Helping Families, Closing Camps
Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps

A Tool Kit of Best Practice and Lessons Learned
Haiti 2010 – 2012
Report written by Emmett Fitzgerald

With the Returns Working Group: Chiara Lucchini Gilera, Deb Ingersoll, Giulia Bazziga, Hilary Dubose, Jackline Amaguru Olanya, James Bellamy, Lama El Batal and Rachel Beach.

With many thanks for their contribution to: Ahmed Abdi, Alejandro Pacheco, Amal Ataya, Antanas Jurksaitis, Ascension Martinez, Claude Andre Nadon, Clement Belizaire, Damien Jusselme, David Preux, Elliott Aykroyd, Giovanni Cassani, Joanna Dabao, Juliana Quintero, Julie Breen, Julien Magnat, Kristin Parco, Leonard Doyle, Luc Ondoua, Luca Dall’Oglio, Marc Levesque, Michela Macchiavello, Patrick Duigan, Peter Kioy, Valeria Falaschi, Vincent Simon, Vlatko Avramovski and Xavier Genot.

For more information on this report see www.eshelter-cccghaiti.info or contact the author at emmettfitzgerald@gmail.com.
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E-Shelter & CCCM Cluster
Returns Working Group
Table of Contents

After initial sections of giving context and strategic analysis of successes and challenges, the document is organized according to steps in the process of camp closure and ends with conclusions and recommendations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................................................... 6

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
  Purpose........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
  Return Working Group......................................................................................................................................................................... 10
  Introduction and Context...................................................................................................................................................................... 11
  The Strategic Role of Rental Support Cash Grants............................................................................................................................. 15
  Overview of Program Fundamentals..................................................................................................................................................... 18
  Differing Approaches of Each Implementing Agency.......................................................................................................................... 23
  Frequently Asked Questions................................................................................................................................................................. 24

STEPS IN THE PROCESS.................................................................................................................................................................................. 31
  Step 1: Registration and Establishing a Beneficiary List...................................................................................................................... 32
  Step 2: Protection..................................................................................................................................................................................... 37
  Step 3: Beneficiary Communication.................................................................................................................................................. 42
  Step 4: Choosing a Housing Option.................................................................................................................................................... 47
  Step 5: Choosing a Rental Support Cash Grant................................................................................................................................. 52
  Step 6: Cash Transfers............................................................................................................................................................................ 55
  Step 7: Camp Closure............................................................................................................................................................................ 58
  Step 8: Surprise Verification Visits....................................................................................................................................................... 61
  Step 9: Livelihoods and Other Complementary Programming ...................................................................................................... 65

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................................................................................... 71
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Executive Summary

Rental Support Cash Grants have enabled over 14,000 families to move from Haiti’s displacement camps into safe housing. Since October 2010, ten months after the January 12th earthquake, these grants of $500 US Dollars covering one year of rent have proven to be a fast, effective and relatively inexpensive method of providing housing solutions.

Questions have been raised about the availability and cost of rental property in Port-au-Prince and therefore about the sustainability of the Rental Support Cash Grant approach. However this report shows that there is sufficient supply in the rental housing market for a further 19,000 families to benefit from grants. Moreover, despite a rise in demand the cost of rent has in fact slightly decreased since September 2011.

As well as providing a short-term housing solution for one year, evidence in this report shows that rental support is proving to be a stepping stone for families to find durable housing solutions. A survey of families more than one year on from the program revealed that 90% of them had found a housing solution through their own means. The other 10% of beneficiary families could not be contacted by telephone, but zero families surveyed had returned to a camp.

The Rental Support Cash Grant approach is not a one-size-fits-all solution to the problems of housing the homeless in Haiti. However, given the clear successes, and given the continuing problems of building social housing on any significant scale in Haiti, rental support has clearly emerged as one approach to providing housing which should be continued and scaled-up.

“97% of people living in Camp Place Saint Pierre didn’t own a house or land. To help every family and close the entire camp, Rental Support Cash Grants were essential.” Clement Belizaire, Government of Haiti’s Unit for Construction, Rehousing and Public Buildings

The findings of this report are that Rental Support Cash Grants should continue to play a significant role in the Government of Haiti’s strategy for camps, housing and urban development. There are five key recommendations:

**Recommendation 1:** The Government of Haiti and donors should make available increased funding for Rental Support Cash Grants in order that more families currently living in camps can have access to a housing solution.

**Recommendation 2:** The Government of Haiti, donors and implementing agencies should prioritize camps with the greatest need.

**Recommendation 3:** The Government of Haiti should lead a process to standardize the approach to camp closure programs and clarify the responsibilities of actors involved (central government, municipal government and/or international agencies).

**Recommendation 4:** The Government of Haiti and donors should fund long-term investment in social housing and the rehabilitation of neighborhoods.

**Recommendation 5:** The Government of Haiti and donors should fund further study of results for families beyond the one year project cycle.
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Helping Families, Closing Camps
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Purpose

This document is intended to provide examples of lessons learned and best practice for those who continue to work in Haiti with the population displaced by the 2010 earthquake. It is also hoped that, beyond the Haitian context, the document may provide lessons learned for future emergency response programs in urban environments.

The report brings together lessons learned from programs implemented by six agencies working in Haiti. As can be seen from the table on page 20, no two agencies took exactly the same approach and not every step described was followed by every agency. Where agencies differed in approach, the document attempts to establish the pros and cons of the varying methods developed.

Further study and evaluation is required: This report has the limited aim of documenting the processes developed and providing a first-cut analysis of the successes and failures of the programs based on available data. The majority of programs described in this report are still ongoing at the time of writing and the Return Working Group strongly advocate for further evaluations, not only of each program, but also of the general approach of closing camps using rental support cash grants.

Structure: To create a clear structure, the document primarily follows the steps involved in one program, such that when an activity is described and the agency involved is not cited, this represents the approach taken by IOM as part of the 16/6 Program. This Government-led program aimed to close six camps and rehabilitate 16 neighborhoods. It is coordinated by the Government of Haiti and operationally implemented by ILO, IFRC, IOM, UNDP and UNOPS.

Management Tools and Supporting Documentation: In order to offer as much practical support as possible, this document is complemented by annexes including examples of management tools used in delivering these types of programs. These annexes are available electronically through the E-shelter and CCCM Cluster Haiti website www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info
Return Working Group

This report was produced under the leadership of the Haitian Government’s Construction, Housing and Public Building Unit (French acronym UCLBP). The report brings together the experience and learning of the Return Working Group made up of staff from six agencies implementing camp closure and Rental Support Cash Grant programs:

- Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
- Concern Worldwide
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
- International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO)
- World Vision International

The Return Working Group was established in Port-au-Prince in October of 2011 with the purpose of providing a forum where managers from different agencies implementing camp closure programs had the opportunity to discuss challenges encountered, share lessons learned and work together to establish best practice. The group is jointly chaired by the UCLBP and the Emergency Shelter/Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster).

Initially, the group contributed to the creation of the Return and Relocation Strategy which was agreed as a common strategic framework in January 2011 by the membership of all Clusters and the UN Country Team.

Subsequently, through the Martelly administration’s leadership in designing the 16/6 Program (16 Neighborhoods/6 Camps), and as part of the process of handing over CCCM and E-Shelter Cluster leadership to national authorities, national authorities became involved in the Return Working Group. The Government is represented in the Returns Working Group by Clement Belizaire, Director of the Relocation and Neighborhood Rehabilitation Section of the UCLBP and Program Director of the 16/6 Program.
Introduction and Context

Because in 2010, for the first time in history, the majority of the world’s population lives in urban rather than rural areas. Since many of the world’s major cities in developing countries have grown up in areas at elevated risk for earthquakes and other natural disasters, there is a high risk of further urban disasters and large-scale urban displacement. Given its scale, the problems encountered and the solutions developed, the Haiti experience can provide lessons for future disaster response.

This review documents response to some key characteristics of the Haiti experience which are likely to be repeated elsewhere: a disaster in an urban setting; poor levels of basic services even before the disaster; unclear land tenure status; delays in delivery of long-term reconstruction; funding for IDP camps running out before the displacement crisis is resolved; and internally displaced populations in urban centers, where it quickly becomes operationally difficult to distinguish between the disaster-affected population and the less-affected urban poor.

In particular, there are lessons to be learned from Haiti’s Rental Support Cash Grant programs. These programs were developed first by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in late 2010 and were adapted and developed by half a dozen other organizations in the second year of the earthquake response with the leadership and support of the Haitian Government.

Evolution of the Camp Population

The graphs below provided by IOM show the evolution of the camp population since the earthquake. When compared to the number of housing solutions provided by the international aid response it is striking to note that the vast majority of Haitian families in camps after the earthquake left camp without any assistance.

Note also that the fall in camp populations is not uniformly positive news. The reduction in camps and camp populations also includes those families who were forced to leave camps because of flooding, landslide, cholera or other natural risks. The fall in camp populations also includes families who were given no housing assistance because they were evicted from camps against their will by landowners.

Graph showing evolution of displaced population by number of camps, families and individuals.
[Source: IOM Data Management Unit]
**Graph showing the origin of the camp population. The overwhelming majority of camp residents lived in the same administrative section before the earthquake. [Source: IOM Data Management Unit]**

**Conditions in camps continue to deteriorate**

**Protection:** As funding for camp management, health, water, sanitation and other services in the camps has reduced, vulnerability increases. This has led to higher levels of child and women’s protection issues in camps. For example reported incidences of transactional sex have increased and there were almost four times as many Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) cases reported in the last quarter of 2011 as during the previous reporting period. [Source: IOM Protection] As worrying as the increased prevalence of protection cases is the decrease in funding to even track and report, let alone react to protection needs.

**Health:** Almost all health services have been removed from camps, but the community-based approach to healthcare has not yet been sufficiently developed. The hurricane season starting from June 2012 will be the first where virtually no camps have access to free health services and funding for cholera response and mitigation has substantially reduced.

**Security:** UN Police are planning a further reduction in camp-based patrols as they move to a neighborhood approach. Yet the security situation is deteriorating in camps like Jean-Marie Vincent where roughly 6,000 families still live.

**Sanitation:** In light of increasing reports of cholera cases [see New York Times May 16<sup>th</sup> 2012] it is worrying to re-read a January 2012 WASH Cluster report showing that in only 7% of camps is solid waste collected and disposed of. In 72% of all camps those conducting surveys saw solid human waste visible in the camp. Of over 600 camps, there are only 81 where latrines have been emptied in the previous month.

**Emergency Shelter:** 2 years ago the populations in camps were given plastic sheeting with a recommended lifespan of 6 months. Although there are contingency plans for some replacements, the vast majority of the 135,000 families still in camps are about to enter a third rainy season still using the same plastic sheeting.

**Forced Eviction:** The issue of eviction remains extremely pressing for many families living in camps. 53,366 people have been forcibly evicted from 130 IDP camps since records began in July 2010. Currently, 81,982 people living in 147 camps are threatened with eviction. This represents 19% of the total of IDP population in Haiti – almost one in five. [Source: IOM Evictions Report April 2012]
Options for Providing Shelter Solutions to the Displaced Population
Since the January 2010 earthquake, housing solutions to help families leave camps have fallen broadly speaking into four categories:

Transitional Shelters (T-shelters): As the charts below show, this was by far the most common housing solution provided. While there are many designs, these are generally wooden structures with plywood walls and a tin roof designed to offer medium-term shelter for between three and five years.

Yellow House Repair: Repairing or retro-fitting damaged houses proved technically extremely complex, but once standard methodologies were developed has been increasingly successful. [See Page 12 for definition of terms]

Permanent Housing Reconstruction: Programs were created to replace houses so badly damaged that they were in need of demolition. The figures on page 12 also show new house construction. The vast majority of permanent housing built to this point has been in peri-urban and rural areas outside of Port-au-Prince. This was caused primarily by the complexities of building in dense, disorganized urban environments where land tenure was unclear.

Rental Support Cash Grants: Helping families by offering them the chance to rent a safe property of their choice in the neighborhood of their choice. This approach can take several forms which fall into one of three categories:

- Families who entered into a formal rental agreement with a house owner. (This category represents the overwhelming majority of cases.)
- Families who moved in with a host family (family or friend). The financial assistance has been broadly termed rent, though in the case of a beneficiary moving back into a parent’s home, the family may have come to an informal arrangement about how the funds were divided.
- Families who moved out of Port-au-Prince and back to the provinces. These families were assisted to leave the city in keeping with the effort of decentralization. Once arrived at their chosen destination outside Port-au-Prince, these families either used the received funds to rent or moved in with a host family.

While this report makes reference where relevant to some of the challenges and lessons learned on repairing Yellow Houses, building T-shelters or providing permanent housing for those with Red Houses, a full review of the shelter response in Haiti after the earthquake is beyond the scope of this report. Those interested can access the shelter response review produced by the IFRC which can be found either through the IFRC website or via the Shelter Cluster (www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info).

Housing Solutions Delivered and Planned
The graphs below show the relative numbers of housing solutions delivered in Haiti since the earthquake in January 2012. There are two things worth particularly noting in the context of this report:

- The speed at which camps can be closed using the rental support approach has meant that despite these programs starting well after the other options, Rental Support Cash Grants have now provided housing assistance for more families than any option apart from T-shelters.
- Providing permanent housing continues to prove hugely challenging. The issues slowing progress include problems with land tenure, lack of available land, training masons to build according to the newly developed building standards. These are only some of the challenges, which begins to explain why so few permanent houses have been built and why, of those which have been built, the majority have been built outside the dense urban environment of metropolitan Port-au-Prince. (Thus far only 1,349 permanent houses have been built in the Greater Port-au-Prince area.)
Graph showing housing solutions planned and delivered in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake  
[Source E-Shelter & CCCM Cluster—May 2012]

Agencies Involved in Rental Support Cash Grant Programs
The graph below shows the number of families which chose to benefit from a rental support cash grant and were thereby assisted to leave camps. [Source E-Shelter & CCCM Cluster—June 2012]

Background: “Green, Yellow and Red Houses”
After the earthquake the Haitian Government along with international agencies assessed the structural integrity of almost every building in Haiti. After the assessment the engineers used a color-coding system, tagging each house with a stamp painted either Green (safe); Yellow (in need of repair); or Red (beyond repair). The Government agency responsible was the Ministry for Public Works, Transport and Communication (French acronym MTPTC), therefore the tags are colloquially referred to as “MTPTC status”. 

[Graph showing housing solutions planned and delivered in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake]

[Source E-Shelter & CCCM Cluster—May 2012]

[Graph showing the number of families which chose to benefit from a rental support cash grant and were thereby assisted to leave camps.]

[Source E-Shelter & CCCM Cluster—June 2012]

[Background: “Green, Yellow and Red Houses”]
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[Images of houses labeled with color codes]
“After more than two years, the vast majority of those with access to land or a home requiring repair have already left camps. T-shelters, Yellow House repair, Red House reconstruction – these are all excellent tools. But 97% of people living in Camp Place Saint Pierre didn’t own a house or land. To help every family and close the entire camp, rental support cash grants were essential.”  
Clement Belizaire, Government of Haiti

In early 2011, one year after the earthquake, it was becoming increasingly apparent that there was a limit to the number of families that could be assisted through the housing solutions which had thus far been developed: T-Shelters, repairing Yellow Houses and building new housing.

It became increasingly clear that reconstruction would be a long process and that there would continue to be a large camp population in need of assistance. After the initial success of the IFRC’s pilot program in 2010, there was an initiative to complement these housing solutions by scaling up Rental Support Cash Grant programs.
As has been shown above, building **T-Shelters**, repairing **Yellow Houses** and building **new housing** provided many tens of thousands of housing solutions for families. However, while these programs contributed to lowering the camp population, they were not ideally suited to targeting the entire population of a camp; these housing solutions did not address the needs of families with no land and no house to repair.

For example, while it is a great achievement that over 110,000 families received a housing solution through T-shelters, **only 23% of T-shelters built were provided to families living in camps**. Since owning or having access to land was a pre-requisite for a family to be a beneficiary of a T-shelter program, it was much easier for agencies to quickly and efficiently identify potential beneficiaries by looking in areas where there was land available. In such areas, many families chose to remain in emergency shelters on their property rather than moving to a camp. As a result, while T-shelters helped many families in need of housing, the majority of T-shelters did not contribute to providing a housing solution for the camp population. In the same way, building permanent houses was not a solution for re-housing any significant portion of the IDP population since only a tiny percentage of the camp population owned land, and the lack of land available for public utility acutely limited the Government’s ability to build social housing.

![Some of the 17,000 residents before they took the opportunity to leave Champs de Mars camp through the Rental Support Cash Grant program.](image-url)
Two further issues complicated the task of closing camps. Firstly, when families did receive a solution and left camp, the tent was often quickly replaced by another family moving in. Secondly, families who received a T-shelter, permanent house or Yellow House repair did not necessarily move out of camps. With over 1000 camps at the height of the emergency, with hundreds or thousands of families tightly packed into each camp, it was simply not feasible to keep up to date lists of the residents of each camp, nor to cross-reference those who had received a housing solution, nor to impose on families to leave camp once they had received a solution.

Since T-Shelters, repairing Yellow Houses and building new housing could not offer a solution to 100% of camp residents, these programs alone did not succeed in emptying individual camps:

![Diagram Showing that Yellow House Repair, T-shelter and Permanent Housing programs help many families but not all. So camps reduce in size, but remain open.](image1)

Therefore, Rental Support Cash Grant programs were a response to several strategic questions:

- What can be done for the population of camps, given that long-term housing solutions will take years to be delivered in sufficient numbers?
- How can housing solutions be found for those who cannot access existing housing solutions available such as T-shelters, Yellow House repair, or permanent housing reconstruction.
- How can entire camps be closed with the needs of every family provided for, given that only a tiny percentage of people living in camps own or have access to land or a home which can be repaired?

**The key strategic role of Rental Support Cash Grants was to offer a solution for the most vulnerable who did not have access to land or a house in need of repair.** Cash Grants were added to the existing palette of housing solutions ensuring that every family could be assisted through the same program. This made it operationally possible to work with every family in camp and thereby close a camp entirely.

![Diagram showing that Yellow House Repair, T-shelter and Permanent Housing programs combined with Rental Support Cash Grants help 100% of families enabling camps to close.](image2)
Overview of Program Fundamentals

Section by section, this document examines each step involved in the process of implementing a Rental Support Cash Grant and camp closure program. Before examining the intricacies and lessons learned at each stage, it is essential to start with a very brief overview of the steps involved in order to understand the process from start to finish. As a guide, this section closes with the two-page process map used by IOM during implementation of their Rental Support Cash Grant and camp closure programs.

The heart of these programs lies in offering choice. Each family’s situation is different, which necessitates a tailored approach so that every family can choose the destination and the housing solution appropriate to their circumstances. Accordingly, each family is offered their choice of one of three housing solutions:

1. Repair of a “Yellow House”.
2. Construction of a permanent house or a T-shelter (plus rubble removal if needed) on land either owned by the family or made available by a third party.

For the majority of families, who neither own nor have access to land or a “Yellow House”, there is a third option:

- **Rental Support Cash Grant**: Helping families by offering them the chance to rent a safe property of their choice in the neighborhood of their choice. This approach can take several forms which fall into one of three categories:
  - Families who entered into a formal rental agreement with a house owner. (This category represents the overwhelming majority of cases.)
  - Families who moved in with a host family (family or friend). The financial assistance has been broadly termed rent, though in the case of a beneficiary moving back into a parent’s home, the family may have come to an informal arrangement about how the funds were divided.
  - Families who moved out of Port-au-Prince to the provinces. These families were assisted to leave the city in keeping with the effort of decentralization. Once arrived at their chosen destination outside Port-au-Prince, these families either used the received funds to rent or moved in with a host family.

**Step 1: Registration**

The first step in the process was to establish the most accurate beneficiary list possible. This was achieved by different agencies in a variety of ways: Concern Worldwide in Camp Oscar worked the camp committee to establish the veracity of claims of residency; other programs refined their registration list through a series of visits ostensibly aimed at distribution of cholera prevention material; in Place Saint Pierre, once IOM had created an initial list, it was the Mayor of Petionville who took the final decision and published the beneficiary list on the walls of City Hall. The technical challenges and innovative solutions developed are discussed in detail in the Registration section.

**Step 2: Protection and Assistance to the Vulnerable**

Given the sensitivities of any displacement of large numbers of people, issues of protection were core. In these programs, protection was one of the principal objectives - giving each IDP more personal security and protection by helping them leave camp for a better housing situation. Yet protection was also a cross-cutting theme infused into each step of the process. Starting with the very first interaction with each family at registration, agencies identified families with special protection needs. For example, in the Champs de Mars program, health teams, psychosocial teams and women and child protection teams were actively working in the camp to assess family needs and either offer direct assistance or refer families to local service providers. For a detailed examination of the steps taken to ensure the rights of the displaced population were respected and special assistance provided to those with need, see Protection section.
Step 3: Beneficiary Communication
In order to meet the norms and standards required when moving populations, it is fundamental to this type of camp closure program that each family make a voluntary and informed choice to leave. This is only possible if major time, effort and resource are invested in beneficiary communication. All the programs studied needed to strike a balance between investing in mass communication and one-to-one communication. The tools and communication techniques developed in Haiti through camp closure programs have been unusually innovative and offer instructive examples for dealing with future urban displacement crises. For details see Beneficiary Communication.

Step 4: Choosing a Housing Option
Through the work of the communication team, each family is sufficiently informed to make the first choice necessary and comes voluntarily to the office to apply to be part of the program. Those families who need help to repair a damaged house sign up for the Yellow House option. Those families whose houses have been destroyed or marked by Government engineers as Red (requiring demolition) sign up for the house demolition and reconstruction option. In some programs, a third option exists to construct a T-shelter or permanent home on land which is either owned or made available to the family by a third party. Finally, for those families who do not have a house to repair or land on which to rebuild, the option is available to rent a home for one year through a Rental Support Cash Grant. For details see Choosing a Housing Option.

Step 5: Choosing a Rental Support Cash Grant
How can the program know where people are moving? After choosing to sign up for the Rental Support Cash Grant option, each family accompanies a staff member for a visit, during which there is a necessary process of verification. The house (or room) chosen must meet safety standards and the purported owner’s right to rent out the property must be verified and witnessed by neighbors. Once these standards have been met, GPS coordinates are taken and a standard contract is signed between the landlord and beneficiary family. For details see Choosing a Rental Support Cash Grant.

Step 6: Cash Transfers
Once a rental property is approved and the contract signed, the Cash Grant of $500 USD is transferred to the parties involved, along with $25 to pay for renting transport to move all the family’s belongings. While the actual payment process may seem relatively simple, the choices made by different implementing agencies have had significant impact on how the program is implemented. For example, the majority of agencies chose to pay through banks and to pay owners and beneficiary families separately. However, World Vision made innovative use of newly-available technology by paying through mobile phone banking. The technical challenges of each approach are discussed in detail in the Cash Transfers section.

Step 7: Camp Closure
Even at this late stage in the process, huge challenges presented themselves to implementing agencies and their local government partners: Once a family has received a rental subsidy, what happens if they refuse to leave camp? Once a family has left the camp, what stops another family replacing them? What steps should be taken for dealing with people who have knowingly installed themselves in the camp after the registration and therefore cannot benefit from the program? What special protection measures can be put in place for the families who leave later than others and find themselves exposed in increasingly sparse camps when their neighbors (and safety network) have already left camp? Once a camp is closed, what norms and standards should be applied for camp decommissioning? These questions among others are considered in the Camp Closure section.

Step 8: Surprise Verification Visit
How many families living in camps are actually in need? How many families are simply keeping a tent in camp and waiting to receive money, but actually live elsewhere? How can Cash Grant programs ensure that families do not leave one camp and move down the street to another camp hoping to be paid twice? To mitigate this risk, and to ensure detailed monitoring and evaluation of the program, each family receives a surprise visit six to twelve weeks after they leave camp. If the family is living in the home as per the contract, a further cash grant of $125
USD is transferred using the same payment method as before. Furthermore, a centralized database of all families receiving cash grants was created to minimize the chances of one family being paid in two camps. The logistical and data management challenges of this monitoring and evaluation process are discussed in the Surprise Verification Visit section.

**Step 9: Livelihood and Other Complementary Programming**

The question most often raised about Rental Support Cash Grant programs is, “given that each family receives 1 year of rental support, what happens to the family next year?” (Note this question is addressed directly in the Frequently Asked Questions section.)

A significant part of the answer lies in income generation and livelihood programs as well as lessons learned on improving program results by including Life Skills training or education grants in the package of assistance. Critically, Rental Support Cash Grants programs cannot exist in a vacuum but must form part of a broader approach. All these elements are examined in detail in the Livelihood and Other Complementary Programming section.

**Overviews of the Process**

To provide an overview of the full process, the following pages show the IOM methodology.

Moreover, to see the process in an interactive and more personalized way, there are two five minute videos which show two families’ progress from a camp back to their community.


Or watch an interview with 68 year old Amelie Pierre where she discusses her new home in Delmas; the contrast with her life in camp and the struggle she still has to financially support her family: [http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/jl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=139&Url=3](http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/jl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=139&Url=3)

Finally, watch Jean Joel’s story: *A Safer Home: Shelter in Haiti:*

Eighteen months after the earthquake, the Red Cross Movement has helped to re-house over 60,000 people in Haiti, both in highly populated areas such as Port-au-Prince and also in more remote, and difficult to access communities. Meanwhile, it is estimated up to 670,000 people are still living in camps, like Jean Joel and his three siblings whose story can be seen here: [http://www.youtube.com/user/ifrc#p/u/12/v4I_Dq7Y-Y0](http://www.youtube.com/user/ifrc#p/u/12/v4I_Dq7Y-Y0)
IOM Housing Assistance and Camp Closure Process

Step 1: Registration
- Final List validated by Mayor and posted in camp.

Step 2: Protection
- Identification of the most vulnerable families for additional tailored assistance

Step 3: Beneficiary Communications
- Every family must be empowered to make an informed and voluntary choice

Step 4: Camp Resident Choose a Housing Option

- Transitional Shelter
- Yellow House Repair
- Rental Solution

Work with Shelter Providers
- Share beneficiary list with housing construction and repair agencies
- Any families whose houses cannot be repaired are referred back to the rental solution team.

Step 5: Choosing a Rental Support Cash Grant
- Every family finds a house and negotiates the price with the landlord
- IOM staff visit to ensure the house meets minimum standards
- Standard one year rental contract is signed

Step 6: Cash Transfer
- Owner and renter (beneficiary family) receive
Step 7: Camp Closure
• Once 100% of families have chosen a housing solution and voluntarily left the camp, the camp must be decommissioned and closed.

2 -3 Months Later

Step 8: Surprise Verification Visit
• 2-3 months later, a surprise visit is conducted to verify if the family leaving camp is still in the rental accommodation provided.
• If the site visit successfully proves residency, the family is entitled to a second cash grant of $125 USD.

Step 9: Livelihoods and Other Complementary Programming
• IOM is beginning to assist beneficiaries with additional programs based on the successes of other agencies in the Return Working Group who have introduced programs including:
  • Income generation
  • Life Skills Training
  • Business Skills Training
  • Education Grants
  • Healthcare support
Differing Approaches of Each Implementing Agency

The Return Working Group’s goal was largely to share lessons learned between agencies and to establish best practice. However, this is not to say that the programs which emerged were entirely uniform. In fact, no two agencies took exactly the same approach, and not every step described in this report was followed by every agency.

When these programs began, there was no evidence of how best to adapt the rental support cash grant tool to the Haitian context. Therefore, each program was a pilot. In the coming months it will be essential not only for each agency to evaluate their programming, but for a comprehensive evaluation brought together under leadership of the Government’s UCLBP. There is a real opportunity to create a best practice model by assessing the relative success of differing approaches at each step of the process.

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<tr>
<th>Concern</th>
<th>CRS</th>
<th>IFRC</th>
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Frequently Asked Questions

This report explores each step of the process involved in closing camps using Rental Support Cash Grants. However, when discussing these programs it often proves useful, before going into detail, to answer in advance four frequently asked questions:

1. **What happens after one year?** What will happen to the families after one year of rental support comes to an end and they are left without further support?
2. **Does one year of rent represent a “durable solution”?** Should more support be offered to each family leaving camps?
3. **Where do the families go?** What is to stop a family taking a cash grant, leaving one camp then immediately moving to another camp?
4. **Is it possible to expand these rental support programs?** How many rental properties are available in Port-au-Prince? Is there capacity to absorb more renters? Should closing camps be a priority goal?

**FAQ 1. What happens after one year?**

What will happen to the families after one year of rental support comes to an end and they are left without further support? Will these families be forced to leave their new homes and find themselves back in the streets or in camps?

**Current evidence indicates that after a year, the overwhelming majority of families find their own coping mechanisms.** The IFRC began a Rental Support Cash Grant program in August of 2010. As a monitoring and evaluation exercise, IFRC routinely attempt to contact all the families who have come to the end of the one year rental contract in order to assess their housing situation after the period of rental support comes to an end. As of May 31st 2012, 352 families had come to the end of their one year of support.

The survey asked where they were living after support from the rental support program ended. IFRC found that:

- **100% of families who responded to the survey had found a housing solution.**
- **63% of families were able to negotiate with their own means to stay in the same rental property**
- **27% of families were able to find an alternative solution — either by paying rent in another property, or by moving in with family or friends.**
- **10% of families could not be contacted by telephone. Their whereabouts is unclear.**

**Zero families had returned to a camp.**

*Graph showing the housing situation of families once one year of Rental Support had expired. No family who responded had returned to a camp. [Source: IFRC]*
Of the 10% who could not be contacted, a worst case scenario could be considered where 100% of these families had moved into a camp, or to one of the informal settlements which began to grow in and around Port-au-Prince after the earthquake. Yet, even in this worst case scenario, it is a striking result that at least 90% of families who were given a helping hand to leave camps for one year did not afterwards return.

As time goes on, the sample size will grow as more and more families come to the end of the year of rental support offered by IFRC and other agencies. It will be interesting to note whether other programs, each of which differ slightly in their approach, achieve similar results. IFRC and other members of the Return Working Group will continue to monitor results, but the evidence thus far indicates that Rental Support Cash Grants provided a viable solution to urban displacement.

**FAQ 2. Does one year of rent represent a “durable solution” to displacement?**

Should more support be offered to each family?

Unquestionably, families living in camps after more than two years have humanitarian needs beyond the provision of shelter. However, when assessing the success of these rental support programs, it is essential to distinguish between needs which are specifically related to a family’s displacement (i.e. housing) and the broader development needs of the Haitian population at large.

The rental support approach does not attempt to solve all a family’s needs. Rather, these programs aim to close the cycle of displacement and help families back into living conditions comparable to those in which they were living before the earthquake. Agencies delivering rental support programs wish to be assessed against these reasonable, somewhat-limited goals, while at the same time, advocating for Government leadership in creating programs which address the broader needs of the Haitian population – both those who were displaced, and those who were not affected by the earthquake.

This approach is in keeping with the “differentiated approach” recommended by Walter Kaelin in his capacity as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for the Human Rights of Internally Displaced People. Kaelin endorses an approach which differentiates between addressing “humanitarian needs which are displacement specific”, and “other humanitarian needs faced by the affected population at large – livelihoods, education, health, water and sanitation”.

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**Rental Support provides a solution to the immediate displacement:**

**Subsequent Longer-Term Development Assistance is required improve standard of living for all**

![Diagram showing the impact of rental support on the standard of living of internally displaced populations](image-url)
Rental Support Cash Grant programs cannot deliver a permanent solution for displaced families who did not previously own housing or land. Instead, these programs offer a helping hand, returning the family to a rental situation similar to their life before the earthquake. Rental support programs buy each family some time to help themselves.

Once these families have returned to neighborhoods, they like their neighbors will continue to have needs across a spectrum of issues from income generation to basic services, but it is not the remit of rental support and camp closure problems to address such issues. Development programs with longer-term timelines, the support of development donors and the leadership of the Government of Haiti are required to address those issues.

Moreover, many of the agencies implementing rental support programs have complemented their rental support assistance with other programs aimed at addressing these broader needs. For more details, see Step 9: Livelihood and Other Complementary Programming.

**FAQ 3. Where do the families go?**
What is to stop a family taking a cash grant, leaving one camp then immediately moving to another camp or to informal settlements?

Families are free to go anywhere, but each house is verified for safety and the location recorded with GPS points. Every family moving out of camps shows their proposed rental property to a member of staff for agreement and GPS location. If the family for some reason falsify their proposed destination, this will become clear during the surprise verification visit and the family will not benefit from an additional payment (between $125 and $140 depending on the program).

Some agencies provided further incentives to “play by the rules” by providing education grants, professional training or livelihood grants. Such additional benefits are only available for those families which remain in the housing which they chose when leaving the camp. (For more details on these additional programs, see Step 9: Livelihood and Other Complementary Programming.)
Verification visits to check on beneficiaries show a success rate of over 90%

There is anecdotal evidence that some families have moved into informal settlements, but the data shows this to be a very small minority. As shown on the map above, these programs recorded the whereabouts of each family. Subsequently, an unannounced verification visit was carried out two or three months after the cash grant was given. Across agencies and programs, the results of those verification visits consistently show that over 90% of families were still living in the rental property.

**Rental Support Cash Grants may be slowing the growth of informal settlements**

Rental Support Cash Grants are providing thousands of families with an alternative to being forced into informal settlements. It is likely that a small minority of beneficiaries chose to misrepresent their intentions and to move to an informal settlement using the cash grant intended for rental support. However, the data shows that over 90% of families who left camps through these programs are proven to be living in safe, legal accommodation. Of the 14,000 families who have thus far received a Rental Support Cash Grant, fewer than 10% (2,100 families) cannot be located and could conceivably be living in informal settlements.

Contrast this success rate of over 90% with the fact that when camps are closed through forced eviction, 100% of families are unaccounted for. IOM’s latest Eviction Report published in April 2012 records that over 16,000 families have been forcibly evicted from camps with no housing assistance. The current living circumstance of 100% of these families is unknown, and without any assistance many will have had no choice but to move to informal settlements.

<table>
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<td>53,366</td>
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<td>Partially Evicted</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>149</td>
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[Source: IOM Eviction Report April 2012]

There is no doubt that everything possible must be done to encourage families to stay in the rental accommodation they choose through Rental Support Cash Grant Programs. But equally, it is seems obvious that forced evictions represent a more significant driver of the growth of informal settlements than Rental Support Cash Grant programs. Indeed, Rental Support has offered thousands of families the chance to avoid the problems of moving to an informal settlement. If there had been no Rental Support Cash Grants over the last year, the problem of forced eviction may have proven more acute and the number of families in informal settlements in and around Port-au-Prince could in fact have been much higher.

**FAQ 4. Is it possible to expand these rental support programs? How many rental properties are available in Port-au-Prince? Is there capacity to absorb more renters?**

A1. After more than 14,000 families have been helped thus far, all available evidence points to more available rental stock.
The first step in establishing the availability of rental housing was to use basic market principles. If the Rental Support Cash Grant programs were causing supply of rental housing to decrease relative to demand, average rental prices would rise. The evidence available points to the contrary. There has been no rental inflation.

The data collected from all return programs shows that there has been no increase in average rent paid by families since the start of programs. Indeed, there has been a very slight decrease in average price between September 2011 and May 2012.

![Graph: Average rental price paid by families receiving Rental Support Cash Grant programs between September 2011 and May 2012. [Source: E-Shelter and CCCM Cluster Study June 2012]]

The risk of affecting rental prices was acknowledged in the program design phase and the key decision made was to allow families to “keep the change” if they found a property for less than $500. This “keep the change” approach was absolutely critical in strategic terms because it incentivized each family to negotiate for their own benefit. In effect this approach ensured that even though the families were receiving support from a third party, the family still paid the market rate since they had the same personal incentive to economize as would any other renter in the market.

**A2. There is still available rental stock.**

Further evidence of the continuing availability of rental stock comes from a small survey of house owners in two neighborhoods conducted by IOM and J/P HRO in April 2012. [Full study available at www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info] Owners in Delmas 32 and Delmas 40 were asked if they had a space available that they were willing to rent – to which 12% responded positively.

Using this figure, the study estimated the rental stock available across these two neighborhoods and across Port-au-Prince:

- 470 available rental properties in the combined area of Delmas 32 and 40.
- 3,694 available rental properties in Delmas Commune
- 19,003 available rental properties in Metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince

While there are clearly considerable limitations to this extrapolation approach, this is the first survey available on rental supply and it provides interesting data. Significantly, the evidence it provides points in the same direction as the average price evidence above. Both data sets indicate that there remains a significant amount of rental availability and therefore support the Government’s decision to encourage an expansion of the Rental Support Cash Grant approach to help even more families.
This is not to say that Rental Support Cash Grants represent the only solution. This is evidently not the case. As can be seen from the graph below, in every commune in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, there is a significant gap between the number of rental properties available and the number of families remaining in camps. Rental grants can only form part of the solution to the ongoing displacement crisis. A combination of strategies will be required including: encouraging repair and construction of more rental capacity; encouraging families to return to the provinces; and construction of new social housing.

**Rental Property Available for Rent Compared with IDP Population in Camps**

![Graph showing rental properties available compared to families in camps](Source: J/P HRO and IOM Rental Markey Study March to June 2012)

**Supporting Government Strategy - Increase Funding for Rental Support Cash Grants**

On the basis of available evidence therefore, the Government’s Housing Unit (UCLBP), along with the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster and the members of the Return Working Group are advocating for further investment in the Rental Support Cash Grant approach to camp closure.

**FAQ 5. Should closing camps be a priority goal?** Having established that Rental Support Cash Grants are an essential tool for camp closure, it is worth examining if closing camps should be a strategic goal?

**Yes, closing camps must remain a priority.** Camps are incredibly insecure environments where conditions continue to deteriorate. Closing camps by giving every family an improved housing solution therefore has inherent value. Of course, it is also important to look at long-term housing solutions for the vulnerable and to invest in longer-term development activities to improve overall conditions, but in the short term it is necessary to help families out of camps.

From a policy perspective, camp closure programs respond to the humanitarian need: the humanitarian mandate after the earthquake was to help close the cycle of displacement by helping families to move into living conditions comparable to those in which they were living before the earthquake.

From the beneficiaries’ perspective, it is very obvious from spending time with families who are in camps and then in rental accommodation that there is a great deal of approval from the population involved. In a satisfaction survey conducted on a sample of more than 1500 beneficiaries of the Place Saint Pierre and Place Boyer projects, respondents were asked their perception of their current situation as compared to life in the camps. Fewer than 1% their circumstances as worse (0.08%) or as unchanged (0.25%). Over 99% of respondents described their situation as better (24%) or substantially better (75%).
Finally, from a societal point of view, these programs have been very positively received by the Haitian press and population. Some camps are impeding expansion of factories and other businesses which will bring increased economic activity and employment. In terms of feeling that life is returning to normal, it is incredibly significant that camp closure programs have allowed the population access to public spaces for recreation.

**Beneficiaries' Perception of Current Circumstances Compared to Camp**

- **76%** Much better
- **24%** Better
- **0.25%** Same as before
- **0.08%** Worse

Camp Champs de Mars before and after IOM relocation operations
STEPS IN THE PROCESS

Helping Families, Closing Camps
Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps

A Tool Kit of Best Practice and Lessons Learned
Haiti 2010 – 2012

E-Shelter & CCCM Cluster
Returns Working Group
Step 1: Registration and Beneficiary Selection

Who is on the List?

One of the most difficult challenges of this type of camp closure program was establishing which families were eligible for assistance. For every project team the problem of “who is on the list” presented itself on Day 1 and sometimes was not conclusively resolved until the day the last family dismantled their tent and left the camp.

When IFRC began the first Rental Support Cash Grant in October 2010, there were still over 1 million displaced people in camps across the country. With so many in need, people living in camps instinctively believed that it was unlikely that housing solutions would be offered to all residents in all camps. At the very least, they understood that solutions for so many would take a long time coming. Therefore the temptation was very great for families living outside a targeted camp to attempt to gain access to the programs by moving their family in. Other people attempted to benefit unfairly, either by establishing a presence in multiple camps or by setting up a tent even though their house was not damaged.

This section deals with the lesson learned as implementing agencies first established criteria for inclusion, then worked through the challenges of creating a beneficiary list which most fairly reflected those agreed criteria.

In addition to establishing a clear and fair beneficiary list, the IDP registration data provided initial demographic and sociological data on the target population and served as the baseline from which return and reconstruction actors could develop beneficiary lists according to their specific project criteria.

Case Study: Camp Oscar

One of the first programs involving Rental Support Cash Grants was implemented in Camp Oscar by Concern Worldwide. This camp had the advantage of being relatively small (192 families) and having a strong camp committee who took an active part in the process, helping to establish an accurate beneficiary list. One member of the committee was hired to work as part of the team verifying application forms and highlighting those which came from families who did not live in the camp.

Lesson Learned: Getting to know the community.

In smaller camps, multiple registration visits by community mobilizers tent by tent over a few weeks proved a useful way of verifying which families really lived in the camp. Some agencies had success in clarifying which families were really living in the camp by doing multiple registrations, or by taking lists of residents through distributions and other activities in camp.

Lesson Learned: Registration methods must be adapted to the size of the camp

While the approach in Camp Oscar was successful, it cannot be replicated exactly in other camps. Variables such as size of the camp, capacity of the stakeholders (e.g. man power, technical skills) to carry out registration and beneficiary selection, security issues inside and around the camp, proximity to the neighborhood, must be considered when planning these activities.

As a result, when Concern received funding to run a return program in Place de la Paix camp with more than 2000 families, they followed an approach developed by other partners for larger camps which relies more on the element of surprise. Likewise, when re-registering the 2nd largest camp in Haiti Petionville Club Camp, J/P HRO and IOM closed the gates to the camp from 4 a.m. until 3 p.m. until every resident had received a token and every
tent was marked to prevent families from coming in after the registration had started. To establish the list of those living in camps with multiple points of exit and entry was even more complicated. See the large-scale registration case study on Champs de Mars.

**Case Study: Registration in a Large Camp, Champs de Mars**

Guests at the plush Hotel Plaza in downtown Port-au-Prince had their sleep disturbed early on the morning of December 6th 2011. Those guests intrigued enough to look out the window at 4am saw over 50 staff of the Civil Protection Department of the Haitian Government, 20 staff of the Port-au-Prince Mayor, dozens of Haitian National Police, multiple trucks full of UN Peacekeeping troops and over 150 IOM staff working as part of the 16/6 program.

Hundreds of staff collected quietly exchanging tired, excited smiles and handshakes in the total darkness. The gathering points near the hotel were at a discreet distance from Champs de Mars camp, and at 4.30am the joint team moved in together.

The ‘camp’ known as Champs de Mars in fact comprises 11 separate camps, spread over six or seven city blocks, dissected by major roads with hundreds of points of access in and out of the camp. This former park provided home and shelter to, as the team eventually learned, 4600 families – more than 17,000 people.

The goal that December morning, and through the two days that followed, was to register the name of every head of household, the names, ages and health status of every member of the family and a variety of other contact and identification details (all of which can be found in the Registration Form in Annex).

The challenge in particular was that even though around 400 staff were involved, the process of filling in the form with each head of family takes time, so more than a day and a half was required to register all the families in camp. That delay left the opportunity for hundreds, even thousands more people to enter the camp and pose as residents during registration.

**Technique:** Given these challenges, the technique used involved numbering each tent in advance, then using the element of surprise and moving quickly on the chosen morning from tent to tent while families were asleep. The teams only paused briefly at each tent to issue the head of each family with a token and a plastic bracelet. The team member then asked the head of household to come later that day to register in full at one of five color-coordinated registration sites set up in areas in and around the camp.

Such was the reasoning that led the joint Government, Mayoral and IOM team to be walking into one of the most notoriously dangerous camps in Haiti in the pitch dark at 4.30 on that Tuesday morning in December.
Lesson Learned: Publishing and validation of the beneficiary list by local authorities
One critical element of securing support among the population for the program is to do everything possible to make the program fair and be perceived as fair. A pre-requisite is to publish the list of beneficiary families in a public place. The programs which received direct support from the Mayor found this process easier to manage. Mayoral leadership was critical both in terms of validating and publishing the final list of beneficiaries at the Mayoral offices, as well as leading the grievance process. Other programs which did not benefit from active Mayoral participation worked instead with camp community leaders to validate and add credibility to the beneficiary list.

Lesson Learned: Validation by camp committees is ideal, but not always possible
Involving the camp committee in the process of creating a beneficiary list helped create the acceptance, support and buy-in of the camp leaders in ways helpful for the implementation of the program. However, in some cases it became obvious that the camp committee was not acting in the interests of the population, and in many cases did not live in the camp. In Champs de Mars, the self-designated camp committees attempted to stop the process because many of them who did not live in camp were not on the registration list and therefore were refused access to the program. The population in general failed to support the committees’ efforts and asked IOM to return to the camp to implement the program for those on the list.

Lesson Learned: Grievance Mechanisms
Inevitably, there are weaknesses to the approach taken in Champs de Mars and in other big camps in Haiti. There will always be cases of families who are longstanding residents of the camp, but who for quite legitimate reasons were not in the camp on the morning of the registration. As a result, grievance mechanisms are essential to give families the chance to plead their case. This works best when Government authorities rather than implementing agencies alone are responsible for distinguishing the genuine cases from those who are seeking to benefit fraudulently.

Lesson Learned: Balancing clear criteria for inclusion with common sense
The criteria for a successful application through the process of mediation were relatively strict, but in order to empower the teams on the ground to make common-sense decisions the criteria were not 100% fixed.
In general, families had a better chance of success in the arbitration process if they had a registration card showing that they had been present for previous registrations in the months prior to the final registration. These families had at one time been living in the camp, but may have moved out long before the final registration, and were not therefore present on the day of the registration, thus rendering them ineligible. Families who were on previous registration lists were required to provide a feasible explanation for their absence on the day of the registration. Some families were also asked as part of the process to show the tent where they currently live in the camp since it is relatively easy to tell with a practiced eye a tent which has only recently been occupied and one which has been occupied long term.

A degree more flexibility was shown for particularly vulnerable families (such as the handicapped). To take one example there was a family in Champs de Mars camp with a large number of children who were quite obviously malnourished. Even though this family could not prove that they had lived in the camp prior to the registration, and even though that family had never figured in any previous registration in Champs de Mars, the decision was taken to include the family in the program given their severe level of vulnerability.

For an idea of numbers of families using the grievance mechanism, below are the figures from the Champs de Mars grievance process (ongoing at the time of writing - 28 May 2012).

- 4,684 families registered in Champs de Mars at the start of the program
- 207 families registering their case with the grievance process
- 135 cases arbitrated to date
- 120 cases not accepted into the program
- 15 cases accepted— family benefited from the rental support program. (11% of cases so far arbitrated granted families access to the program.)

**Lesson Learned: No registration process is perfect**

It is important to be open about the challenges of this approach in the Haitian context. Many local authorities have shown strong leadership and taken difficult decisions to include or exclude families through a fair and transparent grievance process. However, there have been cases where figures in authority (camp committee members and others) have been less helpful, slow in offering assistance or even attempted to influence the process to include families who were ineligible. These sorts of issues have been among the most sensitive and difficult to manage for implementing agencies and no approach or technique offers a consistently successful method for handling such issues.

**Lesson Learned: No beneficiary list can ever be perfect**

It is important to limit expectations with regards to beneficiary lists – as with any system providing a social safety net. It should be acknowledged plainly that, even close coordination between the Government, implementing agencies and camp committees cannot preclude the possibility that there will be people on the list who should not be. More troublingly, there have no doubt been families with real needs who found themselves excluded. This is inevitable given that systems and standardized methods are the only feasible approach to dealing with large populations such as those in large camps. Every effort is made to be flexible and to include as many families as possible by creating a grievance mechanism for those who feel they were unfairly excluded. But in the final analysis, once criteria are established, they must be followed to create a fair process and deliver projects with established budgets and timelines.

**Lesson Learned: Ineligible families**

For a discussion of how to deal with those families who are not on the beneficiary list but remain in camp even after all eligible families have left, see the *Camp Closure* section.
Above: World Vision Registration Operations

Right: Camp residents lining up for registration operations conducted by CRS
Step 2: Protection

In November 2010, the Mayor of Petionville attempted to close the camp in Place Saint Pierre where around 550 families had been living since shortly after the earthquake. The Mayor’s initiative involved offering $500 USD to each family in exchange for an agreement to leave. This approach was fiercely criticized and judged by many to be a case of illegal forced eviction.

In August 2011, the camp in Place Saint Pierre was closed after a program which had at its core an offer to each family of the equivalent of $500 USD. This program received Presidential recognition, was generally praised by the media and formed the model on which other programs were built.

What made the second program different from the Mayor’s much-criticized first camp closure initiative? The succinct answer is protection. Protection was not both a step in the process, and a cross-cutting theme which runs across every one of the steps detailed in this process. Respecting the rights of the families in camps and putting protection of the vulnerable at the core of these programs fundamentally changed the nature of camp closure programs for the better.

Creating a Protection Framework for Rental Support Cash Grant programs
It is instructive to look at the criticisms leveled at the Mayor’s attempted camp closure initiative in November 2010. The key challenge for those later developing camp closure programs was to find ways of doing things differently. Camp closure programs needed to achieve the same aim of liberating parks, public spaces and private property, but to do it in ways which prioritized and respected the rights of those living in camps.

The fundamental criticisms of the Mayor’s approach in November 2010 were as follows:
I. The families were not consulted, were not given a reasonable delay, and were not given the opportunity to make an informed and voluntary choice to leave;
II. Each family’s individual circumstances were not considered. Rather, they were all given a one-size-fits-all $500 USD cash grant;
III. No grievance mechanism or recourse to appeal;
IV. No care was taken to establish where the families were going once they left the camp. There was no follow up to establish whether they moved into rented accommodation or simply moved into another camp;
V. No additional assistance was given to help the vulnerable.

I. Informed Choice and Consultation
The heart of these Rental Support Cash Grant programs lies in offering choice. In stark contrast to the November 2010 exercise, the camp closure programs described in this document established as a pre-requisite that 100% of families voluntarily signed up for the program. This involved ensuring that a substantial communication exercise was undertaken, and considerable time was given for people to make an informed and voluntary choice. (For more detail on ensuring an informed choice see the Communication section.)

Norms and standards were established and shared with national and local government officials, for example with regards to minimal guarantees of procedure in the event of needing to remove a family’s tent (either because the family has been paid and has subsequently refused to leave, or because an individual or family moved into camp after the registration and is therefore not eligible for the program). In these cases, it was stressed to all parties concerned the necessity of a reasonable delay, the visible presence of the Mairie or Judge of the Peace and the use of force only when absolutely necessary.

II. One-size-fits-all vs Tailoring solutions to family needs
The problem with the approach taken in November 2010 was that the one-size-fits-all cash grant approach did not address the fundamental cause of why each family was living in a camp. Families whose houses were dam-
aged or destroyed required help to repair or rebuild. A payment of $500 was insufficient for rebuilding. So rather than receiving the help they needed to move home, those families were moved out of camp without any fundamental improvement of their housing situation.

One of the reasons that the camp closure programs later developed are costly is because, to adequately respond to the individual needs of each family, case work is required. Family by family, unique circumstance by circumstance, the right solution takes time and effort to be found: For one family what is needed is a Yellow House repair in Delmas 18; whereas the family in the tent next door need rubble removal and rebuilding for a Red House in Carrefour; and the family in the next tent along had no home before the earthquake and need to be helped to rent a property in Tabarre.

Programs which engaged with each family and helped them find the right solution for their unique needs are fundamentally different from a one-size-fits-all approach of handing out envelopes of cash.

III. Grievance Mechanism and Appeal Process
As described in the Registration section it was necessary to establish mechanisms for families to appeal if they felt they had been unfairly excluded from the beneficiary list, or had any other problem in the process. Agencies established a variety of mechanisms to give camp residents access to appeal their case, register a grievance or simply ask questions to understand the program better. I/P HRO for example created information kiosks as well as a toll-free telephone number for camp residents to call with questions and concerns.

This is only one example of a registration list arbitration decision among thousands. It gives only a flavor of the challenges involved in establishing a final beneficiary list. The time and effort to sort through these issues family by family was enormous and contributed to the need for large numbers of staff to achieve camp closure in a way which respected the rights of all the families involved to the greatest extent possible.

Case Study: Grievance Mechanism and Arbitration
It is worth taking one example of the difficulties brought to the team complaint mechanism for arbitration. During the two years between the initial registration of camps and the registration exercise which signaled the start of a camp closure and relocation program many couples separated, most often with the man leaving the camp while the woman stayed behind. Since he had been registered as head of household in the initial registration before the program was announced, he held the IDP registration card and therefore claimed to be entitled to receive the cash grant instead of his estranged partner.

As a rule the teams decided to arbitrate in favour of the family who were physically present in camp during the registration, rather than those who subsequently arrived. As a result, there were cases of men who evicted their former partners and moved back into the camp to claim the cash grant. These disenfranchised women could then address their problems to the complaints mechanism through the community mobilizers.

This is only one example of a registration list arbitration decision among thousands giving only a flavour of the challenges involved in establishing a final beneficiary list. The time and effort to sort through these issues family by family was enormous and contributed to the need for large numbers of staff to achieve camp closure in a way which respected the rights of all the families involved to the greatest extent possible.

IV. Where did they go? Continued Case Management vs One Time Payment
Another great criticism of the Mayor’s November 2010 program was that there was no follow up with the families once they left. There was no way to tell if the family had moved into a better or worse situation. In essence, the program achieved no more than moving the problem with no discernible concern for the fate of those moving out of sight and out of mind.

By contrast, each family leaving the same camp eight months later signed a rental contract on a property which was visited by a member of staff to ensure it was safe; contact details were stored in a database with phone numbers and GPS coordinates noted; and two months later, the family was visited to see if they were still in the
property. For a more detailed description of how programs mitigated the risks of families returning see Surprise Verification Visits section and the Camp Closure section.

V. Providing Assistance for the Most Vulnerable
As well as tailoring assistance to each family’s unique housing needs, camp closure programs also identified and offered support to the most vulnerable people in camps to help them through the process of finding a new home.

Support for the vulnerable came in a variety of forms depending on an individual’s needs. Teams were involved in offering tailored assistance to: unaccompanied minors; survivors of sexual or gender based violence (SGBV); disabled camp residents; pregnant women; people with health problems; and people suffering from psychological distress.

In the most fully-developed protection programs, the assistance given was not just to help that family through the process of leaving camp, but also to help that family gain longer-term access to services in the community to which they moved. This involved offering services such as those listed below:

Training on the Rights of the Displaced Living in Camps
Some Rental Support Cash Grant and camp closure programs addressed the need for increased rights awareness by training camp residents to improve their understanding of their rights, both in general and their specific rights within framework of the camp closure program.

Replacing Lost Identity Documentation
Since some families did not have identification documents they were unable to receive a cash grant from a bank and were therefore accompanied by a member of staff to the bank to verify their identity. By working in the camps, the teams encountered a large number of people who lost identification documents in the earthquake, or never owned them to begin with. These people were assisted directly with new identification documents or referred to services run by third party organizations which specialize in helping people get access to documentation.

Case Study: Creating bespoke identification documents for the relocation process:
J/P HRO and World Vision created identity cards for each head-of-household for the relocations process, using the LMMS (Last Mile Mobile Solutions) Identification Card System. Some local banks agreed to accept this form of identification for all beneficiaries in place of a national ID. The unique ID system proved useful for organizing and identifying beneficiaries in the program, particularly since high illiteracy levels mean that names were not were not always spelled consistently when heads of household interacted with the program teams).

Health and Psychosocial Support for the Vulnerable
As part of the 16/6 Program, IOM Health Unit staff worked in camps providing health services including: preventive health; health education and information; medical assistance; and psychosocial assistance to families identified as particularly vulnerable through the camp closure program.

Health and Psychosocial teams were present from the start of the registration process reviewing each family’s application to identify vulnerable families and later working pro-actively in camp to identify any other vulnerable families. Once vulnerable families had been identified they were assessed by qualified staff able to recognize psychological distress symptoms, as well as identifying people who might require additional assistance to find a new home such as the elderly and those with chronic disease.

In addition, after the distress of the earthquake, many camp residents had very real fears about moving back into a permanent structure. The idea of sleeping under a concrete roof was terrifying to many people who had lost
family and friends, or been trapped themselves in the rubble. Psychological support groups helped individuals to process and mentally and emotional prepare for a return to permanent housing structures.

The health team provided medical consultations, wound care and referral to medical facilities including through transportation allowance, medication and payment for laboratory tests. The team was able to provide non food items (NFIs) such as mosquito net, blankets, mattresses, solar torches, hygiene and kitchen kits, mops and chlorine water purification tablets to the most vulnerable families.

Those initially identified as possibly requiring psychosocial support were evaluated, and families who required it received some form of psychosocial assistance, either one to one or as part of support groups created for camp residents. Through these return programs, hundreds of families have received some form of psychosocial support and a number of the most acute patients have been referred for treatment at a local psychiatric centre.

**Case Study: Some families need medical help to move to a new home**

The following is an actual case taken from one implementing agency (her name has been changed). Yvette is a 17 year old, single mother of a 1 year old baby and a rape survivor who became pregnant after sexual abuse. Yvette lost her parents during the earthquake, and since then, she has lived with an older cousin who is herself only 18 years old. When the IOM team met Yvette in camp, the baby had been suffering for two days with diarrhea, vomiting and a fever. When asked why she had not taken the child to hospital she answered that she could not afford the cost. She had no income and she did not have any financial support from relatives. After assessment, the health referral team took Yvette and the baby to Saint Damiens hospital, paid for laboratory tests and medicine and provided Yvette with a donation of a hygiene kit and a mosquito net. Yvette also benefited from counseling support from the Psychosocial team, and was referred to the Protection team, who coordinated with IFRC for Yvette’s relocation to her native region in Jeremie. During a follow up visit, twelve days later, Yvette received the IOM team with a big smile. Looking at her baby, totally recovered and playing on the ground, she said in tears, “Thank you for everything. Thanks to you my baby is alive, and I can go back to my home. Thank you for helping me recovering my dignity, my life”.

**Lesson Learned: Identify vulnerable families immediately**

From the very first encounter with each family at registration, the team is trained to identify particularly vulnerable families. The family is given tailored assistance through the process to account for their particular circumstance. Families may need assistance from health, psychosocial and/or protection staff.

**Lesson Learned: Link rental programs to sustainable models of healthcare provision**

It is heartwarming to read about the assistance offered to Yvette and her baby. But at a strategic level, it is important to step back and acknowledge that this degree of interaction and assistance cannot be sustained once the family leaves camp. In an attempt to move beyond this short-term assistance model, CRS and IFRC offered beneficiaries of their Rental Support Cash Grant the chance to be part of a related program for micro health insurance. CRS provides a varied group of beneficiaries with micro health insurance benefits through its Community Resettlement and Recovery Program. These benefits have been offered to several thousand Cash for Work beneficiaries and more than 300 livelihoods program beneficiaries. Through a local organization with basic health clinics in many locations across Port-au-Prince, CRS covers up to six months of basic health insurance for all Rental Support Cash Grant targeted families once they have resettled in a rental home outside the camps. The covered health services include vaccinations subsidized by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Government of Haiti. An underlying objective is to expose families to the benefit of micro-health insurance, hoping a small percentage of people will choose to continue to pay for the insurance service once the six months are over.

**Lesson Learned: Camp closure programs leave some people confused. Give the most vulnerable the chance to ask questions.**
Despite the best efforts at beneficiary communications, there are always people who are left confused. Through their conversations with the most vulnerable families in camps, community mobilizers and the Psychosocial team were made aware of their concerns about the relocation process. Among these concerns were a lack of information, a difficulty in finding rental houses in the limited time periods between payment cycles; fear of the future.

In part, this confusion is a natural consequence of explaining a complicated process to large numbers of people, but the teams discovered that the confusion was also created by unfounded rumors and misinformation. Some false rumors were started through malign intent, more were innocently created by misunderstanding and gossip. These misunderstandings point to the enormous importance of the beneficiary communication efforts discussed in detail in the Beneficiary Communications section.

The interaction between the psychosocial teams and the most vulnerable provides a useful feedback loop for the program management team to see where communication activities are not succeeding.

Lesson Learned: The vulnerable also includes cases of marital and other familial dispute.
Once an agency engages family by family to establish the particular needs, other factors can further complicate issues, such as family disputes. There were instances where family members from a single tent refused to live with one another after the beneficiary list had been established and they had been registered as one family. In such cases, a determination needed to be made about which family member would be paid. If relocations packages are made on the determination of a ruling in such a conflict, the relocations agency takes on an expanded role of social case worker and this can put staff in a difficult position. Moreover, once families begin to split for genuine reasons, others see a way to gain and feign similar issues in an attempt to obtain two housing solutions instead of one.

Assessment of vulnerable displaced families in Champs de Mars Camp.
Step 3: Beneficiary Communication

In order to meet the norms and standards required when moving populations, it is fundamental to this type of camp closure program that each family make a voluntary and informed choice to leave. This is only possible if major time, effort and resource are invested in beneficiary communication.

All the programs studied needed to strike a balance between investing in both mass communication and one-to-one communication. Often, as project managers craving tight control of messaging, the temptation is to revise and refine printed material over and over. Yet, in truth, the most important thing was take full account of Haiti’s strong oral tradition. What was important was not how an idea is expressed on a poster, the essential thing is how that message was understood and transmitted orally to three or four others, some of whom may have been illiterate, but who in turn transmit the idea to their family and friends.

Lesson Learned: The continuing importance of one to one Communication

There is no more effective way of getting messages across than through the work of well-trained, motivated community mobilizers. Repeated interactions between beneficiary families and trained staff who are able to explain, answer questions and re-explain the program has demonstrably shown itself to be the most effective communication tool. Using the capacity of local people to communicate during the long, hot Caribbean days with their fellow Haitians was the clearest way to engage the population in two way communication and thereby increase understanding of the program.

Lesson Learned: Kiosks and assigning one team member to a group of families

Beneficiaries seek a point-of-contact, so J/P HRO set up kiosks staffed at regular hours where beneficiaries could go with questions. One staff member was assigned to a specific group of families and followed those families throughout the process. This increased awareness and built relations between staff and beneficiaries so that the relocations process could be more responsive to individual needs.

Once a staff member was assigned to each family, J/P HRO’s project management team also tracked the family’s progress by labeling an individual magnetic tile on a board in the main office. The team could track each family’s progress through the process by tracking the tiles across the board. This may sound simple, but visual tools such as these allow management teams to track progress collectively and to ensure that individual families do not get overlooked or lost in the process. See the Lesson Learned on coordinating joint programs in the Choosing a Housing Solutions section to see how in other projects without this kind of tool sometimes struggled to keep track of individual families in the process.

Lesson Learned: The essential role of Community Mobilizers: J/P HRO’s team started working in Terrain Golf in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and over two years build relationships with community members. While the long-standing relationship with the camp committees was somewhat helpful, there were still large problems in getting the population to accept that only one part of the camp was targeted initially for closure using the standard approach discussed in this document. One key element of that communication was to explain the rationale choosing one part of the camp, and to communicate to the camp in general that further funding to expand this pilot project would be sought if the program proved successful.
Lesson Learned: The effectiveness of small group meetings
J/P HRO and CRS found that holding group meetings of between 25-35 heads of households was an effective group size which allowed for a Q&A session that gave the project staff the opportunity to hear and address rumors and concerns immediately. Likewise, IOM and World Vision’s caseworkers conduct small group meetings to explain the process in details, and to ensure that households have all the information they require to make an informed housing solution decision and allowing them to provide feedback and ask questions. Households then receive individual support from case worker to complete the application form.

Lesson Learned: Government in the lead
IOM were very fortunate to receive an unprecedented degree of support from the Mayor of Petionville during the program in Place Saint Pierre and Place Boyer. The project team was invited to run the project from the Mayor’s office. Not only did this enable daily contact and the Mayor’s involvement in both strategic and tactical operational decisions, it also had an enormous effect on communication:
- Communication material was prepared always with the Mayor’s logo to the fore.
- The same agreed messages were given out by her staff and by IOM community mobilizers.
- The beneficiary list was validated and published by the Mayor who took responsibility for managing the grievance mechanism for families who felt unfairly excluded. (For more details on the grievance mechanism process, see the Registration section).
- The Mayor stood alongside President Martelly and spoke on behalf of the program at televised press conferences and at the official re-opening of Place Saint Pierre.
This very visible leadership contributed to the very positive perception of the program in the Haitian media. More significantly, the people living in camps respected the grievance process because it was led by the Mayor. The vast majority of families who unsuccessfully pled their case for late inclusion in the project agreed to leave camp voluntarily. (For a discussion of those families who still refused to leave, see Camp Closure section.)

Lessons Learned on Mass Communication:
As Rental Subsidy Cash Grant programs moved up in scale, effective mass communication with beneficiaries and the general public became essential.
While community meetings and one-to-one interaction is ideal, it is one thing to communicate complex ideas to 200 families, and quite another to be faced with the challenge of communicating the essential elements of a program in a camp like Champs de Mars with 4,600 families. With just over 17,000 people in the camp, organizing one-to-one discussions with each family could not be the only method of communication. The diverse tools developed to achieve this mass communication have proved to be among the most innovative and exciting elements of camp closure programs.

Radio Tap Tap
Capitalizing on the hours many Haitians spend commuting in public busses (Tap Taps), Radio Tap Tap sought to entertain and spread public information messages to this captive audience. CDs were passed out to over 100 long distance Tap Tap drivers who played a radio show produced at regular intervals on new subject matter. Following on the success of songs and radio soap opera episodes on cholera, a program specific to Rental Support Cash Grants was produced. (For more on Radio Tap Tap go to http://citizenhaiti.com/radio-tap-tap.html)

Newsletters
J/P HRO distributes newsletters in the Petionville Club Camp on a regular basis to communicate critical information. This tool was used to educate the population at-large about relocations of certain sections of the camp, to dispel rumors about the relocations process, and to inform families on which days they were requested to remain in their tents in order to be registered with the unique ID card system used for the relocations process.

Cartoon Posters
Posters were created by a local Haitian artist for the non-literate to explain the choice each family could make between Yellow House repair, Red House demolition or a Rental Support Cash Grant. These posters were made
available through the Returns Working Group so that other partners involved in the same sort of Rental Support Cash Grant programs could benefit from the visual material already developed. In this way families across Port-au-Prince began to recognize the consistent messaging of similar programs implemented by multiple agencies.

**Cartoon-based Newspaper**

Given the low literacy rates of the population, cartoon style stories distributed for free to camp populations proved very effective for communicating on a range of subjects. Hundreds of thousands of copies of the comic newspaper *Chimen Lakay (The Road Home)* were distributed on subjects such as cholera, gender-based violence and hurricane preparedness. *Chimen Lakay* quickly became the publication with the largest circulation in Haiti. Using the same model and indeed the same central character, a citizen journalist and actual former Internally Displaced Person named Sandra, an edition of *Chimen Lakay* was produced to explain the camp closure and Rental Support Cash Grant program. Although the tool was developed by IOM, it was made available as a platform for other organizations and messaging was deliberately written to be of interest to large numbers of camp management and other agencies which distributed it widely.

**Lesson Learned: Two Way Communication – Conversations not passive messaging**

In “Let them Speak”, a 2011 report written about communication with disaster-affected communities after the Haitian earthquake, the authors rightly stressed the importance of two-way communication. (See Annex for a copy of “Let them Speak”.) It is essential to offer the chance for an interactive dialogue with those in camps and surrounding communities. Cash Grant Return Programs built adopted this approach in a variety of ways:

- By meeting regularly for discussion with camp residents and camp committees;
- By setting up relocations kiosks inside the camps and neighborhoods of return;
- By setting up Community Platforms to continue dialogue in the communities to which camp residents were returning. These Community Platforms were set up with support of local and municipal authorities and development agencies with development funding. The intention was to give community members a platform to contribute to the process of neighborhood-level urban planning within the context of municipal development plans led by the Mayors;
- By offering prizes to listeners who called a specially-developed call center number and answered quiz questions on the public information messages played on Radio Tap Tap. Staff in a call centre were able to provide data on the level of understanding of the listeners after the show, aggregate information to show trends and map where listeners were calling from. This data was made available to project managers using an internet-based reporting system. (For more information on the Noula call centre and information gathering capacity visit [www.noula.ht](http://www.noula.ht))

**Short Films shown at public meetings**

Screenings movies at night in camps was a highly popular initiative, which provided agencies with the opportunity to also screen public information messaging. This approach was adapted as a tool to help families in the target camps to understand the process of how the camps were to be closed and their choices.

The key to increasing understanding was to adapt to the Haitian audience by using comedy, fun characters and a
simple sense of narrative to tell a story about one family who were leaving a camp.

Watch Sandra and her husband Marcel in “Let’s Go Home” discussing their choice of housing option and the importance of choosing a rental property which is, “not yellow, not red, not in an unsafe ravine, but is stamped by the Government as Green and safe”. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4l0AQWPnL8](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4l0AQWPnL8)

All the short communication films made starring Sandra discussing in comic ways the following subjects are available on the IOM Haiti You Tube channel:

- Helping families understand the Yellow House repair program;
- Sensitizing families on the special needs of vulnerable family members when choosing rental accommodation;
- Helping people understand the nature of the 16/6 program in general;
- Telling the story of a much-improved area in Cite Soleil called La Difference. This film promotes the need for self-sufficiency and concerted action from communities to improve their own situation, without waiting for external support.

Describing how Brunache Jude, a university graduate and accountant who lives in a dangerous camp, manages to survive.

**Lesson Learned: Adjusting to a Haitian Style**

Take ten minutes to watch two films made on leaving camps and you cannot fail to note the stark difference in style and tone between the piece on Naomi Joseph aimed at Cluster partners and donors, directed by an expatriate member of staff, and on the other hand, the Haitian-written, Haitian-acted, Haitian-directed short films produced through a process known as *participatory video production*.

It was fascinating to show the two films to Haitian audiences and note again and again the general disinterest in the Naomi Joseph film, which expatriate staff, donors and international media reacted positively to. By contrast there was raucous laughter and discussion during and after “Let’s Go Home” was shown to Haitian audiences. It is not surprising that the Haitian-produced film was more successful as a communication tool to Haitian beneficiaries, but the degree to which Haitian audiences reacted to one over the other was remarkable.
Lesson Learned: Adapting to Unsafe Camps
Film screenings have long been a tool of communications teams in Haiti – setting up an outdoor screen at night when the heat has died down and the sun has set. However, there was a need to adapt the methodology when it became clear that certain large camps targeted for closure using Rental Support Cash Grant programs were unsafe at night. Therefore, residents were invited to a small, make-shift building in groups of 50 to attend communications events where the films were shown. Before and after the event the crowd answered questions to measure their level of comprehension. See the before and after surveys in Annex.

Lesson Learned: New ways of conducting surveys
In the urgency to move from zero communication to getting the word out, the simple but effective tool of a surveys and particularly baseline studies is easily forgotten. One new way of affecting such surveys at lower cost involves sending SMS messages to beneficiaries incentivizing them to contact a toll free information number. This tool offers the chance to contact beneficiaries at the start of the program, during and after communications exercises to assess the level of effectiveness achieved in communicating clearly the key messages. In this way the efficacy of a communications program can be more accurately gauged and adjusted as a program goes forward.

Soap Opera / Situation Comedy: “Tap Tap”
The very noticeable cultural difference in how Haitian audiences reacted to the different film styles was central to the decision to hire a Haitian film maker to produce a more ambitious product – a three episode soap opera or situation comedy.

Funded as part of the Government’s 16/6 project, the Tap Tap films have a broader goal than specific messaging only on camp closure or rental support programs. Rather, Tap Tap is intended to convey positive images of Haiti; to show the colour and diversity of the country. The first episode tells the story of a positive interaction which changes the perceptions of a self-employed businessman who has negative preconceptions about people living in camps. Finding himself stranded, he is helped by an honourable man who has been forced to live camp since the earthquake.

Noted for its production values and shown on Haitian National Television, as well as through new media and mobile phones, the hope is that having started as part of a Rental Support Cash Grant program, Tap Tap will evolve such that further episodes are produced weaving a narrative while examining more issues in contemporary Haitian society. (Watch Tap Tap with English subtitles online at http://haititaptap.org/).
Step 4: Choosing a Housing Option

The Communication team’s aim was for all camp residents to be sufficiently informed that they understood the process and were able to make an informed decision about what housing option was most suitable for their circumstances.

Each family came voluntarily to the program office to apply to be part of the program and was offered the choice of one of three housing solutions:
1. Repair or retrofit of a “Yellow House”.
2. Construction of a permanent house or a T-shelter (plus rubble removal if needed) on land either owned or made available to the family by a third party.
3. Rental Support Cash Grant: The family can choose any house, in any area of the country and the rent will be paid for 1 year. Up to a limit of $500 USD. As discussed in the Introduction and Context section, rental support cash grants fell into one of three categories:
   - Families who entered into a formal rental agreement with a house owner. (This category represents the overwhelming majority of cases.)
   - Families who moved in with a host family (family or friend). The financial assistance has been broadly termed rent, though in the case of a beneficiary moving back into a parent’s home, the family may have come to an informal arrangement about how the funds were divided.
   - Families who moved out of Port-au-Prince and back to the provinces. These families were assisted to leave the city in keeping with the effort of decentralization. Once arrived at their chosen destination outside Port-au-Prince, these families either used the received funds to rent or moved in with a host family.

Lesson Learned: Over 95% of camp residents choose the rental option
When these programs were initially developed, the available registration data from camps suggested that prior to the earthquake 30% of the camp population owned a house. Those houses had been assessed as unsafe (either yellow or red depending on the severity of the damage). The assumption was that to help empty the camps, 30% of families would need their house repaired or rebuilt and 70% of the camp were renters who would require a Rental Support Cash Grant.

During the course of the program, it became clear that the number of those choosing the rental option was considerably higher – in most cases 95% or above. Very few families who owned a house were still living in a camp two years on from the earthquake. The camp population was almost entirely made up of people who do not own a home or land and who cannot therefore be assisted by housing reconstruction programs unless land is donated.

Lesson Learned: The Yellow and Red Houses shown to staff by families who chose were often ineligible for repair or reconstruction for technical or safety reasons
The MPTPC color marking system is widely recognized by Haitians, but not all houses marked yellow can be repaired which caused confusion for camp residents. During the application process residents who responded that they had a Yellow House were often disappointed when a more detailed technical assessment determined the house to irreparable. As a result planning financing for Yellow House repair and Red House rebuild packages was difficult and unpredictable. It is useful to conduct housing assessments as soon as possible in the process to determine if a family is eligible for any type of repair or rebuild, or may need to be offered a rental support cash grant instead.

Lesson Learned: Plan to give 100% of camp residents the rental solution as a protection measure (even those who will later receive a Yellow or Red House solution through the program)
There was a particularly alarming protection-related consequence to the discovery that almost every family chose the rental option. Given that finding and paying for a rental property is inevitably quicker than rebuilding a home,
it had always been anticipated that those awaiting a yellow or new house solution would be last to leave camp.

However, given the very small numbers of families involved in permanent reconstruction options, it transpired that only a handful of families were left in camp. These families were faced with the prospect of a delay of weeks or months before their house was to be completed, and without their neighbors around them, they faced hugely increased security risks as a result of isolation.

In the short term, a variety of solutions were found to deal with this security issue:

✦ Some families accepted a tent and moved to their own land, living beside the construction site until they could move back into their home.
✦ Others moved in with family temporarily.
✦ In some camps, attempts were made to convince the remaining families to move into one area of the camp to increase safety. This was not popular and many families resisted since the structures constructed over two years were not tents but wood and metal structures which could not be moved without being destroyed. Many families, wary perhaps of previous broken promises, stated that they wanted to see a completed home with their own eyes before they would accept moving or demolishing their current shelter.

While this palette of options provided a solution, it was obvious that in future programs it would be preferable to avoid this problem in the first place. It became obvious that the most efficient way of solving the problem of the safety and security of these families was to give them the chance to rent a property while waiting for their permanent solution to be built. Planning from the start to pay 100% of the families saves time and operational costs, benefits the families who are waiting and gives housing agencies more time to deliver permanent solutions.

Lesson Learned: Camp closure programs will be successful even when 100% of families are given a rental solution and no permanent housing options are offered as part of the program.

Once it was clear that operationally it was advisable to move 100% of families out of camp by offering a Rental Support Cash Grant, there was a further logical conclusion which ran contrary to expectations. The Return Working Group started out with common assumption that it was necessary to offer a choice of rental solutions to every family leaving a camp including T-shelters, Yellow House repairs or Red/new house reconstruction.

Contrary to those expectations there has been an evolution in the thinking of Return Working Group which now concludes that camp closure programs can be successful using only Rental Support Cash Grants and not offering access to permanent housing solutions through the camp closure program.

This conclusion was drawn from several strands of reasoning:

✦ Firstly, the numbers choosing rental support are so overwhelming that disproportionate amounts of time and resource are spent on tiny a minority of camp residents who have the rare fortune of owning or having access to a Yellow House or piece of available land for building. In Champs de Mars for example, at the time of writing 4,578 families have applied to join the program. Only 3 families have requested a Yellow House repair and only 2 have requested a permanent house to be built on their land.
✦ Secondly, repairing or building take considerably longer than finding rental housing. Moreover, since there
are protection issues of leaving behind a small number of families at the end, it became obvious that the safest, most efficient and paradoxically less costly option was to give a rental support cash grants to 100% of families including those who subsequently received a permanent housing solution. Therefore, the question is no longer whether all families will receive the same solution. The question is now whether the same project team will subsequently follow up to also deliver a permanent yellow or red housing solution.

Thirdly, agencies and personnel with the necessary capacity and experience to work in camps helping families to move with rental grants were very rarely the same personnel or agencies with the capacity to build permanent housing solutions. Agencies with the camp management capacity tended to coordinate with the CCCM Cluster, whereas agencies building housing solutions had coordinated with the Shelter Cluster.

Even for large agencies with both capacities, these camp closure programs were complicated because the two departments were almost always separate departments with leadership in each which was used to separate programming and separate budgets. While cross-cutting management structures may be ideal in principal, in practice it is very difficult to manage programs which require input and coordination between departments which over the previous year had often (quite understandably) become vertical delivery silos. [For more detail of the complexities of joint programs see Coordination of Joint Programs later in this section]

Finally, the few T-shelter, Yellow Houses or Red House new builds requested by families in camps were often scattered geographically all over Port-au-Prince and beyond. UNOPS, which is the partner agency responsible for the five families requesting permanent housing solutions through the Champs de Mars pointed out that from a logistical and management perspective, it is extremely inefficient to repair three houses in three different areas of the city. For a family leaving Champs de Mars to move to Nerette, it is far more efficient and cost effective for UNOPS to repair the house when their team moves in to Nerette to repair every house in the neighborhood (as is the operational methodology of the 16/6) than it is to send a small team to repair one house months in advance of the broader neighborhood exercise.

It was the same scenario of higher costs and longer timeframes for the IOM engineers charged with building T-shelters for the 31 families who chose that housing solution from a total of 1,329 families who moved out of Place Saint Pierre and Place Boyer (3%). The sites for these 31 T-shelters were dispersed all around Port-au-Prince and as a result the average unit cost for those 31 shelters was 4000 USD (including material, building, site preparation, logistics and management costs). This is 60% higher than the 2500 USD which is the same team’s average unit cost when building an equivalent number of T-shelters grouped together in the same neighborhood.

Pulling together these strands, it became clear that choosing beneficiaries for permanent housing solutions by closing one camp at a time is inefficient and expensive. This led to the conclusion that beneficiary selection for housing repair programs should move neighborhood by neighborhood, not camp by camp.

As a result, **camp closure programs should prioritize time and resources to provide a rental solution for all families in a targeted camp. Delivering permanent housing solutions by repairing Yellow and rebuilding Red Houses should be approached by separate programs working neighborhood by neighborhood.** Those families living in a camp targeted for camp closure will receive a permanent housing solution if and when reconstruction programs target their neighborhood.

The question this poses is what happens to a family living in a targeted camp whose house falls outside of the neighborhoods targeted for comprehensive rebuilding. The hard truth is that this family may not receive a permanent housing solution in the foreseeable future. At the end of the one year of support, this family will find itself in the same situation as their camp neighbors who were renters before the earthquake and did not own a Yellow or Red House.

At a strategic level, this is the correct course of action since there are many thousands of families in need of housing repairs or reconstruction. Some are in camps, some are living at risk in their damaged house. Given the limited financing available, the most efficient and cost-effective method should be followed to deliver housing solutions to all those families. Taking the approach described above which separates camp closure from neighborhood rehabilitation is the most efficient methodology and therefore offers the best chance that in the long run sufficient funding will be found to repair all the damaged and destroyed homes.
A note on Returns to the Provinces
Return to the provinces involved supporting families to leave camps in Port-au-Prince with a cash grant and assistance with transport. The family rented or moved in with a host family outside the capital. Similar to host family programs, some agencies distinguished return to the provinces as a separate option, while others categorized it as a Rental Support Cash Grant, albeit one with a destination further from the camp.

Verification of the safety of a rental property proposed by the family was more challenging logistically when the house was outside Port-au-Prince. By dedicating substantial resources, the IFRC were by far the most successful in overcoming the logistical challenges involved in helping families to move to rental properties or host families outside Port-au-Prince.

As part of a comprehensive evaluation exercise for these camp closure programs, one key area of study must be what factors contributed to the IFRC’s success with return to provinces. The difference with other programs is striking. In Place Saint Pierre and Place Boyer, only 2 families out of over 1,300 chose to return to provinces. By contrast, through IFRC’s Mais Gate 1 and Mais Gate 2 programs 235 families chose to return to provinces (11% of the total camp population of 2,075 families).

Lesson Learned: Coordination of Joint Programs – detailed case by case follow up
Earlier in this section, there was a discussion of how camp closure programs can be successful even if permanent housing solutions are not offered through the same program. Nevertheless, there will continue to be agencies with the operational capacity to implement programs which make all options available (rental, Yellow House repair, Red House reconstruction and/or T-shelters).

Therefore, it is worth recording the lessons learned in implementing this approach. Here we focus in particular on the challenges of implementing a joint program where the agencies involved in building houses, repairing Yellow Houses or building T-shelters were different from those agencies managing camp closure and rental support cash grant assistance. The example used is the Government-led 16/6 program where IOM were responsible for camp management, rental solutions and T-shelters while UNOPS were responsible for Yellow House repair and permanent house reconstruction.

This 4th Step in the process, when each family makes their own housing choice, was the touch point between the different agencies which were partnering. There was often a degree of confusion for the families in camps because, based on their choice between a Yellow House repair or a cash grant option, families living side by side in a camp who perceived themselves as entering the same unified program in fact became beneficiaries of two separate parts of a camp closure program run by two totally different agencies with separate sources of funding.
In an environment with multiple agencies and hundreds or thousands of families, agencies needed to work extremely hard to exchange targeted beneficiary lists, organized by desired housing solution. The program teams needed to then follow up case by case, in order to ensure that every family was being given assistance. This necessitated working diligently both at a field level, and in the back office on updating databases to ensure every family's case was being followed.

**Lesson Learned: Families can slip through cracks in the system between partner agencies**

In particular, it took time to develop an efficient feedback mechanism for families who applied for a T-shelter or a Yellow House repair, but subsequently had their application rejected for technical reasons. This was particularly challenging because engineers who worked as part of pre-existing housing construction programs (UNOPS had been running a Yellow House repair program for many months) had established methodologies and did not initially understand the consequences for the family concerned or for IOM of accepting or rejecting an application. Previously, if a UNOPS engineer found that a house was technically beyond repair, that family was told that it could not benefit from the Yellow House program and the engineer moved on to a new house for assessment. When the family whose house was analyzed had been referred by IOM, the UNOPS team needed time to adjust their methodology to introduce a feedback loop so that the family was referred back to IOM. IOM then needed to send a community mobilizer back to that family in the camp to explain the situation and encourage them to sign up for another housing option – in most cases the rental support cash grant.

**Lesson Learned: Flexible Funding Allocation**

In a program like the 16/6 where one agency was working in camp and delivering cash grants (IOM), and another was delivering the Yellow House repairs (UNOPS) these types of issues posed not only case management issues, but also had financial implications. There was a need for flexibility and collaboration since a rejected application for a Yellow House meant one more family’s solution being funded by IOM’s cash grant budget allocation, rather than the UNOPS Yellow House budget allocation. Given that the budgets had been agreed up front, this situation demanded a collaborative approach.

Yellow and Red house owners were also excluded often because the cost to retrofit or repair their home far exceeded the government-stipulated limits of $1500 and $3500, respectively. For instance, many houses need major site preparation including high retaining walls on the steep hillsides of Port-au-Prince, before basic reconstruction of the home could commence. Organizations such as J/P HRO are now trying to budget for these additional costs and find ways to communicate effectively to camp beneficiaries the cause of delays, and often offer a rental stipend while the technical assessments of their homes are in progress.
Step 5: Choosing the Rental Solution

Once a family chose the rental option, there were several steps for them to understand and navigate before they were able to leave the camp.

Before filling in an application for the program, each family in advance were asked to identify a rental property and negotiate the price with the landlord for one year of rent. Each family was given access to up to $500 USD of rental support. If the family chose to rent a house costing more than $500 per year, they were free to supplement with their own income. If the family instead chose to make a saving, they were free to negotiate a lower price and “keep the change”.

Lesson Learned: Government and Cluster Coordination to establish a standard approach
With the support of the Government Housing Unit and the E-Shelter/CCCM Cluster, the Returns Working Group played a role in standardizing the basic package of support at $500. As was shown earlier, other elements of camp closure programs were not entirely standardized, but the essential element was the baseline amount for rental support.

Rental Homes must be Safe
One of the risks discussed in the planning stage was that families leaving camps would choose to rent unsafe yellow or Red Houses. As a result, each proposed rental property was visited by a member of staff to ensure the house fulfilled basic technical and legal pre-requisites:
- The house was not marked as unsafe with red or yellow stamps from the Government’s MTPTC engineers
- The house was not in an area such as a ravine at risk from flooding or landslides
- The house was empty and available for rent
- The purported landlord was confirmed by neighbors to be entitled to rent out the property.

Once the landlord and the camp resident agreed on a price and the house had been verified as meeting specifications, a standard rental contract was signed on site. Arrangements were then made for the landlord to be paid directly the agreed sum, and for the remainder of the $500 USD to be paid to the family leaving the camp (along with a fee for transport of between $25 and $40 depending on the implementing agency).

To watch a video created to help camp residents understand these criteria see the link in the Beneficiary Communications Section.

Lesson Learned: Standardizing Contracts
By coordinating through the Returns Working Group and the Logements Quartiers Working Group, a standardized rental contract was established. This contract was made available to all implementing agencies, some of which made only minor changes, others of which chose to adapt it to their particular needs.

Lesson Learned: Practical limitations of rental property safety checks
One of the frequently asked questions about this part of the program is, are the rental houses safe? There are valid concerns about the quality of the housing in the neighborhoods to which families are returning. As a result, each rental house was checked for a Government engineer’s Green stamp. For houses which had no stamp, or had been repaired or painted, it was difficult to make and assessment, so the staff involved were given some flexibility to use common sense. The best practice was from agencies which hired engineers to re-assess each house, though this took longer and was therefore more costly. For others, the staff were not qualified to assess the risk, but made a best assessment.

While it was not encouraged, there were undoubtedly some cases where no stamp was available and staff exercised their judgment – rightly or wrongly. Ideally, these borderline calls would be checked by an engineer, but some programs did not have the resources to achieve that. All programs entailed risk management decisions and
some programs took the choice to rely on personal decision making by families. This though required specific communication on the issue of the risks of houses not marked green. One key lesson is to plan financially to hire engineers to assess any cases of houses which are not visibly stamped by the MTPTC as safe.

Lesson Learned: Link to professional training and widespread information campaigns on housing safety and building standards: As well as trying to ensure that families move back to safe housing, there is a linked longer-term effort to improve building standards across the construction industry. Through many initiatives, including the Government-led 16/6 program, the Government’s established building standards were widely advertised and large-scale training programs were established to train masons and other construction workers on safe housing materials and building techniques.

Lesson Learned: Modest but decent
As well as these established criteria, the field staff also used their common sense to occasionally reject some properties which were too small, too far from sanitation services or otherwise were inappropriate – but this was an exception as the program tried as much as possible to respect the family’s choice.

In practice this meant that some of the houses rented do not look like what was envisaged by Government leaders when they pledged to offer permanent solutions and “Build Back Better”. Often the houses chosen were not appealing to the eyes of those implementing the programs since many families chose move to neighborhoods that were among the poorest areas of the city with the most earthquake damage and the worst access to basic services.

Some rental support programs imposed higher standards, for example imposing minimum distances from the rental property to sanitation facilities. However, in practice most programs were forced to increase flexibility on these criteria because the reality of the neighborhoods into which people moved is that there are simply not enough houses in Haiti with sanitation access.

Lesson Learned: Allow IDPs to rent from friends and family
Families were given the option to “rent” from friends and family for nominal fee. Initially, there was a feeling that any family who were in a position to move in with family could or should have left camp already, and perhaps should be excluded from receiving a rental support cash grant.

However, the decision was taken to allow this, firstly because many families accepted camp-based families to move into their homes only on the condition that they would be able to contribute to the household income. Secondly, the challenges of policing who is related to whom or friends with whom is simply unrealistic and unnecessary. By allowing families to openly admit their family relationships, data being gathered on average rental prices in the open marked place would not be skewed by the nominal figures negotiated between family and friends.

Lesson Learned: How to combat rental price increases – “keep the change”
One key concern raised in the program design stage was that if the Haitian Government and big international donors were seen to be involved in renting property, there would be an inevitable spike in rent prices. To limit as much as possible this potential rental inflation, the natural self-interest of each family was engaged as a tool. If the rent negotiated was $400 – the family received the remaining $100 in cash to spend as they deemed most appropriate for their family. Some families spent the remainder on food, education or household improvements. Others, no doubt, spent in other ways, as was their free choice.

Lesson Learned: Empowering families to make better housing choices.
Program staff noticed that some families were choosing properties which, while technically meeting criteria, did not make a great deal of sense: families with elderly family members chose houses with difficult access; families with several children did not know whether there was a school anywhere near their proposed property; people with health problems were not considering access to health facilities in their choice of housing.
In response, CRS developed a simple training module as part of their Rental Support Cash Grant program. The training focused on family empowerment, with each family required to meet with an advisor to establish their priorities (health issues; education; access to market to sell goods etc). This discussion helped families create a family plan, including a considered decision on where to look for housing.

**Lesson Learned: Communicate the rental housing minimal criteria to save wasted visits**

Given the logistical challenges of sending a member of staff to assess each family’s chosen property (see below) it is extremely important for families to understand in advance the criteria for acceptable rental properties.

As an example, in the opening weeks of the Champs de Mars program, over 30% of properties visited were not meeting the required criteria. As a result, each family was required to look for an alternative house and a visit to the new property was organized. With over 4500 property visits to organize, a 30% failure rate was a serious waste of resource. As a result, communication on the criteria for suitable properties was increased, including the creation of a short video shown in camp to explain the criteria and the dangers of choosing a red or Yellow House. (To watch the 5 minute comedy sketch film developed to address this issue, see the link in the **Communications** section)

**Lesson Learned: Taxation – short-term vs long-term priorities**

There were considerable problems caused by the issue of taxation. Particularly at the start of the programs, many landlords refused camp beneficiaries as tenants because they did not want to enter into a contractual relationship with a Government-supported program for fear of taxation.

One Mayor delayed a camp closure, demanding to be given the personal data of the landlords in order to add them to the tax roll. Though there is a reasonable case to be made for the need to expand the tax base, it remains the case that camp closure programs would have been almost impossible if landlords knew that accepting a short rental contract today meant paying taxes from this point on. The decision was therefore taken by the central government to prioritize camp closures over the long-standing problems of the Haitian tax system.

**Lesson Learned: Supporting movement to the provinces**

It is widely acknowledged that it would be of enormous benefit to decongest Port-au-Prince through encouraging families to move into the provinces. Therefore some camp closure programs offered the choice to move to the provinces with a T-shelter or a Rental Support Cash Grant.

Some agencies simply did not have the resources to be able to accompany singe families hundreds of miles. As a result, some agencies took the decision to offer the $500 USD to the family without seeing the property, acknowledging the risk that the family would move to another camp.

Other agencies refused to allow rental of properties in provinces and encouraged families to rent in Port-au-Prince. The rationale for this seemingly draconian program choice was that many families initially believed that by claiming to return to the provinces, they would be able to receive $500 and move to another camp in Port-au-Prince with no follow-up.

As an example, at a meeting in Place Saint Pierre one member of the camp committee asked to return to the provinces and after discussion more than half the people present decided to follow suit. When IOM made clear that resources existed to accompany the family to any city in Haiti and the property verification and follow-up would be identical there as in Port-au-Prince, the number volunteering for this option reduced to one family. The greatest success for this type of program has unquestionably been for the IFRC who invested very considerable time and resource in assisting hundreds of families to leave Port-au-Prince by finding a housing solution in the regions.
Step 6: Cash Transfers

For the majority of implementing agencies, the most practical payment method was to give each landlord and each beneficiary a pin code voucher linked to a temporary account at a local bank in their name.

For example, a landlord who had signed a contract for $400 was given a pin code voucher which he could redeem in that amount at a designated bank. The renter of that house was at the same time given a pin code voucher for $100 (the “change” from the rental support grant) + $25 for transport.

To simplify the process and make it clearer for beneficiaries, these payments were generally organized in bulk, sometimes with hundreds of landlords and tenants being given their pin number vouchers on the same day.

As will be shown in a dedicated section below, other agencies had success with innovative new approaches harnessing cell phone banking technology. (See Mobile Money Case Study below.)

Lesson Learned: Working with Banks in Advance
After difficult early experiences, agencies paying large numbers of families on the same day made special arrangements with their bank to ensure extra bank tellers were available and there was sufficient cash on hand.

Lesson Learned: Pros and Cons of paying landlords directly
World Vision and J/P HRO chose a different approach to pay the camp resident the entire $500 USD cash grant, and allow the renter to pay the landlord directly. The risks presented by giving the full sum to the beneficiary were mitigated by the stipulations of the additional $110 dollars which was available to the family if they were still in the property when the surprise visit was conducted two or three months later. J/P HRO had a 92% success ratio with this strategy and this approach of paying only the beneficiary and not the landlord was one of the central choices which enabled World Vision to use the innovative “mobile money” cell phone credit transfer.

By signing for receipt of the cash grant, the family agrees to leave the camp within 72 hours of receiving payment (for other agencies the allowed delay was five days). Staff followed up tent by tent to check for any families who are having problems or need extra assistance. (For a discussion on dealing with families who refuse to leave see the Camp Closure section.)

Lesson Learned: Photo ID cards for every family in the program
J/P HRO and World Vision introduced an ID card system for all heads of households in the program. The LMMS card system involves providing each beneficiary family with a plastic card with their picture and a barcode. This form of identification was accepted by banks (or the micro-finance institution Fonkoze) when beneficiaries went to cash their cash grant vouchers. The advantages of this system were considerable: it made the process more efficient in terms of time and tracking of the families, and presented a solution to the fact that many families do not have national IDs, which would present a problem for withdrawing funds from the banks. The only disadvantage was that it disincentivized beneficiary families to avail themselves of the service making available National identification documentation – an activity described in the Protection Section of this report.
Case Study: World Vision’s Mobile Money

Since the earthquake in Haiti, there have been successful beneficiary payment programs developed between private sector cell phone companies and NGOs such as Mercy Corps. Building on this, World Vision were able to partner with the cell phone company Voila and apply some of the benefits of “mobile banking” to their Rental Support Cash Grant program.

How Mobile Money works
Mobile banking gives poor families with no bank account a safe place to digitally store their savings. The pin number system ensures that the money stored can only be transferred, redeemed or “cashed out” by the account holder. If the phone goes missing, the account can be re-activated with a new handset.

Benefits
Banking via mobile phones has proved hugely successful in other developing countries. For many poor families this system represents the first time they have ever had access to a financial product and it is a first step towards including these families in the benefits of the formal financial system. As micro-finance schemes throughout the world have proved, giving poor families access to credit and other financial products through official institutions, rather than back street money lenders, can have a marked and sustained effect on household income.

Introducing Mobile Money to Rental Support Cash Grant programs
The World Vision program donated a telephone to each head of household who was taught to use the system by World Vision and the phone company’s staff. Once a family had identified a rental property, the cash grant was released to the account linked to that phone and a text message notification sent. The family was then able to “cash out” at any one of hundreds of street vendors or stores connected to the Voila phone credit purchase network.

Lesson Learned: Local Mobile Money vendors were initially unprepared for the demand
In the first weeks, mobile money vendors in the areas around the camp did not have sufficient cash on hand to allow families to cash out. Families were forced to go further afield to cash out until local vendors adjusted to the new higher demand.

Lesson Learned: Challenges of teaching the new technology
This was new technology, so the populations of camps needed to be trained to understand how the system worked. At first, families struggled to understand and complained that they would prefer to deal with cash. But adoption of the simple system was fast and those families who did not like the system could, once the program had run its course, immediately cash out and stop using the phone if they so chose. Others saw the benefits and continued to use the system after the program. One of the recommendations of this report is a comprehensive review of Rental Support Cash Grant Programs. As part of that process, it will be very interesting to examine how many families immediately cashed out and how many were still using the mobile money system three, six or twelve months later.

Lesson Learned: Limits to the “wallet” size
Technical limits currently imposed by banking legislation in Haiti limits each phone’s “wallet” size to $250 USD. Therefore, the family needed to be paid in two tranches: only once the first $250 had been “cashed out” was a second tranche of funding transferred.

Lesson Learned: Protection issues
From a protection standpoint, providing a phone to each family was helpful, giving a more guaranteed link for follow-up with the family after they left camp as well as guaranteeing that the family could contact...
World Vision in case of problems. Moreover, the fundamental benefit of the mobile money is that it is pin protected, so if the phone was stolen, the credit remained safe and could only be redeemed by the family with the code.

During the program development, there were concerns about the safety issues in the Mobile Money approach. Due to the limitations of “wallet” size before paying for one year of rent, each family needed to cash out $250 USD. They then kept this money either on their person or in their tent until the second tranche of funding was transferred a few hours or days later.

The concern was that through communication efforts about the program in general, it would be public knowledge that families who were part of the program were receiving large amounts of money and could therefore be targeted. World Vision therefore went to considerable efforts to ensure that each family was paid outside camp in a secure and private way.

From a program management standpoint, there were also questions about not having control of the payment to the landlord. One extra link in the money chain increased risks and raised questions about how to deal with families whose cash grant was lost or stolen before they were able to pay the landlord. Operationally, implementing agencies would be faced with very little choice but to pay the family a second time or be faced at the end of the program with one family remaining in camp with no housing solution. Such a system would be vulnerable to abuse if large numbers of families were to claim to have “lost” the money. However, despite initial concerns, to this point, there have been no security issues and no families have lost cash before leaving camp.

**Can this approach work at scale?**

Operationally, there are open questions about how feasibly this approach can be scaled up to deal with larger camps. Firstly, the phones were donated for this program by World Vision and Voila, but at scale the cost of between $5 and $10 per handset needs to be factored in to program costs. Though there are equivalent costs for the bank transfer approach.

Secondly, on security and protection, the fundamental idea of using a phone with a pin rather than cash could be a real positive for protection. However, the limited “wallet” size is an issue. In countries where the phone can hold the entire value of the cash grant ($500), mobile banking may prove the ideal solution for secure cash transfers.

In Haiti, until the “wallet” size legislation is changed, the best compromise solution is to pay landlords directly via a bank pin number, and pay the camp beneficiaries via mobile money phone banking. For the families leaving camp this has the advantage of keeping their cash safely digitally stored and also being a first step in enabling access to new banking products for these very poor people who do not currently have access to the formal financial system.
Step 7: Camp Closure

Even once every family on the beneficiary list was provided with a housing solution, the process of finally closing camps presented challenges to implementing agencies and their local government partners:

✦ Once a family has received a rental subsidy, what happens if they refuse to leave camp?
✦ Once a family has left the camp, what stops another family replacing them?
✦ What steps should be taken for dealing with people who have knowingly installed themselves in the camp after the registration and therefore cannot benefit from the program?
✦ What special protection measures can be put in place for the families who leave later than others and find themselves exposed in increasingly sparse camps when their neighbors (and safety network) have already left camp?
✦ Once a camp is closed, what norms and standards should be applied for camp decommissioning?

Mitigating the project risks

The driving factors for the methods adopted in closing camps were based on two risks: firstly, the risk that families who were paid would subsequently refuse to leave camp. Secondly, the risk that once one family left, their place in camp would be re-occupied by a new family.

This second risk was based on the negative and widespread experience of camp management and shelter agencies which provided thousands of T-shelters and Yellow House repair solutions to families in camps. In some large camps hundreds of families were helped to move out thanks to one of these solutions, yet the camp management agencies noted that the population of the camp did not reduce. Families who left were immediately replaced by new families moving in from elsewhere.

Given the size and porous borders of camps which had no single point of entry, but were integrated into surrounding neighborhoods with dozens of paths and roads, it was impossible to control the flow of families moving in and out. Some agencies tried to control the situation by marking and removing tents of families who moved out, but this proved of very limited effectiveness for a number of reasons described below.

Given the number of actors involved across Port-au-Prince, it was almost impossible for camp management staff to access timely household-level data from Yellow House repair or T-shelter actors. As a result camp management agencies were not aware of which families in camps had received a housing solution. Therefore, agencies were not able to remove those tents, which allowed the family to either stay in camp, or to donate or sell their camp shelter to a new family from outside the camp.

When considerable efforts at data coordination were undertaken between shelter and camp management agencies, families adapted by using different members of the family to register with different agencies. Cross-referencing became virtually impossible even with regular coordination meetings and databases were shared.

In the end, the Sisyphean effort to keep track of the movement in and out of even one camp of thousands of families was incredibly resource intensive. Even when done well in one camp, the hundreds of camps with no camp management agency remained uncontrolled, allowing movement to go unchecked and it was acknowledged that the massive resource required was not adding any operational value. (Moreover, just around the time when these efforts were getting coordinated, the cholera epidemic flared up and management time and effort was required for other priorities.)

Rental Support Cash Grant programs offered a solution to these problems. Programs of T-shelter or Yellow House repair were limited to offering solutions only to those families in camps who owned property. Rental support closed the whole camp by offering a solution to 100% of camp residents at the same time. [For more detail see Strategic Role of Rental Support Cash Grants section.]
Lesson Learned: Fair but Firm
If camp residents saw flexibility in the process, there were some who tried to take advantage inappropriately. For example, particularly at the start of the program some families did not respect the agreed 3 day limit and stayed in camp even after being paid. These were not cases of vulnerable families, for whom special assistance was available if necessary, nor of families in unforeseen circumstances. These were families who were delaying for other reasons.

Program managers therefore needed to dedicate teams of community mobilizers to verifying that shelters were taken down after each group of families had been paid. Once camp residents saw that there were teams following up and checking on their departure, the number of families delaying reduced considerably. Community mobilizer staff were very successful in convincing families to leave without any recourse to threats, simply by reminding families that they had voluntarily signed a contract to leave and appealing to their sense of fair play one Haitian to another.

Lesson Learned: Local Government Leadership
There were cases of families who refused to leave after they had received their cash grant. More often, there were families who refused to leave even though they were not eligible for the program. As discussed in the Registration section, complaints mechanisms were in place for families to show they had a valid case for inclusion in the program. Therefore, those left in camp after the program had helped all families on the beneficiary list were ineligible families who were not camp residents but moved into camp after the program had been announced.

If these ineligible families refused to leave camp voluntarily, it became necessary to have families removed; something NGOs and international organizations had no authority to do. Here again, Local Government leadership was absolutely critical. Mayors used their authority though Justices of the Peace (Juge de Paix) to enforce the law and remove families from the camp, if necessary with the support of the Haitian National Police.

Lesson Learned: Working section by section is not necessary – opening the process in parallel for all parts of the camp is more efficient
During program design phase in the Place Saint Pierre program, the IOM project management team’s original idea was to close the camp section by section. The idea was that by closing one section entirely before families could begin the process in the next section was the most effective way to combat the risk that families would be paid but refuse to leave. The idea was to use natural social pressure from other camp residents.

In practice, this approach turned out to be inefficient. After some initial issues, families saw that IOM were following up after the payments and there were no significant issues of families refusing to leave camp. Rather, the most time-consuming and logistically-arduous task was to accompany each family to validate the safety of the chosen rental property, necessitating thousands of visits to sites spread out throughout the city.

The advantage of opening up applications from the entire camp in parallel, rather than only dealing with a limited section of the camp as originally planned was that this made possible considerable economies of scale possible. The quickest way of implementing in a program was for the entire camp to apply at the same time. In the Champs de Mars, thousands of families applied within a few weeks, so the applications were grouped not by section of the camp, but according to the location of their rental property. Each day instead of one car taking a small number of families, busses were chartered to areas of the city where multiple property visits took place.

In the case of J/P HRO working in Petionville Club camp, they were obliged to move section by section because the pilot program only had funding available for 500 families out of over 5000.

Lesson Learned: Marking shelters for removal – but only on day three
As part of the process of visibly following up and checking on the departure of families community mobilizers marked with paint the tents of families who had already been paid their cash grant. One lesson learned was on the timing of marking the tents. When initially the tents were marked on the first day, there were several cases of families being targeted by thieves who knew from the sign on the tent that the family had received their grant
and therefore were likely to have cash in their tent. Therefore, tents were marked only on the final day of the waiting period (the day on which the shelter was removed) in order to reduce any protection issues.

**Lesson Learned: Using proper legal process and engaging local authorities in the case of people who were not on the beneficiary list refusing to leave camp.**

It is worth highlighting the necessity of this step of tent removal, precisely because it is one element of the program which it is least comfortable to discuss. The rights of individuals in a post-emergency environment were at the very core of the design and implementation of these camp closure and relocation programs.

However, there were difficult occasions when people who were not eligible for the program refused to leave the camp. There were some people who moved into the camp after the registration and attempted to get access by falsely claiming to be longstanding residents. These families were not on the beneficiary list, but had access to the Grievance Mechanism process where (as discussed in the Protection section) a flexible approach was possible in the case of families who were particularly vulnerable.

Once a family had been informed that their application to the grievance mechanism had been unsuccessful, national legal processes were initiated. Local authorities including the Mayor’s office and a Justice of the Peace were notified and the authorities gave the person involved three days to leave camp in accordance with legal norms.

**Lesson Learned: Dismantling empty tents**

Following on from experience learned and shared by teams managing and closing camps in Jacmel camp management agencies throughout the country organized activities in camps to identify and dismantle tents which were not inhabited. These tents were proving to be hazardous for the remaining population of camps since the empty tents were misused in a variety of ways disturbing to neighbors: as places for gangs of young men to gather; for consumption of drugs and alcohol; as venues for sex, including transactional sex; as dumping grounds for garbage; or as unofficial latrines.

Given the issues involved, the resistance encountered by camp management staff and the need for appropriate authorities, these activities were conducted in collaboration with the Haitian National Police. Tents were not immediately dismantled if found empty, instead camp management agencies like J/P HRO marked the tent and left an official notice in Creole inside the tents asking for any family living in the structure to report within 3 days to the camp office. At the end of the three days the empty structures that were not claimed had to be broken down with the support of national authorities.

**Lesson Learned: Camp Decommissioning and handover to landlord.**

The final steps in the process were to decommission camps by appropriately dealing with latrines and other hazards, then officially handing over responsibility of the camp to the landlord (either private land owner or the local Mayor).

To guard against the risk that the camps fill back up, it is essential to establish who will be responsible for the land once the program is over and the land is clear. IOM developed an official Camp Closure and Handover form which stipulated that the camp was closed, that all responsibility for the land now passed to the landowner, and that any families erecting tents or structures after this time would not be registered as IDPs on this site.

*Place Saint-Pierre, the left hand side of the park is already empty, after relocation, the other half still awaits. Every family was assisted and the park cleared as of November 2011.*
Step 8: Surprise Verification Visits

How many families living in camps are actually in need? How many families are keeping a tent in camp and waiting to receive money, but actually have a housing solution elsewhere? How can Cash Grant programs ensure that families do not leave one camp and move down the street to another camp hoping to be paid twice?

These were some of the questions being raised when these camp closure programs were being initially discussed. The final risk of moving form one camp to the other remains and issue and was tragically highlighted during the Champs de Mars program. One family accepted a cash grant and ostensibly left the camp, but came to a secret arrangement with the landlord to be reimbursed. They then moved into another part of Champs de Mars camp, seemingly hoping to be paid a second time. Weeks later, there was a fire in Champs de Mars with many tents lost and three members of the same family were killed in the blaze.

To mitigate these risks, and to ensure detailed monitoring and evaluation of the program, each family receives a surprise visit two or three months after they leave camp. If the family is living in the home as per the contract agreement, a further cash grant is transferred using the same payment method as before. Furthermore, a centralized database of all families receiving cash grants was created to minimize the chances of one family being paid in two camps. (For some programs the value of the final payment is $125, for others $110 depending on the amount paid for transport earlier in the process - between $25 and $40.)

Lesson Learned: The overwhelming majority of families – more than 90% – were in real need. Before these programs started, there was considerable skepticism at the idea of giving support to all families. It was relatively commonplace to hear the question, “Do the majority of people in camps really need assistance, or are they in camp by choice to benefit?”. There was a fairly widely-held belief that many families were in the camp by choice; that they had a home but chose also to occupy a tent to receive benefits. One great risk of the program was that huge numbers of families would claim to move into a house, but subsequently take the cash grant and move back into an existing home, leaving the rental properties empty.

To give an indication of how widely-held this view was, it is worth noting that some programs agreed with their donors a management target of 70% occupancy for the verification visits. Mindful of the desperate need of the majority living in camps, it was calculated that if as high as 30% of families were falsely claiming to be in need of housing, 70% presence would still represent success.

Therefore, for all programs with figures available to have achieved over 90% is an noteworthy success and strongly suggests that the anecdotal claims of large numbers living in camps out of choice proved false. As examples, see below the results from the CRS and IOM 16/6 programs:

Results of Validation Visits (CRS)

- 94% Families present in rental property
- 6% Families not found in rental property

Results of Validation Visits (IOM)

- 92% Families present in rental property
- 8% Families not found in rental property
Lesson Learned: Openly advertise that the verification visits will happen (but not when)
There was a debate in the Place Saint Pierre project design phase on whether or not to publicize the verification visits (and the associated financial benefits for families who were still where they agreed to live). It was argued that the success rate figure may have proven to be less reliable if families know that they need to only stay in the house for a couple of months and can leave immediately afterwards with no financial consequences. In the end, it was agreed that the visits should be widely advertised since the over-arching priority is to encourage people to stay in their new homes. The hope is that having moved in for two or three months, the family was more likely to get accustomed and stay long term.

Lesson Learned: Visits are very resource intensive
One of the key lessons during this phase of the projects was the resource intensive nature of verification visits which necessitated considerable human and logistical resources and management focus. There had initially been a view that it would be possible to scale down in resources during this phase, but this did not prove to be the case. Not only do program managers need to budget for enough staff to visit each of the houses, they must also plan for an initial failure rate of up to 30% with second and third visits required.

The chart below shows the one of IOM’s weekly updates during the surprise verification visits step of the program. If the family was not present on the first visit, a second and third visit were required in order to establish whether the family was simply out at the time of the visit or had in fact left the property.
Lesson Learned: If you want to find the house again...keep the same team members
Not only did it emerge that the verification phase is extremely resource intensive, it became clear that it is essential to keep exactly the same team members in place. Even though the teams took addresses and GPS coordinates, the dense, confusing and anarchic nature of the neighborhoods made it almost impossible to find a property if you had not been there before.

Given that the visits were by their very nature unannounced, it was not possible to ask the family to guide the team to the property as it had been during the first visit to sign the contract and check the safety of the property.

Therefore, from a human resources point of view it is essential to keep exactly the same team throughout the project for the infuriatingly simple reason that in order to find the houses, there is no substitute for having been there before.

Lesson Learned: Find funding for follow up visits and data collection 6, 12, 18 months later
For many agencies implementing programs with six to nine month funding cycles, it is impossible to guarantee a follow up after the program closes. IFRC’s data below shows the value of further verification visits after 6 and 12 months. Therefore further funding was identified to do follow up with a sample of families which will be taken from across programs regardless of the implementing agency. This exercise will be funded and organized through the Government’s Housing Unit using 16/6 Program funding.

Lessons Learned: There remain questions regarding the extent to which these camp closure programs are contributing to the growth of informal settlements.
As was discussed in the Frequently Asked Questions section, there has been a very clear growth of informal settlements on public and private land both in the hills around Port-au-Prince, and on the plateau in the areas around Corail camp which are now known as Canaan, Jerusalem and Onaville. Concerns have been expressed that Rental Support Cash Grants are causing or exacerbating this phenomenon in any of three ways:

- Families are taking the 500 dollar rental grant, not moving into the identified house as contractually agreed and instead moving into these informal settlements.
- Families currently living in houses are opportunistically moving out of their homes and renting them to families leaving a camp and moving to the informal settlements. This has been termed “voluntary secondary displacement”.
- Landlords are forcing current tenants to leave in order to welcome beneficiaries of Rental Support Cash Grants into their properties because the payment is made up front for the entire year. This has been termed “involuntary secondary displacement”.

As was shown in the FAQ section, the available evidence shows that relatively few families who have benefited directly from a rental solution have moved into informal settlements. Likewise, the argument for large-scale “voluntary secondary displacement” is unconvincing and there is no evidence to support it.

There is no dispute that some home owners may have accepted rent and used that rental income to stake a claim in a newly developing informal settlement. What is at issue is the idea that camp closure programs are causing this phenomenon. The key point here is the “keep the change” approach discussed earlier. By allowing each family to keep any difference between $500 and the rental price agreed, Rental Support Cash Programs ensured that families leaving camp were incentivized to pay market price, just as if the money was their own.

Since families in the programs were paying market price, they were acting in a way no different from any other consumer in the rental market. It may be the case that some home owners chose to rent out their houses and move elsewhere, but they would have done so regardless of whether the renter was part of the program or not. This is a conclusion supported by the fact that static average rental prices indicate that Rental Support Cash Grant programs have had no significant effect on overall demand for Port-au-Prince rental property.

On the issue of “involuntary secondary displacement” there is little evidence and this merits further study. The
argument has been made that families who receive a lump sum of one year rent from a Rental Support Cash Grant Program are more attractive tenants. So much so that existing tenants may be forced to leave by landlords in order to accommodate families being assisted to leave camps with a rental grant.

This may be the case for some families, but as yet there is no data to suggest whether this has been an issue for a significant number of families. One indication to the contrary is that focus groups before project implementation strongly suggested that the cultural norm in Haiti was to pay rent up front for the entire year. Groups with Haitian staff and camp residents, were vehement in rejecting the suggestion that the program could pay families in several tranches throughout the year. This was said to be culturally inappropriate since it was common practice for rent to be paid up front once per year. If this is true, it would suggest that most tenants would be expected to pay up front and beneficiaries of a Rental Support Cash Grant program would not be significantly more attractive as tenants.
Step 9: Livelihoods and Other Complementary Programming

The question most often raised about Rental Support Cash Grant programs is: “given that each family receives one year of rental support, what happens to the family next year?”

The simple answer is that each family will need to prepare during the year of rental support for that financial reality and take responsibility for their own housing needs.

At the forefront of our reflection on this issue must be that the urban poor are innovative and industrious and that these families found ways to make ends meet and pay rent before the earthquake. Many work in the informal economy and many receive remittances from relatives overseas. All this notwithstanding, there is no question that a year on from their rental support cash grant, some of the most vulnerable families will find themselves unable to afford to stay in their rented accommodation, unless their financial circumstances improve.

As a result, many of the agencies involved in Rental Support Cash Grant programs have also added a component aimed at helping families generate income and get access to a sustainable livelihood. Agencies have differed in their philosophy and methodology, so highlighted below are examples of the two different approaches:

✦ The first from IFRC directly targets the families leaving camps
The second from UNDP working as part of the 16/6 program does not offer families leaving camp preferential treatment, but instead focuses on creating income generation activities in neighborhoods.

As well as specific livelihood programming, this section highlights other complementary elements of programming linked to helping families cope after the year of assistance comes to an end:

✦ Life Skills: There is a particularly noteworthy and innovative approach from CRS to encourage each family to take financial responsibility, plan ahead and develop coping mechanisms for future challenges.

✦ Business Skills: As well as the Life Skills training option, World Vision provides an additional choice of 3 days of business skills training.

✦ Education Grants: A significant proportion of each household’s income is spent on schooling, so some programs included support for education as part of the resettlement package.

✦ Neighborhood Reconstruction Approach: In order to thrive in the long term, families moving out of camps need to live in neighborhoods which provide a positive living environment. Some programs have complemented Rental Support Cash Grant programs with large-scale investment in the neighborhoods of return. A brief description of these broader programs offers insight into how rental support fits into the broader reconstruction effort and Haiti’s long-term development agenda.

Income Generation Programs: Livelihood Cash Grants (Red Cross Red Crescent Societies)

Building on experience from across the world in disaster response, the Red Cross’ livelihoods support focuses on providing cash inputs to families in order to help people meet their immediate needs. Complemented with training, this cash injection offers the chance to restore a family’s ability to generate an income.

The livelihoods program, which began in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, formed an integral part of the Red Cross Red Crescent camp relocation program. In keeping with the process used by other organizations, each family in selected camps was offered a choice of housing...
options. Once the family had relocated to their chosen solution, three to six months later the now-settled family was given a further cash grant of $350 and access to vocational training. The idea of this program is to give a helping hand to help families to kick start income generation activities and thereby increase the chances of that family being able to pay their own rent the following year.

The initial results of the IFRC initiative to combine Rental Support Cash Grants with livelihood grants have been very positive – using the indicator that 100% of survey respondents have provided for themselves a housing solution one year on (for details see FAQ section). If the results continue this pattern it will be fascinating to compare the results of IFRC program with other Rental Support Cash Grant programs. Although it will be difficult to disaggregate the effects of an individual element of the program, it will nevertheless offer some insight if the results for families who received the IFRC livelihood grant are better on average than those families who were not offered a grant of the same size by other agencies implementing Rental Support Cash Grant programs.

**Income Generation Programs: Neighborhood Approach (16/6 - UNDP)**

The crucial difference in the approach to income generation taken by the 16/6 program is that it does not target the families leaving camps. The philosophy of the 16/6 program is to focus resources not on camps but on communities to which families are returning. As a result, there is no livelihoods grant for any of the families leaving 16/6 camps.

Rather, the approach, developed in previous programs around the world by UNDP, is to rebuild the economy of a neighborhood in sustainable ways. This is done by channeling financial assistance to existing businesses in the neighborhoods, targeting those with potential to expand and giving financial and management assistance to help entrepreneurs grow their businesses – thereby creating sustainable employment opportunities in Haitian-run businesses.

Residents of the 16 neighborhoods targeted by the 16/6 are equally eligible for support regardless of whether they lived in a camp. Those chosen for support are targeted only on the basis of their potential to develop a successful business and create economic opportunity and jobs.

**Life Skills Training: Encouraging Self-sufficiency, taking responsibility and making a plan for your family (CRS)**

As discussed in the *Frequently Asked Question* section, one of the question marks over rental support programs is what families will do one year later. CRS took an innovative approach to answering that question by focusing not on what Governments, donors or international agencies could do for each family one year on, but focusing instead on what each family could do to plan for their future.

Recognizing that many families lack some basic life skills which could be easily encouraged, CRS developed a training program to encourage individual responsibility and personal agency.

CRS provided this training to help equip program participants with the skills and information they need to make good decisions, not only in regards to moving out of the camp, but in all aspects of their lives. Topics covered in the life skills training component include communication within the family, personal responsibility, problem solving, planning and prioritizing for needs, and personal financial management.

Social Workers were assigned approximately 35 families from the camp to work with. Small group and individual meetings provided a forum for families to learn life skills including critical thinking, conflict resolution, financial planning, and prioritization of family needs. In addition, with many individuals still suffering from earthquake-related trauma, grief, and anxiety, CRS provides psychological support to help people recover their mental health so that they are prepared for the move out of the camp.

Through these trainings and meetings families identified and prioritized their needs, learned how to find solutions and develop a household resettlement plan or *Family Plan*, which is a personalized road map to sustainable resettlement. The Family Plan not only helps the family to leave the camp, but also helps prepare them more generally for the future, including how to face up to inevitable setbacks and crises.
The participation in the trainings, and planning and adhering to the Family Plan by any IDP family were measured and assessed as major indicators of success for the camp closure project. It was mandatory for families to attend at least one training session, but most (94%) attended them all.

This program stands out as an excellent example of how to innovatively create programs which respect the rights of people in camps, but which operationally focus on helping Haitian people who want to take responsibility and help themselves. As with the IFRC livelihood grants, it will be interesting after the program period to assess the living circumstances of the families who went through this training and see if families are on average better off as compared the beneficiaries of other programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Group Session</th>
<th>Family Session</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family communications</td>
<td>Interpersonal skill building and conflict resolution</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal responsibility and Problem Solving</td>
<td>Role within the country of Haiti, larger community, neighborhood and family</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prioritizing needs, Planning for the Future</td>
<td>Helps the family learn how to identify needs and create a plan. Individual sessions results in actual Family Plan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial planning</td>
<td>Banks, saving, lending options, health / other insurance, negotiations</td>
<td>4</td>
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Case Study: Ann Ale Lakay (CRS)

Preliminary feedback and results from the CRS program have been overwhelmingly positive: 95% of program participants reported that the life skills training had led to changes in their lives, and 100% of participants surveyed reported that their symptoms of anxiety, grief, trauma, or stress had improved after receiving psychological support. In addition to the positive life changes reported by beneficiaries, CRS observed that through the training and psychological support, beneficiaries were able to build strong relationships with CRS staff, which not only helped ease their stress about making the upcoming move, but also improved their perception and trust of CRS, making camp closure easy to facilitate.

When CRS first launched the program in the camp where Marie Andrée Lundi lived with her family, she did not trust that CRS would fulfill their promise to help people leave. However, after participating in the life skills training, Marie Andrée says that her life has changed: she has reconciled with her husband, let go of her anger, and feels more love towards her children. She is now committed to making positive changes in her life, one of the most important being the adoption of a little girl whose mother was killed in the earthquake. The family made this decision together, wanting to help their fellow citizens after they witnessed so much help pouring in from around the world after the earthquake. Marie Andrée says, “I love waking up in the morning and breathing the air outside of the camp. I feel joy in my heart each day, and I owe it all to God and to CRS.”

Another program participant, Adeline Laguerre, was still experiencing symptoms of trauma more than two years after the earthquake. She explains “I was afraid all of the time, and had to bring a knife with me to bed just to be able to sleep. I suffered from headaches, and at each moment, I felt as if the earth was shaking under my feet when I walked.” After she was referred to the CRS psychologist, Adeline’s trauma-related symptoms have completely disappeared. Following her recovery, CRS helped her rent a safe home, where she now lives, reunited with her children whom she had been obliged to send away when she was living in the camp. Adeline says, “Before, I thought CRS would leave us. Now I am convinced otherwise. I hope that CRS continues to help people who are in the same situation as me.”
Business Skills Training (World Vision)
All families participating in the World Vision return program must attend either Life Skills or Business Skills training for three days. Upon completion of one of these trainings, and after they have left the camp and resettled, households receive the second payment worth $400. Families can use the amount to cover education needs and/or strengthen their ability to generate income. Households are given the choice to invest in their businesses or start their own income generation initiatives.

Education Grants
In many cases education is one of the major expenditures stopping families from being able to afford rent outside a camp. Therefore agencies such as Concern and World Vision have included education grants as part of a package of relocation assistance aimed at creating sustainable living conditions outside camps. These programs pay primary school fee payments for one year for one child once the camp departure is complete (some families may be eligible to receive assistance for up to three children, based on total assistance received). Since some families did not have children, World Vision gave families a choice between a livelihood grant and an education grant.

For J/P HRO the greatest challenge for education grants was confirming that funding was actually spent on education or education material. J/P HRO plans to conduct a survey of all schools within neighborhoods of return, and rank them based on basic criteria, distribute the lists to beneficiaries, noting schools that met basic requirements.

Families will be invited to identify a school where they (intend to) enroll their children, from the pre-qualified list, and return to J/P HRO with a signature slip from the principle confirming a child’s intention to enroll. These families will then receive an education cash grant and a follow-up will be conducted of schools with reported enrollments. The system encourages families to use the education cash grants as intended, but also has several useful purposes – introduce families to available schools and by giving them this information and awareness, also in turn encouraging schools to improve quality of services offered, which in turn improves the quality of life for families of return.

Concern Worldwide considered a similar approach to creating relationships with schools. However, through the experience in Camp Oscar, it became clear the children of the camp residents were attending so many different schools that coming to an arrangement with each one was not feasible. As a result, Concern made the operational decision to make the education grant available in the form of a cash grant. Families had the choice to spend the grant on education or a need they considered more important. Likewise, CRS started with the idea of an educational grant but later adjusted their program and offered a cash grant which families could use as they chose.
Lesson Learned: Education grants are a complex program unto themselves
It is interesting to note that these efforts at creating a system for education support grants were designed as a small addendum to camp closure programs with Rental Support Cash Grants. Yet, at the time Concern were working in Camp Oscar (May 2011), the Education Cluster advised that no other agency in the country was working on supporting education grants. The fact that the beneficiaries are moving to new neighborhoods provides still more complexities than if this was an education grant program in existing communities. These education grants, which were a relatively small part of the camp closure programs, merit considerable reflection and evaluation in and of themselves. There is considerable scope for adding real value in the lives of families leaving camps.

Yet, there needs to be a clear-eyed assessment by program managers of whether the management, logistical and financial commitment involved is an investment worth making in the context of managing camp closure programs which are already exceptionally complex.

Lesson Learned: Camp closure and the link with rebuilding neighborhoods of return
While the most obvious need after the emergency was dealing with the populations in camps, reconstruction of neighborhoods is essential for the long term recovery. Ideally, programs of camp closure should be implemented in parallel with programs focused on reconstruction of neighborhoods through house repair and reconstruction, investment in basic social infrastructure and programs focused on livelihoods and income generation.

Lesson Learned: Not every camp is linked to a specific neighborhood
Despite the successes of some joint programs, not every camp closure program will have a linked neighborhood reconstruction program. Particularly since families from most camps are returning to an unexpectedly diverse number of neighborhoods – see here the example of families leaving Champs de Mars.

Case Study: J/P HRO and Delmas 32

J/P HRO found that a majority of the camp residents of the Petionville Club Camp originated from Delmas 32 and a majority were moving back to this same neighborhood. J/P HRO included school retrofits, the opening of two health clinics and a community center, as well as income-generating projects including recycling and water kiosks in conjunction with the first phase of their relocations project. The strategy was to harmonize services, moving services that had been offered to families in the camp to neighborhoods of return. This was designed as an added incentive for return and to ease and support the transition process.

The second phase of their relocations plan includes a comparable expenditure on infrastructure improvements. In addition community agents in communities of return function as points-of-contact assisting in the reintegration phase, addressing psychosocial issues much like a social worker would, and organizing focus groups of returned families to help them re-create a social support network among other families in the hopes of sharing both resources and similar challenges with each other.
It is therefore the Haitian Government’s Housing Unit’s policy not to expect every program to address both camp and neighborhood needs. Instead, the Government is leading by ensuring that overall at a national level there is a balanced portfolio of programs addressing these linked needs.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Helping Families, Closing Camps
Using Rental Support Cash Grants and Other Housing Solutions to End Displacement in Camps

A Tool Kit of Best Practice and Lessons Learned
Haiti 2010 – 2012

E-Shelter & CCCM Cluster
Returns Working Group

REPUBLIC D'HAITI
UCLBP
IASC
Conclusions and Recommendations

The available evidence detailed in this report leads the Return Working Group to the following conclusions. Details of the rationale and evidence which lies behind each of these conclusions can be found in the section of the document referenced in brackets.

1. Rental Support Cash Grants are a very successful tool for closing camps. [Strategic Role of Rental Support Cash Grants section]

2. The most successful programs were those where the Government of Haiti provided leadership in strategic planning and was operationally involved through the DPC and through Mayoral involvement in registration, grievance mechanisms, dismantling of empty tents and other activities. [Step 1: Registration section]

3. There remains considerable capacity in Port-au-Prince to accommodate more families in rental accommodation if further funding is provided for Rental Support Cash Grants. [Frequently Asked Questions section]

4. The overwhelming majority of families still living in camps does not have an alternative and need housing assistance. Questions were raised initially about how many families were in genuine need, and how many families were voluntarily living in camps even though they had access to housing elsewhere. The evidence of these programs indicates that over 90% of families were in real need, as demonstrated by their still living in a rental property 2-3 months later. [Step 8: Surprise Verification Visits section]

5. Over 95% of families in camps require rental assistance because they cannot access permanent solutions. Even when offered the choice to receive both a rental grant and a permanent housing solution, families do not apply for Yellow House repairs or Red House reconstruction because they do not own a damaged house, nor do they own or have access to land for construction. [Strategic Role of Rental Support Cash Grants section]

6. As well as providing a short-term housing solution for one year, evidence in this report shows that rental support is proving to be a stepping stone towards a durable housing solution. 90% of families surveyed more than one year later found a housing solution through their own means camp. The other 10% of the beneficiaries could not be contacted by telephone, but zero families surveyed have returned to a camp. [Frequently Asked Questions section]

7. Rental support programs contribute as one element of providing durable solutions to those affected by the earthquake. However, given the overwhelming needs of the population even before the earthquake, these programs cannot address by themselves the broader humanitarian and development needs of the entire affected population. [Frequently Asked Questions and Protection sections]

8. Rental solutions offer a way for many families to close the cycle of their displacement and return to paying rent as they did before the earthquake. The rental support cash grant is not designed to provide for needs beyond housing. Beneficiaries of the programs, like many other families in precarious neighborhoods who were not beneficiaries, will require additional programs aimed at providing long-term development assistance including job creation, investment in basic neighborhood infrastructure and housing programs to address the housing deficit. [Frequently Asked Questions section]
9. Camp closure programs are successful even when 100% of families are given a rental solution and no permanent housing options are offered as part of the program. Offering the option for camp residents to receive a permanent housing solution has been found to be extremely resource intensive and less efficient than providing such permanent solutions through neighborhood-based programs. Therefore, some agencies will choose to offer the rental support cash grant option to 100% of camp residents, without offering the possibility of T-shelter, Yellow House repair or permanent housing directly through the program. [Step 4: Choosing a Housing Option section]

10. Moving camp by camp is an inefficient method for selecting beneficiaries for Yellow House repair, rubble removal and new house reconstruction. Instead, housing repair programs should move neighborhood by neighborhood. Families who were in a camp but left through a rental support program should continue to be eligible for repair or construction of a permanent housing solution if they own or have access to a Yellow House or available land in a neighborhood targeted for housing reconstruction. [Step 4: Choosing a Housing Option section]

11. The Rental Support Cash Grants Programs described in this report represent only one among several approaches to providing housing assistance and closing camps. For example, if correctly managed, some camps will transition successfully to become permanent settlements.

**Recommendations**

On the basis of their experience of working in camps with the displaced population over the past two years, and in particularly on the basis of the lessons learned through the design and implementation of Rental Support Cash Grant programs, the members of the Return Working Group humbly submit to the Government of Haiti, to donors, to NGO partners and to other international organizations the following recommendations:

**Recommendation 1: The Government of Haiti and donors should make available increased funding for Rental Support Cash Grants in order that more families currently living in camps can have access to a housing solution.**

Given that there remain over 600 camps in Haiti; given the protection concerns and vulnerability of the populations of camps; given the operational success thus far of providing families with housing through Rental Support Cash Grant programs; given the success in closing entire camps; given that, to this point, rental prices have not significantly increased; given that rental properties appear to be still abundantly available; given that an established methodology is now in place; and given the support of the Government of Haiti for these initiatives, the Return Working Group advocates for increased funding for camp closure programs using Rental Support Cash Grants.

**Recommendation 2: The Government of Haiti, donors and implementing agencies should prioritize camps with the greatest need.**

Given the number of camps at high risk of flood, landslide or other natural threats as the rainy and hurricane seasons begin; camps where sanitation services are no longer available even as cholera cases continue; given the number of given the number of camps under threat of eviction; given the number of camps where it is impossible to ensure the adequate protection of women and children, the Return Working Group advocates for the Government of Haiti to lead an exercise to prioritize the remaining camps and address first those with the greatest needs.
Recommendation 3: The Government of Haiti should lead a process to standardize the approach to camp closure programs and clarify the responsibilities of actors involved (central government, municipal government and/or international agencies).

Given that primary responsibility for the protection of IDPs lies with the Government of Haiti; given that the most successful programs have been those where the Government of Haiti has shown clear leadership and has been operationally involved in registration, grievance mechanisms and dismantling of empty tents; given the increasing role of the Government of Haiti itself as a direct implementer of camp closure programs through the Ministry of the Interior (DPC) and Communal authorities (Mayors); and given the increased coordination made possible through the creation of the Housing Agency (Unite de Construction, Logement et Batiments Public), the Return Working Group advocates for the UCLBP to formally clarify the roles and responsibilities in camp closure programs of each of the involved actors: Central Government; Ministry of Interior (DPC); UCLBP; Mayors; International Agencies and NGOs.

Recommendation 4: The Government of Haiti and donors should fund long-term investment in social housing and the rehabilitation of neighborhoods.

Given that Rental Support Cash Grants represent a humanitarian intervention to offer a helping hand and do not address all the long-term needs of the populations of camps, or the urban poor living in the neighborhoods of return, the Returns Working Group advocates for development donors to support the Government of Haiti in its efforts to rehabilitate neighborhoods, rebuild damaged houses, create social housing, invest in basic social infrastructure and increase access to sustainable income generation opportunities.

Recommendation 5: The Government of Haiti and donors should fund further study of results for families beyond the one year project cycle.

Given the pilot nature of the programs described in this document; given that the programs described have limited timeframes; and given that so few families have reached the end of the one year period of assistance, the Returns Working Group recommends the Government of Haiti and international donors make available funding for further study of these programs to document one and two years down the line the results of the intervention for individual families and the conclusions to be drawn for future emergencies.

One key indicator which must be tracked over at least 18-24 months is the housing status of families after the one year of rental support comes to an end. This data will be essential for future assessments of the fundamental approach of offering a “helping hand” for one year during the humanitarian response.
Champs de Mars camp which housed 17,000 people directly in front of the Presidential Palace is now once again a public park after the Rental Support Cash Grant program helped every family to find an alternative housing solution.
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