



# REVIEW OF FOOD FOR PEACE MARKET-BASED EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Zimbabwe Case Study report

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REPORT BY TANGO INTERNATIONAL

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## ACRONYMS

APS	Annual Program Statement
CT	Cash transfer
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CNFA	Cultivating New Frontiers in Agriculture
DFAP	Development Food Aid Program
DFID	Department for International Development
EFSP	Emergency Food Security Program
ENSURE	Enhancing Nutrition, Stepping Up Resilience and Enterprise
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FGD	Focus group discussion
FFP	Food for Peace
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IP	Implementing Partner
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
KI	Key informant
KII	Key informant interview
LEWIE	Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation
LRP	Local and Regional Purchase (of food)
mVAM	Mobile Vulnerability Analysis Mapping
PAC	Productive Asset Creation
PRIZE	Promoting Recovery in Zimbabwe
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RUTF	Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Foods
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
ZimVAC	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM ZIMBABWE

**Zimbabwe** reflects the recent Southern African drought crisis during a period of a regional El Niño-related drought and a national cash crisis. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Food for Peace (FFP) funded a mix of programming between fiscal years 2011 and 2015, including local and regional purchase of food and, to a lesser extent, cash transfers. With a high level of uncertainty about the regional food supply and the national economy, in 2016 FFP largely shifted to US sourced in-kind food aid, while other donors continued cash transfers. FFP funding to the World Food Programme supported the Productive Asset Creation program, which had strong livelihood development linkages that helped beneficiaries move to resilience pathways and prepare for future climatic shocks. Excellent coordination among humanitarian actors and the government contributed to an effective patchwork of cash transfers and in-kind aid, maintaining a sufficient national supply of both food and cash with which to buy food.

### I. INTRODUCTION

#### CASE STUDY SCOPE AND APPROACH

This report is one of seven case studies conducted under a global review of FFP market-based emergency programs that receive Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) or Title II 202(e)-enhanced funding between FY2010 and 2016. Market-based emergency programming uses food assistance modalities that support local and regional markets, such as providing cash or vouchers so that beneficiaries can purchase items from local markets, or purchasing food to distribute to beneficiaries from local or regional markets.

This case study provides information about the global review's four main objectives: (1) establish a historical narrative about FFP market-based emergency food assistance programming between 2010 and 2016, (2) review program design and implementation processes, (3) analyze program cost-efficiency trends across a range of variables, and (4) identify developmental impacts of the projects on local economies and market actors. The global review<sup>1</sup> is based on: FFP's guidance and award documents and partner reports; field visits to seven countries specified by FFP; and data, documentation, and information provided by FFP, IPs, key informants, and program beneficiaries. A consistent methodology was used across cases to allow for comparison and aggregation of findings for the Global Report. The review is intended to gather lessons learned that focus on how FFP, as a unique actor and the largest international food assistance donor, has evolved to address food security in crisis contexts.

Field work was conducted in Zimbabwe between April 24 and May 5, 2017. For further details, see Annexes 3 and 4. Field visits and focus group discussions for this case study were limited to a small proportion of project sites and beneficiaries, selected to be representative of recently implemented

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<sup>1</sup> A review differs from a program evaluation or audit in that it is a broad assessment of program performance, process, and operational issues. The United Nations Development Program defines a “review” as “distinct from evaluation and more closely associated with monitoring. They are periodic or ad hoc, often light assessments of the performance of an initiative and do not apply the due process of evaluation or rigor in methodology” (UNDP 2009).

projects. To gather information about programming changes over time, the review team also met with key informants about projects completed several years ago. This report concludes with recommendations for FFP about good practices and approaches to continue, and those that FFP should consider modifying in Zimbabwe.

## COUNTRY CONTEXT

Zimbabwe is a low-income, food-deficit country that has recently experienced two years of historically severe drought, including one of the strongest El Niño related droughts on record (FEWS NET 2016). After the first year of low rainfall in the 2014-15 growing season, most families in the north had enough food from their crops to eat, whereas people in the south were already facing Stressed (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 2) outcomes (FEWS NET 2016). The second and more severe El Niño related drought in 2016 resulted in another poor to failed harvest, and food security outcomes were expected to reach Crisis (IPC Phase 3) level by the end of 2016. Cash shortages had begun in April 2016 and worsened over the course of the year, resulting in long bank queues and serious liquidity shortages countrywide. The El Niño related drought reduced crop production regionally, and export bans in neighboring countries brought further uncertainty to the grain supply in Zimbabwe. The Government of Zimbabwe declared a state of national emergency in February 2016, and the World Food Programme (WFP) predicted that by March 2017, approximately 4.1 million people (42 percent of the population) would be food-insecure (FEWS NET 2016, 2016; WFP 2016a).

**MARKET FUNCTIONING:** Zimbabwe has a history of economic uncertainty. Around 2007-08, Zimbabwe experienced commodity shortages and hyperinflation with inflation rates reaching 231,000,000 percent (BBC 2016). Since 2009, Zimbabwe has used a multiple currency system with U.S. dollars and South African Rand, and the economic growth rate peaked at 12 percent in 2011. However, the growth rate plummeted in 2015 to just 1.1 percent and was forecast at 0.6 percent in 2016 due to several factors, including decreased international commodity prices (e.g., for minerals), reduced foreign investment, high national debt, decreased incomes, and a series of major droughts (ZimVAC 2016). In 2016, Zimbabwe began experiencing a cash crisis. Dollars and Rand had become increasingly scarce in Zimbabwe due to factors including decreased earnings from exports, externalization of hard currency, and depreciation of the Rand (FEWS NET 2016). The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe introduced bond notes in October 2016, which was met with mixed reactions due to fears of a possible return of hyperinflation. The liquidity shortage meant that businesses could not transfer U.S. dollars out of the country, such as to purchase grain from neighboring food-surplus countries like Zambia (CARE International UK 2017b); the Government of Zimbabwe struggled to pay civil service salaries (World Bank 2017), and some banks had limited withdrawals to \$20 per day resulting in long lines at banks, sometimes with people waiting overnight (Chutel and Mukwazhi 2016).<sup>2</sup>

Despite this uncertainty, the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) report released in July 2016 found that markets were functioning well enough in 42 out of 51 districts that cash transfer programs could be effective (ZimVAC 2016; WFP Zimbabwe, n.d.). In the remaining nine districts, the ZimVAC found one district where markets were not suitable for cash distributions, five districts where

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<sup>2</sup> All amounts in this report are U.S. dollars (US\$).

further analysis was needed to determine cost of trade and adequacy of the mobile network, and three districts where it recommended a combination of cash and in-kind.

Food prices tend to fluctuate seasonally and are affected by harvest levels. Maize prices increase during the lean season (October through March) and decrease after harvest (April through September). Following above average harvests such as in 2013-14, maize prices fell 40 percent to \$0.28/kg in September 2014, then rose 32 percent to \$0.41/kg by March 2015, the next lean season (ZimVAC 2015).

### **Summary finding**

*Flexible modalities have helped FFP and IPs pivot based on changing conditions. Most FFP emergency funding is used for locally and regionally purchased food.*


## **2. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF FFP MARKET-BASED FOOD ASSISTANCE**

This section describes how FFP's market-based food assistance programming, policy, processes, and capacity to design and implement cash-based programs have evolved across the years (Objective 1).

**FFP ROLE IN ZIMBABWE:** To improve food security in a context of recurrent drought and economic turmoil, FFP emergency programming in Zimbabwe

from FY2010-2016 has used a mix of U.S.-sourced in-kind food; locally and regionally purchased food (LRP), and cash transfers (CTs). Beneficiaries have mostly been in rural areas. CT programs used a variety of transfer mechanisms including mobile phone transfers and cash in envelopes, referred to locally as cash in transit. In 2016, after a second year of drought, FFP decided that, based on increasing national cash shortages, projections of regional food shortages, and expected export bans from countries that regularly exported maize to Zimbabwe,<sup>3</sup> FFP would shift its approach from mainly regional procurement to U.S.-sourced in-kind aid to be distributed by the two five-year development food aid programs (DFAPs).

Figure 1: FFP emergency funding (EFSP , 202(e) and 202(e)-enhanced) in Zimbabwe FY2011-2016



Source: FFP tracking sheets as of Aug. 2017

### **FFP RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION TO ALL OTHER DONORS:**

The United States contributed \$98.5 million or 59 percent of funds received toward the 2016 Zimbabwe Humanitarian Response Plan (Financial Tracking Service, n.d.). The United Kingdom funded 16.6 percent of the Humanitarian Response Plan, and the European Commission funded 6.9 percent. The Department for International Development (DFID) funded the largest cash transfer program in Zimbabwe from 2015-2017 and transferred almost \$41 million via mobile transfers (CARE International UK 2017a).

**FFP EVOLVING APPROACHES IN EMERGENCY PROGRAMMING:** From FY2011 through FY2016, FFP has awarded \$54.2 million through EFSP, \$10.1 million via Title II section 202(e), and \$3.1 million in 202(e)-enhanced funding. Most EFSP funding was used for LRP (\$39.6 million) and cash transfers (\$17.6 million). U.S.-sourced in-kind aid and vouchers have been used a lesser extent (Figure 1).

WFP was the main recipient of EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced funding (\$58.2 million and \$3.1 million, respectively). Only two other implementing partners (IPs) received either EFSP funds (Save the Children in 2014) or 202(e) (regular) funds (Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in 2012). The United Nations

<sup>3</sup> Zimbabwe often receives grain imports from Malawi, Zambia, and South Africa.

Children's Fund (UNICEF) also received in-kind Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Foods (RUTF). Two DFAPs—Enhancing Nutrition, Scaling Up Resilience and Enterprise (ENSURE) and Amalima—used 202(e) funding to scale up and provide U.S.-sourced in-kind aid as part of the 2016-2017 El Niño response. Funding to the DFAPs is not included in Table I.


### **PROGRAMMING TIMELINE**

**2010:** To address increased food insecurity during the 2010-2011 season due to failed and poor harvests following insufficient rainfall and agricultural inputs, WFP was awarded \$5.7 million for regional procurement of white maize, which was distributed to 933,800 beneficiaries through the Vulnerable Group Feeding program

(WFP Zimbabwe 2011b, 2011a). This was part of the WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 105950, which also sought to reduce asset depletion and increase resilience.


**2011 AND 2012:** WFP's PRRO 200162, Assistance to Food Insecure Vulnerable Groups, received EFSP and 202(e) funding to support regional purchases and cash transfers for the Seasonal Targeted Assistance component. Of the EFSP funding, most (\$14 million) was used for regionally purchased food; \$4 million was used for cash transfers. The 2012-2013 lean season was unique in that the Government of Zimbabwe contributed grain to the Seasonal Targeted Assistance program (WFP Zimbabwe 2013). The **Cash for Cereals** component distributed pulses and oil plus \$5 cash twice a month for three months in 2011/12 and 2012/13 (WFP Zimbabwe 2012, 2013). In 2013, market monitoring found that local market prices had increased, so the transfer amount was increased to \$9.

Table I: FFP emergency funding (EFSP and 202(e)-enhanced) per modality in Zimbabwe, FY2010-2016



Source: FFP tracking sheets as of Aug. 2017

Figure 2: Zimbabwe Timeline



Source: FFP and implementing partner program documents

In 2012, CRS was awarded \$4.7 million in 202(e) (regular) funding to support the Promoting Recovery in Zimbabwe (PRIZE) project, a Title II FFP program (FFP program docs). The 202(e) (regular) funding is not included in the timeline (Figure 2) because it is not a focus of this report, but we include it here because program staff reported that this funding gave the program additional flexibility to pay for administrative costs. PRIZE provided emergency food assistance, rehabilitated productive assets, and implemented livelihoods focused interventions (Valuing Voices et al. 2016). PRIZE was also one of the first FFP-funded efforts to blend emergency and development programming (per interview with CRS staff). PRIZE distributed food for assets, based on beneficiary preference after years of hyperinflation, which made the value of cash very uncertain. The program used cash transfers on a limited basis in later years but mostly to substitute for missing commodities. 202(e) funding importantly provided cash that the program could use to administrative costs such as hiring agricultural and market specialists, supporting programming to improve market linkages, and purchasing non-food materials to build or rehabilitate productive asset creation (PAC) (e.g., cement, wheelbarrows), rather than having to monetize U.S.-sourced in-kind commodities to pay administrative costs.

**2013-2015:** PRRO 200453, “Responding to Humanitarian Needs and Strengthening Resilience to Food Insecurity” received funding through EFSP (\$17.5 million) and enhanced 202(e) (\$3 million). While FY2013 and 2014 awards were used primarily for regional purchase of maize, in 2015, WFP received \$4.5 million for the first FFP-funded all cash-transfer award in Zimbabwe, which was implemented as a Cash for Assets program in the Mwenezi district. Cash transfers were delivered via Cash in Transit for part of the program duration while WFP set up its digital platform using mobile money, which was expected to increase efficiency. Under this PRRO, WFP in some cases used mixed modalities, distributing maize (in-kind) and cash transfers for beneficiaries to use to purchase pulses and oil (WFP Zimbabwe 2016a).

In 2014, Save implemented the Emergency Food Security Cash for Training/Work Program in two northwestern districts, Binga and Kariba (Save the Children 2015). Households received \$28 each month to buy cereal, pulses, oil, and fresh foods from September 2014 through July 2015. Beneficiaries

who were able to work received conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and participated in agricultural training or construction or rehabilitation of community assets including dams, community gardens, irrigation schemes, dip tanks, spray races, and latrines. Labor constrained people received unconditional cash transfers. The program experienced more-than-expected delays due to EcoCash liquidity and network constraints. Beneficiaries in the most remote areas received cash in transit, and beneficiaries in Kariba received a slightly larger transfer amount toward the end of the program to offset the cost of transportation to EcoCash agents to redeem their transfer.

In April 2016, the FFP office decided to switch to U.S.-sourced in-kind aid to be distributed by the two DFAPs, ENSURE and Amalima. Both DFAPs implement a variety of activities; this review focuses on the emergency food security response. ENSURE, implemented by World Vision with CARE scaled up dramatically from 30,000 to 400,000 beneficiaries in just 11 days from the time the funding was awarded. ENSURE distributed sorghum, pulses, and vegetable oil from October 2016–March 2017. Amalima, implemented by Cultivating New Frontiers in Agriculture (CNFA), focuses on improving food security and community resilience. Amalima used mobile transfers, cash in transit, and U.S.-sourced in-kind aid.

In September 2016, PRRO 200944, Building Resilience for Zero Hunger received both EFSP and 202(e) funding. WFP had proposed distributing regionally procured maize and beans from Zambia and U.S.-sourced in-kind vegetable oil. This Lean Season Assistance from July through September 2016 would target 706,000 beneficiaries in 20 districts and then scale up in October to December to 1 million beneficiaries (per the award letter). The program also supported the Productive Asset Creation component in 13 districts, bridging emergency relief and longer term resilience interventions. The award was modified twice to increase funding and the number of beneficiaries.

### 3. PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

***Summary finding***  
*FFP Zimbabwe's decision to use U.S. sourced in-kind food aid in response to the El Niño drought was appropriate.*

This section reviews Objective 2: program design and implementation processes including flexibility, modality choices, participant preferences, markets, timeliness, gender, and protection. The discussion for this objective draws upon evidence from program documents and interviews with implementing partners, other stakeholders, and beneficiaries.

#### **DESIGN DECISIONS: MODALITY CHOICE AND CHANGES, TARGETING STRATEGY**

**MODALITIES CHOICE:** FFP's modality choice in Zimbabwe has been appropriate. Food distribution was most appropriate in remote areas with limited access to markets and mobile phone

networks. Distribution of RUTF, which is not available for sale in markets, is appropriate for meeting nutritional needs. In areas with functioning markets and mobile phone networks, WFP appropriately piloted and scaled up cash transfers using mobile phones in 2014, which were continued by Save the Children. Save the Children chose to use mobile money (i.e., cash transfers via mobile phones) because that modality had low delivery costs, quick delivery times, high traceability, convenience and choice for beneficiaries. In areas with insufficient liquidity, mobile phone networks, and mobile cash transfer agents, Save the Children used Cash In Transit, delivering physical cash directly to beneficiaries.

Switching to U.S.-sourced in-kind food for the 2016-17 lean season was appropriate, given the national cash crisis and failed local and regional harvests in the 2015-16 season. Moreover, FFP considered the likelihood of grain export bans in neighboring countries and forecasts of food price spikes that could result from grain shortages. Moreover, other cash programs using mobile transfers were reporting challenges such as beneficiaries traveling long distances and/or paying fees to cash out and having increasing difficulty getting cash due to the limited cash supply nationally. FFP was concerned that beneficiaries receiving mobile transfers would not be able to cash out and thus not receive the full food security benefit. FFP decided against cash or mobile transfers. In June through August 2016, FFP planned regional procurement and requested U.S.-sourced in-kind so that it would arrive in time for the lean season which begins in October.

Other donors disagreed with FFP's rationale and chose other approaches. European Union- and DFID-funded projects continued to use cash. DFID funded a large cash transfer program and, to ensure sufficient grain on the market for people to buy affordably, created a Grain Trade Market Facility, managed by Crown Agents, which imported 55,000 metric tons of maize to sell on the open market, which is enough to meet the food needs of 1.6 million people for three months (CARE International UK 2017b). According to several key informants, this innovation entailed a high level of risk. In the end, key informants stated that there was not a national grain shortage because food entered the country through both formal and informal channels from other countries, donors used a patchwork of responses (i.e., food and cash), and people learned to keep some of their mobile transfers as credit on the phone instead of cashing out.

**TARGETING:** Targeting was considered appropriate by all FGDs and Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) district administrators contacted in the course of this review. IPs targeted vulnerable individuals, mostly based on the ZimVAC market assessment reports and community level vulnerability rankings with input from District Administrators and District Disaster Response Committees and community members (according to ENSURE and WFP program docs; review team FGDs and KIIs). IPs targeted the most vulnerable people listed, based on available resources. To avoid, reduce, or eliminate overlap between programs, IPs verified information before distributions and during monitoring and post-distribution monitoring.

To identify its beneficiaries, Save the Children used a Household Economy Approach with wealth and vulnerability ranking criteria to identify the most vulnerable households with community input. Save the Children further categorized households as labor constrained or non-labor constrained. Non-labor constrained households received conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in exchange for attending agricultural trainings or participating in productive asset rehabilitation and construction projects in their communities (Save the Children 2015). Registration and categorization took one and a half months, which was longer than planned and contributed to a delay of the first cash transfer.

**ASSESSMENTS CONDUCTED:** FFP and IPs relied on multiple sources of information (e.g., FEWS NET, ZimVAC) and also conducted their own assessments. During the modality selection process in early 2016, FFP consulted FEWS NET reports (e.g., Food Security Outlook) and a U.S. Department of Agriculture 2015/16 crops assessment, both of which predicted very poor harvests (FFP program docs). FFP conducted a Rapid Market Assessment in the Amalima program area (Matabeleland North and South) and found that beneficiaries preferred food over cash because of concerns about reduced remittances due to the depreciating South African Rand, the national cash crisis, poor terms of trade for

livestock, possible food price spikes, and other uncertainties (FFP Zimbabwe 2016) (also see “Cost-efficiency trends” section below). Given these and USAID-Bellmon Estimation Studies analyses and the regional nature of the drought, FFP decided that U.S.-sourced in-kind food aid would not negatively impact local markets (according to FFP documents and interviews). FFP and WFP continued to monitor market prices. WFP posted bulletins on a monthly basis, which indicate that maize prices increased moderately without dramatic spikes through the 2016-2017 lean season until January 2017 (WFP 2017, 2017a). FFP-funded IPs largely relied on FFP analysis.

**CHANGES MADE DURING PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION:** Individual IPs appropriately made changes to their programs. In 2014, when Save the Children’s first cash transfers to beneficiaries were delayed due to poor network coverage and insufficient cash held by EcoCash agents, Save the Children worked with EcoCash to improve their network and establish more agents with sufficient cash. Save the Children also used Cash in Transit for the most remote beneficiaries in Binga district; for remote beneficiaries in Kariba district who had to travel to get network access, Save increased the transfer amount by \$2 to cover transportation costs (Save the Children 2015). Save the Children and EcoCash also provided educational meetings in large groups to teach people about mobile money (e.g., how to use their accounts and cash out) and one-on-one assistance such as to help reset personal identification numbers (Bailey 2017). On distribution days, Save the Children, EcoCash agents, and community members set up help desks to address any issues.

In response to the drought, WFP extended Livelihoods Support Assistance programming one extra month through April 2016 and started the next year’s assistance the next month in May, five months earlier than originally planned in order to maintain food security (WFP Zimbabwe 2016b). WFP also continued food distributions through March 2016 in the worst affected areas. Although FFP did not fund WFP cash transfers in 2016, other donors did, and WFP continued to work with private sector providers to pilot an electronic smart card solution, which they expected to serve as a multi-purpose cash transfer platform.

Amalima started out as a Cash for Assets program, but cash shortages due to the national cash crisis resulted in delays in acquiring enough cash to pay people (CNFA Zimbabwe 2017a), and insufficient cellphone network coverage made e-transfers unfeasible. To ensure food security during El Niño, CNFA switched to U.S.-sourced in-kind distribution and offered 50 kg sorghum. Unfortunately, young men were unwilling to work for food and left the program, leaving fewer beneficiaries than expected to complete community asset projects. With fewer participants to complete asset construction, the program extended its work schedule. This had the unintended benefit of extending the amount of time over which the remaining beneficiaries received food. In February 2017, Amalima increased the payments to 60 kg sorghum and 10 kg lentils, which helped to attract and retain participants (CNFA Zimbabwe 2017b).

### **IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS, CHALLENGES, AND SUCCESSES:**

**PROCUREMENT:** Because WFP regularly responds to food insecurity crises, it has established infrastructure (e.g., Global Commodity Management Facility) which allows bulk purchases, pre-positioning of commodities, and time and cost savings. WFP regionally procured a majority of commodities for Zimbabwe from Zambia and Malawi and some oil internationally (Indonesia), enabling cost savings (WFP Zimbabwe 2011a). In 2014, WFP used its Forward Purchase Facility, a corporate WFP fund used for advance purchases of commodities when prices are low, to purchase cereals and

pulses regionally before FFP funding was confirmed (WFP program documents). WFP mostly uses the port in Durban, South Africa, and to a lesser extent, Beira, Mozambique (WFP Zimbabwe 2016b). Road transport is the main mode of transporting commodities. Less than half of the roads linking markets to source markets are in good condition (39 percent tar roads and 7 percent gravel roads) (ZimVAC 2016). About one-third of roads are seasonally inaccessible from October to March. Zimbabwe has sufficient warehouse space.

UNICEF Zimbabwe regularly procures RUTF regionally, but the RUTF for the Title II emergency El Niño response came from the United States and did not arrive on time.

**GOVERNMENT POLICY:** To prepare for the El Niño response, the GoZ participated in some coordinating meetings and, with input from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), worked on a commodity import plan with a few countries (per KII). The GoZ declaration of a national disaster in 2016 helped humanitarian agencies and others request funds from international donors. FFP had concerns that GoZ could interfere (e.g., politicize food aid) or divert food aid. In 2016-17, although some GoZ food distributions were politicized, USAID distributions were not. GoZ also worked with UNDP to coordinate distribution of rice donated by China. IPs report in KIIs that a GoZ import substitution ban made it very difficult to import food and costly to buy locally produced items, such as vegetable oil.

**ACCESS/SECURITY:** Access is limited in some areas by poor road conditions, especially during the rainy season (e.g., Binga) (Save the Children 2015). All FGDs reported no incidents of theft, but cash distributions using Cash In Transit regularly hired security guards to protect beneficiaries from theft.

**CAPACITY:** Each IP has experience implementing emergency food security responses. FFP assessed the capacity of each applicant to carry out market-based emergency programming in Zimbabwe. The main IP, WFP, has extensive experience procuring and distributing food and, to a lesser extent, cash transfers in emergencies. WFP expects that as they gain experience with cash and voucher programs, WFP will become more efficient at establishing and administering the programs (Foliot 2011). Save the Children had implemented a cash transfer and Cash for Assets program under WFP, showing that they had the necessary capacity before applying independently for an EFSP award (WFP Zimbabwe 2016b). IPs have monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning systems that include feedback and complaint response mechanisms, post-distribution monitoring, and baseline and end-line surveys.

**RISK ASSESSMENT/WASTE/FRAUD:** Transportation losses were minimal. In CT programs, IPs set up complaint mechanisms such as the tip-off line managed by Deloitte, through which community members could lodge complaints anonymously. FGDs reported no incidents of fraud or diversion at food distributions. Zimbabwe national IDs were used for the registration process, and CARE uses Last Mile Mobile System cards with barcodes to reduce fraud.

**BENEFICIARY PREFERENCE:** In focus groups discussions, beneficiaries were divided regarding their preferences for cash transfers, food, or a mix of food and cash. In two FGDs, all participants preferred cash or cash in transit over food. One FGD with men was evenly divided between people who preferred cash or food, and in five FGDs (4 with women, 1 with men) in more remote areas, the majority of participants preferred food. When asked if they would prefer transfers of food or cash once a month in small tranches or once every three months in a larger tranche, almost all FGD participants preferred monthly transfers, which people thought would be easier to budget so that it would last

through the month until the next tranche. This is in contrast to Sierra Leone where beneficiaries were very enthusiastic about having received larger, less frequent tranches, which they reported allowed them to save money by buying food in bulk and then use the savings for other expenses such as livelihood investments and school fees.

Between FY2011 and 2017, two programs distributed U.S.-sourced in-kind food that was not well matched to beneficiary preference. Around 2012, CRS used 202(e) funds to support in-kind food aid distribution and complementary programming. CRS chose U.S.-sourced in-kind food because of beneficiary preference for food rather than cash because of fears about hyperinflation and commodity shortages that had occurred around 2007-2008 (FEWS NET 2016). The program distributed bulgur and sorghum, however, which people did not like. CRS provided cooking demonstrations and recipes to help people learn how to use the grains. More recently, (as described above in “Changes Made During Program Implementation”) Amalima youth beneficiaries preferred cash over food, and some left the program when the program switched from Cash for Assets to Food for Assets.

**LESSONS LEARNED/ M&E:** All IPs have conducted evaluations or lessons learned meetings regarding most FFP-funded programs (e.g., New Dimensions Consulting 2013; Brewin et al. 2014; WFP 2017b). As indicated in key informant interviews and program documents, all IPs that implemented cash transfers encountered delays in the startup and utilization phases, from distributing SIM cards to educating people how to use mobile transfers. Once the systems were established and people understood how to use and keep credit on the SIM card, though, the rate of unsuccessful cash-outs declined, and the level of effort needed to sustain the cash transfer system decreased. Moreover, even if people aren’t able to cash out their transfer, mobile transfers can help meet food security needs if reasonably priced, desirable foods are available for purchase.

Save the Children applied for further FFP funding in Kariba and Binga districts. They did not receive funding from FFP, in part because of challenges and delays experienced with setting up cash transfers. However, Save the Children received funding from another donor (the European Union), and the program continues and benefits from foundational work completed with FFP funding.

Multiple key informants stated that FFP could have relied more on informal information when deciding on modalities for the El Niño response. Key informants report that Zimbabwean borders are porous, and goods will find their way to functioning markets. Despite warranted concerns about possible grain shortages and price spikes because of the regional drought and related import and export bans, more grain came into Zimbabwe than expected through formal and informal channels, filling the supply gap such that prices did not spike but increased steadily through the lean season.

**GENDER ISSUES AND PROTECTION, POWER DYNAMICS, VULNERABLE GROUPS:** All FGDs agreed that cash transfer programs should give cash to women, rather than men, because women are responsible for feeding the family and will know what the household needs. Both male and female FGDs reported minimal incidence of gender based violence and indicated that gender based violence declined with CT programs due to decreased stress over meeting household needs. The evaluation of WFP’s PRRO 200453 Productive Asset Creation program found that including vulnerable, labor constrained households (e.g., elderly, disabled) in Lean Season Assistance was not efficient; they would be better served by social safety net programs designed to meet chronic needs, rather than short term food security assistance (WFP 2017b). This review team observed the same and agrees with the finding.

**TIMELINESS:** Market based modalities have provided options that improve timeliness. Local and regional procurement most years has helped deliver food to beneficiaries more quickly than shipping it from the United States. WFP program documents state that saving more than 20 days in the procurement process. New cash transfer programs have taken three to four months to register beneficiaries and distribute SIM cards, but subsequent CT programs could be expected to have a faster scale up period. As reported in KIIs, factors that contributed to ENSURE's rapid scale up included (1) getting a cost modification to DFAP in the form of 202(e) and Internal Transportation, Storage and Handling, which was much faster than applying through the EFSP application process, (2) prepositioning food in Durban, and (3) IP capacity to implement large scale food distributions through pre-positioning staff and equipment.

**SEASONALITY/FREQUENCY OF DISTRIBUTIONS:** Most programming in Zimbabwe gives monthly distributions during the lean season from October to March. In a DFID-funded CT program, CARE gave a carefully timed supplemental cash transfers (i.e., top-up grants) in October. CARE did not put restrictions on how the funds could be used but did encourage beneficiaries that it was a good time to purchase agricultural inputs and pay school fees. According to KIIs, beneficiaries used the extra cash transfer agricultural inputs and benefitted from low seasonal prices.

**ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR:** Private sector partners included Cash In Transit agreements with banks and security guards; mobile network providers (mainly EcoNet); and transportation and hauling. As reported in key informant interviews and documented in program documents, Save the Children, World Vision, and WFP all had challenges with EcoNet such as overstated network coverage, lengthy contractual negotiations, cash shortages, and difficulty scaling up quickly for the emergency response (Save the Children 2015; WFP Zimbabwe 2016a). Save the Children requested more EcoNet agents, which increased beneficiaries' access to their transfers.

### PARTNERSHIPS IN ZIMBABWE TO DELIVER MBEP

IPs formed consortia, in some cases partnered with private sector (see section above), and with the GoZ such as agricultural extension services or to secure enough cash for programming.

**COORDINATION MECHANISMS:** Despite disagreement about whether cash or food aid was the most appropriate modality, donors and IPs in Zimbabwe demonstrated a remarkable level of coordination, which was achieved through the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). UNDP created the HCT and included donors in discussions, which helped coordinate funding, minimize overlap, and harmonize the El Niño response. WFP liaised with GoZ and chaired the Food Assistance Working Group and co-led the Cash Working Group, both of which worked to harmonize transfer levels (WFP Zimbabwe 2016a). Coordination of how to combine or use a "patchwork" of modalities (e.g., cash transfers and in-kind food distributions) was lacking.

Most IPs, with one exception, coordinated and harmonized their transfers. The HCT agreed upon transfer value was \$7-9. ENSURE proposed distribution of 7.5 kg of sorghum, 1 kg of split yellow peas, and 0.5 kg of vegetable oil per beneficiary household member, at a value of \$8.15. In contrast, when Amalima switched to U.S.-sourced in-kind, Amalima beneficiaries received only sorghum (as described above in "Changes Made During Program Implementation"). Furthermore, after Amalima had conducted registration, another organization started programming in the same area and offered a more desirable

food basket, and GoZ also gave 50 kg maize in nearby areas and required less work by beneficiaries. Amalima appropriately reviewed is registration list to eliminate overlap.

## **FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES**

**PROJECT CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCING HUNGER AND ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY:** The FFP-funded programs implemented significantly contributed to reducing food insecurity of targeted households during the program implementation period. The Save the Children endline survey found that, despite challenges such as limited EcoNet connectivity and liquidity, beneficiaries in Kariba and Binga ate more meals, on average, per day at endline (2.25 and 2.43 meals, respectively) than at baseline (1.62 and 2.0 meals), and they ate more diverse foods (Save the Children 2015). During the El Niño response, ENSURE monitoring data indicates that Global Acute Malnutrition rates in ENSURE program areas peaked in October 2016, the beginning of the lean season when large scale food distribution began, and declined to 3.6 by February 2017 (World Vision Zimbabwe, n.d.) WFP reported anecdotally that although beneficiaries use cash transfers for food, which meets food security needs, the cash transfer does not necessarily improve dietary diversity because beneficiaries may choose to buy only maize (Foliot 2011).

The PRIZE final evaluation found that PRIZE provided lean season emergency food assistance to 151,280 people (CRS Zimbabwe 2013). WFP monitoring for PRRO 200453 around 2014 found that 93 percent of beneficiaries had 'acceptable' food consumption scores, though attribution to the program is not verified (Brewin et al. 2014).

FGDs and anecdotal evidence suggest that longer term transfers associated with PAC have larger impacts on food security impacts than the short term lean season assistance and that gardens are expected to contribute to food security beyond the program end (Brewin et al. 2014; Save the Children 2015). The review team saw vegetables and cash crops growing in community gardens during the field mission, and FGDs reported appreciation for the gardens, which provided food for home consumption and sale, thereby increasing dietary diversity, household income, and community access to nutritious foods.

**Conditional transfers and community attitudes about shaping their future through asset building:** FGD participants who had participated in PACs enthusiastically described the benefits they had received from community assets, especially community gardens (described above) and dams, which provided water for household and community use (e.g., for gardens, brickmaking, and washing clothes).

**Modality monitoring/re-assessment:** IPs monitored and assessed modality implementation through post-distribution monitoring, quarterly reports, final results reports, and assessments. IPs also reported to USAID, if applicable, the planned versus actual costs of locally and regionally purchased commodities plus transportation and other costs. IPs made changes as needed (discussed above).

**Tracking project outcomes and impacts:** WFP, in partnership with Voto Mobile and Geopol, began using innovative tools in 2016 with mobile technology for real-time market monitoring for Mobile Vulnerability Analysis Mapping (mVAM). To conduct remote monitoring, mVAM surveyed over 1,000 respondents using an Interactive Voice Response system (WFP 2016). WFP reports monthly findings on coping strategies, food security, and food prices in its mVAM bulletins.

**Unintended food security outcomes:** Anecdotal evidence suggests that some beneficiaries who either left or were excluded from programs migrated to seek work in neighboring countries, potentially putting them at risk of exploitation (e.g., low wages, violence).

**Summary finding**

*DFAPs with crisis modifiers enabled rapid scale up and cost-savings.*

## 4. COST-EFFICIENCY TRENDS

**Objective 3:** Analyze program cost-efficiency trends across a range of variables including but not limited to modality, partner type, emergency classification and delivery mechanism. Costing delivery of food assistance across modalities is a critical piece to ensuring value for money and allows FFP to maximize the efficient use of its resources.

FFP partners assess costs of modality choices in proposals for LRP, but no cost efficiency analysis was found in program documents for cash transfer programs; this reflects the Annual

Program Statement (APS) requirements. In 2010, WFP compared the cost of regionally purchased maize to U.S.-sourced in-kind grain (Table 2). Regional maize cost less (\$559-689 per metric ton) than U.S.-sourced in-kind bulgur wheat and sorghum (estimated at \$1,020 and \$875 per metric ton), respectively<sup>4</sup>. Through 2015, IPs were only required to include rationale for modality selection that could be based on appropriateness, timeliness, and/or cost-effectiveness. The FY2015 APS guides applicants to compare the cash-based resources (i.e., cash transfers, LRP, vouchers) with the cost of U.S.-sourced commodities plus shipping. However, applicants could avoid this step by justifying their modality choice based on appropriateness or timeliness. The FY2017 APS is the first year in which cost efficiency analysis is required, and the analysis requested requires more effort to calculate, especially for cash transfers. The APS states that applicants should “provide a comparison of the ration-specific costs (e.g., transfer value or commodity and freight) of the proposed project relative to an equivalent Title II program. Savings should be indicated as percentage and absolute value.”

Table 2: WFP cost comparison of in-kind versus LRP in 2010

Source	Commodity	Value (US\$) per MT							
		Price	Ext TR	LTSH	ODOC	DSC	Total	ISC	Grand Total
US IK	B. Wheat	310	175	303	57	109	953	67	1,020
US IK	Sorghum	190	160	303	57	109	817	57	875
LP	Maize	233	-	147	57	109	522	37	559
RP - Malawi	Maize	298	-	232	57	109	695	49	744
RP - Mozambique	Maize	230	-	232	57	109	627	44	670
RP - South Africa	Maize	239	-	232	57	109	636	45	680
RP - Zambia	Maize	247	-	232	57	109	644	45	689

With this grant it is expected that a fair balance between local and regional purchases will be supplied.

Source: WFP and USAID. 2010. Award letter, AID-FFP-G-11-00002

<sup>4</sup> WFP assessed the cost of US bulgur and sorghum rather than US maize because Government of Zimbabwe GMO regulations prohibit whole grain maize from the US.

For the El Niño response, cost effectiveness analysis conducted by FFP in Washington DC calculated that in 2015, cash transfers in Zimbabwe were 63 percent more costly than U.S.-sourced in-kind food. Despite the added expense, cash transfers were chosen to address food security needs during a drought, which reduced harvests and contributed to higher local grain prices. Cash transfers were selected to infuse cash in rural markets, give beneficiaries choice of commodities, and bridge the food gap until in-kind food could arrive for distribution in the lean season. Moreover, key informants reported that CT beneficiaries were having increasing difficulty cashing out, indicating the growing scarcity of cash and difficulty buying commodities.

Another aspect that is not factored into FFP cost analysis is Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) findings. A 2014 study using LEWIE simulation methods found that for the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer, administered by the Ministry of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare, each dollar of transfer has the potential to generate \$1.73 of total income within the project area, benefitting both direct recipients and other community members (FAO 2014).

Scaling up the DFAP had cost benefits. The program had in-country staff and infrastructure established and was able to quickly hire, train, and supervise additional staff for the 8-month contract. Moreover, using a cost modification maintained a streamlined budget and accounting process and reduced the wait time of going through the EFSP application process.

## 5. DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS


**Objective 4:** Assess the qualitative effects of the projects such as on local economies and market actors.

**LOCAL ECONOMIES/MARKETS:** Cash transfer programs positively impacted local markets during the program implementation period. Save the Children reported that its CT program stimulated local markets (Save the Children 2015), and FGDs report that in communities receiving CTs, vendors stocked up on commodities, and prices were stable because both traders and products were abundant. During the El Niño response, FGDs in communities receiving in-kind aid reported that commodity prices remained stable. In areas where CT programs were implemented but ended, KIIs and FGDs report that business declined sharply and negatively impacted vendors. The programs that seemed to have the greatest potential for long term developmental impacts are those that include a productive asset creation component such as community gardens, dam, and dip tanks. “Life History I: Atwell” (next page) provides an example of a beneficiary who benefitted from such a program. Several FGD participants also highlighted the importance of savings and loan groups created by these programs, through which they earned income from interest. Participants in community gardens especially talked about selling vegetables from the garden in local markets, which benefitted the larger community both nutritionally and economically.

U.S.-sourced in-kind food aid did not distort markets except possibly in one community. One FGD in a community receiving U.S.-sourced in-kind food reported a decline in local commodity prices; attribution to in-kind aid, however, is difficult to establish considering the macroeconomic context (e.g., devaluation of the Rand).

## Life History I: Atwell

### Emergency food assistance linked to livelihood development and community asset creation builds resilience to economic + climatic shocks



\*Name has been changed.

**Atwell** was born in 1965 in Zimbabwe. He was sick as a child and started school a few years late, when he was eight years old. Atwell's schooling was interrupted several times, first by war from 1972 to 1977, and then just two years later, when Atwell fell ill again and had to stay home. Atwell returned to school in 1980 and attended until his mother died. Atwell was supposed to start secondary school at that time, but his dad did not have enough money to pay school fees for all of his children. Instead, Atwell repeated Grade 6 and advanced to secondary school the following year. Atwell attended three years of secondary school before dropping out due to insufficient money to pay school fees.

At age 24, Atwell began working part time as a carpenter and builder in Rushinga, but he did not have enough training or work to earn a good living. He married in 1994 and started a family, which grew to seven children, and he worked hard to provide for them. His life was good and improving.

Since 2015, Atwell has participated in the Productive Asset Creation (PAC) garden program, which he reports has further improved his life and helped diversify his livelihoods. “If you just sit, things will not work out because life is difficult, so I diversified.” The PAC garden provides unconditional food or cash transfers to participants during the lean season, among other activities. It is implemented by a community partner of World Food Program (WFP) with funding from USAID.

In addition to working in the PAC garden, Atwell uses skills learned in PAC trainings to improve his home garden and field crops, such as using proper plant spacing, soil ridges to capture water, and fertilizers. Atwell also built a small dam at his homestead to water his garden. The dam was damaged in the recent rainy season and needs repair, but he is growing kale and tomatoes. Atwell supplements his income with building, carpentry, and blacksmithing jobs in Rushinga and with earnings from the garden village savings and loan group. He contributes monthly to the savings and loan group and earns 10 percent interest, which is paid out every six months. The community weir dam was built through a Cash For Assets activity, and Atwell is looking forward to when the fish are mature so that he can earn money fishing as well. In all, the trajectory of his life since joining the program has been very positive.

**VENDORS:** The changing mix of modalities had varying impacts on vendors. At some cash transfer sites, vendors brought goods to distribution sites and were able to sell directly to beneficiaries. At other cash programming sites, vendors built up businesses but closed or were planning on closing when CTs ended. For vendors involved in mobile transfers, EcoNet provided hardware and training for their “ambassadors” or vendors (Save the Children 2015). FGDs reported little price fluctuation due to CTs and that some vendors stocked up in preparation for CTs.

**PSYCHOSOCIAL BENEFITS/CONFIDENCE:** Participants in PAC programs were enthusiastic about the benefits of community assets and wanted to expand the program so that others could participate and have vegetables to eat and sell. “Life History 2: Emerencia” (next page) illustrates this point.


**COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL CAPITAL:** Communities with PAC activities established project implementation committees (PITs), which were trained on topics such as bookkeeping, asset management, and leadership (WFP 2015). It was unclear how effective these committees are or will be in the future in terms of maintaining assets or managing possible conflict.

**LIVELIHOODS/PAC:** PAC activities created assets that are expected to improve livelihoods and ability to manage shocks after the program: 4 dams, 8 gardens, 1 irrigation scheme, 12 dip tanks, 10 spray races, and at 31 of the asset sites, two-stance latrines (Save the Children 2015). The Save the Children program also gave communities tools at the end of the project.

**FINANCIAL INCLUSION/TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT:** Mobile cash transfers increased financial inclusion and increased familiarity with mobile phones and e-wallets among beneficiaries, some of whom had not used mobile phones previously (Save the Children 2015). Cash transfer programs during the cash crisis have had the unintended effect of helping people transition to a cashless economy by enabling them to use mobile money on their mobile phones to pay for groceries and an increasing number of other goods and services. Based on input from multiple key informants, FGDs, and the literature, the increased use of mobile transfers, improvements in the mobile network, and the cash crisis have encouraged more businesses and institutions (including schools) to accept mobile money transfers, which is enabling people make more cashless payments despite the lack of cash (Bailey 2017).

## Life History 2: Emerencia

### Cash/Food for work program improves widow's well-being and empowerment



**Emerencia** has faced major ups and downs in life since she was born in 1980. Her father was a subsistence farmer, and she grew up in extreme poverty, as the seventh of ten children. At age four, Emerencia almost died of chest pains but recovered with medical treatment. While she was still young, two of her older sisters married, and the family received fourteen cattle as dowry (*lobola*). These assets significantly helped the family, but most of the cattle died in 1992 during an El Niño-induced drought, and the family experienced severe food insecurity. Despite these hardships, Emerencia continued attending secondary school, walking eight kilometers each way, sometimes bare-foot. She would arrive at school tired and with dirty clothes and low self-esteem. This, in turn, made learning difficult. Although she completed the secondary school classes, she failed the final exams.

When she was 19, Emerencia married, and her standard of living improved sharply. Her husband sent remittances from income earned as a shopkeeper in South Africa. After two years of marriage, Emerencia had a baby boy, which brought her great joy. Sadly, this phase ended when her husband died in 2007. Emerencia earned money growing and selling vegetables. She recalled that she nearly died due to living conditions that were even worse than her childhood. These were incredibly distressing years of her life.

In 2012, Emerencia was selected to be a beneficiary of the World Food Program (WFP)/Mwenezi Development Training Centre Productive Assets Creation (PAC) program. The program provided cash or food to participants who constructed assets such as a community garden, a fence, and a weir dam. Emerencia and other participants also grew vegetables in the community garden for household consumption and sale. She further benefitted from livelihood trainings and psychosocial support, which helped decrease her stress levels. As her livelihood strategies improved, Emerencia's hope was restored. "A new lease on life was provided," she said.

Through the training center and PAC, Emerencia also joined a savings group. Using proceeds from selling produce and from the local savings group, she bought four chickens in 2012, a goat in 2013, and a cow in 2015. Since then, she has further increased her livestock. She has been able to pay school fees for her son and build a house with three rooms and a corrugated iron roof. Emerencia says her sadness of being a widow is gone, and her standard of living is now the same as when her husband was alive. She is proud of having livestock registered in her own name, and she is very grateful to the PAC program.

## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

### APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES TO CONTINUE

- Continue and scale up programs with productive asset creation to strengthen community resilience, i.e., ability to respond to and recover from shocks.
- Identify DFAP partners that have capacity to scale up quickly for emergency response using the selected modality. Continue to design DFAPs with flexible programming and funding mechanisms built in to ensure rapid funding and response.
- Continue and scale up cash: In years when grain and foods are available in markets, consider shifting to greater use of cash transfers. Program design should include time and resources to educate beneficiaries about e-wallets, mobile phone technology, SIM cards, passwords, and how to get help or file complaints if needed. Community based program ambassadors or “fixers” have been very helpful and should be included in future program design. Programs should verify network coverage and have contingency plans in case private partners cannot deliver services at the needed scale, speed, or quality.
- Recommended with reservations: Pre-authorizing funds and prepositioning food, as done very successfully by one DFAP, are good for improving timeliness but are also risky. If the funds don’t come through, IPs lose out (as occurred with another IP that made promises to its partners but did not receive funding). Prepositioning commodities has the risk of limiting options or biasing decisions toward food, such as in the event that response analysis determines that cash is the more appropriate modality, but stored commodities are due to expire.

### APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES TO MODIFY

- Consider a mix of cash and food transfers so that beneficiaries have food to meet food security needs and have cash to purchase items to supplement their diet and pay for other essentials like school fees and soap and invest in livelihood related assets such as tools or small livestock.
- Analyses should continue to include formal market information and would improve with the inclusion of informal information, such as from key informants.
- Encourage IPs to consider giving beneficiaries top-up grants at key times such as when prices are favorable for buying agricultural inputs or when school fees are due.
- Design program interventions to meet the different needs of chronically vulnerable households and acutely affected households. Short term transfers effectively meet short term food security needs, and community asset creation programs are a step toward longer term resilience, both of which are appropriate for both chronically vulnerable and acutely affected households. However, chronically vulnerable households need longer term support such as a Productive Safety Net program.
- Explore options for a productive safety net for chronically vulnerable households.

- Consider encouraging IPs to give cash transfers in larger tranches to meet immediate food security needs and allow for bulk purchases, investments in livelihood activities, or investment in village savings and loan groups. Financial management and investment training for beneficiaries must be included, and post distribution monitoring will be important to assess market and other impacts.
- Increase outreach efforts to assess beneficiary preference and livelihood needs among youth in remote areas.
- Allow local and regional procurement of RUTF from verified suppliers.
- Ensure that U.S.-sourced in-kind food does not compete with local markets and that it is well-matched with beneficiary preferences. FFP should not send U.S.-sourced maize because the corn is usually yellow, a variety not preferred by beneficiaries, and is from genetically modified seeds, which are not permitted by GoZ. Moreover, in normal harvest years, maize is available in local and regional markets. Vegetable oil, in contrast, is locally produced but in short supply. U.S.-sourced vegetable oil would be appropriate. FFP should keep a flexible approach based on beneficiary preference, market conditions, and predicted harvests.

## 7. ANNEXES

### ANNEX I: SUMMARY OF FFP FUNDED PROGRAMS IN ZIMBABWE

IP	Award number Project Name	Award Project Dates	Original Budget (US\$)	Key Activities	Title II/202e, EFSP, or both?
WFP	AID-FFP-G-11-0002; PRRO 105950	10/1/2010	\$5.7 million (M)	Regional Procurement.	EFSP
WFP	AID-FFP-IO-12-00004 PRRO 200162 (specifically Seasonal Targeted Assistance)	12/7/2011 - 8/31/12	\$10 M EFSP + \$1.4 M 202e	> \$ 8 M Regional Procurement (maize, pigeon peas) > \$2 M CTs	EFSP + 202(e)
CRS	No award number. Promoting Recovery in Zimbabwe (PRIZE)	FY12	\$4.7 M 202e	Single-Year Assistance Program for drought response: emergency food assistance and ag. improvement	202(e)
WFP	AID-FFP-IO-13-00002 PRRO 200162, Assistance to Food Insecure Vulnerable Groups, only Seasonal Targeted Assistance	11/16/2012	\$8 M	> \$6 M Regional Procurement > \$2 M CTs	EFSP
WFP	> AID-FFP-IO-13-00015 and > AID-FFP-IO-13- 00015-02 (mod) PRRO 200453 Responding to Humanitarian Needs and Strengthening Resilience to Food Insecurity	9/26/2013	\$10 M EFSP \$9.2 M 202e \$3.1 M 202e enhanced	> \$3 M CTs > \$ 7 M Regional purchase	EFSP, 202(e), and 202(e)- enhanced
WFP	AID-FFP-IO-14-00009	2/5/2014	\$3 M	\$2.1 M Regional Procurement \$0.9 M CTs	EFSP

<b>IP</b>	<b>Award number Project Name</b>	<b>Award Project Dates</b>	<b>Original Budget (US\$)</b>	<b>Key Activities</b>	<b>Title II/202e, EFSP, or both?</b>
Save the Children	AID-FFP-G-14-00060 Emergency Food Security Cash for Training/Work Program in Binga and Kariba	9/23/2014	\$2.9 M	Cash Transfers (Cash for Work)	EFSP
WFP	AID-FFP-IO-15-00032 PRRO 200453 Responding to Humanitarian Needs & Strengthening Resil to Food Insecurity	8/28/2015 programming: 9/1/15-3/16	\$4.5 M	Cash Transfers	EFSP + 202(e)
WFP	AID-FFP-IO-16-00023 PRRO 200944: Building Resilience for Zero Hunger (2016-2018) drought; AID-FFP-IO-16-00023-01 Mod 1 added \$10 M; Mod 2 added beneficiaries	9/9/2016	\$10 M \$10 M (mod) + \$10 M T2	Regional purchase	EFSP, 202(e), T2
UNICEF	RUTF	FY16	\$539,049	RUTF	202(e)
WFP	n/a Program costs (evaluation)	FY16	\$125,000	Evaluation costs	202(e) enhanced
All amounts above are U.S. dollars (US\$).					

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### ANNEX 3: INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS

Table 3: Stakeholders interviewed during the Zimbabwe field mission April 25-May 5, 2017 and/or via Skype prior to the field mission

Organization	Name	Stakeholder type/title
CARE, ENSURE	Paul Moyo	Ensure Supervisor- Zaka District
CARE, ENSURE	Backmore Moyo	Field Supervisor, CTP Zaka
CARE, ENSURE	Kevin Makuvaza	Food Monitor- ENSURE
CARE, ENSURE	Fortune Tafirenyika	Project Field Assistant -ENSURE
Commercial Farmers' Union	Peter (Ben) Purcell-Gilpin	Acting Director
Commercial Farmers' Union	Peter Steyl	President
CRS	Sekai Mudonhi	Head of Programs
CTDO	Ackulina Jonga	EST Coordinator
CTDO	Emory Marufu	CTDO staff
CTDO	Atwell Mudzviti	CTDO staff
Cultivating New Frontiers in Agriculture (CNFA)	Godfrey Nehanda	Lead Livelihoods/ SO1 & SO2 Manager, Amalima Program; Deputy Country Representative
DFID	Anthea Kerr	Humanitarian, Social Protection, Agriculture and Livelihoods team leader
EcoNet	Eddie Chibi	Acting Chief Executive Officer
European Union	Michele Schivo	Attache, Economic and Food Security Section
GoZ	Edgar Seenza	PA
GoZ	Mr. Mugarisanwa	Director in the Minister of State
GoZ	Tendai Kapanzi	DA, Mutasa
GoZ	Gordon Mukome	Assistant DA, Mutasa
GoZ	Chigaro Nigel	Assistant DA, Mwenezi District
GoZ	Chingwe Rosemary	DA, Mwenezi District
GoZ	Mr. Tavaziva	Mwenezi District Council Representative
GoZ	Mr. Zinhanga	DA
GoZ	Clever Machekera	DA, Rushinga
GOZ Food and Nutrition Council	Mary Bwanali	
GOZ Food and Nutrition Council	Yvonne Mavhunga	Food Security Officer
GOZ Food and Nutrition Council	George D Kembo	ZimVAC Chairperson

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Stakeholder type/title</b>
Mwenezi Development Training Centre	Promise Makone	Training and Community Development manager
Mwenezi Development Training Centre	Fungai Mposhi	M&E Officer
PLAN	Betina Nyamutswa	Programme Cordinator
UNICEF	Ismael Ngnie Teta	Nutrition Officer
UNICEF	Jane Muita	Deputy Country Representative
USAID	Jason Taylor	Office Director
USAID	Suzanne Truchard	Deputy Director
USAID	Themba Nduna	Nutrition Advisor
USAID	Fanuel Cumanzala	Food Security Specialist
WFP	Eddie Rowe	Country Rep
WFP	Niels Balzer	Deputy Country Rep.
WFP	Hebert Matsikwa	Program Policy Officer
WFP	Tafara Ndumiyana	Nutrition Officer
WFP	Miriro Mvura	Food for Assets Programme Assistant
WFP	Bianca Munyira	Program officer
WFP	Jens Nylund	Head of Programs
WFP	Farai Mukwende	Program Officer, Masvingo
WFP	Kudzai Akino	Program Policy Officer
WFP	Andrew Chimedza	Logistic Officer
WFP	Wisdom Dube	Program Policy Officer
WFP	Nomthandazo Musengezi	Program Associate
WFP	Jacqueline Chinoera	Program Policy Officer
WFP	Agnes Mungatia	Program Policy Officer
WFP	Samia Salim	Program Policy Officer (Partnerships)
WFP	Chengetai Chinguwa	Programme Assistant
WFP Bulawayo	Preacherd Donga	Program Policy Officer
WFP Bulawayo	Praxcedes Moyo	Program Policy Officer
WFP Country Office	Michael Chirashi	Food for Assets Program Engineer
WFP Country Office	Isaac Tarakidzwa	Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) Officer
WFP Country Office	Tendai Hamandishe	Logistic Officer
WFP Country Office	Sherita Manyika	Programme Associate
World Vision	Dave Evans	CoP
World Vision	Richard Ndou	D/CoP

Table 4: Summary data for focus groups/interviews conducted in Zimbabwe: locations, number, and type of participants

<b>Location</b>	<b>Focus group (FGD) or interview</b>	<b># of participants</b>	<b>Type of participants</b>
Old Mutasa clinic (Zongoro Health Facility)	FGD	8	WFP PEPFAR Beneficiaries, female
Mwenezi - Ward 2- Matande Weir and Garden	FGD	11	Beneficiaries, male
Mwenezi - Ward 2- Matande Weir and Garden	FGD	16	Beneficiaries, female
Mwenezi - Makotore Ward 5, Tsvimborume Nutrition Garden	FGD	13	Beneficiaries, female
Mwenezi - Makotore Ward 5, Tsvimborume Nutrition Garden	FGD	10	Beneficiaries, male
Zaka - Muuyu Ward 10	FGD	10	Beneficiaries, female (CARE CT program)
Zaka - Muuyu Ward 10	FGD	11	(CARE CT program)
Zaka Ward 14	FGD	10	(CARE CT program) non-beneficiaries
Zaka, Ward 14	FGD	10	Beneficiaries, male
Zaka Ward 14	FGD	20	ENSURE Livelihoods Support Assistance beneficiaries, female
Female beneficiary in Mwenezi	In Depth Interview	1	Beneficiary
Female beneficiary #2 in Mwenezi	In Depth Interview	1	Beneficiary
Male beneficiary in Mwenezi	In Depth Interview	1	Beneficiary
Female beneficiary in Rushinga	In Depth Interview	1	Beneficiary
Female beneficiary #2 in Rushinga	In Depth Interview	1	Beneficiary
Male beneficiary in Rushinga	In Depth Interview	1	Beneficiary
Female beneficiary in Zaka	In Depth Interview	1	Beneficiary
Female beneficiary #2 in Zaka	In Depth Interview	1	Beneficiary

#### **ANNEX 4: APPROACH**

The review team used a multi-layered approach including document review, field visits to beneficiary communities, and interviews with donors, government, implementing partners, and beneficiaries, including:

- Desk review of metadata including reports from technical papers from the Cash Learning Partnership, WFP Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping, WFP Bulletins, FEWS NET, EFSP APSs, IP program proposals, award documents, quarterly reports, and annual results reports.
- Field work in Zimbabwe April 24 – May 5, 2017, including 19 KIIs, 8 in-depth beneficiary interviews, and 14 FGDs.