.

### 3.5.5. Recommendations

1. **Conduct joint market assessments for livelihoods with other agencies (which consider the risks of duplicating livelihoods activities)**
2. **Jointly implement individual livelihoods CCTs and CCGs to associations (distinguishing clearly between the objectives of each)**
3. **Expand the reach of livelihoods support by providing training (technical and BDS) to all member of the associations and community members beyond direct beneficiaries of CTs**
4. **Advocate to donors for varied and flexible livelihoods support packages in proposals**
5. **Institutionalise use of partnership MoU for CCGs**
6. **Do not implement CFW directly but consider supporting CFW through CCGs**

## 4. INTEGRATION (PROGRAMMES AND OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF CTP)

### 4.1. CTP Pre-Integration (Phase I)

CTP was considered as a response option for multiple activities across sectors for Phase I of the response. Whilst very positive, this resulted in a very complex variety of activities – as of December 2013 a total of 11 planned support packages using CTP had been established<sup>33</sup>. Many of these were implemented simultaneously in the same field bases; which was inevitably complex to manage and monitor for staff; and difficult to fully comprehend for beneficiary communities, as corroborated by Save the Children's Complaint-Response mechanisms at the field level. A majority of complaints came from misunderstandings on the multiple beneficiary selection processes and dissatisfaction with Community Selection Committees, which some saw as not selecting the most vulnerable for the CTPs. The timelines contained in Annex I clearly show that the combination of activities was not implemented consistently across locations, nor in the timely manner initially intended. For example, CCGs were distributed to Irrigators Association in Eastern Leyte in December 2013, but community grants were not given in Western Leyte until October 2014. Eastern Leyte began shelter CCTs March 2014, whereas Western Leyte and Iloilo began shelter CCTs in May 2014.

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<sup>33</sup> Minimum expenditure basket (food and non-food needs); Livelihood recovery cash grants – boats repair; livelihoods recovery grants – fishing gear; livelihoods recovery grants – agriculture crops farming; livelihoods recovery grants – intercropping for coconut farmers; livelihoods recovery grants, support to market traders/petty vendors; community cash grants; cash for work; cash grant for shelter recovery; cash grant for 1 unit sanitary water sealed toilet; community cash grant for water connection

## 4.2. Rationale for Integration

Six months on from Haiyan, and building on lessons from above, SC developed its Phase 2 strategy, with a focus on longer term recovery and rehabilitation. The Multi-Sectoral Assessment (MSA) and HEA findings both highlighted the limited economic recovery rates of Haiyan-affected populations, even in areas where SC had been intervening. Specifically, the Eastern Leyte HEA results showed that the poor and very poor (50 – 75 % of the populations) were unable to increase income sufficiently to rebuild adequate shelter and livelihoods simultaneously if unaided, and that SC's initial response analysis process had not captured multi-sectoral gaps in requirements. The impacts of limited economic recovery were also observed across other sector needs (e.g. the MSA in Western Leyte which linked poor educational attendance and child labour with economic vulnerability).

One key programmatic implication of these findings is that if households are unable to meet their urgent food and livelihoods recovery needs, cash-based assistance for other needs will not be effective and may be diverted to other expenditures, as was witnessed in Eastern Leyte (see box 1). This confirmed the need for UCTs for basic needs as a pre-requisite for effective use of Shelter (and WASH) CCTs; complemented in parallel by CCTs for livelihoods support. The value added of this integrated package was corroborated by the HEA which showed an improved rate of recovery in Livelihoods Zones which had received UCT in the initial phases of the response (namely from Tzu Chi).

## 4.3. Summary of new operational model

The potential for efficiency and effectiveness gains from integration using CTP depends considerably on the operational model for programme delivery. Over the period November 2014 to March 2015, SC's Haiyan response field officers are re-aligning their operational structures towards SCI's Three-pillar organisational design framework (Programme Operations; Programme Development & Quality (PDQ); Support services). This primarily involves many of the functions previously held by sector-based Programme Managers to be transitioned under the management of field operations. The new approach is tailored to facilitate cross-sector integration, with key expected benefits being: increased community focus; PDQ focus on design and quality; increased operational accountability (for budgets, people and project management); scalability; and standardisation. This new set-up provides clear opportunities to maximise the use CTP as a cross-sectoral modality, both as a multi-sectoral and a multi-purpose tool,<sup>34</sup> as does the Child Poverty focus in SC's forthcoming country strategy.

## 4.4. Integration in Practice

### Rapid overview by field base

CTP-based integration in the Haiyan response has to date mainly been through CTP as a multi-sector tool and has inevitably been linked to specific grants, whilst the new operational structure fully takes shape in each field location. The following multi-sectoral CTP grants have been (or are currently being implemented):

- **ECHO 2:** The grant included a conditional grant of PHP 10,000-14,000 to 3,404 households for shelter, an unconditional grant of PHP 4,100 to 225 households for immediate needs and a conditional grant of PHP 10,000 to 1,000 beneficiaries for livelihood recovery (including 50 small scale traders). The grant was only for the Panay area.
- **DEC 2:** Provided households in both Eastern and Western Leyte with PHP 27,000 for shelter reconstruction and an unconditional grant of PHP 4,000-10,000 for immediate needs. The grant also provided community associations and individual households with cash transfers of varying amounts for livelihood recovery.

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<sup>34</sup> Multi-sector grants involve the complementary use of different CTP modalities to meet different sector needs, whereas CaLP defines multi-purpose cash grants as ad hoc cash entitlements that are provided to specific target groups defined in relation to the objective, e.g. families with school-age children, person in need of legal assistance, etc. Beneficiaries may use the cash to meet their priority needs. Multipurpose grants bring potential gains in ensuring humanitarian assistance reflects the priorities of those affected by disaster, considering both degrees of affectedness, sector-specific needs, and stages of crisis and recovery, with associated gains in accountability.

- **DEC 2.2 (Eastern Leyte):** 1,500 households in the municipalities of Alang-alang and Jaro in Eastern Leyte will receive shelter assistance in conditional cash grants based on their assigned category. Category A beneficiaries need a complete rebuild of their shelter (PHP 42,000), category B1 need major repairs (PHP 22,500), category B2 repaired their homes using borrowed funds (PHP 22,500) and category C need minor repairs (PHP 14,500). The money given for shelter will be inclusive of WASH.
- **MAC 2:** The grant provided beneficiaries in Eastern and Western Leyte with one UCT tranche for immediate needs, about PHP 15,000-30,000 in CCT tranches for shelter reconstruction and PHP 5,800 for latrine construction.

The following table summarises the ways in which integration is being applied through these grants across the three Haiyan field offices (as of mid-February 2015).

	<b>Eastern Leyte</b> <i>New operational model adopted in Jan '15</i>	<b>Western Leyte</b> <i>New operational model adopted in Nov' 14</i>	<b>Iloilo</b> <i>New operational model adopted in Dec' 14</i>
Targeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DEC 2: Beneficiaries targeted by the shelter team were then 'filtered' by other sectors;</li> <li>• MAC2: joint targeting through multi-sector teams</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DEC 2: Beneficiaries targeted by the shelter team were then 'filtered' by other sectors;</li> <li>• MAC2: joint targeting through multi-sector teams; joint General Assembly for beneficiary selection</li> <li>• DEC 2.2: As above, but Shelter &amp; WASH now one programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ECHO 2: Shelter selected beneficiaries first, of which 50% received FSL support</li> </ul>
Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MAC2: included retrospective payment of UCT to some beneficiaries who had already received shelter under previous grants</li> <li>• Distributions conducted by sector (because of different activity start dates)</li> </ul> <p>WASH: CCTs<sup>35</sup> Shelter: CCTs FSL: UCTs and CCTs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint distributions and transfers (Shelter; WASH and FSL)</li> <li>• Joint carpenters for WASH and Shelter rehab</li> </ul> <p>WASH: In-kind; CCT pilot planned for April Shelter: CCTs FSL: UCTs and CCTs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ECHO 2: Distributions conducted by sector (because of different activity start dates)</li> <li>• No new funding yet confirmed with which to test the integrated approach</li> </ul> <p>WASH: in-kind Shelter: CCTs FSL: UCTs and CCTs</p>

<sup>35</sup> From Eastern Leyte Shelter PM: "On a practical level, WASH uses less materials than shelter and giving cash so households can make purchases makes sense, especially since a lot of the materials for WASH are the same materials needed for shelter programmes (except for latrines)"

Outcomes	MAC 2 household questionnaire endline and FGDs	MAC 2 household questionnaire endline and FGDs	ECHO 2 evaluation
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## 4.5. Successes

The comparison above and discussions with multiple staff across all three locations highlight some key successes of integration so far, and significant opportunities for learning between bases as detailed below.

### Improved Targeting and Accountability

The integrated approach offers significant efficiency gains for targeting (see Western Leyte model for DEC 2.2). In Eastern Leyte, the team is confident that integration will enable real community-based targeting, facilitated by continued presence by the same SC staff in one area. This integrated targeting approach should also reduce the requirement for 100% verification, which is still implemented in many locations and is inefficient. MEAL staff in Western Leyte reported that since the integrated approach, complaints have decreased: people are already well informed and therefore community responders are prepared. But this is not a miracle solution: “We’ve tried to address beneficiary challenges, but it is impossible to avoid complaints. Every barangay has its own assembly to come up with the criteria. Everyone wants money because they are all affected, but we don’t have the luxury of that money. Due to our budget, we can’t target everyone.” Whilst Iloilo does not currently have funding for the ‘new’ integrated CTP approach, the positive effects of integration have already been observed in barangays where comprehensive package of support (e.g. across Carles municipality), where community consultation on multiple needs, complementing the barangay recovery plan, has been commended by barangay leaders.

### Monitoring

Whilst efficiencies in programme monitoring have not yet been fully realised across locations, the use of an integrated household questionnaire for the baseline and endline of the MAC2 grant, complemented by an FGD tool (developed as part of this research) are positive steps towards measuring integrated outcomes. Monitoring tools need to be multi-sectoral from outset; and sector-specific indicators need to be more realistic as many sector-specific outcome indicators developed initially were not monitored. There is also a need to reduce the emphasis on process indicators & monitoring; but increase monitoring of household outcomes and markets.

## 4.6. Challenges

The potential value-added of integration is nonetheless hindered by the following factors:

### Funding Cycles

The MAC2 grant was initially intended to be implemented over a 6 month cycle but this was reduced to 3 months because of delayed internal approval of funds. Also, initially in Eastern Leyte staff was unable to focus on the integrated approach as the new operational model was not yet adopted. More broadly there is a real risk for the new model to be overridden by grant cycles, as raised by the Western Leyte Field Manager: “We need an integrated strategy from the outset, otherwise we will never catch up”.

### Sector-based Set Up At SCI

Despite the new operational model, sector-based thinking is entrenched within SC, and remains a hindrance to integrated programming, particularly as teams have been working on a sectoral basis for over a year. To date, multi-sectoral grants have still been implemented in a ‘carved-up’ way by individual sectors, although the new operational model should address this.

### Equity

The provision of an integrated package in locations previously targeted by other grants created disparity between those who received full integrated package (i.e. MAC2) and those who only received Shelter CCTs (from DECI) and a complementary retrospective UCT. This is particularly

problematic given the beneficiaries initially targeted were the most vulnerable in those locations (corroborated by key community informants in the research). Community leaders in MacArthur noted this problem during an FGD saying that those who initially received only Shelter CCTs weren't considered as vulnerable when the integrated package was being implemented. However, they were the ones selected first and were more vulnerable overall so they should have received a better package of assistance.

## **4.7. Outcomes of the Integrated Approach**

### **4.7.1. Methodology**

To gauge the impact of the integrated project, the researchers used a combination of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), Key Informant Interviews (KIs) and the findings from the MAC2 grant endline report. FGDs were conducted with adult beneficiaries, children beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and community leaders in four municipalities in Eastern and Western Leyte with about 8-12 participants per group. KIs were conducted with barangay captains, programme and relevant administration staff, and shelter traders. Questions focused on the implementation process and the impact of the intervention.

The endline report, conducted by the MEAL team in the Eastern Leyte office, encompassed PDM, case studies on children, an Internal Project Learning Review, and a WASH KAP (Knowledge Attitudes Practices). The PDM and WASH KAP were conducted simultaneously in 10 barangays in the municipalities of MacArthur and Mayorga in Eastern Leyte to a random sample of 297 households.

### **4.7.2. Appropriateness**

Beneficiaries and community leaders welcomed the integrated approach as a complete package, which met all their needs – shelter, latrines, and a source of income. During the interviews, the beneficiaries mentioned that it had allowed them to use the money as intended and provided them with better quality shelters and improved livelihoods. It is no surprise that households preferred the integrated approach as it provided them with much more cash. Beneficiaries didn't have to compromise needs because the money was allocated for a variety of purposes. As one beneficiary put it, "I like the integrated approach because it gives us everything we need, a house with food and a latrine, just like 3-in-1 coffee." Furthermore, beneficiaries stated that the flexibility of cash given for all three purposes couldn't have been replicated by in-kind assistance.

For children, the program was beneficial because it allowed them to live more comfortably away from other relatives with a roof over their head, private latrines and a source of income for their parents. Children in all focus groups discussions mentioned the inclusion of latrines as the most important part of the programme since it provided them with more comfort and privacy.

Community leaders said the program helped traders as well as beneficiaries because they had stable customers and profits were higher. Communities saw an increase in traders since the intervention because the demand was so high. In the case of MacArthur there were five more shelter traders after the intervention than before. Shelter traders were able to use the extras capital to start other businesses on the side such as selling grocery items, dry goods and opening up *sari-sari* stores, all of which boosted the local economy.

However, discussions with non-beneficiaries revealed that the scope of the grants had also created envy-related tension within the community. It is possible that the generous support of very vulnerable households put them ahead of less vulnerable households that were not targeted in the first place. Such effects are more likely to occur – the more generous the extent of the support and the smaller the group of assisted households. Because such effects are likely to create tensions in communities, it is necessary to consider communities as a whole when implementing sizeable programmes and find ways to address these effects.

### 4.7.3. Programme Design

#### Value of transfers

There were few complaints on the value of the transfers for the integrated program given that it was designed to mitigate the risk of shelter money being used for other purposes. Beneficiaries were happy with the amount of money they received. Some even said they could feel the effects of the cash in their household and community one week from the distributions since latrines and houses were going up quickly. Only 4% of the endline respondents said that they had to come up with an alternative plan (such as borrowing money) to rebuild their home due to lack of resources. In comparison, of beneficiaries who only received shelter, 27% said that the amount wasn't sufficient to rebuild or repair their shelter.

One major concern for communities who received the integrated package was that they were given more overall assistance than the previous shelter phase I beneficiaries, even though the shelter phase I beneficiaries were more vulnerable. It was suggested that it would have been better to implement the integrated program with the MACI beneficiaries who were also in need of the extensive and complete package.

#### Timeliness

Cash was disbursed to beneficiaries starting October 2014, almost a year after Haiyan (refer to timelines in Annex 1). Beneficiaries of the integrated programme mentioned that the cash could have been given earlier because shelter and livelihood input markets were already in place at the local level before the distributions. The evaluation of the individual CTPs above (UCTs; FFVs; Shelter CCTs) highlight that their effectiveness is intrinsically linked to the implementation of complementary interventions, and the entire rationale of the integrated approach is based on the need for earlier economic recovery, as quantified in the HEA reports. Nonetheless, the timing of the integrated package is still suitable to complement existing recovery efforts by households (as exemplified by the case study on shelter loan repayments in Box 1). Another benefit of the timing of the programme was that beneficiaries didn't have to take on additional loans, something they said they would have done during the FGDs if the assistance had not been provided to them.

#### Conditionality

Similar to the beneficiaries of other CCTs, beneficiaries who received the integrated approach in both Eastern and Western Leyte applauded the conditional nature of the integrated support. Since the program had many components, beneficiaries felt they were able to budget for multiple aspects of their lives because the grant was given in conditional tranches. Even non-beneficiaries interviewed said that they approved of conditionalities being placed on transfers so that beneficiaries could "spend the money in the right way." 96% of all endline respondents agreed that conditionality was the best way for them to buy the necessary materials to complete their shelters.

#### Training

The MAC2 integrated approach provided trainings to children on hygiene practices and livelihoods trainings for youth and adults. For parents, the training really helped children get excited about hygiene and going to school. However, beneficiaries expected more from the skills trainings for adults. They suggested that more training would have been useful in the long-term and that additional support for livelihoods already in place at the barangay level would have been welcome. For example, beneficiaries in the municipality of MacArthur in Eastern Leyte mentioned that they received information and skills for broilers, the livelihoods intervention SC was implementing, but nothing for farming, the main livelihood people rely on in the area. For children, the WASH trainings were one of the most memorable parts of the programme. Children agreed that the whole community kept better hygiene practices after the trainings, demonstrating the importance of including as many people as possible in the trainings.

The shelter and WASH teams in the different locations also trained and paid carpenters in the assisted communities to support beneficiary households in their effort to reconstruct their shelters

and latrines. This additional service was highly appreciated by the beneficiaries – particularly by those who did not have the skills or physical strength to perform the work (e.g. women headed households, elderly).

## 4.8. Conclusions

SC's new operational model, combined with a programmatic strategy for integration using CTP as a multipurpose tool, is a very positive step towards improved beneficiary accountability and Value For Money (VFM) (refer to Section 6). However, the response missed a major opportunity to use multi-sectoral thinking and a holistic understanding of household recovery needs at the outset of the response. Had an HEA-style economic recovery assessment been conducted within the first month of the response, programmes could have been designed to successfully reinforce multi-sectoral outcomes, rather than risk undermining them. This early economic recovery approach to programming would have also prevented many of the operational obstacles which currently appear to be limiting the effectiveness of integration – particularly funding cycles and the entrenched sectoral set-up. Multi-sector CTP is only one way of facilitating integration and it can be argued that the flexibility of unconditional multi-purpose cash would have been even more effective in supporting early economic recovery and cross-sectoral integration. However, whilst there are potential efficiency gains from removing conditionalities and giving beneficiaries full flexibility in deciding on their recovery needs, the recurring appreciation of conditionality expressed by SC beneficiaries is a significant element of social norms which should be reflected in programme design. SC should also capture opportunities to coordinate with other organisations with a multi-sectoral mandate, and take the lead in coordination forums, which facilitate integration (e.g. highly successful experience of SC leadership of the Early Recovery and Livelihoods Cluster – ERLC – in Iloilo). Effectiveness comparisons between the integrated approach and single-sector approaches were very difficult to establish, given that the timing of the interventions (and thus household priorities) were different. Synergy effects such as improved health of the family members or increased school attendance were not mentioned, despite the FGDs specifically probing for this. Lessons learned and suggestions for measuring the effectiveness of integration are elaborated in the VFM section.

## 4.9. Recommendations

1. **Embed early economic recovery assessment (which captures quantified multi-sectoral gaps in need) into first phase of response**
2. **Develop a CO funding strategy which can enable integration**
3. **Use the HEA methodology to monitor household impact of integration**
4. **Improve efficiency gains of integration by stopping 100% verification of beneficiaries where community-based targeting is effectively applied**

# 5. CTP OPERATIONS

## 5.1. DELIVERY MECHANISM REVIEW

### 5.1.1. Identification and set-up

The efficiency of SC's delivery of CTP in the first few weeks post-Haiyan was severely delayed by the internal process required to compare delivery mechanisms and get approval for the selected delivery agent from SCI Centre. The selected mechanism, Philpost (PHLP) had already been used in 2013 to respond to typhoon Bopha and was selected based on the following advantages: broad geographical presence, even in very remote areas; reported capacity to scale up; and limited reliance on technology (which was assessed to be a positive in the early weeks of a sudden onset response).

Yet, despite the fact that an MoU and contract had already been drafted during the Bopha response, and the presence of CTP-experienced international staff in the first few weeks post typhoon, it still took over two months for the first cash transfer to be delivered by PHLP. By which point, as a basis

for comparison, the PRC and IFRC had already disbursed transfers (through LBC and GCash) to over 46,000 households.

Reported reasons for the delays are a combination of operational and programmatic challenges, namely the lengthy targeting process for CTPs. On the operational side, CTP process set-up was principally delayed by the need to re-draft the contract with PHLP, and acquire approval at SCI centre level for the use of PHLP (which required a waiver<sup>36</sup>) and the content of the contract. This delay can partly be attributed to the absence at the time of an SC-specific methodology for rapid Feasibility and Risk Assessments for CTP (now contained within the SCI CTP Operations Manual). However, there is extensive external documentation of key preparedness activities for delivering CTP in emergencies in the Philippines (most notably a dedicated CaLP review on Disaster Preparedness and CTP in the Philippines<sup>37</sup>), which could have been used by the country office. Even once the contract was signed on 23 December 2013, the Scheme of Delegation requiring country office level approval for any transfers above USD 100,000 and delays in signing MoU Annexes to the contract at field level further delayed the implementation of CTP. Hence, whilst the first CCGs to associations was delivered in December, this was via bank transfer to the associations and the first transfer through PHLP took place in mid-January 2014, two months after the typhoon. As the SCI CTP Operations manual contains standard contract templates with Financial Service Providers, this should reduce contracting delays in future.

### 5.1.2. Implementation through PHLP

The following section outlines SC staff feedback step-by step on the management of the relationship with PHLP.

#### **Contract management:**

- Field operations staff see it as ineffective to draw up a new annexe to the MoU for every new cash transfer project; the content of the MoUs is also not consistent across field bases and leaves room for interpretation by the service provider;
- For compliance reasons, the process used for selecting PHLP as a service provider should also be documented and attached to the contract
- Some operations staff queried why this is an MOU, when the format should resemble a service contract (as per the new SCI CTP Operations Manual) which can be 'drawn down upon' for each subsequent distribution; and periodically negotiated/re-assessed (see footnote on waivers below)
- An additional concern is that the MoU does not include any provision for liability if services are not delivered

#### **Pre-distribution:**

- Staff across locations reported occasional limits to scaling up (either when other organisations are 'competing' for services, or within SC programmes when multiple distributions are planned); however, it is likely this can be mitigated through good forward planning from SC
- Concerns regarding the lack of an alternative - at the moment SC has no contingency mechanism in the case of a break-down of PHLP service and/or demand for their service which cannot be met
- Relationships between PHLP and SC finance at field office level are generally positive, although there has been at least one incident of SC programme staff authorising a PHLP transfer (which is against the Segregation of Duties established in the CTP Ops process designed in Eastern Leyte)

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<sup>36</sup> Notably, the waiver was only for the use of PHLP up to a certain USD value, and should have been revisited beyond this. The need for a waiver reflects the inherent issues within SCI's CTP Operations manual which requires a tender for the entire cash amount to be disbursed rather than just for the cost of the transfer fees. This means that a waiver is systematically required for CTP procurement to avoid the need for an international tender.

<sup>37</sup> Poisson, Gregoire. "Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies – Cash Transfer Mechanisms and Disaster Preparedness in the Philippines." The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP). 2011.

- SC finance and programmes staff training on CTP processes has been limited and ad-hoc (Eastern Leyte benefitted from presence of Cash Advisor in July/August 2014)

#### **Distribution process:**

- Feedback from staff and beneficiaries is overwhelmingly positive
- PHLP service is timely
- They are perceived as a strong partner in remote and insecure environments
- PHLP staff were not trained on Child Safeguarding policy<sup>38</sup> which is a missed opportunity for accountability

#### **Post-distribution:**

- Reporting is still very problematic (and is not effectively enforced) due to weaknesses in the MoU content and the absence of penalty systems
- Delayed reconciliation (e.g. up to four months in Eastern Leyte) was very problematic where there is an underspend on a particular grant as a result and not rigorously followed up by SC

Overall there is a clear need to better centralise the management of the relationship with PHLP at a country office level, to better leverage the following:

- Contract enforcement regarding reconciliation times
- Transaction fees which have the scope to be renegotiated
- Other contractual aspects (e.g. minimum number of beneficiaries per distribution is currently 400; this should be revised downwards given the value of SC contract)

### **5.1.3. Alternative delivery mechanisms**

The initial delivery mechanism assessment conducted in November 2013 recommended a transition to BanKo as a delivery agent for Phase 2 of the response. BanKo is the first mobile-based microfinance-focused bank in the Philippines. The key advantage was the additional banking services that could be provided to SC beneficiaries, which would seem a particularly effective complement to CCTs for livelihoods. As of February 2015, SC has no plans to transition to BanKo. Staff feedback is that their distribution network is very limited (i.e. only one outlet in Eastern Leyte city) and that there are multiple other local MFIs which could offer complementary financial services. Mercy Corps (which originally established Banko) is currently finalising a Randomised Control Trial to review how cash transfers (when complemented with financial products and services) can be delivered in a way that enhances economic recovery and builds resilience. SC needs to use the extensive mapping of financial providers produced by OCHA and consider whether the organisational priority is to invest in preparedness for mobile platforms (that have the greatest potential to be scaled up in future responses) and/or how to use local MFI capacity to facilitate cash delivery when tied to longer-term objectives. It is recommended to strengthen the relationship with PHLP and conduct pilot 'stress-tests' to evaluate its capacity to deliver rapidly in a new environment. In parallel, each field base should conduct its own mapping of delivery mechanisms to assess the capacity of local MFIs to provide cash delivery services which could be used in the second phase of a response, and whereby the relationship could also be leveraged for the free provision of financial literacy training and Business Development Services (BDS). It is also recommended to strengthen cooperation with other

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<sup>38</sup> The Save the Children Child Safeguarding in Cash Transfer Programming guidelines set out the following specific action points (among others):

- Ensuring accountability to children through participation, complaint mechanisms and referral pathways, and engaging with communities by sharing information
- Including child protection needs in emergency risk and needs assessments
- Staff training on child protection and child protection reference checks
- Setting limits and forms of work in line with national legislation (for CFW)
- Ensuring gender-sensitivity when implementing programmes

agencies so there can be strategic approaches to dealing with service providers, rather than several similar bilateral discussions. These discussions would help in ensuring the capacity of the provider given that many agencies work with the same provider in one area and to limit the amount of cash pay outs in one day. Providing information as a humanitarian sector, rather than agency by agency, would facilitate better allocation of resources and cash flow planning from service providers.

## 5.2. Internal CTP Operational Process

Country office and field office staff interviewed as part of this review were not aware of the SCI CTP Ops Manual (available on OneNet). This manual contains mandatory guidance on the procurement and delivery process for cash transfers as well as voucher programmes (which were implemented for both WASH and FSL). However, the manual was only formally approved (though not subsequently rolled out) in May 2014, so it is not surprising that staff are unfamiliar with it. Nonetheless, the deployment in-country of experienced CTP practitioners supported the development of country-specific SOPs with clear Segregation of Duties<sup>39</sup>. Despite this, the SOPs for cash distribution lack necessary detail (e.g. requirement for finance to be present at all distributions) and as a result are not consistently applied. For example, in Eastern Leyte the CTP finance officer reports to the FSL Manager (and was previously in finance), whereas in Western Leyte the finance officer is in finance (and was previously in the FSL team). As the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were initially developed in Eastern Leyte, other field offices appropriated them without training, but the new operational structure offers an opportunity to clarify these roles and responsibilities. A process issue that resulted in delays in payment processing is the approval of CTP payments in advance through the Cash Transfer Application (CTA) form, which the Cash Operations adviser included in the SC Philippines SOPs, and which is also contained in the SCI CTP Operations Manual. In the SCUk Cash SOPs which it was extracted from, this form was intended to provide a format for pre-authorisation (through the Scheme of Delegation) of multiple tranches of cash transfers, thus reducing the need to get approval at country office (or even regional) level for every large cash transfer. However, in reality (and as per the SCI CTP Operations manual), whilst the CTA form was used to plan transfer of funds between Manila and the field offices, it was not approved as a means of pre-authorising multiple tranches of cash transfers.<sup>40</sup>

## 5.3. Risk Mitigation

This section summarises some of the key current risks identified with the CTP delivery process, across field bases. Some of the proposed internal controls are already being implemented in certain offices, but it is recommended that all are applied consistently. Whilst clearer SOPs will mitigate these risks, the internal controls below need to be complemented by systematic spot-checks by field management to prevent collusion.

	Identified Risk	Mitigation
Pre-Distribution	Staff fraud (resulting from occasional incidents whereby programme staff authorised disbursements with PHLP)	- <b>Revised PHLP contract needs to clearly state specific finance staff who are sole SC staff allowed to engage with PHLP</b>
Distribution	Beneficiary fraud (resulting from lack of consistent identification and verification process)	- <b>Use of photo ID (either programme ID card or printed 'voucher' for each distribution)<sup>41</sup></b>

<sup>39</sup> Including the following segregation: Beneficiary identification and registration: Programmes; Distribution list with transfer amounts: Programmes; Approval of list: Field Manager; Beneficiary list and transfer request to PHLP: Finance; Pay-out: PHLP & Finance; Reconciliation: Finance

<sup>40</sup> This is a significant issue within the SCI Cash Operations Manual and should be reviewed

<sup>41</sup> Photos can be taken during beneficiary registration

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Duplicate (or triplicate) Acknowledgement Receipts (ARs) – Finance; PHLP; (Programmes)</b><sup>42</sup></li> </ul>
	Lack of auditable evidence that payments have been received (resulting from inconsistencies between duplicate Acknowledgement Receipts, whereby some are signed but some are not)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Spot-checks of duplicates by finance and field management</b></li> <li>- <b>Obligatory presence of finance at distributions</b></li> </ul>
	Risk of staff fraud and theft and ‘abuse’ of vulnerable beneficiaries (e.g. occasional cases of PHLP giving money to staff when one or two beneficiaries did not turn up and occasional cases of staff offering to buy materials with CCT on behalf of beneficiaries )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Staff sensitisation on CTP distribution behaviour</b></li> <li>- <b>Staff fraud awareness training</b></li> <li>- <b>Beneficiaries and communities to be clearly sensitised to what SC staff can and cannot do</b></li> <li>- <b>Finance to provide narrative report of every distribution detailing ‘exceptional’ incidents</b></li> <li>- <b>Rigorous review of Complaints and Response Mechanisms (CRMs)</b></li> <li>- <b>PHLP is not supposed to give any money to SC staff since they should return the undistributed money using bank accounts.</b></li> </ul>
Post-Distribution	Diversion risk (at distribution site, or intra-household <sup>43</sup> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b><u>Beneficiary sensitisation on programme objectives and CRMs</u></b></li> <li>- <b>Community-based monitoring post-distribution</b></li> </ul>
	Delayed detection of fraud; and risk of donor disallowances or grant underspend (resulting from delays and inaccuracies in reporting and reconciliation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Enforce time-frame for reconciliation by PHLP through revised contract</b></li> <li>- <b>Finance cash distribution reporting figures to be cross-checked with PHLP figures on systematic basis (where reporting has been provided in a timely way)</b></li> </ul>

#### 5.4. Preparedness

Many of the recommendations proposed below relate to improved operational preparedness to deliver CTP. SC needs to learn from other organisations’ CTP experiences in the Philippines (CaLP review; Oxfam<sup>44</sup> case study) and actively engage in the OCHA-led Cash Coordination. In addition to the SCI CTP Operations Manual, SC also has guidance on Cash Emergency Preparedness (CEP) assessments and experience conducting these in comparable contexts to the Philippines. SCUUK is

<sup>42</sup> Estancia: 3 ARs to check for consistency; Ormoc: 2 ARs as consider this reduces risk

<sup>43</sup> A specific case was mentioned in Abong (Panay) where a women beneficiary was coerced by her in-laws to give them the cash, and then was unable to receive her 2<sup>nd</sup> CCT tranche as had not spent the money as planned; this was a clear protection case which staff were concerned about

<sup>44</sup> Hughbanks, Kendra (Oxfam GB). “CaLP Case Study – Unconditional Cash Grants for Relief and Recovery in Rizal and Laguna, The Philippines (Post-Typhoon Ketsana).” The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP). January 2012.

scaling its capacity to have three dedicated Cash Operations staff with the capacity to deploy for preparedness activities. There is a strong rationale (and the necessary capacity) to conduct a detailed Feasibility and Risk Assessment for CTP in each field location. The ‘stress-test’ pilots mentioned above should be conducted in a few selected locations, including ones where SC does not currently have an operational presence. Pilots have been demonstrated to significantly increase the speed of response, as documented in IFRC’s review of cash pilots<sup>45</sup>. In addition to pilots, SC needs to embed an organisational commitment to delivering cash as part of its contingency planning. The 10,000 emergency NFI kits need to be complemented by contingency funding for UCTs to be delivered simultaneously.

## 5.5. Recommendations

1. **Review PHLP MoU in line with standard contract template in the SCI CTP Operations manual;**
2. **Review MoU annex content at field base level**
3. **Review cash distribution SOPs in-line with SCI CTO Ops manual and for consistency across field bases**
4. **Review contingency planning process to include provision for delivery of CTP at scale in first 72 hours**
5. **On basis of revised contingency plan, conduct pilot ‘stress-test’ of PHLP for defined scenario (e.g. EQ in Manila), which should assess: cost implications; SC staff requirements; requirements from PHLP**
6. **Conduct Feasibility and Risk Assessment (FRA) and review cash delivery mechanism assessment (by field base), with the objective of identifying delivery mechanisms appropriate to different stages of a response**
7. **Establish framework agreements at national level and field office level on basis of FRA**
8. **Invest in staff training capacity in country, through in-country opportunities (CaLP and EMMA); and support visits from SC CTP Ops staff**
9. **Develop CTP implementation guidance material for each phase of the program cycle and for different CTP modalities.**

### Box 5 – CASE STUDY: Effective operational preparedness for CTP

- IFRC: Institutional investments in preparedness enabled it to reach 46,000 households within eight weeks (timely and at scale). Specific preparedness measures included leadership commitment; experience of distributing unconditional cash grants from previous small-scale pilots in 2013, cash standard operating procedures (SOPs) and pre-arrangements with two remittance companies for cash delivery.
- Tzu Chi: Had experience using CTP in the Ketsana response; not grant funded model (so rapidly scalable) – disbursed PHP 1.2 billion in three months through Metrobank (with whom it already had a contract).

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<sup>45</sup> IFRC. “Evaluation of the Preparedness Pilot for Cash Transfer Programmes – Achieving scale in relief cash transfer programming – 2014.” The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP). November 2014.

## 6. VALUE FOR MONEY OF CTP IN HAIYAN RESPONSE

### 6.1. What is Value for Money

As per the Department for International Development's (DfID's) definitions, Value for Money (VFM) refers to the optimal use of resources to achieve the best outcomes for people affected by crisis and disaster. DFID's approach to VFM, which SC aims to adopt, is made up of three components, referred to as the three E's:

- Economy relates to the price at which inputs are purchased. Inputs can include the price of in-kind goods, banking fees, vehicle and storage rentals, staff salaries, truck rentals and the cost of consultants.
- Efficiency relates to how well inputs are converted to the output of interest, which in the case of humanitarian programmes is usually access to certain goods and services. Cost-efficiency analysis spans both economy and efficiency, focussing on the relationship between the costs of a programme and the value of the assistance delivered to beneficiaries. Efficiency also includes costs to recipients, such as paying for transport or the opportunity cost.
- Effectiveness relates to how well outputs are converted to outcomes and impacts, such as food consumption, food security, improved nutrition, school attendance, increased use of health services / improved health, improved livelihoods, asset accumulation, market impacts and social cohesion. Cost-effectiveness analysis examines the cost of achieving intended programme outcomes and impacts, and can compare the costs of alternative ways of producing the same or similar benefits.

Current debates within the humanitarian sector are primarily focused on the challenge of measuring effectiveness, which this research piece sought (and struggled) to contribute to.

### 6.2. Review of VFM of CTP in Philippines

A specific review of the VFM of CTP (as opposed to other modalities) was conducted by DfID in August 2014, and this study aims to complement DfID's review with some very specific case studies from SC's programme. The DfID study found only one direct comparison between cash and in-kind food assistance: "cash was roughly of the same efficiency as food aid to *increase access to food* but more efficient when considering the cost of transferring USD 1 of resources to beneficiaries."<sup>46</sup>

This has critical implications for SC as a multi-sectoral organisation aiming to implement integrated programmes – the strongest indicator of VFM was that beneficiaries used the cash to purchase diverse goods that would have been impossible, or not practical for aid agencies to provide. The considerable range of expenditures observed in SC's own PDM reports for UCT demonstrates the importance of this flexibility. For example in Western Leyte, 32% of beneficiaries spent the cash on staples such as rice and milk, 17% on non-staple foods, 12% on shelter and the rest were able to buy different inputs for livelihoods recovery (like purchasing piglets) or save the money. Similarly, in Iloilo, 57% of UCT beneficiaries spent the money staple goods, 17% on education of children (such as school fees and supplies) and 14% on health-related needs. The Philippines VFM study therefore poses the question: "if cash transfers are the more efficient approach – either to increase access to food or as a multi-sector transfer – the question then becomes whether more in-kind assistance should have been replaced with cash transfers and whether this transition should have started sooner", which is what the optimal timeline in 2.D. conclusions advocates for.

The DfID study also highlights the lack of data on cost efficiency of different transfers to inform this study, which was also experienced within SC during the course of this research. Cost-efficiency

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<sup>46</sup> DFID VFM Study

calculations should be a core part of response analysis and should have been more systematically used by SC to inform decisions on responses, particularly once the acute phase of the response was winding down. Despite the lack of retrospective cost-efficiency information, this report has attempted to show-case three case studies of potential VFM gains within SC programmes. The research approach used the DfID modality cost comparison template to retroactively evaluate the efficiency of comparative programmes; and then made suggestions for potential measures of programme effectiveness (though these were not measured in any of the three examples and cannot be reported upon).

### **6.3. VFM Case Study I – CTP VS. IN-KIND FOR WASH IN Western Leyte**

#### **Background**

The WASH team in Western Leyte initially considered CTP as part of response but when they started to design their programme, they realised that latrines were not a community priority and that the shift from open defecation needed significant sensitisation. This also reflects the limited understanding of overall household needs resulting from the lack of a holistic economic recovery assessment. From April 2014 onwards, the logistics team conducted very basic market assessments and assessed it was difficult to find the necessary materials for latrine construction especially in remote areas. It should be noted that this does not align with findings on shelter material availability (see section on Shelter CCTs), and actually reveals the limited nature of the market assessments conducted. However, the WASH team's observations on the Shelter CCT programme is that if demand is quantified with local traders, this can increase the quality and supply of materials (as corroborated by the analysis of market impact of the Shelter CCTs in the section above). In addition, in February 2015, a rapid assessment (not documented, but looking at availability of specific items and trader ability to stock) concluded that the high quality water bowls desired by the WASH team were available on local markets in sufficient quantity. Therefore the WASH team in Western Leyte are now piloting CCTs as part of a DfID grant. The pilot will use CCTs with 550 households in four barangays in two municipalities in Western Leyte, whilst four other barangays will continue to receive in-kind support.

#### **Efficiency findings**

The principle efficiency rationale of this approach aligns with the rationale for integration (see section 4 on integration above and VFM section 6 on integration below) in terms of shared operational costs for beneficiary identification; cash transfer fees and household monitoring; as well as potential reduced costs for beneficiaries buying 'joint' Shelter and CCT materials in bulk. The cost efficiency comparison template found CTP to be more cost-efficient than in-kind with average costs per beneficiary of USD 149.61 for in-kind and USD 140.31 for CTP. The actual input costs (the 'economy' factor of VFM) were valued at USD 113 for in-kind versus USD 125 for CTP. When transport costs are considered, the average cost for in-kind is USD 133 versus for CTP USD 128. It should be noted that the overall costs-efficiency calculations in Annex 6 are likely to be slightly skewed by the fact that staffing levels were estimated to be identical for in-kind and CTP despite there being 400 in-kind beneficiary household vs. 550 CTP beneficiary households. It is recommended that the cost-efficiency comparisons are reviewed with actual costs once the CTP pilot has been implemented.

#### **Measuring effectiveness**

The effectiveness rationale of this approach is two-part: household level; and community/market level. At household level, the assumption is that completion of latrines will be faster and quality will be improved because of the incentive to spend each tranche in order to secure the next disbursement. At market and community level, the assumption is that CCTs will have additional effectiveness gains relative to in-kind including strengthening local markets (as evidenced with the Shelter CCTs) and improving the quality of local supply which would benefit non-beneficiaries too. However, the WASH team was clear that this will require sensitisation of market actors regarding the scale and objectives of the intervention, particularly in terms of the minimum quality

requirements. These potential indicators must be incorporated into a MEAL framework that will accompany the pilot.

## **6.4. VFM Case Study 2 – COMMUNITY CASH GRANTS VS. CCTs FOR LIVELIHOODS**

### **Background**

The second ‘case study’ proved to be a challenging example, as the research sought to compare the VFM of CCGs through associations versus CCTs to association members (see section 3.5 on CCGs vs. CCTs for livelihoods for clarification of the distinction). The specific comparison made was between CCGs to Irrigator’s Associations and CCTs to members of fishermen’s associations, both in Eastern Leyte, overseen by the Eastern Leyte office.

### **Efficiency findings**

Two critical elements need to be considered in analysing the costs of these two different interventions: firstly, the comparison is between two different forms of livelihoods, therefore is not an objective comparison as the recovery needs differ; secondly, whilst the support to fishermen was intended to contribute substantially to livelihoods recovery, the support to irrigator’s associations was relatively minimal, and was intended primarily to allow irrigators to restart their farming activities, through subsidising canal clearing. Additionally, what this analysis shows is the substantial cost of supporting livelihoods recovery, specifically for fishing, which is the primary activity in Haiyan affected areas.

Hence, the significant difference in cost per beneficiary is not directly comparable. The figures in Annex 2 show that the average CCT transfer value was USD \$810 per beneficiary whereas for CCGs it was only USD 30 – which demonstrates the incomparability of the two approaches. Interestingly, though the efficiency rationale for the CCGs assumes that the operational delivery costs will be lower than for CCTs – this has not emerged from the cost-efficiency comparison as the ratio of the transfer to the total cost is actually marginally lower for CCGs at 0.79 than for CCTs at 0.8. This comparison does raise a clear question as to how programming decisions are made and the necessity of including cost-efficiency and effectiveness considerations as a key part of programme design, along with a livelihood-specific understanding of economic recovery requirements.

### **Measuring effectiveness**

In addition to the differences in objectives and livelihoods, a major challenge with comparing the VFM 2 approaches is that no outcome indicators were measured for either activity, making it impossible to compare effectiveness. KIs with staff and FGDs with fishermen revealed that potential effectiveness indicators for these livelihoods support programmes could include the effect on the strengthening of associations (as measured by formalisation of structure and increased membership). Broader indicators of effectiveness can include market-level beneficiaries (e.g. as a result of the fisheries interventions: increased sales for fish vendors; improved sales for large boat input traders; improved business for transporters). In terms of methodology, one potential way of measuring the effectiveness of livelihoods interventions could be to use the 5 assets structure of the sustainable livelihoods framework to gauge both individual livelihoods impacts (e.g. increased income) and community-level impacts (e.g. participation; cohesion; indirect beneficiaries and employment creation).

## **6.5. VFM Case Study 3 – MULTI-SECTOR / INTEGRATED CTP**

### **Background**

The DfID VFM study states that “the potential for VFM gains of cash are particularly evident when cash is considered as a multi-sector tool with a wide range of benefits. The goods and services households access as a result of cash transfers vary between households and span different aid sectors – results that would be difficult or impossible to replicate via in-kind assistance. The specific outcomes of the intervention depend not solely on the transfer but also on the context, programme

design and implementation, including targeting and programme quality.” The multi-sectoral benefits of UCTs in the SC Philippines programme are exemplified in the analysis of expenditure patterns (see section 3.1 on UCTs), which demonstrates the broad range of expenditures prioritised by beneficiaries. In future, as recommended in the UCT section of this report, if UCTs are designed on the basis of a holistic MEB including food and non-food needs, these multi-sectoral gains will be even more evident. Whilst SC Philippines did not implement multipurpose CTPs, its integrated CTP programme (detailed in the section on integration) provided the potential for multiple efficiency and effectiveness gains. The researchers were not able to retrieve data from field management to compare the VFM of the single-sector approach, which characterised the early phase of the response and compare this to the integrated approach.

### **Measuring efficiency**

The expected efficiency gains of SC’s integrated CTP approach in the Philippines are detailed in the section on integration above. These include increased operational accountability (for budgets, people, and project management); scalability; and standardisation of approaches. However, as of February 2015, given the new operational model is very new, none of these efficiency gains have yet been measured. As clearly indicated above, substantial differences still remain between field bases in the practical implementation of the new operational model and integrated CTP. Building on the WASH CCT pilot described above, further potential efficiency gains across locations include the use of common beneficiary databases; the systematic ‘merging’ of transfers between programmes, and shared monitoring systems. It is recommended that a cost-efficiency comparison of the integrated approach is conducted between field bases to review operational set-up and encourage learning between field bases.

### **Measuring effectiveness**

The SC Philippines experience has demonstrated that a lot of investment is still required to measure the effectiveness of CTP-based integration – whether delivered through multi-sectoral CTP as in this programme, or through multipurpose CTP as recommended in the UCT section. The MAC2 endline only looked at sector-specific outcomes, and whilst the FGDs conducted as part of this research attempted to uncover complementary benefits of the integrated approach for broader indicators of child well-being no conclusive findings were observed. Lessons learned include the need to look at expenditure patterns more broadly, beyond sector silos; to set out a Theory of Change at the outset of an integrated programme which looks at broader indicators of child well-being<sup>47</sup>; and to determine from the outset what broader community and market-level benefits the intervention is intending to achieve.

## **6.6. Conclusions**

This part of the research clearly demonstrated the challenge of measuring VFM retrospectively in this context for the following reasons: operational realities differed between locations and over time, hence activities that were designed similarly (e.g. multi-sectoral CTP) were implemented very differently; actual budget information was not consistently analysed and was difficult to access for the researchers; and outcome indicators were rarely included in MEAL frameworks making it very difficult to measure effectiveness. The WASH CCT pilot does however provide an interesting opportunity to simultaneously compare the actual cost-efficiency of two different approaches in real-time, whilst defining a framework which seeks to measure effectiveness indicators at household and community/market level. Additionally, the HEA thresholds provide real scope to be used as a benchmark for measuring integration outcomes (through the analysis of multi-sectoral spending patterns and their contribution to livelihoods recovery).

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<sup>47</sup> SCUK’s PPQ and HTU teams are collaborating on a project to define a framework for measuring the link between Economic Strengthening interventions (including CTP) and child outcomes which will address these deficiencies.

## 6.7. Recommendations

1. **Conduct cost-efficiency comparison as core part of response analysis – considering recovery needs by livelihood (as measured by the HEA) in the effectiveness considerations**
2. **MEAL frameworks should systematically include sector-specific and cross-sectoral effectiveness indicators which are measured at baseline and outcome level; this is a pre-requisite to measuring VFM**
3. **Western Leyte team WASH CCT pilot:**
  - i. **Design MEAL framework for pilot to include effectiveness indicators**
  - ii. **Review WASH CCT cost-efficiency comparison during pilot and to design MEAL framework**

# 7. EFFECTIVENESS FOCUS AND MARKET RECOVERY

## 7.1. How did the markets evolve?

The first encompassing market assessment was the one WFP conducted from 10 November to 10 December 2013. The assessment tried to estimate markets' capacities to provide the populations in the affected areas with commodities. The study was intended as an operational tool for the initial decision making and planning for CTP. It recommended cautious gradual injection of cash starting in the west and moving to the east; injections of cash to revive retail supply capacity and household-level effective demand in areas where retailers face respective problems to recover (particularly in Leyte); carefully coordinated retail facilitation where the small-scale retail sector had been particularly affected; and public market rehabilitation. WFP noted that prices were still high and recommended caution when implementing CTPs. It suggested that actors implementing CTPs also conduct market and price monitoring systems to make sure that interventions do not cause price increases that might erode transfer values or hurt non-beneficiaries.

The Cash Learning Programme (CaLP) pointed out that vulnerabilities had been identified "in supply chains (e.g. lead time for restocking, quality, and quantity issues) for certain critical commodity/item classes such as construction materials and tools, rice, specific types of livelihood assets and specialized labour (e.g. skilled builders)." This comes as no surprise because – apart from rice – the demand for most of these commodities had strongly increased as a direct consequence of the devastation caused by the typhoon. Markets could not be expected to have the capacity to react to such an exceptional event. Taking Corrugated Galvanised Iron (CGI) sheets as an example, shelter material traders could not be expected to stock the quantities necessary to cover the sudden needs that emerged after Haiyan. Their stocks are laid out for home maintenance and the occasional new construction – not for the needs that emerge after natural catastrophes.

Despite the identified problems most actors and observers seemed to agree that markets were restoring quickly. As time went on, it became clear that markets were actually recovering quicker than anyone had expected. However, recovery was not homogenous – markets were developing at their own speed. As the OCHA cash coordinator mentioned, this meant that there was no need for a national policy on market recovery. What was thought was needed was market and price monitoring by those agencies implementing CTPs. Interviews with traders and consumers confirmed that markets were developing at different speeds according to location and market type (see section 4) illustrating once more how important it is to monitor them when implementing CTPs. Determining how the market evolved is thus not possible. Details on how the different market types in different locations developed can be found in section 4.

WFP mentioned in their first market assessment that they were developing rapidly deployable structured market assessment tool that would allow them to track trader operational constraints and market price dynamics and allow deductions about the general state of markets in a broader catchment area. This tool does not seem to have been deployed after Haiyan – at least no respective

results could be found. In fact, there are very few reports describing how markets developed after Haiyan. There were a series of market assessments that provided snapshots of the respective market situations at the time of the assessment, but market and price monitoring assessments and analyses could not be found. Whether such assessments were not conducted or not shared could not be determined. In absence of respective assessments and analyses one wonders what the statements on price increases mentioned in various humanitarian reports were based on.

There have been no well-founded reports of CTPs causing price increases or inflation. All traders interviewed mentioned that price increases had been mostly caused by increases in transport and fuel costs and that they had been minor. While the claims made by the traders appeared credible and were confirmed by consumers too, it is not possible to confirm or reject them without proper data. The fact that there have been no reports of CTPs causing major problems however suggests that such problems did not occur and that markets were able to absorb the cash injected through the various programmes.

It is felt that market and price monitoring activities of humanitarian actors were insufficient or, at the very least, insufficiently shared. It appears that once markets started recovering humanitarian actors seem to have assumed that things were going in the right direction and did not require further assessment.

## **7.2. What was the role of the private sector?**

An article on the private sector response to Haiyan points out that the latter was more sophisticated than for any preceding disaster: “Companies with local presence were often the first responders, leveraging their networks, people, assets and products. They donated relief items (for example water, food, tarpaulins, water filters, solar torches, blankets, clothes, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and hygiene items), logistics (vehicles, air and sea freight, warehouses), services (including communications, passenger flights, port services), expertise (such as project management, financial and logistics surge capacity) and volunteers for packing, distribution and rapid assessments.” Smith (2015) notes that it is estimated that western-based companies alone have contributed USD 58.9 million towards the typhoon response and points out that in addition, Filipino companies had made significant contributions too.

An impressive private sector initiative worth noting in this respect is the Tzu Chi Foundation’s CTP. The foundation provided over USD 12 million in cash transfers in the first two weeks of the response. Throughout their response they provided 300,000 man-days of short term employment within 19 days paying workers PHP 500 per day as well as 68,000 households with UCTs of PHP 8,000, 12,000, or 15’000 depending on households size. In total, the Tzu Chi Foundation disbursed over USD 20 million in cash transfers within the first few weeks of the response.

The mentioned article further states that after the initial relief phase, the private sector engaged in supporting distribution chains for essential items and rebuild livelihoods. However, it does not provide an estimate for the extent of provided support – it only mentions two examples. The evaluation team came across one of these private sector initiatives conducted by P&G. Although the team met with a representative of P&G, it could not find out a lot about the programme. All that could be established is that P&G provided *sari-sari* store owners in Estancia with store signage, glass cabinets to display goods, and PHP 2,000 worth of products to replenish their stores. In comparison to SC’s support of cash grants worth PHP 10,000 – 15,000, the support appears moderate.

According to the cash coordinator the most concrete example of collaboration between the humanitarian sector and the private sector was the collaboration with Financial Service Providers (FSP). There was a lot of interaction between the two sides as they tried to increase disaster preparedness for CTP. Different FSPs participated in the CWG meetings for this purpose. OCHA is currently busy mapping the respective financial services throughout the country and plans on making them publicly accessible. This will certainly be a very useful contribution to increase disaster preparedness for humanitarian actors and allow choosing the most adapted transfer mechanisms

from a vast number of service options in the three available categories of over the counter services, debit card and electronic money transfer services, and mobile money services.

That the humanitarian sector is serious about involving the private sector may be illustrated by the fact that OCHA has approved a private sector representative to sit on the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). Smith (2015) mentions that OCHA recently set up a private sector section globally, looking at how to improve coordination between the humanitarian system and businesses to improve humanitarian effectiveness. Discussion and efforts around the subject are likely to continue. Smith (2015) recommends that the humanitarian system should find ways to coordinate with the private sector so that common standards can be developed and efficiencies can be leveraged. Smith points out that there are a number of private sector umbrella bodies in the Philippines that are promising entry point to start such a cooperation and mentions that they are well positioned to leverage funds for disaster response and recovery programmes – and in some cases implementing these directly – and include organisations for which distribution and supply chain analysis and recovery are core parts of the business strategy. Smith lists a series of initiative that were supported by these bodies during the Haiyan response and the early recovery phase.

SC should try to stay on top of these developments and see if any interesting opportunities come up that would justify to engage directly in respective cooperation activities.

### **7.3. What was the impact of in-kind assistance?**

In-kind assistance came in several forms. The most sizeable in-kind assistance was the rice that WFP distributed through its implementing partners in various affected locations. SC's rapid food market assessments for Leyte and Panay both pointed out that demand for rice has significantly decreased as a consequence of the in-kind assistance. Some small rice traders reported that they had been selling no rice in the months following the typhoon but could have started selling rice in February 2014. By April 2014, WFP closed its food pipeline and all major general food distribution came to halt. The government meanwhile continued targeted food distributions until July 2014. Some households mentioned that they had been consuming the relief rice until the month of June. Many actors felt that the food distributions went on too long and slowed down market recovery. However, studies underpinning this claim could not be found.

The Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment stated at the same time that rice distributors faced problems procuring rice, the GOP increased rice imports to prevent shortages, and that there was no information indicating that markets would recover as quickly as they did. This suggests that while general food distributions were an appropriate reaction in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon, it might have been possible to stop them earlier and replace them with UCTs allowing the rice market to recover quicker. Yet, without detailed market and price monitoring data, this claim could not be verified.

Apart from the direct impact of in-kind food assistance had in the marketplaces of the areas it was distributed, it appears to have also contributed to bottlenecks in the supply chains as humanitarian actors consumed an increased share of upstream production of food items. It is not clear if and where this has increased prices and reduced availability. While the DTI imposed a price freeze in the disaster stricken areas it is not clear that this measure is actually effective to deal with price increases further up the supply chain.

The in-kind assistance provided by humanitarian actors also had a significant impact on the transportation sector. Several traders mentioned that the availability of trucks and barges had gone down and prices to hire them had gone up as a consequence of the vast transport needs of humanitarian actors. Increased fuel prices also made transport more expensive. While there are no studies or statistics to determine the extent of these effects, increased transport and fuel costs were said to be the main reasons for local price increases. Even INGOs faced problems to find transport to bring in imported commodities.

## 7.4. What was the impact of the CTP response?

### The extent of the losses

In a matter of weeks after Haiyan, the GOP prepared a reconstruction plan to address the consequences of Haiyan: the Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY). The assessment presented initial estimates of damages, losses, and needs; identified the phasing of the needed interventions (relief, recovery, and reconstruction) and estimated that four years would be needed to address them. The initial estimate of the damages was almost USD 13 billion – while the value of destroyed physical assets was estimated at about USD 9.6 billion, the remaining USD 3.3 billion denote reductions in production, sales, and income to date and in the near term. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR), was tasked to coordinate post-Haiyan recovery and reconstruction, subsequently prepared the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP) based on the RAY and a post-disaster needs assessment. The plan estimates reconstruction needs at roughly USD 3.8 billion and foresaw over 18,000 projects and programmes in 171 municipalities and cities across the affected area.

S. Brown (2015) mentions that only around USD 1.5 billion of the USD 13 billion of damages caused by Haiyan were insured – leaving USD 11.5 billion uncovered. The numbers are presented to put the assistance provided by the humanitarian system in perspective.

### The impact of the global CTP response on recovery

The inter-agency humanitarian CTP response to Haiyan amounted to an estimated USD 338 million making it one of the largest cash based interventions ever. And yet, the amount corresponds to less than 9 % of the reconstruction needs estimated by the CRRP and to less than 3 % of the uncovered losses and damages caused by Haiyan. With respect to the total extent of the losses and damages, the potential outcome of the CTP interventions is thus likely to remain moderate. The Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE, 2014) of the response to Haiyan confirms this by pointing out that the major part of the response came from the government, the private sector, and the diaspora and that the inter-agency emergency response was a timely and effective complement.

The extent of remittances is worth noting as it really puts the scope of the humanitarian assistance into perspective. The remittances of Filipino overseas workers for the month of June 2014 were USD 2 billion – remittances in the Philippines are significant and account for about 9 % of GDP. According to the Central Bank of the Philippines, remittances went up by USD 600 million in the first three months following Haiyan when compared to the same three months during the previous year. It seems reasonable to assume that a disproportionate amount of the increase went to typhoon-affected households but there are no figures to support this. Some of the households interviewed mentioned remittances as important for their recovery.

The extent of the inter-agency CTP response is modest compared to the response that came from the government, the private sector, and the diaspora and the extent of damages and losses. Accordingly, expectations regarding the importance and potential impact of the inter-agency CTP response should be modest too.

While the scale of CTP in the humanitarian response to Haiyan was unprecedented, there is no information that comprehensively captures the amounts of cash distributed. Nonetheless, the IAHE concludes that the innovations in scaled-up cash based approaches had been largely effective. The fact that it also recommends setting up a practice-oriented research project to learn from the large scale use of cash-transfer programme approaches in the Haiyan response, which includes consideration of a) the results of CTPs for communities and local economies; b) benefits and challenges of different modalities; c) areas where standards would add value; and d) consistent monitoring approaches to support inter-cluster approaches that benefit households and communities as a whole, underlines that respective information is not yet available and little can be said as to the impact of the respective interventions.

The way in which CTPs are currently monitored does not allow to determine their impact on household recovery: Usually actors implementing CTPs focus on expenditure patterns and programme objectives without taking a broader look at the cash's impact on the recovery of households, communities, and local economies. If the general impact of CTP responses is to be determined, a respective impact evaluation system will have to be put in place before such responses are implemented. Respective systems do not appear to have been implemented during the response to Haiyan.

### **The impact of SC's CTP responses on recovery**

SC's combined cash transfers in Iloilo, Eastern Leyte, and Western Leyte amounted to roughly USD 8.5 million – Iloilo received roughly USD 3.3 million, Western Leyte USD 2 million, and Eastern Leyte USD 3.2 million. With respect to the size of the regional economy the amounts are negligible: the combined Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) for Eastern and Western Visayas in 2013 was over USD 16 billion. That is not to say that the amounts did not have a significant impact for the people and the communities in which they were disbursed. It is just to say that we cannot expect to find an effect in available official data.

As mentioned above, to determine the impact of CTPs on the recovery of households, communities, and local economies, respective evaluation systems must be devised and put into place. This requires defining indicators for the dimensions of interest and collecting the respective baseline data before the start of the programme. It also requires a simple properly timed monitoring process to identify changes. All of this was not put into place for SC's response to Haiyan. Consequently, it is very difficult to determine the impact SC's programmes had on the recovery of households, communities, and the local economies.

Only general statements can be made. For example: The fact that there were no reports that any of SC's CTPs caused inflationary pressure in the local markets suggests that the latter were able to absorb the cash injected into them.

SC's UCT's were deemed useful but implemented late. It is felt that earlier disbursements could have sped up market recovery in the local markets because households were seriously cash constrained and traders reported low sales. The same is true for the FFVs. Most fresh food traders were back on the market as early as December 2013 because Tzu Chi had disbursed its CTPs and traders wanted to benefit from households increased purchasing power.

The CCTs for shelter materials do not appear to have caused any disturbances in the local markets. It is believed that the CCTs for shelter materials could have been implemented earlier. Yet, this would have required a well-devised market monitoring system that would have allowed SC to see whether the market would have been able to deliver.

Market support to sari-sari store owners was small in scope and is felt to have had only a limited impact on households access to commodities. Maybe the programme could have had a more significant certain impact if it would have been implemented immediately after the typhoon and in combination with UCTs for households.

### **Multiplier effects**

One argument for cash-based interventions is that they can have multiplier effects in local economies and contribute to more sustainable recovery. Let's take a UCT programme as an example: the UCT programme provides beneficiary households with a PHP 4,100 cash grant. In an emergency situation where households are seriously cash constrained and experience various pressing needs they are likely to spend the entire amount of cash. Consequently, the cash transfer starts spreading to others inside and outside of the targeted barangays. Households may buy locally produced foods, shelter materials, hygiene products, pay school fees, repay debts, and so on. They are thus setting in motion income multipliers within the economy as their expenditures increase the income of others who – it is assumed – will then again increase their expenditures and so on.

There are different ways of quantifying multiplier effects. The principal method used is the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM).<sup>48</sup> A SAM is a table that summarizes all the monetary flows among the different actors of a particular economy: wages firms pay to households, household's consumption of goods, and taxes and transfers administered by the Government. It is a representation of all existing monetary transactions in an economy. Needless to say that establishing a SAM is very complicated and requires accurate data on income and expenditure that cannot be gathered by normal project baselines and monitoring. Even if a SAM is available for a particular context, calculating multipliers requires technical skills that are often not available in the field.

Accordingly, alternative methods have been suggested to allow conclusions about multiplier effects in situations where quantitative data or the skills to handle it are lacking. Creti (2010) describes a qualitative approach to multiplier analysis that maintains the framework, while adapting the level of analysis to the information, tools, and capacity typically available in the field: while normal programme monitoring usually stops at the first round of expenditures, the qualitative multiplier analysis follows up on subsequent rounds of expenditures. That is, the expenditures of the food, shelter material, and hygiene product retailers and thereafter the expenditures of the main actors that receive these payments. The aim is to understand whether the cash initially disbursed remains in the local economy and creates additional commodities are created to meet the additional demand.

Needless to say that such qualitative multiplier analyses are time consuming and complex. They are unlikely to be a realistic endeavour in an emergency and early recovery response where time and human resources are scarce. As it became clear during the evaluation, SC found it difficult to monitor the first round of expenditures in a detailed way. Until it manages to monitor and document the direct effects of programmes in a consistent way, it should definitely not engage in assessing secondary effects (i.e. multipliers).

Knowing the multiplier effect of a programme can be useful if it is necessary to make a choice between different programmes that try to attain the same objectives. In such a situation one would choose the programme with the highest multiplier in order to increase positive secondary effects on the local economy. If however the programmes try to attain different objectives one would focus on the respective objectives (the primary effect intended) to make the choice rather than the potential positive secondary effects of the programmes. In case it is necessary to take a decision of the first kind, a qualitative multiplier assessment could be undertaken if the scope of the programmes justifies the additional effort. However, it is felt that in most cases the decision on programmes will be determined by primary objectives and constraints (e.g. quality consideration in shelter programmes) rather than by potential secondary effects.

## 7.5. Conclusions

Markets evolved quicker than expected and various actors started implementing CTPs soon after Haiyan had hit without causing major problems. It is felt that the absence of problems may have prompted some actors to reduce their market and price monitoring activities because they were not expecting any problems. This could be an explanation why respective data is so hard to come by. The CaLP minimum requirements for market assessments in emergencies state that “regular market monitoring and analysis of data collected is crucial as it allows for the capturing of the dynamic nature of markets as opposed to the taking of a single snapshot”. SC neglected market monitoring and analysis in most of its CTPs. While this did not lead to major problems, it may do so in the future.

The private sector's role in disaster responses is a topic worth following. With respect to the Haiyan response the most tangible results on cooperation between humanitarian actors and the private sector were obtained with FSPs. OCHA is currently mapping the FSPs and the services they offer on a national level so that humanitarian actors have easy access to these providers in case of

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<sup>48</sup> See Creti (2010): The Impact of Cash transfers on Local Markets: A Case Study of Unstructured Markets in Northern Uganda, CaLP, April 2010.

future disasters. Other cooperation remained modest but that is not to say that they are less interesting. It might be interesting to establish contacts with certain private companies to work on disaster pre-paredness projects. For example, SC could, through its logistics department, establish contacts with large private sector actors trading with key commodities (e.g. rice, canned foods, shelter materials etc.) to establish a market monitoring system that contributes to SC's general disaster preparedness.

SC's current monitoring and evaluation efforts are strongly focused on the procedural aspects of CTPs and not adequate to assess these programmes wider impacts on households, communities, and the local economy. Hence it is not possible to make any statements on the respective consequences of CTPs although they should be the focus of attention. SC needs to adapt its monitoring and evaluation system and orient it more towards measuring the direct and indirect consequences of its programmes. These systems should be simple and practical. Respective guidelines are available and should be consulted. It is felt that improving the monitoring and evaluation efforts also requires respective capacity building efforts.

Assessing multiplier effects, though interesting, should at this point not be a priority for SC. SC should start by properly assessing the primary effect of its activities before addressing secondary ones.

## **7.6. Recommendations**

1. Establish relationships and framework agreements with different financial service providers offering adapted cash transfer services to increase disaster preparedness.
2. Implicate logistics in market and price monitoring activities and develop contacts with large traders in key commodities (e.g. rice, canned foods, shelter materials etc.) to be able to map and follow key markets as a measure of disaster preparedness.
3. Closely monitor the use of cash transfers, especially for UCTs, to determine how they affect households, communities and the local economy.
4. Organise capacity building for market assessment and monitoring for permanent staff in relevant teams.

# **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Specific conclusions and recommendations have been detailed throughout the report, relating to each of the elements of programme design, implementation and effectiveness reviewed as part of this research. This section will not repeat the conclusions above, but will draw out cross-cutting themes and recommendations, structuring these according to the project cycle as follows: Preparedness; Programme Design; Programme Implementation; and Monitoring and Measuring impact. This will be complemented by an 'optimal' timeline, which visualises how the response might have looked if the conclusions and recommendations below had been applied; and how a future emergency response using CTP should look.

## **A. Preparedness**

Across all sectors, despite the scale of Haiyan's impact, markets recovered surprisingly quickly demonstrating that Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) is highly feasible in country across sectors and needs. Relative to the markets' capacity to absorb cash, most of the CTP interventions across agencies were very late; whereas earlier CTP interventions (e.g. Tzu Chi's UCT programme) were credited with supporting market recovery. The delayed operational set-up of SC's contract with PHLP and the lack of standard SOPs delayed the start-up of CTP until mid-January 2014, which was too late to meet immediate recovery needs and hampered the effectiveness of future CTPs.

- **RECOMMENDATION 1:** Review operational preparedness (finance, logistics and operations) for CTP including: review of PHLP contract and conducting operational feasibility and risk assessments for CTP in all programme locations; review of contingency plans and allocation of contingency funds
- **RECOMMENDATION 2:** Seek inter-agency agreement from donors on the use of unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) being a good first response for defined situations should be obtained as a disaster preparedness measure
- **RECOMMENDATION 3:** Conduct baseline national and regional market maps for key commodities (e.g. rice, canned foods, shelter materials etc.) as part of preparedness, and in coordination with other agencies and private sector
- **RECOMMENDATION 4:** Develop contextualised standardised programme guidance for all CTP modalities (to be modified in the event of an emergency), including strong accountability processes
- **RECOMMENDATION 5:** Devise a contextualised standardised targeting process that is accepted and understood by the communities and train SC staff on how to apply it (HEA findings and community based wealth breakdowns have shown first positive results).

## B. Programme design

Rapid market assessments should be conducted across sectors in the first few days of a response – these should not be exhaustive (e.g. EMMA) but should build on market baseline (where available) to answer a few critical questions on market functionality. The emphasis should be on multi-sector market assessments rather than in-depth sector-specific market assessments.

An understanding of economic recovery needs is critical to the design of effective integrated programming, through CTP or other modalities. Many of the programmes implemented by SC in Phase I of the response were hampered in their effectiveness by a poor understanding of household expenditure prioritisation and lack of quantified information on recovery needs (and how these differ by wealth group and livelihoods).

UCTs, designed based on a comprehensive food and non-food Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB), should systematically be used to provide household-level support to meet immediate needs and support early recovery while more detailed assessments are conducted and focussed and targeted interventions are being devised. Targeting of UCTs caused significant delays and tensions in SC Philippines's programme, and the option of blanket targeting should be systematically considered, and raised with donors (see recommendation above). UCTs appear to have contributed to localised market recovery when provided in the immediate aftermath of the disaster (e.g. PRC & IFRC or Tzu Chi). SC's UCTs did successfully enable households to cover various immediate and recovery needs (food, shelter and livelihoods inputs), complementing the diverse range of assistance received across locations and sectors. UCTs are an essential complement to ensure effective conditional interventions as they allow households to cover other essential needs, making it feasible for them to comply with the conditionality.

SC needs to carefully devise market support interventions to ensure that the objectives (whether individual livelihoods recovery or market-level recovery) are clear. If the objective is market-level recovery, these interventions need to make sure they include all relevant traders and limit market distortions (e.g. vouchers not suitable for small vulnerable traders, cash grants only for those who have not yet recovered ignoring debts and limited capacities of others) and critically, need to be timely.

Conditional cash transfers (CCT) should only be considered if it is certain that the conditionality is going to have a significant positive impact on the outcome of the programme because the conditionality increases the cost of the interventions and slows down the speed of the implementation. Changing behaviour in a programme that is intended to address emergency and early recovery needs seems inappropriate and unrealistic, thus programmes such as the FFV programme should not be reconsidered.

CCGs to associations are a valuable complement to UCTs in the first phase of a response as they enable investment in community assets, which are critical to livelihoods recovery. However, they should principally be used for communal assets whereas CCTs for livelihoods should be targeted individually based on vulnerability (not association membership); and should be designed with variable values depending on the needs of specific livelihoods.

There appears to have been no particular effect of the integrated approach in terms of programme outcomes (e.g. positive secondary effects on child health), other than predictable beneficiary appreciation of the comprehensive package of support. However, if economic recovery assessments are conducted from the outset of a response, these should lead to an integrated programme design from Phase I which will facilitate efficiency gains; and is assumed to increase effectiveness (though this research was not able to demonstrate this).

- **RECOMMENDATION 6:** Systematically conduct economic recovery assessments (based on HEA methodology) within the first six weeks of any future response; to support the design of integrated programmes
- **RECOMMENDATION 7:** Consider blanket coverage of UCTs based on a multi-sector MEB in the first 2 months of a response, whilst designing CCTs
- **RECOMMENDATION 8:** Systematically conduct cost-efficiency comparisons between CCTs and in-kind as part of response analysis
- **RECOMMENDATION 9:** Every programme should be summarised in a programme description outlining the reason it was devised (response analysis), the objective, the way it is going to be implemented, the way in which it is going to be monitored and the way in which it is going to be evaluated.

## C. Programme implementation

SC designed a very complex programme with multiple overlapping CTP interventions, which were not always implemented in a timely or complementary way. As a result, the effectiveness of many interventions was undermined (e.g. FFVs, if not supported by UCTs; Shelter CCTs if not supported by UCTs; support to CCGs if not sufficient to allow livelihoods recovery), and is only retroactively being addressed through the integrated approach. Coordination with other organisations also hindered effective multi-sectoral programming, particularly in Eastern Leyte. It was suggested by the head of the Tacloban field office that blanket UCTs in the first two months of a future emergency could provide a strong operational presence (more so than one-off NFIs), building a base for complementary multi-sectoral programmes.

Despite the challenges of timing and complementarity, there are some very successful examples of CTP programmes which should be commended and documented for future replication in the Philippines and globally – including the Shelter CCT programme and the integrated CTP approach currently being implemented in Western Leyte and Eastern Leyte. CCTs were most effective when closely monitored and supported by training and technical support from advisers – given the social importance tied to conditionality in the Philippines, these best practices should be replicated.

Operational constraints related to the delivery mechanism also reduced the potential effectiveness of CTP implementation as there were significant delays in the set-up of the PHLP contract as well as inconsistencies in process between field bases opening up potential risks. However, the CCGs to associations also provided a rapid way of disbursing cash whilst the PHLP mechanism was not yet set up, and should be used systematically as a complement to CCTs.

In terms of market support interventions - the logic of *sari-sari* market support interventions was not clear, and the activities were implemented much too late to have any impact on markets. However, the Shelter CCTs did have a positive effect on local shelter markets although this was not their intended objective.

- **RECOMMENDATION 10:** Document the objectives of all CTP activities clearly; and include outcome indicators for each from the outset
- **RECOMMENDATION 11:** Devise a standardised price and market monitoring system across locations; consistently report on the findings
- **RECOMMENDATION 12:** Complement CCTs with a specific sectoral objective with UCTs to meet basic needs

## D. Monitoring & measuring impact

Monitoring and evaluation systems need to be adapted to the programmes they intend to cover and must be devised before the programmes are implemented. The same is true for the baseline data that is required to determine the impact of a programme. Devising such a monitoring and evaluation systems requires the people to be familiar with the details of the planned programme – hence the importance of noting the details of the programme in a document (see above).

The monitoring and evaluation efforts regarding the SC’s programmes in response to Haiyan were insufficient to ensure that the latter remain relevant, are implemented as planned, and achieve the intended impact. This is mainly due to a lack of understanding of the functioning and objectives of the different programmes by the MEAL teams.

The monitoring reports obtained all had different formats making comparison difficult. Moreover, many of them were still in draft form, appeared incomplete, and were thus hard to analyse.


In terms of the impact of CTP on markets, it must be stated that the extent of the inter-agency CTP response is modest compared to the response that came from the government, the private sector, and the diaspora and the extent of damages and losses. Accordingly, expectations regarding the importance and potential impact of the inter-agency CTP response should be modest too. Specifically, SC’s CTP response only represented an estimated USD 8.5 million, in indicative comparison to the combined Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) for Eastern and Western Visayas in 2013 which was over USD 16 billion. This does not mean that market-based programming cannot have an important effect on the livelihoods of individual market actors, and local economic recovery in remote areas. However, without the monitoring systems recommended above, this was not feasible to measure.

VFM appears as a comprehensive means of comparing different modalities including CTP. This study has demonstrated that it is near impossible to measure VFM retrospectively. Cost-efficiency comparisons should be conducted as part of response analysis; and effectiveness indicators need to be defined at the outset and in-built into the monitoring systems described above. Applying the recommendations in this report, SC is however in a strong position to demonstrate the VFM of its integrated approach.

- **RECOMMENDATION 13:** The extent of monitoring process indicators should be reduced to what is needed.
- **RECOMMENDATION 14:** Simple and solid monitoring systems are required to follow the evolution of the markets and to get a rough idea on how interventions may influence them
- **RECOMMENDATION 15:** Clear and measurable indicators to monitor the evolution and the ultimate impact of CTPs need to be defined and respective baseline values established before the programme starts
- **RECOMMENDATION 16:** Monitoring and evaluation activities should be standardised across locations so that the respective results can be compared and lessons can be learned.
- **RECOMMENDATION 17:** Devise a continuous monitoring system for a few essential key commodities (e.g. rice, canned foods, CGI, cement etc.) This could be done in collaboration with logistics, which could establish contacts with the main traders of these

commodities in order to have the respective reference point (price & supply changes) when disaster hits again.

## E. Optimal Timeline



\* Key questions for market analysis

\*\* HEA-based/multi-sector/qualified

° Voucher for supplies, re-stocking of stores, credit facilitation, communication with other actors

°° Market based but not for market support

Whilst the time frame above is general, this may differ depending on the seasonal calendar for the types of livelihoods selected

The timeline above represents the optimal timeline for SC's CTP activities during Haiyan, which takes into consideration the recommendations and conclusions that have already been made in the report. The timeline works off the assumption that there is an agreement in place with PHLP to ensure the timely delivery of all cash transfers in the first months after the emergency. The timeline begins with a Rapid Market Assessment done in conjunction with the initial MSIRA in first days after Haiyan hit. The inclusion of key questions in this rapid assessment for market analysis such as where are the operating market places, what goods are available, how many traders are in operation, etc. are crucial so that the feasibility of CTP is analysed and, if deemed appropriate, can begin as soon as possible. The first types of CTP recommended for implementation are UCTs for the first three months after the emergency. By implementing UCTs with blanket geographical targeting to the most affected areas, field staff would have time to complete a more detailed Economic Recovery Assessment (based on HEA) and sector specific, cross-cutting market assessments in the first month; as well as sector-specific needs assessments and multi-sector targeting in the second month.

The second type of programme recommended is market support to traders, to be implemented at the same time UCTs begin, to ensure availability of products before cash is distributed to beneficiaries. These types of programmes include vouchers for supplies, re-stocking of stores and credit facilitation to shelter, fresh foods, or convenience goods traders (such as sari-sari stores), depending on the type of programmes designed by field teams to begin in the coming months. Following the support to market traders, by the fourth month, an integrated package of shelter CCTs, FSL individual livelihoods grants (market based, but not intended for market support), and WASH CCTs to the beneficiaries selected in the second month should be implemented, lasting five to six months.


Two types of community cash grants for livelihoods would then begin. The first type, implemented just after the integrated package, is CCGs for associations to support short-term livelihood recovery. These grants are to be distributed to *individuals* within an association with the purpose of supporting their particular livelihood needs, similar to the CCGs delivered to fishermen's associations in Eastern Leyte. The second type, which begins six months after the emergency, is community grants for associations, aimed at supporting the *association's* long-term needs, similar to the alternative marine livelihoods CCGs supported in Iloilo. By using an MFI instead of PHLP for this type of CTP, associations can be provided with long-term financial services and financial training to help them in the future.

In terms of funding, using prepositioned seed funding for the first three months would allow CTP to reach beneficiaries the soonest possible through UCTs and relevant market traders. Grants for CTP received after, intended for the support to market traders, the integrated package, and CCGs, should be at minimum six months so that CTPs can support different types of livelihoods in a timely fashion, according to the seasonal calendar.


# Annex I: Timelines

The following three timelines give an outline of the dates for specific CTP activities per field site including market assessments, distributions and grant start and end dates. Timelines are referred to throughout the report for a better understanding of results and conclusions.


## Tacloban



# Ormoc



# Estancia



## Annex 2: Informants

### External

Date	Municipality	Type of Informant	Program	Type of Interview
26 November	Cebu	Ninette Adhikari – Mercy Corps Research and Evaluation Adviser	CTP in Haiyan Response	One-on-one
1 December	Tacloban	Ana Ferreira – CRS	CTP in Haiyan Response	One-on-one
1 December	Tacloban	Michael Siao – Tzu Chi Social Service Coordinator	CTP in Haiyan Response	One-on-one
1 February	Manila	Gabrielle Smith – Researcher for Cash Coordination Review Philippines	CTP in Haiyan Response	One-on-one
4 February	Tacloban	Trader promotion officer DTI	All	One-on-one
4 February	Tacloban	Owner of Home Depot	CCG Shelter	One-on-one
5 February	Tanauan	Barangay Captain	CCG Fishermen	One-on-one
5 February	Tanauan	Non-beneficiaries	CCG Fishermen	FGD
5 February	Tanauan	Targeted trader	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Tanauan	Targeted trader	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Tanauan	Nontargeted trader	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Tanauan	Community leaders	CCG Fishermen	FGD
5 February	Tanauan	Beneficiaries	CCG Fishermen	FGD
5 February	Tolosa	Barangay Captain	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Tolosa	Targeted trader	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Tolosa	Targeted trader	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Tolosa	Nontargeted trader	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Tolosa	Community leaders	FFV	FGD
5 February	Palo	Barangay Captain	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Palo	Targeted trader	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Palo	Targeted trader	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Palo	Nontargeted trader	FFV	One-on-one
5 February	Palo	Non-beneficiaries	FFV	FGD
5 February	Palo	Community leaders	FFV	FGD
5 February	Palo	Beneficiaries	FFV	FGD
6 February	Macarthur	Shelter Trader	MAC2	One-on-one
6 February	Macarthur	Shelter Trader	MAC2	One-on-one
6 February	Macarthur	Non-beneficiaries	MAC2	FGD
6 February	Macarthur	Barangay Captain	MAC2	One-on-one
6 February	Macarthur	Beneficiaries - Adults	MAC2	FGD
6 February	Macarthur	Community leaders	MAC2	FGD
6 February	Macarthur	Beneficiaries - Children	MAC2	FGD
6 February	Dulag	Non-beneficiaries	IAs	FGD
6 February	Dulag	Beneficiaries	IAs	FGD

7 February	Mayorga	Shelter Trader	MAC2	One-on-one
7 February	Mayorga	Non-beneficiaries	MAC2	One-on-one
7 February	Mayorga	Shelter Trader	MAC2	One-one-one
7 February	Mayorga	Beneficiaries - Adults	MAC2	FGD
7 February	Mayorga	Beneficiaries - Children	MAC2	FGD
7 February	Jaro	Shelter Trader	DEC2	One-on-one
7 February	Jaro	Shelter Trader	DEC2	One-on-one
7 February	Alang-Alang	Saw mill owner	DEC2	One-on-one
7 February	Alanga-Alang	Shelter Trader	DEC2	One-one-one
10 February	Estancia	Sari-Sari Association Leader	QIPS	One-on-one
10 February	Ormoc	Barangay Captain	Market Traders Grant	One-on-one
10 February	Ormoc	Non-beneficiaries	Market Traders Grant	FGD
10 February	Ormoc	Community leaders	Market Traders Grant	FGD
10 February	Ormoc	Buyers accessing sari-sari stores	Market Traders Grant	FGD
10 February	Ormoc	Beneficiaries	Market Traders Grant	FGD
10 February	San Isidro	Buyers accessing sari-sari stores	Market Traders Grant	FGD
10 February	San Isidro	Beneficiaries	Market Traders Grant	FGD
11 February	Villaba	Beneficiaries	Shelter	FGD
11 February	Villaba	HH accessing sari-sari stores	Market Trader Grant	FGD
11 February	Villaba	Beneficiaries	Market Trader Grant	FGD
11 February	Villaba	Non-beneficiaries	Market Trader Grant	FGD
11 February	Villaba	Beneficiaries (Adults)	MAC2	FGD
11 February	Villaba	Beneficiaries (Children)	MAC2	FGD
11 February	Villaba	Community leaders	MAC2	FGD
11 February	Abong, Carles	Barangay Captain	CCG	One-on-one
11 February	Abong, Carles	Community leaders	CCG	One-on-one
11 February	Abong, Carles	HH accessing sari-sari stores	CCG	FGD
11 February	Abong, Carles	Sari-sari traders	CCG	FGD
11 February	Manlot, Carles	Community leaders	CCG	FGD
11 February	Manlot, Carles	Beneficiaries	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	FGD
11 February	Manlot, Carles	Association leader	CCG	One-on-one
11 February	Abong, Carles	Beneficiaries	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	FGD
11 February	Abong, Carles	Non-beneficiaries	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	FGD
11 February	Poblacion, Carles	Sari-sari store supplier	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	One-on-one

12 February	San Isidro	Barangay Captain	Market Trader Support	One-on-one
12 February	San Isidro	HH accessing sari-sari stores	Market Trader Support	FGD
12 February	San Isidro	Beneficiaries	Market Trader Support	FGD
12 February	San Isidro	Non-beneficiaries	Market Trader Support	FGD
12 February	San Isidro	Community leaders	Market Trader Support	FGD
12 February	San Isidro	Sari-sari store suppliers	Market Trader Support	FGD
12 February	San Dionisio	Barangay Captain	CCG	One-on-one
12 February	San Dionisio	Community leaders	CCG	FGD
12 February	San Dionisio	Beneficiaries	CCG	FGD
12 February	Takbuyan	Barangay Captain	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	One-on-one
12 February	Takbuyan	Community leaders	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	FGD
12 February	Takbuyan	Beneficiaries	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	FGD
13 February	Bayuyan	Barangay Captain	CCG	One-on-one
13 February	Bayuyan	Community leaders	CCG	FGD
13 February	Bayuyan	Beneficiaries	CCG	FGD
13 February	Feeder Port	Association leader	Support to Sari-sari traders	One-on-one
13 February	Feeder Port	Buyers accessing sari-sari stores	Support to Sari-sari traders	FGD
13 February	Feeder Port	Beneficiaries	Support to Sari-sari traders	FGD
13 February	Feeder Port	Non-beneficiaries	Support to Sari-sari traders	FGD
13 February	Gogo	Barangay Captain	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	One-on-one
13 February	Gogo	Community leaders	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	FGD
13 February	Gogo	Non-beneficiaries	Individual Livelihoods CCTs	FGD

16 February	Manila	Fe Kagahastian – OCHA Cash Coordinator	CTP in Haiyan Response	One-on-one
	Estancia	Neil Cameforthe – Procter & Gamble Philippines	CTP in Haiyan Response	One-on-one

### Internal

Name	Position	Location
Gustavo Cavero	FSL Program Manager	Tacloban
Junalie Katalbas	FSL Program Officer	Tacloban
Archimedes Lirios	FSL Program Coordinator – CTP	Tacloban
Madeline Gotico	MEAL Coordinator	Tacloban
Joanna Watson	Field Manager	Tacloban
Aaron Anderson	Shelter Program Manager	Tacloban
David	Operations Manager	Tacloban
Nancy Obias	PDQ Manger	Tacloban
Gian De Las Alas	Finance Manager	Tacloban
Glenn Genovate	FSL Program Manager	Estancia
Nicola Padamada	MEAL Coordinator/PDQ	Estancia
Maria Gabriela Semeco	Shelter Program Manager	Estancia
Manny Borres	Shelter Coordinator	Estancia
Gonzalo Atxaerandio	Field Manager	Estancia
Benedict Redman	Operations Manager	Estancia
Dia Basas	Finance Officer	Estancia
Mykiel Patcho	FSL Project Officer	Ormoc
Reggie Aquino	PDQ Manager	Ormoc
Thomas Howells	Field Manager	Ormoc
John	Operations Manager	Ormoc
Bishnu Prasad Gotame	Shelter Manager	Ormoc
Luis Sasuman	Finance Manger	Ormoc
Julius Lacaba	WASH Coordinator	Ormoc
Edwin Horca	PDQ DTL - Haiyan	Manila
Caroline Raclin	Haiyan Consortium Coordinator	Manila
Michel Rooijackers	Deputy Country Director - Ops	Manila
Jose Estuar	FSL Technical Advisor	Manila
Charles Dean	Shelter Technical Advisor	Manila
Anil Pokhrel	WASH Technical Advisor	Manila
Zahra Fatima	Education Advisor	Manila
Mohammad Maguad	CTP Finance Officer	Manila

## Annex 3: Programme Descriptions

### CTP Summaries – Tacloban

<b>Name</b>	<b>FSL Fresh Food Voucher Project</b>
<b>Grant</b>	Gates & QIPs
<b>Objective</b>	To support the nutritional needs of households with 6-23 month old children by 1) increasing the infant and young child feeding practices and prevent an increase in malnutrition among the household and 2) increase financial access to micro nutrient rich foods for vulnerable children and their families
<b>Time Frame</b>	Grant time frame November 2013 – November 2014. Cash distributed April-June and September- November 2014.
<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	2,300 households
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	3,600 Php given in 3 tranches of 1,200 Php
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Tolosa, Tanauan, Palo
<b>Program Description</b>	<p>The Fresh Food Voucher project was created to supplement concurrent nutrition interventions such as the Blanket Supplementary Feeding and the Infant and Young Child Feeding programmes. Households were selected if they had children between 6-23 months old, received the Blanket Supplementary Feeding and the Infant or Young Child Feeding programmes, relied on one source of income, relied on seasonal income, were single parent led and if the household had a high dependency ratio. Upon validation beneficiaries were given food vouchers that could be used at Save the Children accredited suppliers.</p> <p>A market assessment was conducted to determine if the market could provide fresh food commodities and analyze the source and price of goods. 30 traders serving fish, meat, eggs, chicken and vegetables were contracted to distribute the food to the voucher beneficiaries. Traders were selected based on whether they were legally operating, had stable supply chains, reasonable prices and willing to participate in the programme. Food varieties and volumes purchased by beneficiaries were recommended by the field site nutrition sector. Bi-monthly price monitoring was conducted by a local price monitoring committee to mitigate increases in food prices.</p>
<b>Key Indicators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of families with children between 6 and 23 months that have access to nutrient rich (nutritious) fresh foods</li> <li>- Number of vulnerable families who receive supplemental food assistance</li> <li>- Percentage of vouchers used on nutritious food</li> </ul>

<b>Name</b>	<b>MAC 2 Integrated CTP</b>
<b>Grant (total)</b>	MAC 2 Appeal
<b>Objective</b>	To provide an integrated package of cash based support and skills training for shelter, WASH and livelihood recovery for 2,000 vulnerable households and communities in underserved areas of Tacloban and Ormoc and to support communities to develop community driven projects for resilient shelter, livelihood or WASH initiatives, following DRR community engagement.
<b>Time Frame</b>	July 2014-December 2014
<b>Number of Direct Beneficiaries</b>	2000 Households
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 15,000 Php conditional cash grants delivered in 3 tranches for 2,000 households for Shelter repair</li> <li>- 6,000 Php unconditional cash grants delivered in 1 tranche for 2,000 households for FSL</li> <li>- 5,800 Php conditional cash grant vouchers for 2,000 households for latrine construction</li> </ul>
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Mayorga and Macarthur
<b>Program Description</b>	<p>The areas for the MAC2 project are the same as SCI's Phase I shelter program. As Save the Children was the only Shelter actor to conduct any programming in Macarthur, Save the Children Tacloban identified a substantial need remaining. Furthermore, based on lessons learned from the Phase I Shelter programme, it was determined that conducting cash programming for Shelter without assessing and intervening in families' food security and livelihoods needs had the potential to damage the programme. Therefore, Shelter/WASH and FSL programming interventions under MAC 2 entailed a new pilot concept for "integrated recovery cash grants".</p> <p>The targeting for the program used a community based wealth ranking in each barangay. This was led by FSL to identify 'very poor' and 'poor' households, followed by an identification of totally or partially destroyed houses within these groups by the Shelter team, alongside identification of WASH/latrine needs in targeted households.</p> <p>The Shelter component of the project allowed beneficiaries to transition from their post-Yolanda emergency shelters to longer lasting and more durable shelters. Cash was released in two conditional cash tranches, the conditions being that households followed Save the Children's DRR techniques. The project also increased access to skilled carpenters by conducting 'skill-building' workshops for carpenters in Macarthur. In order to protect the Shelter grants given to beneficiaries Save the Children provided 6,000 pesos of unconditional recovery grants under Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) to every Shelter beneficiary household. The programme also provided skills training in technical and non-technical areas to support the cash component and address the underlying challenges of household economy of the poorest households. Community cash grants were also given under the MAC2 grant to support community driven initiatives, depending on each community's priority. In addition to the Shelter and FSL components, Save the Children provided access to or improvement of sanitation facilities. Shelter beneficiaries who were identified to have WASH needs were given commodity vouchers or cash grants to purchase part of the materials to repair or construct their household latrines.</p>
<b>Key Indicators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of functioning community facilitation committees in targeted barangays for integrated Shelter/WASH/FSL coordination</li> <li>- Number of communities participating in FSL, Shelter and WASH joint multi-sector child-centered HVCA</li> <li>- Number of households who receive conditional cash grants and training living in a shelter constructed from durable materials which incorporate disaster risk reduction construction techniques and adequate water and sanitation</li> <li>- Number of households demonstrating improved knowledge on construction methods, resilient/DRR building techniques and WASH</li> <li>- Number of construction related trades people who received a nationally certified training course</li> <li>- Number of very poor households able to contribute towards their basic needs and recover/restore their livelihood, alongside supporting their shelter needs</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of households supported with unconditional cash grants receiving skills training to restart or diversify their livelihood</li> <li>- Number of at risk youth (ages 18-24) from the most vulnerable supported households have skills to engage in the labor and services market or contribute to their household diversification</li> </ul>
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<b>Name</b>	<b>FSL Irrigation Associations Community Cash Grants</b>
<b>Grant (amount invested)</b>	DECI
<b>Objective</b>	To support Irrigation Associations to clear their irrigation canals to improve their water supply for agricultural activities, increase the income of affected farmers and improve the food security of farmers.
<b>Time Frame</b>	December 2013-February 2014
<b>Number of Direct Beneficiaries</b>	13 Associations with a total of 2,400 households reached
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	\$71,000.00 per association on average; individual association members received payments if they took part in canal clearing
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Dulag, Mayorga, MacArthur, Julita and La Paz
<b>Program Description</b>	<p>A total of 13 Irrigator’s Associations (IA’s) were supported – the first round of funding covered 9 IAs and the second 4 IAs. The purpose of the projects was to rehabilitate the irrigation systems affected by the Typhoon Yolanda in a timely fashion to enable farmers prepare the land for rice production. The systems were partially blocked with debris, trees, and silted as a result of the typhoon. The project was designed to prepare for the harvesting season and the need for the land need to be soaked for at least two weeks before planting. In the second round of projects, an additional activity was added, to support warehouse rehabilitation and the provision of agricultural machinery. This was intended to improve the security and storage of harvested rice during the harvesting season.</p> <p>The activities were as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Plan the interventions with the IAs, MOD, and NIA</li> <li>- Sign ‘small partner/CSO grant agreement’ between IA and Save the Children</li> <li>- Select beneficiaries that would work in canal cleaning: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o 50% from Target Group (farmers)</li> <li>o 50% from community (labourers)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Provision of chainsaws in partnership with UNHCR</li> <li>- Canal cleaning using Work in Emergencies approach</li> <li>- Monitoring of activities (including process and financial reports)</li> <li>- Payment to beneficiaries that helped in canal cleaning</li> <li>- Follow up on increase agricultural activities</li> </ul>
<b>Key Indicators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of productive organizations supported</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Total length of irrigation canals cleared</li> <li>- Number of Irrigator’s Associations able to resume rice production</li> <li>- Number of post-harvest facilities repaired</li> </ul>
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<b>Name</b>	<b>FSL Fishery Associations Community Cash Grants</b>
<b>Grant (total amount invested)</b>	QIPs (UDS 115,000)
<b>Objective</b>	To provide support to fishermen to restore their productive assets to reinstate their livelihoods and help affected households to increase their income and satisfy their basic needs
<b>Time Frame</b>	October 2014-December 2014
<b>Number of Direct Beneficiaries</b>	10 Associations with a total of 745 households reached
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	Average of 165 USD per association
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Macarthur, Mayorga, Dulag, Tolosa
<b>Program Description</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Engage with national authorities, BFAR, and local municipalities to identify vulnerable fishermen</li> <li>- Assess the needs of fishermen related to boat reparation, gear provision, which were identified as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o MacAruthur: in pond and Feeds for the fingerlings</li> <li>o Mayorga: Mother Boat and Accessories and Fish Aggregating Devices</li> <li>o Dulag – San Miguel: Fish pens and Fish Aggregating Devices</li> <li>o Dulag – San Jose: Fish Aggregating Devices and Fishing gears and Accessories</li> <li>o Tolosa: CBED Training and Conditional Cash Grants for the fish processing</li> </ul> <p><i>NB: some associations received boats from BFAR or other NGOs (e.g. Oxfam)</i></p> </li> <li>- Selection of beneficiaries based on SC criteria</li> <li>- Provision of Conditional Cash Grants in 2 tranches to each fisherman, on the basis of the required fishing gear</li> <li>- Monitoring of asset restoration</li> </ul>
<b>Key Indicators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of fishermen households served</li> <li>- Number of fishermen able to resume activities</li> <li>- Number of initiatives aimed to restores natural resources implemented</li> <li>- Number of productive infrastructure restored</li> </ul>

### CTP Summaries – Ormoc

<b>Name</b>	<b>Cash and market based recovery support for vulnerable children, households and communities in Leyte Province, Philippines</b>
<b>Grant</b>	DFID I
<b>Objective</b>	<p>The livelihoods of the most vulnerable/landless households in targeted rice and corn farming communities severely affected by typhoon Haiyan in Leyte Province of Region VIII are restored and diversified through cash based assistance. (Impact statement)</p> <p>Livelihoods are protected and restored in order to increase the resilience of typhoon affected households.(Outcome )</p>
<b>Time Frame</b>	January 2014-December 2014
<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<p>2338 Households with Unconditional cash (target is 1500)</p> <p>2108 Households with unconditional cash ( target is 1500 ) plus training</p> <p>500 market traders (Target reduced to 500 from original 750)</p>
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	<p>Unconditional cash Php 4100</p> <p>Conditional cash =12,000 Php in two tranches</p> <p>Market traders =14,000 PhP in two tranches</p>
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Kananga, Villaba, San Isidro
<b>Program Description</b>	<p>In Save the Children’s operations in Western Leyte covering Ormoc City and the municipalities of Kananga, Villaba, San Isidro , DFID support came through the project entitled “Cash and market based support for vulnerable children , households and communities in Leyte province.” The project aimed for the impact that the livelihoods of the most vulnerable households in targeted rice and corn farming communities severely affected by typhoon Haiyan in Region VIII are restored and diversified through cash based assistance. The project is part of an integrated approach by DFID involving the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization ( FAO). The partners operationalized DFID’s integrated approach into a convergence strategy where a project management team was organized together with an advisory committee composed of major partners (DOLE, DA, DSWD etc) . The convergence approach mapped out the areas of operations to insure maximum coverage , complementation and avoid replication..</p> <p>Save the children identified vulnerable communities in cooperation with partners based on a vulnerability criteria . The initial phase was reviewing secondary data of affected communities and conducting visual inspection. This was followed by wealth ranking exercises with community leaders to support the efficient and participatory identification of vulnerable groups within target communities . Save the children engaged community leaders through the Community selection committees that acted as champions of the agreed criteria.</p> <p>In total, the project reached 2338 families with unconditional cash transfers that supported initial recovery and household food security strategies. 2108 of the unconditional cash beneficiaries then received conditional cash received transfer to support livelihood recovery packaged with skills training. 500 market traders received conditional cash transfers with training that enabled them to invest and re-start the business.</p>
<b>Key Indicators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- % of vulnerable households and communities targeted by the project with livelihoods restarted and recovery activities initiated</li> <li>- % of beneficiaries that are still practicing their livelihood activities and reporting increase incomes at end-line relative to baseline</li> <li>- Number of vulnerable/landless HHs in rice and corn producing communities receiving unconditional cash transfer and livelihood recovery support</li> <li>- Number of vulnerable/landless HHs in rice and corn producing communities receiving training and conditional livelihood recovery grants.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- % of targeted households reporting increased income at end-line relative to baseline</li> <li>- Number of market traders identified for recovery support</li> <li>- Number of market traders received training on use of recovery support grants</li> <li>- Number of market traders receiving cash support that enables investment in income generation</li> </ul>
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<b>Name</b>	<b>MAC 2 Integrated CTP</b>
<b>Grant</b>	MAC 2 Appeal
<b>Objective</b>	To provide an integrated package of cash based support and skills training for shelter, WASH and livelihood recovery for 2,000 vulnerable households and communities in underserved areas of Tacloban and Ormoc and to support communities to develop community driven projects for resilient shelter, livelihood or WASH initiatives, following DRR community engagement.
<b>Time Frame</b>	July 2014-December 2014
<b>Number of Direct Beneficiaries</b>	361 Households
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	6,000 Php in 1 UCT tranche for food and immediate needs About 30,000 Php in 3 CCT tranches for reconstruction of safe and strong houses 5,800 Php for latrine construction
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Matag-Ob, Villaba
<b>Program Description</b>	<p>A Multi-Sectoral Assessment was conducted during the first quarter of the 2014 which informed the MAC 2 strategy. The MSA pointed out that 89% of houses in Western Leyte were partially or severely damaged and are looking for Shelter assistance. As per the MSA, SCI program focused on providing safer and stronger shelters in severely affected communities. After a detailed assessment including interviews and technical verification, SCI constructed durable and safe houses where 87% will be rebuilt and 13% repaired.</p> <p>The typhoon further exacerbated the situation as the destruction left around only 35% of HH with functioning latrines. This is true within the 54 barangays where Save the Children WASH in community projects are implemented. With 65% of HH not having access to basic latrines, more open defecation practice is assumed. Save the Children's approach to community sanitation combines the provision of materials, provision of technical support to the HH for the construction of the latrines and HH hygiene promotion with zero unskilled labour cost as the beneficiaries are supported to construct their own latrine. This approach ensures there are materials, tools, labour and skills necessary to construct, the latrines in a safe, timely, and cost effective manner to ensure sustainability.</p> <p>For FSL, the target beneficiaries are able to meet the survival threshold through the unconditional cash transfer but this will immediately deteriorate due to unsustainable livelihood coping strategies adopted. SCI will immediately conduct a follow up support through conditional cash transfer and capacity building in ecologically smart livelihood technologies.</p>
<b>Key Indicators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Communities who participated in Hazards, Vulnerabilities and Capacities Assessment (HVCA)</li> <li>- Number of vulnerable households receiving unconditional cash support</li> <li>- Number of vulnerable households receiving conditional cash support</li> <li>- Number of individuals receiving skills development training for livelihoods diversification /strengthening</li> <li>- Number youth from vulnerable households receiving skills development training for livelihoods diversification/strengthening</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Number households receive conditional cash grants and training and are subsequently living in a shelter constructed from durable materials which incorporate disaster risk reduction construction techniques and adequate water and sanitation</li><li>- Number of targeted households who have received materials for latrine</li><li>- Number of households with completed latrine construction</li></ul>
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### CTP Summaries – Estancia

<b>Name</b>	<b>Estancia Cash Grants for Small Scale Traders</b>	
<b>Grant</b>	QIPs	ECHO II
<b>Objective</b>	To support 65 small scale traders in Estancia through cash grants that can be used for replenishment of their stores.	Affected vulnerable households have improved access to cash and livelihood recovery assistance.
<b>Time Frame</b>	January 25 – March 25 2014	April-December 2014
<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	65 small scale traders	50 small scale market traders
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	15,000 Php distributed in two tranches of 7,5000 Php	10,000 Php in 2 tranches of 7,000 and 3,000
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Brgy. Poblacion Zone I, II and III of Estancia	Brgy. Bancal and Cawayan, Carles
<b>Program Description</b>	<p>100% of the members (65 small scale traders) of Kapihan sa Feeder Port Association Inc. from Poblacion Zone I, II and III, Estancia were provided financial support of Php15, 000.00 each to be used for the replenishment of their stores that were totally lost during the Super typhoon Yolanda. The financial support were distributed in two tranches at Php7,500.00 per tranche where the release of the 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche is dependent upon compliance of the conditionality outlined in the tripartite social agreement between SCI, LGU Estancia and the Beneficiary. All 65 beneficiaries qualified for the 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche as per result of the conditionality assessment conducted one week after the distribution of the first tranche. The Business Skills Development Training was facilitated by an External institution (TSKI) with experience in conducting similar training with small-scale traders.</p>	<p>The ECHO II Livelihood grant provided assistance to vulnerable household beneficiaries affected by the typhoon. These beneficiaries included the highly vulnerable groups and small-scale market traders. The target vulnerable population was provided with cash grants for livelihoods to provide a source of income and food security and reduce vulnerability. Small-scale market traders were provided with the same grants to facilitate restoration of market mechanisms.</p>

<b>Name</b>	<b>Estancia Household Livelihoods Cash Grants</b>			
<b>Grant</b>	SIDA	SHO II	DFATD	ECHO II
<b>Objective</b>	To enable typhoon-affected children and families to restore their livelihood options without having to employ harmful coping strategies	To enable typhoon-affected children and families to restore their livelihood options without having to employ harmful coping strategies	Typhoon-affected households provided with cash and in-kind support to rehabilitate mangroves, install artificial reefs, increase fish aggregating capacity, and diversify marine livelihoods.	Affected vulnerable households have improved access to cash and livelihood recovery assistance.
<b>Time Frame</b>	1 December 2013 to 30 November 2014	January 1, 2014 – December 31, 2014	February 1 2014- March 31 2015	April-December 2014
<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	600 HH bens.	1,000 HH bens.	2, 923 HH beneficiaries	1,000 HH bens
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	6,000 Php in 1 tranche	6,000 Php in 1 tranche	6,000 Php in 1 tranche	10,000 Php in 2 tranches of 7,000 Php then 3,000 Php
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Estancia, Pilar, Concepcion	Estancia, Pilar, Concepcion, San Dionisio	Estancia, San Dioniso, Concepcion, Carles, Pilar	Carles
<b>Program Description</b>	This intervention was redesigned due to identified gaps on livelihood diversification during assessments conducted in inland barangays. The savings generated from the training of boat builders was used for this intervention. Additional 600 vulnerable households were provided cash assistance of Php 6,000.00 to re-start or diversify their livelihoods.	The SHO 2 livelihoods recovery program concentrated on the recovery of fishing as a source of income for the majority of coastal communities. In the focus area for this activity up to 90% of all boats were destroyed, along with fishing nets and other equipment. Activities promoted the recovery of boats and of related industries through the direct provision of resources to repair and replace boats. Training on environmentally friendly fishing practices and alternative marine livelihoods (seaweed production; oyster production; etc.) was also conducted.	The fishing sector was supported by DFATD through cash and/or materials, training and capacity building, contributing to marine livelihoods, which have been devastated by the typhoon. Selection of target households was based on community-led selection criteria and was complementary to the support being provided to the fishing sector by other actors, including the government. Individual fishing households were supported to construct fish aggregating materials for distribution amongst fishing households. Support to fishing households with alternative marine livelihoods, such as seaweed production, was also provided.	The ECHO II Livelihood support grants will help selected beneficiaries affected by the typhoon. These beneficiaries may come from the vulnerable population (including the highly vulnerable groups) and small-scale traders and businesses. Target vulnerable population will be provided with support for livelihoods to provide a source of income and food security and reduce vulnerability.

<b>Name</b>	<b>Estancia Community Cash Grants</b>		
<b>Grant</b>	SIDA	SHO II	DFATD
<b>Objective</b>	To provide financial support to community groups and fishing associations for the restoration of community assets or structures that were damaged by Super typhoon Yolanda.	To provide financial support to fishing associations for the construction and deployment of artificial reefs or fish aggregating device.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Typhoon-affected households provided with cash and in-kind support to rehabilitate mangroves, install artificial reefs, increase fish aggregating capacity, and diversify marine livelihoods.</li> <li>b) Typhoon-affected community committees are supported with provision of cash and training to conduct community-led recovery initiatives</li> </ul>
<b>Time Frame</b>	1 December 2013 to 30 November 2014	January 1, 2014 – December 31, 2014	February 1 2014- March 31 2015
<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	12 Community Groups and Fishing Associations	2 Fishing Associations	20 Fishing Associations Community Groups
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	Approximately 260,000 Php per group or association	Approximately 450,000 Php per association	Approximately 200,000 Php per fishing association while 300,000 Php per community group
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Batad, Estancia, Concepcion, San Dionisio	Carles	Carles, Pilar, San Dionisio, Estancia
<b>Program Description</b>	The SIDA programme focused on the recovery of fishing as a source of income for coastal communities. Activities promoted the recovery of boats and related industries through the direct provision of resources to repair and replace boats and other vital assets. The SIDA grant gave community cash grants in addition to individual livelihood grants. The purpose of this was to provide support to the wider community to restore productive assets such as post-harvest facilities/equipment, small scale irrigation facilities or other structures that are directly linked to livelihoods or micro-enterprises benefitting the whole community.	Support to fishing associations through the construction and deployment of artificial reefs – jackstone type. The SHO 2 livelihoods recovery program concentrated on the recovery of fishing as a source of income for the majority of coastal communities. In the focus area for this activity up to 90% of all boats were destroyed, along with fishing nets and other equipment. Activities promoted the recovery of boats and of related industries through the direct provision of resources to repair and replace boats.	The fishing sector was supported by DFATD through cash and/or materials, training and capacity building, contributing to marine livelihoods, which have been devastated by the typhoon. SC worked through local fishing associations to support the construction and dispersal of artificial reef structures in order to promote reef recovery. Further, financial support were also provided to community-led recovery initiatives towards community resilience particularly, recovery projects that are in line with community needs and will lead to improved food security and resilience of typhoon affected households by increasing their access to livelihood inputs and/or increasing their level of purchasing power.

<b>Cash Grants for the Repair of Damaged Motorised Boats</b>		
<b>Name</b>		
<b>Grant</b>	SIDA	SHO I
<b>Objective</b>	To enable typhoon-affected children and families to restore their livelihood options without having to employ harmful coping strategies.	To alleviate the suffering of children and families affected by Typhoon Haiyan by providing them with critical shelter and non-food items and the means to purchase food, alleviating their food insecurity.
<b>Time Frame</b>	1 December 2013 to 30 November 2014	25 November 2013 to 25 May 2014
<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	1,043 HH bens	870 HH bens
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	15,000 Php distributed in two tranches of 7,5000 Php	15,000 Php distributed in two tranches of 7,5000 Php
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Estancia, Carles	Carles
<b>Program description</b>	The programme focused on the recovery of fishing as a source of income for coastal communities. Activities promoted the recovery of boats and related industries through the direct provision of resources to repair and replace boats and other vital assets.	The programme will facilitate conditional cash transfers to the most vulnerable fishing households to replace damaged boats to enable them to resume their livelihoods, particularly fishing, leading to increased food security and market stabilization.

### Other CTP

<b>TACLOBAN</b>						
<b>Sector</b>	<b>FSL</b>			<b>Shelter</b>		<b>WASH</b>
<b>Grant</b>	QIPs	DFID 2	DEC 2	DEC 1	DEC 2	DEC 2
<b>Time Frame</b>	February 2014- July 2014	September 2014 – November 2014	January 2015- Present	April 2014 – June 2014	January 2015- Present	January 2015- Present
<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	10,211 Households	1,054 Households	For details see DEC 2 Ormoc – below	4000 Households	1500 Households	1500 Households
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	3,700 – 5,000 PHP in one tranche as UCT for basic needs	9,000 PHP in 2 tranches as UCT for individual youth livelihoods		6,000 PHP in one tranche as UCT for shelter materials	Category A: 42,000 PHP Category B1/B2: 2,500 PHP Category C: 14,500	Same categories as shelter, since the amount given was inclusive of WASH
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Dulag, MacArthur and Mayorga	Jaro, Alang-Alang, Tacloban, Palo		MacArthur and Mayorga	Alang-Alang and Jaro	Alang-Alang and Jaro

<b>ORMOC</b>					
<b>Sector</b>	<b>FSL</b>		<b>Shelter</b>		<b>WASH</b>
<b>Grant</b>	DEC 2 (Ormoc and Tacloban)	DFID 2	DEC 2	MFA	MAC 2
<b>Time Frame</b>	January 2015- Present	September 2014 – November 2014	August 2014- October 2014	May 2014 – July 2014	July 2014-December 2014
<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	1,681 Households with UCT 1 500 Households with individual CCTs for livelihoods 200 Households for fishing recovery grant 100 Market traders 30 community grants for land clearing	560 Households	1,790 Households	789 Households	361 Households
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	4,000-10,000 PHP in 2 UCT tranches for food and immediate needs No information received on specific amounts given for other programmes	4,000 PHP in 1 tranche as UCT for food and immediate needs	27,000 PHP in 3 tranches as CCT to construct safe and strong houses	15,000 PHP in 3 tranches as CCT to construct safe and strong houses	5,800 Php for latrine construction
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Ormoc, Kananga, Capoocan, Jaro, Alang-Alang	Matag-Ob	Kananga, Villaba	Kananga	Matag-Ob, Villaba

<b>Estancia</b>				
<b>Sector</b>	<b>FSL</b>		<b>Shelter</b>	
<b>Grant</b>	ECHO I	ECHO II	ECHO II	FFO
<b>Time Frame</b>	February 2014	May 2014	April 2014 – November 2014	February 2014-October 2014
<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	5,205 Households	225 Households	3,404 Households	1,462 Households
<b>Average Cash Amount per Beneficiary</b>	4,100 PHP in 1 UCT tranche for coverage of immediate essential needs	4,100 PHP in 1 UCT tranche for coverage of immediate essential needs	10,000 – 14,000 PHP in 2 CCT tranches for shelter rehabilitation and reconstruction	10,000 – 14,000 PHP in 2 CCT tranches for shelter rehabilitation and reconstruction
<b>Location (by municipalities)</b>	Estancia, San Dionisio, Concepcion, Batad	Batad	Carles	Carles

# Annex 4: Secondary Information Review

## Internal

### 1. Post Distribution Monitoring Reports

#### Ormoc

- FSL UCT (DFID) – August 2014
- Shelter CCT – no date

#### Tacloban

- FSL Fresh Food Voucher Project – No date
- MacArthur, Mayorga and Dulag Irrigator's Association FGD Report – no date
- Shelter MAC2 (Integrated Approach) beneficiary monitoring – no date
- FSL UCT Mayorga and Dulag – no date
- FSL UCT (in support to the community-based management for acute malnutrition) – no date

#### Estancia

- 1<sup>st</sup> FSL CCT for livelihoods (boat repairs) - May 2014
- 1<sup>st</sup> FSL UCT for immediate needs – May 2014
- 2<sup>nd</sup> FSL CCT for livelihoods (boat repairs) – no date
- 2<sup>nd</sup> FSL UCT for immediate needs – July 2014
- Shelter CCTs (ECHO II) – no date
- Shelter CCTs (FFO) Gabi and Punta – no date
- DRR Training Post-test and Pre-test results – October 2014

### 2. Complaint Response Mechanisms

- Ormoc
- Tacloban
- Estancia

### 3. Proposals

#### Ormoc

- MAC2 – July 2014
- Appeals – no date
- DFID I – January 2014
- DFID II – no date
- DEC I – no date
- DEC 2 – March 2014

#### Tacloban

- Fresh Food Voucher Proposal – November 2013
- MAC 2 – July 2014
- UCT FSL – no date
- DEC 2 – March 2014
- CCG for Fishermen – no date
- CCG for Irrigation Canals – December 2013
- DFID I – January 2014

#### Estancia

- ECHO I – February 2014
- ECHO II – February 2014
- SHO – January 2014
- SHO II – January 2014
- DFATD – January 2014

- SIDA – January 2014
- FFO – January 2014

#### **4. Endlines**

- FSL UCT Endline Report (ECHO II). Estancia. July 2014
- MAC2 (Integrated Approach) Endline. Tacloban. February 2015
- ECHO II Endline (preliminary findings). February 2015

#### **5. Market Assessments and Market Monitoring Reports**

- FSL and Shelter Market Monitoring Report – August 2014
- Panay Food Market Assessments - 28 November 2013
- Market Assessment for Boat Building Inputs – 29 November 2013
- Food Markets Rapid Assessment, Leyte – 6 December 2013
- Draft Market Survey Report for Food Voucher Project – February 2014
- Vegetable Market Analysis for the Eastern Visayas Region – January 2015

#### **6. Need Assessments / Other**

- FSL Recovery Assessment – based on HEA methodologies. Upland Coconut and Rain-fed Rice Zone, Western Leyte, Philippines. July 2014
- Rapid Household Economy Approach, Recovery Analysis for Urban and Peri-urban Coastal Zones in Eastern Leyte – June 2014
- Tacloban and Ormoc DEC 2 Baseline Survey – November 2014
- Standard Operating Procedures and Common Implementation Approaches to CTP. Tacloban

#### **External**

ACAPS. “Secondary Data Review – Philippines Typhoon Yolanda.” The Assessment Capacities Project .  
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Austin, Lois and Chessex, Sebastien. “Minimum Requirements for Market Analysis in Emergencies.” The  
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Bailey, Sarah; Cabot Venton, Courtenay; Pongraca, Sophie. “Value for Money of Cash Transfers in  
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- programming – 2014.” International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 6  
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- “Gross Regional Domestic Product, base Year 2000, 2010-2013.” Philippine Statistic Authority.
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- Hughbanks, Kendra. “CaLP Case Study: Unconditional Cash Grants for Relief and Recovery in Rizal and  
Laguna, The Philippines (Post-Typhoon Ketsana) Oxfam GB.” The Cash Learning Partnership. 31  
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- Juillard, Helene and Opu, Mainul Islam. “Scoping Study: Emergency Cash Transfer Programming in the  
WASH and Shelter sectors.” The Cash Learning Partnership. December 2014.
- “Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (Final Report).” Philippines, Typhoon Haiyan, December 2013.
- Poisson, Gregoire. “Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies. Cash Transfer Mechanisms and Disaster  
Preparedness in the Philippines.” The Cash Learning Partnership. 14 December 2011.
- “RAY – Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda, Build Back Better.” National Economic Development  
Authority. 16 December 2013.
- Smith, Gabrielle. “Cash Coordination in the Philippines: A Review of Lessons Learned during the  
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to Super Typhoon Haiyan.” February 2015.
- WFP. “WFP Rapid Market Assessment, Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda).” The World Food Programme.  
10  
November – 10 December 2013.

## Annex 5: Data Collection Plans

Data collection plan for the Tacloban conditional cash transfer for livelihoods vs. community cash grants			
QUESTION	Sub-questions	Informants (internal/external)	How the information is to be gathered
<b>How cost-effective is the community cash grants model relative to CCTs for livelihoods?</b>	<b>Assessment of programme design and targeting</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Main objectives of each programme</li> <li>- Total number of beneficiaries reached by each intervention</li> <li>- Response analysis process leading to different programme design (needs analysis; market analysis)</li> <li>- Where was the programme implemented?</li> <li>- How was the programme targeted (locations; and beneficiaries)</li> <li>- Cost-break down per benef of individual cash transfers (including all operational costs for SC)</li> <li>- Cost-break down per benef of community cash grants (including all operational costs for SC)</li> </ul>	<b>Internal</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FSL programme staff</li> <li>- Finance and grants staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programme description</li> <li>- Programme information sheet</li> <li>- Targeting strategy</li> <li>- Needs assessments</li> <li>- Boat markets assessment</li> <li>- PDM results database</li> <li>- Individual cash grant business plan / conditionality 'proof'</li> <li>- Community cash grants business plans</li> <li>- Monitoring reports</li> <li>- Evaluation report</li> <li>- Interviews with internal staff</li> </ul>
	<b>Review of programme implementation and quality</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Timeliness of programme implementation (and link to internal operational challenges)</li> <li>- Estimate of indirect beneficiaries of each intervention</li> <li>- Appropriateness/timeliness of support (value; type)</li> <li>- Level/quality of communication by Save the Children staff</li> <li>- Technical support role of Save the Children staff</li> <li>- Complementarity with other forms of assistance</li> </ul>	<b>External</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Barangay captains</li> <li>- Leaders of fisheries associations</li> <li>- Leaders of irrigators associations</li> <li>- Members of fisheries associations</li> <li>- Members of irrigators associations</li> <li>- Barangay captains in intervention areas</li> <li>- Non-beneficiaries in intervention areas</li> <li>- Market traders selling livelihoods inputs (e.g. boat inputs)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cost-efficiency template applied to both programmes</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr)</li> <li>- With leaders of fisheries associations (x1)</li> </ul>
	<b>Retrospective assessment of impact of</b>		

	<p><b>intervention:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Difference in income-generating capacity (pre and post); recovery to pre-crisis levels?</li> <li>- Review of expenditure/use of CCTs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Overall value of Cash transferred</li> <li>o Investment in common goods (for associations) vs. individual goods (comparison between 2 interventions)</li> <li>o Availability of / access to necessary livelihoods inputs</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Constraints to implementation</li> <li>- Unintended positive/negative impacts in each case</li> </ul>		<p>(1 hr)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- With leaders of irrigators associations (x1)</li> <li>- FGDs with farmers (from irrigators association)</li> <li>- FGDs with fishermen (from fisheries association)</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) with farmers (x5)</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview with barangay captains in intervention areas (1 hr)</li> <li>- FGDs with non-beneficiaries in intervention areas (1hr)</li> </ul>
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<b>Data collection plan for the Tacloban and Ormoc 'integrated cash programmes' (MAC)</b>			
<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>Sub-questions</b>	<b>Informants (internal/external)</b>	<b>How the information is to be gathered</b>
<p>REVIEW OF INTEGRATED CASH PROGRAMME APPROACH, including:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How has the integrated CTP approach supported household level recovery and child-focused outcomes?</li> <li>2. Appropriateness of integrated targeting</li> </ol>	<p><b>Programmatic rationale for move to integrated programming</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Response analysis process leading to different programme design (needs analysis; market analysis), for each sector, and across sectors</li> <li>- Enabling factors leading to integration; best ways of working?</li> <li>- Main objectives of programme; and design of packages of assistance</li> </ul>	<p><b>Internal</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PDQ</li> <li>- Ops</li> <li>- FSL programme staff</li> <li>- Shelter programme staff</li> <li>- WASH programme staff</li> <li>- MEAL staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ormoc integrated strategy</li> <li>- Programme description</li> <li>- Programme information sheet</li> <li>- Targeting strategy</li> <li>- Needs assessments</li> <li>- Monitoring reports</li> <li>- MAC baseline &amp; endline</li> </ul>

<p>approach</p> <p>3. What is the optimal operational model for delivering integrated CTP</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Community involvement in programme design</li> </ul> <p><b>Operational rationale for move to integrated programming</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Move to integrated operational set-up as facilitator?</li> <li>- Efficiency gains of integration; have these been quantified?</li> </ul> <p><b>Targeting</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lessons learned on targeting from first phase of response; and how applied to new 'integrated' approach</li> <li>- Total number of beneficiaries reached by each intervention (disaggregated by package of support)</li> <li>- % of households receiving the 3-sector package</li> <li>- Community involvement in targeting</li> <li>- Communication with community (including non-benefs) re targeting</li> <li>- Two-way accountability, including use of findings from CRMs</li> </ul> <p><b>Assessment of implementation and quality of the programme</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Where was the programme implemented?</li> <li>- How was the programme targeted (locations; and beneficiaries)</li> <li>- Timeliness of programme implementation (and link to internal operational challenges)</li> <li>- Level/quality of communication by Save the Children staff</li> <li>- Technical support role of Save the Children staff</li> </ul>	<p><b>External</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Barangay captains</li> <li>- Beneficiaries of integrated package in intervention areas</li> <li>- Non-beneficiaries in intervention areas</li> <li>-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FGDs with beneficiaries</li> <li>- FGDs with non-beneficiaries</li> <li>- Semi-structure interviews with Barangay captains in intervention areas (1 hr) and/or other key informants</li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Complementarity between integrated activities</li> <li>- Complementarity with other forms of assistance</li> <li>- Constraints to implementation</li> <li>- Maximization of possible operational efficiencies through integrated programming?</li> </ul> <p><b>Assessment of programme outcomes/impact</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Methodology for measuring the effectiveness of the integrated approach? At household level? At market level?</li> <li>- Appropriateness/timeliness of support (value; type)</li> <li>- Review of causal linkages between integrated cash assistance (&amp; livelihoods support) programme and: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Education outcomes (attendance)</li> <li>o CP outcomes (child labour)</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Review of casual linkages between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o provision of livelihoods CCTS and income</li> <li>o provision of shelter CCTs and income</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Any negative unintended consequences of the programme (on benefs and non-benefs)?</li> <li>- Scope for improvements to the programme?</li> </ul>		
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<b>Data collection plan for the Ormoc &amp; Estancia CCT to traders programme</b>			
<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>Sub-questions</b>	<b>Informants (internal/external)</b>	<b>How the information is to be gathered</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>What has the impact of CCTs for market traders been on the ‘very poor’</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Assessment of the implementation and quality of the programme:</b></li> </ul>	<p><b>Internal</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ops Director and Staff</li> <li>- Programme managers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programme description</li> <li>- Programme information sheet</li> </ul>

<p><b>target population?</b></p> <p>For: <i>Ormoc and Estancia</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lead on the question: DDW</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What were the main objectives of the programme?</li> <li>• Where was the programme implemented?</li> <li>• How were the target barangays identified?</li> <li>• How timely was the implementation?</li> <li>• To whom was the programme explained?</li> <li>• How well was the programme communicated and explained?</li> <li>• Who did the targeting of the traders and on what basis?</li> <li>• How was the targeting monitored and what was the quality?</li> <li>• How easy was the programme to implement and what were the main constraints?</li> <li>• What was the monitoring plan for the market and the programme?</li> </ul> <p>- <b>Retrospective assessment of impact of intervention:</b> Most of the following questions will have to determine the situation before, during and after the voucher programme.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did the prices of products evolve?</li> <li>• How did the supply of products (availability, diversity, and quality) evolve?</li> <li>• How did the source markets evolve?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FSL staff</li> <li>- PDQ</li> <li>- Logistics / Administration</li> </ul> <p><b>External</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Department of Industry and Trade (person familiar with markets)</li> <li>- Market representative in each of the targeted markets</li> <li>- Barangay captains of the barangays in which the targeted markets are located</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. Interviews with targeted traders (sari-sari stores)</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with non-targeted traders (sari-sari stores)</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with large suppliers of traders (sari-sari stores)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Targeting strategy</li> <li>- PDM results database</li> <li>- Price monitoring database</li> <li>- Monitoring reports</li> <li>- Evaluation report</li> <li>- Interviews with internal staff</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) In Ormoc/Estancia?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each of the targeted markets?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (30 min) One in each of the targeted markets?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each targeted market?</li> <li>- Short individual questionnaire (5 min) With targeted traders: 260 (?) for Ormoc /280 (?) for Estancia?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each targeted market?</li> <li>- Short individual questionnaire (5 min) With targeted traders: 260 (?) for Ormoc /280 (?) for Estancia?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each targeted market? If focus group is not possible then individual interviews with a few larger suppliers in each marketplace</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One with each group on each market?</li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did the transaction costs for trading the products evolve (e.g. transport, rent)</li> <li>• How did the very poor households benefit from the programme?</li> <li>• How did the scale of the business evolve for targeted businesses?</li> <li>• How did the scale of the business evolve for non-targeted businesses?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with very poor households accessing the marketplaces the traders are located</li> </ul>	Maybe add some surrounding barangays?
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Data collection plan for the Tacloban FFV programme			
QUESTION	Sub-questions	Informants (internal/external)	How the information is to be gathered
<p><b>What role did SC's FFV programme have in the recovery of local supply of fresh foods?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Assessment of the implementation and quality of the programme:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What were the main objectives of the programme?</li> <li>• How timely was the implementation?</li> <li>• How were the target barangays identified?</li> <li>• How well was the programme communicated and explained?</li> <li>• Who did the targeting of the households, how was it monitored, and what was the quality?</li> <li>• How easy was the programme to implement and what were the main constraints?</li> </ul> </li> <li>- <b>Retrospective assessment of impact of intervention:</b> Most of the following questions will have to determine the situation before, during and after the voucher programme.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Internal</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ops Director and Staff</li> <li>- Programme managers</li> <li>- FSL staff</li> <li>- PDQ</li> <li>- Logistis / Administration</li> </ul> <p><b>External</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Agricultural Office (person responsible for food production &amp; marketing)</li> <li>- Department of Industry and Trade (person familiar with food production &amp; marketing sector)</li> <li>- Barangay captains of 5 (?) representa-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programme description</li> <li>- Programme information sheet</li> <li>- Targeting strategy</li> <li>- PDM results database</li> <li>- Price monitoring database</li> <li>- Monitoring reports</li> <li>- Evaluation report</li> <li>- Interviews with internal staff</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) In Tacloban?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr)</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did the demand for food products evolve?</li> <li>• How did the supply of food products (availability, diversity, and quality) evolve?</li> <li>• How did prices for food products evolve?</li> <li>• How did the source markets for food products evolve?</li> <li>• How did the transaction costs for trading food evolve (e.g. transport, credit, shop rent)</li> <li>• How did the household consumption pattern evolve?</li> <li>• What would households have bought if they had received cash instead of vouchers?</li> <li>• How did the scale of the business evolve for targeted businesses (voucher &amp; non-voucher based)?</li> <li>• How did the scale of the business evolve for non-targeted businesses?</li> <li>• What was the impact of the programme on local food producers/production?</li> <li>• Would traders, producers, or households have preferred a different approach?</li> </ul>	<p>tive barangays (e.g. 1 Palo, 2 Tanuan, and 2 Tolosa)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Focus groups of community representatives (teachers, health workers etc.) in the same 5 barangays</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. Interviews with targeted traders in Palo, Tanauan, Tolosa</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with non-targeted traders in Palo, Tanauan, Tolosa</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with beneficiaries</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with non-beneficiaries</li> <li>- Large traders from Cebu and Mindanao</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with local food producers supplying local markets</li> </ul>	<p>In Tacloban?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each barangay?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each barangay?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One with each group on each market?</li> <li>- Short individual questionnaire (10 min) With all of both groups?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each of the 5 barangays?</li> <li>- Short household questionnaire (5 min) 330 households?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (20 min) How many are there?</li> <li>- Semi-structured group interview (40 min) or ind. Interviews (15 min.) How many locations are there?</li> </ul>
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Data collection plan for the Ormoc & Tacloban CCT for shelter repair programme			
QUESTION	Sub-questions	Informants (internal/external)	How the information is to be gathered
<p>• Did Conditional Cash Transfers for shelter facilitate recovery of the market(s) for shelter materials?</p>	<p>- <b>Assessment of the implementation and quality of the programme:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What were the main objectives of the programme?</li> <li>• Where was the programme implemented?</li> <li>• How were the target barangays identified?</li> <li>• How timely was the implementation?</li> <li>• To whom was the programme explained?</li> <li>• How well was the programme communicated and explained?</li> <li>• Who did the targeting of the traders and households and on what basis?</li> <li>• How was the targeting monitored and what was the quality?</li> <li>• How easy was the programme to implement and what were the main constraints?</li> <li>• What was the monitoring plan for the market and the programme?</li> </ul> <p>- <b>Retrospective assessment of impact of intervention:</b> Most of the following questions will have to determine the situation before, during and after the voucher programme.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did the demand for shelter</li> </ul>	<p><b>Internal</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ops Director and Staff</li> <li>- Programme managers</li> <li>- Shelter staff</li> <li>- PDQ</li> <li>- Logistics / Administration</li> </ul> <p><b>External</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Department of Industry and Trade (person familiar with markets)</li> <li>- Market representative in each of the targeted markets</li> <li>- Barangay captains of representative barangays that have received the programmes and that will receive the programme</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. Interviews with targeted traders in Palo, Tanauan, Tolosa</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with non-targeted traders in Palo, Tanauan, Tolosa</li> <li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with large suppliers of shelter material traders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programme description</li> <li>- Programme information sheet</li> <li>- Targeting strategy</li> <li>- PDM results database</li> <li>- Price monitoring database</li> <li>- Monitoring reports</li> <li>- Evaluation report</li> <li>- Interviews with internal staff</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each barangay?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each barangay?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each of barangays?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One with each group on each market?</li> <li>- Short individual questionnaire (5 min) With all of both groups?</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr) One in each targeted market? If focus group is not possible then individual interviews with a few larger suppliers in each marketplace</li> <li>- Semi-structured interview (1 hr)</li> </ul>

	<p>products evolve?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• How did the supply of shelter products (availability, diversity, and quality) evolve?</li><li>• How did prices for shelter products evolve?</li><li>• How did the number of shelter material traders evolve?</li><li>• How did the source markets for shelter products evolve?</li><li>• How did the transaction costs for trading shelter products evolve (e.g. transport)</li><li>• What was the impact of the programme on local shelter traders (according to them)?</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with beneficiaries (focus on poor and very poor)</li><li>- Focus group and/or ind. interviews with non-beneficiaries (focus on poor and very poor)</li></ul>	<p>One for each group in each of barangays?</p>
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## Annex 6: Cost-Efficiency Calculations

### I. VFM Case Study I – CTP vs. In-Kind for WASH in Ormoc

	In-Kind [\$ USD Total]	Vouchers [\$ USD Total]	Cash [\$ USD / Total]
Transfer (value of cash transfer or voucher, cost of in-kind kit)	\$51,968.00		\$70,550.00
Other direct costs (e.g. Printing vouchers, overseas shipping of food)			
Local delivery costs (e.g. Trucks to distribution site, % fee from bank for cash)	\$1,288.50		
Staffing	\$4,665.00		\$4,665.00
Monitoring costs	\$1,824.00		\$1,856.00
One-time start up costs (e.g. Purchase of point of sale devices)			
Other Costs			
Indirect support costs (e.g. Agency overhead)	\$100.00		\$100.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$59,845.50</b>		<b>\$77,171.00</b>
<b>Number of beneficiaries</b>	<b>400</b>		<b>550</b>
<b>Cost per beneficiary</b>	<b>\$149.61</b>		<b>\$140.31</b>
<b>Ratio of the transfer to the total cost</b>			

<b>IN-KIND: COST CATEGORY</b>	<b>Cost description</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Unit</b>	<b>Unit cost</b>	<b>Level of effort [%]</b>	<b>SUB-TOTAL [\$ USD]</b>
Transfer (value of cash transfer or voucher, cost of in-kind kit)	Latrine Materials Cost	400	HH	\$113		\$45,200
	High Water Table Additional Materials Cost	188	HH	\$36		\$6,768
Other direct costs (e.g. Printing vouchers, overseas						\$-

shipping of food)						
Local delivery costs (e.g. Trucks to distribution site, % fee from bank for cash)	Truck rentals( from SC Warehouse to distribution site	1	lot	\$1,288.50		\$1,289
Staffing ( 3 months implementation)						
	WatSan Officer	3	person	\$1,100	50%	\$1,650
	WASH Engineers	9	person	\$670	50%	\$3,015
Monitoring costs						
Transportation Cost for Monitoring ( Car rental good for 4 hrs) @ 8 visits per month for 3 months	WatSan Officer	16	visit	\$29		\$456
	WASH Engineers	48	visit	\$29		\$1,368
One-time start up costs (e.g. Purchase of point of sale devices)						\$-
Other Costs						\$-
Indirect support costs (e.g. Agency overhead)	Office Supplies	1	lot	\$100		\$100
<b>ABSOLUTE TOTAL =</b>						<b>\$59,846</b>
<b>TOTAL PER HOUSEHOLD =</b>						<b>\$150</b>
<b>TOTAL PER INDIVIDUAL =</b>						

<b>CASH: COST CATEGORY</b>	<b>Cost description</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Unit</b>	<b>Unit cost</b>	<b>Level of effort [%]</b>	<b>SUB-TOTAL [\$ USD]</b>
Transfer (value of cash transfer or voucher, cost of in-kind kit)	Cash Transfer	550	HH	\$125		\$68,750
	High Water Table Additional Materials Cost	50	HH	\$36		\$1,800
	WatSan Officer	3	person	\$1,100	50%	\$1,650
	WASH Engineers	9	person	\$670	50%	\$3,015
Monitoring costs						\$-

Transportation Cost for Monitoring ( Car rental good for 4 hrs) @ 8 visits per month for 3 months	WatSan Officer	16	person	\$29		\$464
	WASH Engineers	48	person	\$29		\$1,392
Indirect support costs (e.g. Agency overhead)	Office Supplies	1	lot	\$100		\$100
<b>ABSOLUTE TOTAL =</b>	-	-	-	-	-	<b>\$77,171</b>
<b>TOTAL PER HOUSEHOLD =</b>	-	-	-	-	-	<b>\$140</b>
<b>TOTAL PER INDIVIDUAL =</b>	-	-	-	-	-	

## 2. VFM Case Study 2 – Community Cash Grants vs. CCTs for Livelihoods

	<b>CCT [\$ USD Total]</b>	<b>GROUP GRANT [\$ USD Total]</b>
Transfer (value of cash transfer or voucher, cost of in-kind kit)	\$115,020.00	\$73,060.00
Other direct costs (e.g. Printing vouchers, overseas shipping of food)		
Local delivery costs (e.g. Trucks to distribution site, % fee from bank for cash)	\$5,000.00	\$5,000.00
Staffing	\$9,350.00	\$3,860.00
Monitoring costs	\$13,750.00	\$10,500.00
One-time start up costs (e.g. Purchase of point of sale devices)		
Other Costs		
Indirect support costs (e.g. Agency overhead)	\$157.78	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$143,277.78</b>	<b>\$92,420.00</b>
<b>Number of beneficiaries</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>2400</b>
<b>Cost per beneficiary</b>	<b>1008.998435</b>	<b>38.50833333</b>
<b>Ratio of the transfer to the total cost</b>	<b>0.80</b>	<b>0.79</b>



<b>TOTAL PER HOUSEHOLD =</b>						<b>\$39</b>
<b>TOTAL PER INDIVIDUAL =</b>						<b>\$8</b>