# Haiti Earthquake Response

## Context Analysis

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ALNAP
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action

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**Humanitarian Outcomes** is an independent team of professionals providing evidence-based analysis and policy consultations to governments and international organisations on their humanitarian response efforts.

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# Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| ACAPS | Assessment Capacities Project |
| ACF | Action Contre la Faim |
| ALNAP | Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action |
| CCCM | Camp Coordination Camp Management |
| CDAC | Communication with Disaster Affected Communities |
| DINEPA | Haitian National Directorate of Water and Sanitation |
| DPC | Haitian National Directorate of Civil Protection |
| DPKO | United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| DSRSG | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| ECHO | European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office |
| ERC | Emergency Relief Coordinator |
| ERRF | Emergency Response Relief Fund |
| EU/JRC | European Union's Joint Research Centre |
| FADH | Haitian Armed Forces |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GoH | Government of Haiti |
| HC | Humanitarian Coordinator |
| HCT | Humanitarian Country Team |
| HNP | Haitian National Police |
| IADB | Inter-American Development Bank |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| ICF | Interim Cooperation Framework |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IFRC | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IRC | International Rescue Committee |
| JOTC | Joint Operations and Tasking Centre |
| MICAH | Civilian Support Mission in Haiti |
| MINUSTAH | United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti |
| MIPONUH | United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |

| | |
|---|---|
| OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OECD-DAC | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development–Development Assistance Committee |
| OHCHR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| PAHO | Pan American Health Organization |
| PDNA | Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework |
| PDSRSG | Political Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| PMCC | Project Management Coordination Cell |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| RC | Resident Coordinator |
| RINAH | Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti |
| SMS | Short Message Service |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDAC | United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNMIH | United Nations Mission in Haiti |
| UNOSAT | UN Institute for Training and Research's Operational Satellite Applications Programme |
| UNSMIH | United Nations Support Mission in Haiti |
| UNTMIH | United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USAR | Urban Search and Rescue |
| WASH | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

# 1 Introduction

The earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010 killed more than 200,000 people, injured 300,000 and left over one million homeless. With its epicentre only ten kilometres below the surface and close to the urban centres of Port-au-Prince, Leogane and Jacmel, the earthquake was the most powerful the country had experienced in 200 years. In response, a massive relief and recovery effort has been undertaken by a complex array of national and international actors, one of the largest since the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004.

Following the tsunami and other recent crises, including those in Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of the main experiences of operational staff was 'evaluation overload'—the high-profile and highly funded crisis saw an evaluative effort that was in some ways as fragmented as the response itself. ALNAP, together with the OECD-DAC Evaluation Network and other key parties, is working to address this issue in the Haiti response and to ensure that the evaluative effort is joined up, coherent and does not place undue burden on the operational agencies nor on local communities, whilst ensuring learning and accountability efforts are being taken forward. (ALNAP's list of major evaluation efforts ongoing at the time of this writing is appended as Annex 1.)

This context analysis and evaluative framework are primarily targeted at humanitarian practitioners, policy-makers in humanitarian organisations and those involved in the evaluation of the Haiti earthquake response. It also addresses other stakeholders who have an influence on how humanitarian assistance is understood and implemented, both in Haiti and other emergencies around the world.

The context analysis and evaluative framework aim to

- provide a useful contextual background for operational reflection based on material available at the time of writing (April-May 2010);
- serve as a sound and shared foundation for evaluative efforts going forward;
- suggest an overarching set of questions contextualised for the Haiti response that might inform the development of a shared evaluation framework—addressing different evaluation criteria (OECD, RC-RC-NGO Code of Conduct, etc.)—and to be used to analyse and provide a compendium of the different evaluation efforts planned and underway; and
- provide a useful structure for a future system-wide synthesis report on the Haiti response.

In preparing the context analysis and evaluative framework, information based on a number of sources was collected. A literature review was conducted, drawing on a range of documents and reports—including information related to the real time evaluations currently underway or in the pipeline. Using a simple questionnaire, face-to-face, telephone or email interviews were conducted with a small number of key informants who have first-hand experience of the earthquake response.

# 2 Political, economic and social context

Haiti has endured political instability, chronic challenges in governance and the highest levels of poverty in the Western Hemisphere (UNDP, Transparency International 2009, Rice and Patrick 2008). According to several indexes measuring states' fragility, Haiti performs particularly poorly, ranking twelfth out of 177 countries in the Failed States Index (Fund for Peace 2009) and 129th of 141 countries according to the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Rice and Patrick 2008). This section provides a background to the political, economic and social context of Haiti.

**Timeline of events since independence**

| | |
|---|---|
| 1804 | Hispaniola is declared an independent republic and renamed Haiti, land of the mountains. |
| 1915–34 | US occupies Haiti. |
| 1934 | US withdraws troops from Haiti, but maintains fiscal control until 1947. |
| 1937 | Haitians are massacred in the Dominican Republic and along the border. |
| 1956 | Physician François 'Papa Doc' Duvalier seizes power in a military coup and is elected president a year later. |
| 1971 | Duvalier dies and is succeeded by his son, Jean-Claude ('Baby Doc'). |
| 1986 | Baby Doc is forced into exile in France by an uprising, ending the 29-year family dictatorship. |
| 1990 | Former Roman Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide becomes the first democratically elected president. |
| 1991 | Aristide is overthrown by the military. |
| 1993–96 | UN conducts its first peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). |
| 1993 | UN imposes sanctions after the military regime rejects an accord facilitating Aristide's return. |
| 1994 | Military regime relinquishes power upon the arrival of US forces; Aristide returns. Aristide dismantles the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH) and the Haitian National Police (HNP) is created. |
| 1995 | UN peacekeepers begin to replace US troops; Rene Préval is elected in December to replace Aristide as president. |
| 1996–97 | UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) in operation. |
| 1997 | UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) in operation. |
| 1997–2000 | UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) in operation. |
| 2000–01 | Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) in operation. |
| 2000 | Aristide wins a second presidential election, amid allegations of irregularities. |
| 2004 | Aristide is forced into exile in South Africa; US forces restore order and are later replaced by the sixth UN mission, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).<br>Severe floods kill more than 5,000 people, including 3,000 in the wake of tropical storm Jeanne; international donors pledge more than $1bn in aid. |
| 2006 | René Préval is declared the winner of the first presidential elections after an internationally brokered deal over disputed results. |
| 2008 | A series of tropical storms devastate Haiti, killing more than 800 people and leaving nearly 1 million homeless or in need of aid.<br>At least 95 people are killed when a school collapses on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince; authorities blame poor construction. |
| 2009 | The World Bank and International Monetary Fund cancel US$1.2 billion of Haiti's debt—80 per cent of the total—after judging it to have fulfilled economic reform and poverty reduction conditions. |
| 2010 | More than 200,000 people are killed, 300,000 injured and over one million left homeless when a magnitude 7.0 earthquake hits Port-au-Prince and neighbouring towns, Jacmel and Leogane. |

*Sources:* AlertNet 2010, UN Office of the Special Envoy 2010.

## 2.1 Political context

The brutal campaigns of Haiti's founding leaders, the electoral practice of 'winner takes all' and shifting geopolitical priorities have consistently prevented the emergence of democratic institutions and have led to overall weak governance (Khouri-Padova 2004, Muggah 2009). Like many developing countries struggling with poverty and instability, Haiti's massive unemployment, weak government institutions, lack of public infrastructure and serious environmental degradation are recognised as contributing factors to violence and related security problems throughout the country (CDA 2010a).

Some would argue against the classification of Haiti as a 'fragile' or 'failed' state, highlighting favourable factors such as its geographic location in an untroubled region, an absence of ethnic divisions and a huge and proximate diaspora (Collier 2009).

Haiti's troubled history of political instability dates back to the French colonial administration and the bloody civil war that led to its independence in 1804. Since independence, Haiti has seen 55 'presidents' of which three were assassinated or executed, seven died in office (one by suicide), 23 were overthrown by the military or paramilitary groups and only nine completed full presidential terms (Buss 2008)[1].

The origins of Haiti's experience of internal conflict can be traced back to pre-independence in France's violent policies to maintain slavery during the colonial period. The US continued the tradition of violence throughout their occupation (1915–34), during which 15,000 people were killed (Flood, in UNICEF 2010) and doing little to either promote governance or lay the foundations for lasting stability in Haiti (CDA 2010a).

The reign of the Duvaliers (Francois 'Papa Doc' and his son, Jean Claude 'Baby Doc') from 1957 to 1986,saw the employment of armed militias (such as the *Tonton Macoutes*) to enforce the new order. Growing frustration with the dictatorship, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, and the extreme poverty—despite multilateral and bilateral assistance pouring in—led to public outrage and popular violence throughout the country. As Maguire (1996, 8) observes,

> For most Haitians, the state existed primarily through its mechanisms of predation: the office of taxation (Bureau de Contributions), the army, and the makouts. That is, the state was both a phantom where government services were concerned and elsewhere a predator.

The subsequent period was characterised by a struggle for Haiti's future between three main groups: (i) those that favoured democratic governance, demanding elections (*Chak Kat Ans* or Every Four Years); (ii) those looking to a return of power to the armed forces and (iii) the Haitian elites (Maguire 1996, CDA 2010a).

Further blood was shed during the military coup d'état that removed Aristide from power only seven months after being democratically elected as president in 1990. Upon his restoration to power, Aristide set out to implement a series of reforms

1 The word 'president' is used by Buss to describe all leaders of Haiti since independence.

**Political indicators**

| Corruption Perception | |
|---|---|
| Index rank (2009) | 168 out of 180 countries |
| Failed States Index rank (2009) | 12 out of 177 countries |
| Index of State Weakness in the Developing World rank (2008) | 129 out of 141 countries |
| Democracy Index rank (2008) | 110 out of 167 countries |
| KOF Overall Globalization Index rank (2010) | 164 out of 208 countries |
| Ease of Doing Business Index rank (2010) | 151 out of 183 countries |

*Sources:* Dreher 2006, Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, Fund for Peace 2009, Privacy International 2007, Rice and Patrick 2008, Transparency International 2009, World Bank 2010

that included disbanding the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH) and reconstituting the Haitian National Police (HNP). The demobilisation process returning ex-FADH soldiers to civilian life was described as a 'dismal failure' as their weapons were merely re-circulated and because command and control remained largely untouched (Muggah 2007, 169).

The late 1990s were characterised by a more positive outlook in terms of governance and peace building, with the first democratic transfer of the presidency in Haiti's history (Aristide to Préval in 1996). However, shortly after widespread corruption and human rights abuses on the part of the HNP, cross-border massacres in the Haiti-Dominican Republic border region and highly contested elections saw another spike in violence that ended with Aristide being ousted from his second administration.

Successive United Nations peacekeeping missions during the 1990s and 2000s repeatedly failed to bring security, stability and support to Haiti (Hawrylak and Malone 2005). The current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)—composed of militaries and police largely originating from South and Central American countries—has nevertheless been recognised for its role in improving security and reducing criminal activity in the country (ICG 2008).

In its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of 2007, the Haitian government identifies investment in democratic governance—particularly in the areas of justice and security—as essential for the country's growth and the reduction of poverty (Republic of Haiti 2007). Crime and security sector reform (including supporting the HNP and strengthening justice systems and the rule of law) have also been recognised by external observers as essential to stabilisation (ICG 2008). A recent violence assessment conducted in 2009 found that crime in Haiti has decreased over recent years and there is a marked improvement in confidence in the HNP (Kolbe and Muggah 2009).

Increased political and economic stability following the relatively free and fair election of Préval in 2006, the improved security situation and a steadily rising GDP have together contributed to a growing sense of optimism for Haiti's progress and a feeling that it is moving in the right direction (Muggah 2009).

*Key messages: Political context*

- Haitian politics have been volatile and often violent.
- Haiti is recognised as a 'fragile' state due its weak social, economic and political infrastructure, particularly in governance.
- A history of corruption has generated mistrust and scepticism among Haitians, national authorities and the international community.
- In the years leading up to the 2010 earthquake, Haiti's political situation was considered by many to be improving (CDA 2009, ICG 2009, Muggah 2009).

## 2.2 Economic context and ODA

Haiti ranks 149 out of 182 in the 2009 Human Development Index (UNDP 2009), with almost three quarters of the population living below US$2 a day (World Bank 2009a). International financial flows into Haiti are significant, with remittance inflows representing almost one-fifth of Haiti's GDP in 2007, and ODA per capita reaching US$92 in 2008 (OECD 2010).

The small Haitian private sector is fragmented, leaving the majority of Haitians to survive in the informal sector, with no guarantee of employment, income or access to capital. Privatisation of public services related to the health, education, transportation and water sectors see Haitians pay high prices for public goods. In addition, mistrust exists between the Haitian public and private sectors, further jeopardising their potential to together lay the foundations for economic growth and a wider distribution of income (Inter-American Dialogue and Canadian Foundation for the Americas 2005).

An estimated three million Haitians living abroad maintain close connections with their homeland by sending remittances, the majority from adopted homes in the US, Canada and France (ICG 2007). Grassroots microfinance institutions such as Fonkoze[2] facilitated such money transfers in addition to a range of other financial services,

2 http://www.fonkoze.org

**Economic indicators**

| | |
|---|---|
| Human Development Index rank (2009) | 149 out of 182 countries |
| Human Poverty Index rank (2009) | 97 out of 135 countries |
| GDP per capita (2008) | US$729 |
| GDP growth (2008) | 1.3% |
| Inflation rate (2008) | 15.5% |
| Ratio of the richest 10% to the poorest 10% (1992–2007) | 54.4% |
| Population living below US$2 a day (2000–7) | 72.1% |
| Remittance inflows (2008) | US$1,300 million |
| Remittance inflows as a share of GDP (2007) | 18.7% |
| ODA funding received (2008) | US$912 million |
| Non-ODA funding for peacekeeping operations (2008) | US$575 million |
| ODA per capita (2008) | US$92 |

*Sources:* OECD 2010, UNDP 2009, World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009b

including micro-credit, small- and medium-sized business development loans, savings products and basic education programmes (literacy, business skills and life skills training).

Official development assistance (ODA) to Haiti has fluctuated over the past 20 years, rising sharply since 2002—mainly due to humanitarian aid flows following tropical storms in 1994, several hurricanes in 2008 and food riots in 2008—particularly in the areas of development aid and peacekeeping (OECD 2009). Humanitarian aid to Haiti reached a total of US$175 million in 2008—just over 20 per cent of total ODA (Coppard 2010). Haiti's principal donors are the United States, Canada, the Inter-American Bank and the European Commission (OECD 2009).

The absence of predictable financing and a coherent aid strategy for Haiti have negative impacts on peace building, reconstruction and economic development efforts (Chataigner and Gaulme 2005, ICG 2009, Muggah 2009, OECD and CIDA 2010). According to the International Crisis Group (2009, 5),

> . . . a clear strategic and comprehensive policy approach does not exist. Funding fluctuates in accordance with political circumstances, donor strategies vary, and the government has little influence over the use of funds. Project visibility, not good results, is often the priority.

Gaps in funding have also been observed between emergency and longer term recovery activities, with one finishing before the other has begun in earnest (Republic of Haiti 2008). For example, the Interim Co-operation Framework (ICF)—a needs assessment or funding mechanism based on the themes of the government's transition strategy that identified activities for the subsequent transition period (July 2004 to September 2006)—has proved unsuccessful in mobilising international support.

With the exception of the electoral sector, where the UN Development Programme (UNDP) established a mechanism for the joint pooling of funds, no trust fund was established for the implementation of the ICF. Donors preferred traditional mechanisms such as financing through direct bilateral projects and sub-contracting to NGOs and other implementing partners (UNDGO and the World Bank 2006).

### *Key messages: Economic context*

- Haiti is very poor, with a small elite of very rich people.
- Haiti has received much aid throughout its recent history, but funding has often been incoherent and unpredictable, particularly for transition.
- The Haitian private sector is small and fragmented and is suspicious of the public sector (and vice versa).

## 2.3 Social context

Throughout Haiti's history, the economic and cultural divisions between a small, urban, mixed-race francophone elite and the majority—black, Creole-speaking peasants—have generated widespread resentment (Kumar, in CDA 2010). Approximately one quarter of the country's total population of 9.7 million lives in Port-au-Prince. The rapid urbanisation has a negative impact on the local environment and the country's natural resources (UNDP 2009, UNFPA 2010). In 2007 45.6 per cent of the population lived in urban centres that have more than doubled in size since 1982. As a result vulnerable populations live in high-density and often appalling living conditions in slums, triggering public health and other problems (UNFPA 2010, Groupe URD 2004).

Populations living in slums are particularly vulnerable to crime and violence, as armed gangs base their operations in shanty towns. Cité Soleil, the largest and most famous slum in Port-au-Prince houses between 200,000 and 300,000 people, most of whom live in extreme poverty. Since 2007 MINUSTAH has been recognised for its achievements in disarming gangs and improving overall security in Cité Soleil (ICG 2008).

The emergence and evolution of an autonomous and active civil society during the governments of Aristide and Préval in the late 1990s demonstrated the potential for groups such as unions, peasant organisations, human rights groups and trade and professional associations to participate in developing more democratic political structures. Religious and economic institutions, including the Catholic and Protestant churches as well as the Chamber of Commerce, also played a role in political processes in Haiti (Khouri-Padova 2004).

Since the Duvalier era, the weakness of Haitian governance institutions and infrastructure has affected its ability to deliver public services to its citizens. As a result, NGOS have stepped in, bringing international aid to fill the gaps. Some argue that this has reinforced state weakness (Smith, in CDA 2010, 5):

> Relieving the state of its duty and doing little to augment the power of the poor, these growing flows of aid played a key role in reinforcing the existing status quo.

Approximately three million Haitians are currently living abroad, comprising representatives of the wealthy elite (some who left voluntarily), the middle and educated upper class (many were political

**Social indicators**

| | |
|---|---|
| Population (2010) | 10.2 million |
| Annual population growth (2005–10) | 1.5% |
| Life expectancy at birth (2008) | 61.0 years |
| Infant mortality rate (2008) | 54 per 1,000 births |
| Population under the age of 15 (2009) | 36% |
| Adult illiteracy rate ages 15 and above (1997–2007) | 37.9% |
| Emigration rate (2000–02) | 7.7% |
| (of which 64.3 per cent emigrate to Northern America) | |
| Urban population (2009) | 50.6% |
| Percentage of urban population living in slums | 86% |
| Urban annual population growth rate (2000–05) | 5.97% |
| Access to improved sanitation (1980–2008) | 51% (urban), 17% (rural) |
| Access to improved water facilities (1980–2008) | 83% (urban), 48% (rural) |
| Government expenditure on health per capita (2006) | US$ 65 |
| Population over the age of 15 with six years of primary education (2009) | 46% (men) |
| | 39% (women) |

*Sources:* Lunde 2009, Republic of Haiti 2007, UN 2008 and 2009, UNData 2010, UNDP 2009, WHO and UNICEF 2010, World Bank 2009a

exiles from the Duvalier era) and the working class (many left recently by boat) (ICG 2007). In addition to their significant economic contribution through remittances and other investments, the Haitian diaspora has demonstrated its potential to contribute to political and reconstruction processes through activism and pressure on their adopted countries to support Haiti (Muggah 2007). The International Crisis Group promotes a 'reverse brain drain' whereby the government of Haiti facilitates the return of skilled and professional expatriates by allowing dual citizenship and diaspora participation in parliament (ICG 2007).

Haiti's history of political instability and competing development priorities have had negative impacts on national institutions and their capacity to conduct disaster risk management (ICG 2009). Haiti's national report on disaster reduction presented at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (Republic of Haiti 2005) notes the weakness in national structures such as the National Civil Protection[3] and the need to strengthen local and national capacities to implement the national plan on disaster risk management developed in 2001. Partly as a result of these ongoing weaknesses, recent disasters such as those following the 2004 and 2008 hurricane seasons have demonstrated that Haiti remains at risk and highly vulnerable. Indeed, the country was still recovering from the 2008 storms when the earthquake struck in January.

3 Responsible for the entirety of Haiti's domestic disaster response (the equivalent to FEMA in the U.S.).

Environmental and associated disaster risks are further compounded by an extremely high national rate of deforestation (99 per cent) and land erosion (UNFPA 2010). Other environmental concerns are charcoal dependence, high levels of rural and urban pollution and the absence of a solid waste collection and recycling system (ICG 2009).

High levels of insecurity have affected aid efforts over the years, particularly during the mid-2000s, which saw a wave of abductions. Humanitarian actors in Haiti are confronted with a range of additional access related challenges. For UN agencies and programmes, and those who follow strict rules dictated by the UN Department for Safety and Security, Haiti is designated as a 'Phase III' duty station, with restricted access and mobility to certain areas of the country. Most NGOs also follow stringent security procedures and practices.

### *Key messages: Social context*

- Haiti has weak social indicators and poor access to basic services.
- A rapidly urbanising country, with many Haitians living in insecure and extremely poor conditions in city slums.
- Haitians rely heavily on remittances sent by the diaspora abroad.
- Haiti is vulnerable to a range of natural disasters, further exacerbated by high levels of environmental degradation.

**Five key readings on Haiti's political, economic and social contexts**


AlertNet. *Country Profile: Haiti*. 2010. http://www.alertnet.org/db/cp/haiti.htm.

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# 3 Lessons learnt and evaluations of disaster responses

Haiti's response capacity and risk reduction efforts are undermined by its history of weak governance institutions. The country is highly vulnerable to disasters such as floods, landslides, storms, hurricanes, tsunamis and earthquakes. Between 2001 and March 2007, disasters resulted in 18,441 deaths, 4,708 injuries and 132,000 homeless; some 6.4 million people were affected and damage was estimated at US$4.6 billion (ICG 2009).

This section presents a series of lessons learnt and evaluations of disaster responses. Section 3.1 looks at lessons from past responses to disasters of relevance around the world or that could be applied to the Haiti earthquake response. Section 3.2 reviews lessons from past responses to disasters in Haiti.

Only two years ago, during the Caribbean hurricane season of 2008, hurricanes Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike together affected one million people and resulted in damage costing approximately 15 per cent of Haiti's GDP.

However, the number of casualties of the 2008 hurricane season (800) is considerably lower than that of the Hurricane Jeanne in September 2004, which caused the death of approximately 5,000 people in the north and north-west of the country. The Haitian government credits risk reduction measures as such as public awareness-raising, early warning and evacuation systems and training for the reduced loss of life (Republic of Haiti 2010a).

In addition to its vulnerability to hydro-meteorological hazards, Haiti is located in a seismically active zone. The country's two biggest towns, Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien, sit directly on fault lines. The last major earthquake to hit Haiti was 200 years ago.

## 3.1 Lessons learnt from past responses to disasters

A range of resources providing lessons learnt from responses to earthquakes and other disasters highlight the following themes:

- impacts of emergency interventions on recovery, reconstruction and risk reduction
- community participation and capitalising on local capacities
- national ownership and coordination of response and recovery
- humanitarian coordination and leadership.
- information and communication to affected communities
- social cohesion, family and community groupings
- shelter, resettlement and responding to urban disasters
- livelihoods, cash-for-work and cash transfers

**Summary of the last four disasters in Haiti**

| Year | Event | Effect on GDP | Individuals Affected | Dead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2004 | Hurricane Jeanne | 7% of GDP | 300,000 | 5,000 |
| 2007 | Hurricanes Dean and Noel | 2% of GDP | 194,000 | 330 |
| 2008 | Hurricanes Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike | 15% of GDP | 1,000,000 | 800 |
| 2010 | Earthquake | 100% of GDP | 2,000,000 | 222,500 |
| **TOTAL** | | | **3,494,000** | **228,600** |

*Source:* Republic of Haiti, Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) 2010

### *3.1.1 Impacts of emergency interventions on recovery, reconstruction and risk reduction*

Lessons from responses to earthquakes highlight the need for response and recovery to start on day one (IRC 2010; O'Donnell, Smart and Ramalingam 2009). Aid workers should avoid prolonging the relief phase, recognising that in the case of disasters there is no gap or stability phase *per se* and that humanitarian interventions have the potential to strengthen or undermine future development (Cosgrave 2008, IEG 2010, IRC 2010).

Disaster risk reduction also emerges as a principal theme that plays an integral role in 'building back better' and linking emergency preparedness, contingency planning and other risk reduction initiatives with recovery and reconstruction to reduce vulnerability to future disasters (Cosgrave 2008; IRC 2010; O'Donnell, Smart and Ramalingam 2009).

### *3.1.2 Coordination, leadership and national ownership*

A 2007 evaluation of the cluster approach to humanitarian coordination found that the system has not performed particularly well in sudden-onset emergencies in prioritising interventions and allocating resources (Stoddard et al. 2007). The study noted that while the cluster approach has helped to foster more predictable leadership, ultimate accountability for the response remains an issue.

Lessons learnt from past responses to disasters highlight the importance of engaging with national and local authorities and civil society groups. Such partnerships are essential for promoting national ownership and coordination before, during and following a disaster, paving the way for a sustainable recovery (O'Donnell, Smart and Ramalingam 2009).

### *3.1.3 Community participation*

The urgency associated with responding to disasters can result in aid workers overlooking local capacity and neglecting community participation in the emergency response (IEG 2010). Lessons learnt from responses to past disasters demonstrate that community participation in decision-making, implementation and evaluation of humanitarian efforts generates positive results, particularly in strengthening local capacities (CDA 2010b, Cosgrave 2008).

Close consultation with communities is recommended as a means of ensuring that relief and recovery policies and programmes are needs-based, reflect community priorities and avoid negatively impacting vulnerable groups such as women, youth, children and others 'at risk' (CDA 2010b, IRC 2010).

### *3.1.4 Social cohesion, family and community groupings*

The importance of social cohesion and community groupings emerges as a key lesson for rebuilding after a disaster (CDA 2010b, IEG 2010). Large-scale natural disasters such as the 2004 tsunami can create opportunities for resolving social and political 'contradictions' through the stimulation of national dialogue, for example in as happened Aceh, Indonesia (CDA 2010b). In urban settings, family and social networks play a central role in the response, serving as means of targeting communities that have taken in friends and relatives affected by the disaster (IEG 2010, IRC 2010).

### *3.1.5 Information and communication with affected communities*

The value of information from and communication with affected communities were lessons that emerged from a range of experiences following disasters. Aid workers are advised to 'slow down' and take the time to learn the local context, to 'listen more' and be accountable to local people by developing mechanisms to both receive and provide information about the response to communities (CDA 2010b).

Developing a dissemination strategy and using local advertising and marketing capacities are cited as effective means to communicate decisions, convey key messages and reach target groups (IEG 2010, IRC 2010). Sound communication and community outreach in a post-disaster setting are also recognised as critical to minimising crime and looting, maintaining a stable environment and enabling progress in relief and recovery (O'Donnell, Smart and Ramalingam 2009).

**Five studies on lessons learnt from past responses to disasters**

Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. *Lessons Learned from Past Experience for International Agencies in Haiti*. CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Cambridge, MA, February 2010. http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/article_general/cda_lessons_for_haiti_draft_20100203_Pdf.pdf.

Cosgrave, J. *Responding to Earthquakes 2008: Learning from Earthquake Relief and Recovery Operations*. ALNAP and ProVention Consortium. London, July 2008. http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/ALNAPLessonsEarthquakes.pdf.

Independent Evaluation Group. *World Bank Group Response to the Haiti Earthquake: Evaluative Lessons*. World Bank, IFC, MIGA. 2010. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOED/Resources/disaster_note.pdf.

International Rescue Committee. *Haiti Earthquake 2010: Lessons Learned and Essential Questions*. Lessons from ALNAP, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and correspondence with Camilo Valderrama about IRC's Pakistan earthquake response. January 2010. http://oneresponse.info/Disasters/Haiti/Education/publicdocuments/Haiti_earthquake%20_lessons_learned_200110.docx.

O'Donnell, I., and K. Smart with B. Ramalingam. *Responding to Urban Disasters: Learning from Previous Relief and Recovery Operations*. ALNAP and ProVention Consortium. London, June 2009. http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/alnap-provention-lessons-urban.pdf.

#### *3.1.6 Urban disasters, shelter and resettlement*

Past experience shows that urban disasters are different than those occurring in rural settings. They have distinctive features of scale, density, economic systems and livelihood strategies, resource availability, governance and public expectations, large informal settlements, likelihood for compound and complex disasters and potential for secondary impacts on rural or regional producers (O'Donnell, Smart and Ramalingam 2009). Targeting assistance is particularly challenging in urban settings (Kelly, in O'Donnell, Smart and Ramalingam 2009, 6), complicated by several factors such as cities' fluid demographics, economic inequity, higher costs of living compared with rural settings and lack of official records related to land and property rights.

Land and property issues and related disputes typically emerge in the aftermath of a disaster, particularly in urban areas where there is high demand for housing (O'Donnell, Smart and Ramalingam 2009). IRC (2010) recommends that the land rights of the poor are supported through accelerated procedures for resolving property disputes and for fair rules on property titles.

Urban environments, with their dense patterns of development, frequent use of multi-story buildings and poor access to infrastructure and services in slums typically require specific shelter solutions (O'Donnell, Smart and Ramalingam 2009).

Lessons from previous disasters recommend minimising resettlement and social dislocation (IEG 2010). Settlement patterns may be dictated by social and economic factors, and post-disaster planning restrictions on land use may have little influence people's preferences to remain near their homes and maintain their social networks (Cosgrave 2008, IRC 2010). Relocation may have a negative impact on livelihoods as well as pose significant risks, such as epidemic disease outbreaks in overcrowded and unsanitary camps (Toole, in Cosgrave 2010).

#### *3.1.7 Livelihoods, cash-for-work and cash transfers*

Past experience in earthquake response shows that livelihoods are the key to recovery (Cosgrave 2008; O'Donnell, Smart and Ramalingam 2009). Providing flexible assistance, by paying people to clear rubble through cash-for-work programmes and providing cash grants targeted at families, allows communities to meet their immediate needs (Cosgrave 2008, IEG 2010, IRC 2010).

### 3.2 Lessons learnt from past responses to disasters in Haiti

#### *3.2.1 Coordination, leadership and national ownership*

The cluster approach was rolled out for the first time in Haiti in response to the 2008 hurricane season. Ten clusters were established, led by UN

and international organisations in conjunction with the corresponding Haitian line ministries: agriculture, coordination and support services, early recovery, education, food assistance, health, logistics, protection, shelter and non-food items and water and sanitation.

A recent evaluation on the cluster approach used in 2008 highlighted the importance of establishing clear roles, and links between and division of labour among humanitarian stakeholders (Binder and Grunewald 2010). The case study also flagged the need for stronger mechanisms within and among clusters to improve overall accountability to both the humanitarian coordinator and affected communities. The involvement of key stakeholders such as national and local authorities and civil society groups is essential to an effective response (Grunewald and Binder 2010).

A discussion paper prepared by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations presenting lessons learnt in Haiti noted the positive impact on coordination and leadership following the appointment of the UN resident coordinator as deputy special representative of the Secretary-General (Khouri-Padova 2004). In contrast, the multiple responsibilities associated with such an appointment was criticised following the 12 January earthquake.

A study of NGOs operating in Haiti observed that while larger international NGOs' efforts to coordinate amongst themselves have proved successful, smaller, grassroots organisations face constraints in time, money or modes of communication to access and coordinate with other like-minded organisations (Benton and Ware 2001).

A recurrent theme in evaluations of past responses to disasters as well as responses to conflict-related crises in Haiti is that engaging government and civil society actors to promote national ownership and coordination paves the way for a sustainable recovery (Khouri-Padova 2004, USAID date unknown). An evaluation of DIPECHO partners' activities in Haiti observed positive results in this regard. Partners encouraged continued engagement with local authorities, promoted national and local leadership of humanitarian planning processes and recommended that project budgets include a component for strengthening local government structures as well as those of local civil society partners (Schuftan et al. 2007).

Reflections on past peacekeeping and peace building operations in Haiti noted 'a striking disconnect between the objectives and plans of the international community and the Haitians', largely due to a lack of appreciation on the part of international aid workers for the complexities of Haitian history and society and its intricate cultural dynamics (Khouri-Padova 2004, 8; Hagman 2002).

### *3.2.2 Community participation*

CARE's disaster response work with local community partners following Tropical Storm Jeanne was commended for promoting relationships with community groups (Wilding, Wood and Regis 2005). However, a lack of genuine participation throughout the project cycle across CARE projects was noted—including the development of systematic mechanisms for feedback—posed a challenge in emergencies 'wherein the imperative to save lives tends to take precedent over participation'(Wildinget al. 2005, 10).

An evaluation of USAID's recovery programme in Haiti following Hurricane Georges in 2002 highlights the benefits of effectively engaging local civil society engagement in response and recovery. The programme enjoyed a high level of community ownership. USAID developed partnerships with community-based organisations for identification, design and implementation of programmes—contributing not only to their success but also to their sustainability (USAID 2002). Another USAID study recognised the role of donors in leading by example by providing information to affected communities, thereby mobilising citizen involvement in aid accountability (USAID date unknown).

An evaluation of USAID's *Haiti Transition Initiative* noted the complexity of urban settings vis-à-vis community participation and communal ownership: urban populations tend to 'look more toward government to solve problems rather than work them out themselves' (Jutkowitz, King and Pierre 2006, 32). The same, however, could be said

in other developing countries that also experience the break down of traditional family and local community support networks when people move from rural areas to cities.

### *3.2.3 Disaster risk reduction*

The Post Disaster Needs Assessment conducted following the 2008 hurricane season highlighted the importance of planning and incorporating early recovery and disaster risk reduction activities at the start of the humanitarian response (Republic of Haiti 2008).

An evaluation of DIPECHO partners' projects in Haiti also strongly recommends that all humanitarian interventions include disaster prevention and mitigation strategies; however, they noted the extraordinary challenges related to the Haitian context as, for most Haitian communities, issues such as livelihoods, health and infrastructure take priority over reducing disaster risk (Gelfand et al. 2009).

Integrating disaster risk reduction in emergency activities remains a challenge for humanitarian organisations. NGOs working in both the humanitarian and development spheres have demonstrated their ability to link humanitarian and risk reduction activities to larger community development processes, thereby resulting in more positive and sustainable impacts (Gelfand et al. 2009).

### *3.2.4 Recovery and livelihoods*

The importance of adopting a long-term approach and continuing international engagement have emerged in various evaluations and lessons learnt exercises conducted on past humanitarian and peace building operations in Haiti (Hagman 2002; Schuftan, Hoogendoorn and Capdegelle 2007).

Cash-for-work activities conducted by Oxfam in response to the floods in north-eastern and southern Haiti (2003–04) enabled the re-establishment of productive assets and access to markets. Activities targeted the most vulnerable and unemployed, giving participants decision-making power on how to spend their wages and cover their immediate household needs (Creti 2005). The importance of engaging women in income generating activities was also highlighted by Schuftan, Hoogendoorn and Capdegelle (2007).

**Five evaluations on past responses to disasters in Haiti**

Creti, P. *Evaluation of the Livelihood Programmes in Mapou and Cape Haitian, Haiti.* Oxfam GB, February 2005. http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/erd-3360-full.pdf.

Gelfand, J., D. Partl and F. Joseph. *Evaluation of DIPECHO Action Plans for the Caribbean.* Aguaconsult, Ltd. for the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO), April 2009. http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/erd-3690-full.pdf.

Binder, A., and F. Grünewald. *Country Study: Haiti.* Cluster Approach Evaluation Phase 2, Groupe URD and Global Public Policy Institute (GPPI), January 2010. http://www.gppi.net/approach/consulting/cluster_approach/.

United States Agency for International Development. *Hurricane Georges Recovery Program.* Final Report. 15 February 2002. http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/erd-3214-full.pdf.

Wilding, J., J. Wood and Y. L. Regis. *Independent Evaluation of CARE's Humanitarian Response to Flooding Resulting from Tropical Storm Jeanne in Haiti (North-west and Artibonite Provinces).* Final Report. CARE International, March 2005. http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/erd-3215-full.pdf.

# 4 Key issues on the response to the 12 January earthquake

This section presents key issues related to the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake that have emerged from a literature review. Eight themes have informed the development of the shared evaluation framework. They are intended to serve as a platform for both real time operational reflections and for longer-term evaluative efforts:

- coordination, leadership and national capacities
- security and civil-military coordination
- financing
- assessments
- information management and communication
- cross-cutting issues
- targeting of beneficiaries
- recovery

A series of questions for evaluators, on the eight key issues, are presented at the end of each sub-section.

## 4.1 Coordination, leadership and national capacities

The already fragile nature of Haiti's governance institutions, compounded by the loss of important government personnel and severely damaged infrastructure, left the government of Haiti in a particularly difficult situation following the earthquake (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010). International community support for the government was slow in the immediate aftermath: while UN agencies and NGOs were moving from tents to 'offices in a box', the president was still conducting coordination meetings under a mango tree.

While some note the slowness in making decisions on the part of the Haitian government, its efforts to respond in certain areas, such as providing support to people returning to rural areas, allowing people and goods to enter the country tax-free and facilitating the humanitarian response effort were welcomed (Oxfam 2010a).

Some local civil administration and civil protection committees have demonstrated their leadership by assisting people within their jurisdiction and promoting their recovery, working with local structures, grassroots organisations (including the church) and communities (Oxfam 2010a). However, as found in previous disasters, coordination between the international humanitarian community and their national and local counterparts within the Haitian government and civil society has been particularly weak, resulting in weak national and local ownership (Duplat and Perry 2010, Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

A lack of inclusiveness on the part of the international community has been attributed to a range of factors such as ambiguity on how to engage with clusters (ICG 2010); difficulties in transport and access to the main humanitarian operation hub (MINUSTAH's logistic base or LogBase) where most cluster coordination meetings are conducted; linguistic challenges whereby many important coordination meetings hosted by international actors are conducted in English, while those of national actors are in French; and a scarcity of valuable coordination and information materials in French or in appropriate formats (the main information Web platform, OneResponse, is largely in English) (Duplat and Perry 2010, Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

Focus groups with representatives of local communities have revealed Haitians' concern regarding the management of aid, emphasising the importance of local authorities being accountable and working in partnership with the national government and the international community in the reconstruction process (Help et al. 2010).

The urban search and rescue (USAR) effort saw the largest ever deployment; 53 USAR teams rescued 211 people trapped under collapsed buildings. USAR efforts were widely praised for their swift deployment and close coordination with UNDAC, though some observed the tendency for certain USAR teams to rescue their nationals before rescuing Haitians (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has coordinated efforts between twelve clusters[4] led by UN agencies and other international humanitarian actors. Field-based clusters were also activated in Jacmel, Leogane and Petit Goave. In the Dominican Republic, a coordination structure was established that mirrored the clusters operating in Haiti, to provide logistics support as well as ensuring the coverage of relief operations in border provinces.

Having already used the cluster mechanism during the humanitarian response to the 2008 hurricane season and throughout contingency planning exercises, the revival of clusters by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) immediately after the earthquake was relatively smooth, with cluster leads swift to take up their responsibilities (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010). However some judged that 'form takes precedence over substance', perceiving a lack of strategic leadership in the humanitarian operation (ICG 2010, Oxfam 2010). Some attribute this lack to the number of cluster members.

Sub-clusters and smaller working groups were created to allow for more effective and manageable meetings. The high number of coordination meetings meant that humanitarian organisations—particularly smaller NGOs—were not always able to participate in important cluster meetings and decision-making processes due to lack of human and material resources.

The enormous influx of international NGOs—particularly US-based organisations, due to their proximity—has further complicated coordination of the humanitarian response, raising the issue of how to manage such a high volume while ensuring efficient decision-making and action. Many NGOs and cluster coordinators arrived in Haiti with little knowledge of the local context and limited operational relevance, working independently according to their respective agendas (Grünewald and Binder 2010, Grünewald and Renaudin 2010, Oxfam 2010). Graffiti around Port-au-Prince proclaiming *Aba ONG vole!* (down with thieving NGOs), reflected Haitians' impatience and frustration with the response.

An NGO Coordination Support Office was established at the On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) by two international NGO consortia[5] to facilitate coordination and 'add value to the work of the broader humanitarian community and particularly NGOs—local, national, and international, including community based organisations' (NCSO 2010, 1).

Difficult physical working and living conditions for international aid workers has made coordination particularly challenging (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010). Early in the response, most were living and working at MINUSTAH LogBase in tents with minimal access to hygiene facilities; meetings were held under tarps and tents around the compound and were regularly interrupted by the drone of planes landing and taking off. The lack of transport presented challenges to aid workers' efforts to maintain contact and coordinate with their counterparts and affected communities (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

High turnover between rotating short-term 'surge' capacity personnel presented additional challenges for coordination and continuity of operations (Oxfam 2010). While the deployment of initial surge capacity was crucial to supporting organisations in shock in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the impact of the multiple waves of incoming staff for short missions is yet to be known. MINUSTAH capacity was maintained throughout the emergency period by temporarily redeploying more than 300 volunteer staff from other peacekeeping missions and UN Headquarters (MINUSTAH 2010b).

4 Camp coordination and camp management (led by IOM), education (UNICEF), emergency shelter and non-food items (IFRC), food (WFP), logistics (WFP), nutrition (UNICEF), protection (OHCHR with UNICEF for Child Protection and UNFPA for GBV), WASH (UNICEF), agriculture (FAO), early recovery (UNDP), emergency telecommunications (WFP), health (WHO/PAHO).

5 International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and American Council for Voluntary Action (InterAction)

Flag-raising among humanitarian organisations and donors wanting to highlight their individual contributions has also been noted for impeding coordination efforts (BBC 2010, ICG 2010), as has the lack of cluster coordination capacity. In an email leaked to the media, Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes expressed his disappointment in the lack of capacity, noting, 'This lack of capacity has meant that several clusters have yet to establish a concise overview of needs and develop coherent response plans, strategies and gap analyses. This is beginning to show and is leading others to doubt our ability to deliver' (Beiser 2010, Lynch 2010).

An earthquake survivor who remained in country until her resignation in late March 2010, the humanitarian and resident coordinator (HC/RC) led the HCT in the overall humanitarian response. However, insufficient support within the office of the HC/RC at the outset of the operation to focus on humanitarian leadership and the multiple responsibilities of coordinator as well as deputy special representative of the secretary-general (DSRSG) made her job particularly difficult. The fact that the first HCT meeting took place more than three weeks after the disaster is cited by some as a clear indication of the herculean nature of the HC/RC/DSRSG role (Duplat and Parry 2010, Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

Repeatedly mentioned in almost all accounts of the earthquake response was that logistics has proved to be a major impediment to humanitarian operations. The airport was operating beyond capacity, and the port was severely damaged (though it was later repaired to receive shipments). With the lack of offloading capacity, trucks, fuel or storage, and the required military escorts for relief distribution, the response was, in the words of the ERC, 'a Herculean job' (OCHA 2010b, 1). A Red Cross report released in late March observed that the ports, warehousing and trucking systems are being stressed by all the humanitarian aid coming into the country, with volumes of goods being so large they cannot be used for months; meanwhile, critical goods have no space to be imported (IFRC 2010).

At the time of writing, an inter-agency real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response is being conducted following a decision of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Groupe URD and GPPi 2010). It focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of current humanitarian coordination mechanisms in Haiti, including early recovery efforts and the subsequent transition to recovery. The results of the evaluation are expected to allow for reflection and real-time feedback on the response.

*Key questions*

- To what extent did international humanitarian actors assess Haitian government capacities, work with and provide support to national and local authorities?
- How effectively did international actors work with government at national, department and municipal levels?
- How effectively did international actors work with Haitian civil society institutions and organisations?
- Given the extraordinary influx of aid actors, did the coordination system effectively prioritise capacity and assets to match urgent needs?
- Were there too many aid actors involved in the earthquake response? What effects did the influx of organisations have on efficiency and effectiveness?

## 4.2 Security and civil-military coordination

While the security situation in Haiti notably improved in the years preceding the earthquake, the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP) remains fragile and dependent on support from MINUSTAH and the UN civilian police (UNPOL). Like many other branches of government and international actors, the security sector experienced heavy human losses, including 77 dead and 253 severely injured HNP officers as well as the loss of the Interim UNPOL Commissioner. MINUSTAH suffered the single greatest loss of personnel in the history of the United Nations, including its special representative of the secretary-general as well as much of its senior leadership (MINUSTAH 2010a).

During the initial relief response, UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) members

and search and rescue teams were confronted with a range of security challenges. Until the adjustment of MINUSTAH's mandate on 19 January (UN Security Council Resolution 1908), the UNDAC team was unable to use the mission's assets to travel to affected areas (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010). Security regulations imposed by the UN's Department of Safety and Security meant that movements early in the response beyond MINUSTAH's logistics base at Port-au-Prince airport were restricted and required military escorts (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

HNP officers were applauded for their prompt return to work following the earthquake, working with MINUSTAH and UNPOL counterparts to restore security and stability. The vast majority of respondents of a recent survey reviewing security and basic services in Haiti believe that strengthening the capacity of the police would make their community safer; indeed, almost 64 per cent of the general population believe the police are the primary actors responsible for security in 2010—up from 50 per cent in 2009 (University of Michigan and Small Arms Survey 2010).

Claims of looting and violence in the immediate aftermath of the disaster were largely exaggerated by the international media and did not materialise (UN 2010e). However, HNP and UNPOL representatives expressed concern about a rise in security incidents since the disaster, including an increase in sexual violence (particularly in displaced settlements), social unrest and the recapture of 4,188 inmates that escaped from prisons as a direct or indirect result of the earthquake (ICG 2010).

Many recognise the importance of MINUSTAH and UNPOL in strengthening HNP capacity while simultaneously investing in courts and prisons (Duplat and Parry 2010, Grünewald and Renaudin 2010, ICG 2010, Maguire 2010, Oxfam 2010b). A real-time evaluation conducted in February 2010 for the French Ministry of Defence recommends adopting a 'soft' police approach to resolving security issues rather than resorting to military-style means of force (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

The humanitarian operation required significant assets and support from the military. Following the revision of its mandate—whereby its capacity increased from 6,940 to 8,940 troops, and 2,211 to 3,711 police officers—MINUSTAH has demonstrated its potential not only in supporting the security and justice sectors, but also as a key player in the humanitarian response, reconstruction and recovery of Haiti (MINUSTAH 2010a).

On 26 January, MINUSTAH, OCHA and other key partners established the Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC), through which the humanitarian community can request military and police assistance and assets for their activities (MINUSTAH 2010b). The Project Management Coordination Cell (PMCC)— comprising representatives from the Haitian government, the humanitarian community and the military (MINUSTAH and other military actors in-country)—served as a forum through which the various actors could collaborate on decision-making and humanitarian action (e.g., managing debris, clearing drainage canals and resettlement).

Following the dispatch of 20,000 troops to Haiti in support of the relief effort, the US led the restoration of operations at the Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince. The US troops facilitated the arrival and departure of more than 150 humanitarian flights daily and were widely recognised as a valuable contribution to the massive humanitarian response (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010, ICG 2010, UN 2010b). The Canadian military provided similar support to Jacmel airport.

However, the US Air Force's approach to airport operations during the response prioritised security over aid, which raised questions following the diversion of an MSF cargo plane carrying medical supplies to Santo Domingo (MSF 2010, Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

Military support (from MINUSTAH, the US and others) came in the form of escorts for aid distributions, following various incidents of rioting. However, humanitarian organisations have differing policies regarding the use of military assets (including escorts), which at times proved problematic. MINUSTAH troops and UNPOL provided support to HNP patrolling on the streets, slums and in displacement camps.

*Key questions*

- Were security restrictions appropriate or too restrictive, hampering key humanitarian engagement with affected populations?
- Was sufficient support provided to the HNP for security and protection-related activities?
- How effective were coordination mechanisms between the Haitian government, the humanitarian community and military actors? Within these structures, how effectively did humanitarian actors articulate their requirements for support from military actors?
- Were civil-military interactions (MINUSTAH, US troops, Haitian police) undertaken only as necessary for aid delivery, and managed in a way that safeguarded independent and apolitical humanitarian action?

## 4.3 Financing

The original flash appeal requested US$575 million within three days of the earthquake. It was based largely on remote sensing, background information estimation and inference, including early aerial surveys as well as rough initial estimates whereby the earthquake's zones of intensity were plotted against population densities. Because of the enormous scale and impacts of the disaster, the flash appeal was published more quickly than usual. This was facilitated by doing most cluster response plans and projects at headquarters level (OCHA 2010d). By the time the revised appeal was launched one month later, the original flash appeal was 100 per cent funded (including official aid, NGO-collected aid and individual donations) (OCHA 2010e).

On 18 February the HCT revised the flash appeal into a full humanitarian appeal covering twelve months, and requesting US$1.4 billion to cover the activities of 76 aid organisations, the largest ever natural disaster appeal (OCHA 2010e). Since the launch of the revised appeal humanitarian funding has stagnated, with the total funds received rising from 47 to 55 per cent[6] as of 30 April.

6 http://ocha.unog.ch/fts

**Timeline of financing and related events**

| | |
|---|---|
| 12 January | Earthquake strikes Haiti. |
| 13 January | The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocates US$10 million for the earthquake response. |
| 15 January | The original flash appeal is launched, requesting US$575 million to meet the humanitarian needs of the three million people estimated to be severely affected by the earthquake over a period of six months. |
| | The CERF allocates an additional US$15 million for the response. |
| 25 January | Foreign ministers from the 'Friends of Haiti' group and representatives from the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank meet at the Ministerial Preparatory Conference on Haiti in Montreal. |
| 16 February | The original flash appeal is 100 per cent funded. |
| 18 February | The Haiti Revised Humanitarian Appeal is launched, requesting US$1.4 billion—including the US$575 million requested in the original flash appeal—for emergency activities over twelve months. |
| 15–17 March | Donors meet in Santo Domingo for the Preparatory Technical Conference for Haiti. |
| 31 March | Donors pledge a total of US$9.9 billion, of which US$5.3 billion is pledged over two years (against the requested US$3.9 million) in support of the Haitian government's Action Plan for National Recovery and Development at the International Donors Conference 'Towards a New Future for Haiti' in New York. |
| 22 April | UNDP launches the Haiti Reconstruction Platform, a Web portal for aid coordination and tracking. |

Within 72 hours of the earthquake, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) disbursed US$25 million for the earthquake response that financed emergency activities in response to the disaster. As of 30 April, the CERF has allocated a total of US$36.5 million to Haiti.[7]

Established by OCHA in response to the 2008 hurricane season, the in-country Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF) for Haiti evolved, from a relatively small rapid response mechanism receiving funding from a few traditional DAC donors into a much larger fund which serves as an alternative channel for un-earmarked contributions from all donors to the emergency (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2010). By 19 January the ERRF had received US$76 million in pledges, allocating funds to NGOs via their respective clusters to support projects of up to US$750,000 in the areas of early recovery (cash-for-work), camp coordination and camp management, logistics, shelter and non-food items and agriculture.

High-level preparatory and technical donor conferences were held in Montreal (25 January) and Santo Domingo (25–17 March) in the lead up to the 31 March International Donors' Conference in New York whereby a total of US$9.9 billion was pledged (of which US$5.3 billion is to be spent over a two year period) in support of the Haitian Government's Action Plan for National Recovery and Dev*elopment* (drawing on the results of the Post Disaster Needs Assessment).

Following the New York conference a multi-donor trust fund was established. Managed by the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC)—comprising an equal number of Haitians and non-Haitians and co-chaired by former U.S. President Bill Clinton, the UN Special Envoy for Haiti, and by Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive—the Fund mobilises and tracks financing and is administered by the World Bank.

Oxfam (2010, 9) notes the importance of ensuring broad participation in the fund to ensure its legitimacy and its contribution to Haiti's recovery:

> Haitian ownership, leadership and engagement—not just of the government, but of civil society (NGOs, academics, youth groups, trade unions) and the private sector—will help to ensure that the Fund is able to operate effectively and is held to account not just by its donors, but also by the people who are supposed to benefit from it.

Coordinating the enormous influx of aid pledged for Haiti's reconstruction has prompted the creation of an aid tracking mechanism by the United Nations Development Programme—the Haiti Reconstruction Platform.[8] Working closely with the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of External Cooperation, the Office of the Prime Minister, and other public and private partners, the platform is expected to improve Haitians' and the international community's confidence in the government's transparent and efficient coordination of aid (UNDP 2010).

Donations from the private sector for the relief and recovery effort in Haiti have been unprecedented. According to the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy,[9] commitments, pledges and disbursements by private donations totalled US$867.781 million as at 23 March. The *Chronicle of Philanthropy* notes the extraordinary private fundraising efforts of American charities that raised close to US$1 billion for the Haiti earthquake as of 16 March, including US$32 million worth of individual donations to the Red Cross via text message (2010). Over fifty per cent of American households were reported to have donated to the response (AFP 2010).

As of June 20, according to OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS), a total of $1.4 billion in paid disbursements had been received by humanitarian organisations for implementation of Haiti relief programming (with an additional 1.8 billion in the pipeline as 'committed' funding).

| **Disbursements** | |
|---|---|
| **Contribution status** | **US$** |
| Paid contribution | 1,408,650,312 |
| Committed (in process) | 1,755,722,504 |
| Pledged | 1,191,020,550 |
| **Total (including pledges)** | **4,355,393,366** |
| *Source:* FTS (downloaded 20 June 2010) | |

7 http://ochaonline.un.org/cerf/CERFFigures/CountriesreceivingCERFfunds/tabid/1799/language/en-US/Default.aspx

8 http://www.refondation.ht

9 http://s3.amazonaws.com/haiti_production/assets/3/Earthquake_Financing_Mar_23_original.pdf

High-profile personalities such as former presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush (working through the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund) have also raised global awareness of Haiti's plight, encouraging individuals to donate to relief efforts. As the co-chair of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), UN Special Envoy for Haiti, as well as lead in the US fundraising efforts for Haiti (along with former President Bush), former President Clinton is playing an increasingly important role in the recovery and reconstruction of Haiti, capitalising on events such as the launch of the revised humanitarian appeal and high-publicity visits to Haiti to generate media coverage and mobilise funds. Some suggest that he was selected not only for his UN experience and authority following the tsunami, but also for his connections in the US government (Charbonneau 2010).

Following the earthquake, a number of countries to which Haiti was indebted cancelled its debt, including members of the G7 (Canada, US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan), the Inter-American Development Bank and Venezuela. The Haitian government also received a US$7.75 million payout from the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF).

*Key questions*

- Did the amount of money requested through the flash appeal, the International Donors' Conference and other financial mechanisms correspond to the humanitarian needs for response and recovery?
- Did humanitarian organisations effectively absorb and disburse the resources made available to them?
- Is the amount of funding provided for relief activities balanced with that provided for recovery?

## 4.4 Assessments

Early in the response, the first damage assessments were conducted remotely based on satellite imagery obtained from the UN Institute for Training and Research's Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT), the European Union's Joint Research Centre (EU/JRC) and Google Earth, providing an overview of the extent of damage and population displacement and informing the preparation of the original Flash Appeal (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010). Following the arrival of the UNDAC team to Port-au-Prince, a number of ground and aerial assessments were conducted to verify information from the remote damage assessments and identify needs of affected communities.

The inter-cluster Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti (RINAH) was the first of ten multi-sectoral humanitarian assessments[10] that have taken place since the earthquake. Conducted from 25 January to 6 February by ACAPS (assessment capacity of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Needs Assessment Task Force), the RINAH collected information on shelter and non-food items (NFIs); water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); food security and nutrition; health and health facilities and cross-cutting issues.

The delay in release of the RINAH report due to 'a lack of understanding of partners of the [assessment] process' and 'organisational difficulties'—due to security restrictions imposed by UN regulations—(ACAPS 2010) raised questions about whether the huge amount of resources[11] invested in the assessment was worthwhile considering the limited use of the outdated data and findings (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010).

CDC (2010) identified a range of limitations in the RINAH data collection process:

- The questionnaire was not fully adapted to the country and disaster context.
- The questionnaire was available only in French, but the interviews were done predominantly in Creole.
- The length of the questionnaire (12 pages, taking approximately three hours to complete) and transportation constraints resulted in uncompleted surveys leading to incomplete datasets.

10 http://groups.google.com/group/assessmentshaiti

11 According to Grünewald and Renaudin (2010), the RINAH cost US$3 million and required 128 staff, 18 assessors, 23 helicopters and 51 vehicles.

- Some questions may have performed poorly in eliciting expected information because of poor wording, limited training of assessment teams, or other reasons.
- In many cases it was not clear if the focus of the evaluation and the questionnaire was the post-earthquake impact, a general needs assessment reflecting pre-existing poverty or both.

Since then, the earthquake clusters have conducted their own sectoral needs assessments, aiming to inform activities, identify gaps and improve coordination among cluster members. For example, the Displacement Tracking Matrix[12] created in early April—updated on a weekly basis by the CCCM cluster—has served to identify new sites and monitor the assistance, services, and protection provided by the government, inter-governmental, local and international NGOs, community-based organisations and civil society.

A range of inter-agency assessments have been conducted in support of government assessments, such as the Joint Education Rapid Needs Assessment (conducted by the Save The Children, United Nations Children's Fund and the Haitian Ministry of Education), Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA, conducted by the World Food Programme and other Food Cluster members), joint security assessment (conducted by MINUSTAH and partners) and EMMA (Emergency Market Mapping Analysis). While a number of needs assessments and other assessments were conducted, any assessment of local capacities was notably lacking. The Working Group for Assessments in Haiti registers these and other individual organisations' assessments in the 'Survey of Surveys'[13] available online.

Individual organisations have conducted their own assessments to inform specific donor project proposals and to prepare their respective humanitarian interventions. Some difficulties were encountered due to the ambiguity in concepts such as 'displacement' and 'affected' and 'non-affected' populations. This potentially influenced the quality and reliability of the information collected. Some interviewees noticed a possible over-reliance on survey data in assessments, a lack of complementary qualitative analysis and issues with the accuracy of survey data, given endemic corruption and a desire on behalf of those surveyed to maximise possible resource flows.

The Haitian government-led Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) was prepared with the support of the UN, World Bank and European Union. It drew on secondary data from analysis of humanitarian assessments from a recovery perspective in addition to a selection of primary data collected on areas for which, up until then, there had been little information. This second PDNA (the first was conducted following the 2008 hurricane season) covered eight themes (governance, productive sectors, social sectors, infrastructure sectors, territorial development, environment and disaster risk reduction, and the macro economy) in addition to a section on cross-cutting issues (including gender, youth, culture, and social protection).

Detailing human recovery needs and economic and social losses, the PDNA informed the preparation of the government's *Plan d'action pour le relevement et le developpement national* (Action Plan for National Recovery and Development or PARDN) presented at the New York donor conference.

The PDNA process has attracted criticism for leaving out certain representatives of Haitian society. For example, a representative from Haitian civil society, the organisation Advocate Alternative Policy (PAPDA, by its Creole acronym) condemned the process, calling it a scandal because 'the Haitian people's movement and their organisations have been excluded by the international community from decision-making in solutions to this crisis' (Chalmers, in Bell 2010).

Similarly, representatives from the Haiti Gender Equality Collaborative (a coalition of NGOs) joined together to publish a PDNA 'gender shadow report' (AMARC et al. 2010) at a conference held at the same time across the road from the United Nations Secretariat, where the International Donors' Conference was held. The report highlights gender concerns regarding the PDNA, presenting recommendations for more gender-sensitive plans of action to promote and

12 http://groups.google.com/group/cccmhaiti/web/displacement-tracking-matrix?_done=%2Fgroup%2Fcccmhaiti%3F

13 http://groups.google.com/group/assessmentshaiti

protect the rights and participation of Haitian women in the relief and reconstruction processes (2010).

*Key questions*

- Were assessment tools methodologically sound and context specific?
- Were results used in an effective and strategic manner?
- Was there sufficient coordination between needs assessment activities?
- Did large-scale needs assessments such as the RINAH and PDNA provide value for money?

## 4.5 Information management and communication

A range of humanitarian information management tools and mechanisms were used throughout the earthquake response. The inter-cluster Web site 'OneResponse' was piloted in Haiti and served as an online platform for the humanitarian community to share operational data and information relating to the response and recovery. Clusters' information management representatives met on a regular basis to agree on common data standards, exchange information and develop indicators to track the effectiveness of their work.

The earthquake set a number of precedents in terms of communication, media coverage and the use of new technologies for humanitarian response. Many UN and international NGOs and some military actors embraced technologies such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Skype in their work, to coordinate, collaborate and act upon information from the ground generated by people directly affected by the earthquake.

Some credit Twitter with helping the MSF plane land at Port-au-Prince after Twitter users bombarded the US Air Force's Twitter account with demands that the plane be permitted to land—the plane landed less than one hour later (Kennedy 2010). The Haitian musician Wyclef Jean used Twitter to raise awareness and mobilise funding for his Yele Haiti Earthquake fund (Todd 2010), while the Red Cross gained more than 10,000 followers on its Twitter accounts since the disaster (Leberecht 2010).

The Red Cross used Facebook in awareness-raising and for rallying support and private donations for its work in Haiti following the disaster (*Huffington Post* 2010b). Social games accessible through Facebook (such as Farmville) raised US$1.5 million from users in 47 countries over a period of five days for the World Food Programme's food distribution work in Haiti (Zynga 2010).

The earthquake saw an expanding number of actors involved in humanitarian response—both remote and on the ground—introducing a range of innovative information management initiatives. Mission 4636[14] used text messaging to communicate with communities affected by the disaster whereby Haitians could text their location and urgent needs to the telephone number 4636 to receive aid (Hattotuwa and Stauffacher 2010).

The Thomas Reuters Foundation developed an Emergency Information System (EIS) for Haitians to use to report missing persons and shelter and food issues (Large 2010). Similarly, Ushahidi[15] developed an information system for people to gather data via text messages, email or the internet and visualise it on a map or timeline. Other information actors engaged in the earthquake response are Crisis Commons, Crisis Mappers, Open Street Map, Harvard Humanitarian Inititiave, INSTEDD, MIT and Sahana.

A survey following the earthquake found that over half of respondents received their national news from radio (University of Michigan and Small Arms Survey 2010). The inter-agency initiative Communication with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) composed of media organisations and foundations, NGOs and the UN worked with 27 local radio broadcasters to communicate key messages—such as explanations on the food voucher and distribution system—to Haitian communities in Creole via a daily radio programme called *Enfomasyon Nou Dwe Konnen* (Creole for News You Can Use) (Brainard 2010, Large 2010). Wind-up radios provided by the US military were distributed by the NGO Internews (Brainard 2010). However, it remains to be

14 http://www.mission4636.org
15 http://haiti.ushahidi.com/main

determined the extent to which such initiatives actually engaged communities to ensure the accountability of humanitarian actors to affected populations.

Throughout the humanitarian response, language has emerged as an issue, whereby many organisations have struggle to identify staff with sufficient command of the French language. Three months after the earthquake, most coordination meetings are still conducted in English, excluding national and local participation (Oxfam 2010b; Grünewald and Renaudin 2010). Similarly, MINUSTAH experienced difficulties in obtaining francophone UNPOL capacity, presenting additional challenges for capacity-building efforts of the HNP (MINUSTAH 2010).

Media coverage of the delivery of aid distributions raised the issue of divergent perceptions of the response and the disregard of the dignity of affected populations (Solnit 2010). Media reporting widespread riots accompanying food distributions were rejected by the UN, who affirmed that the overall security situation post-earthquake was calm and that security incidents were sporadic and localised (OCHA 2010a). International journalists in the immediate aftermath of the disaster reported weak coordination and delayed delivery of aid to affected communities, without taking into account the unprecedented logistical and extraordinary coordination challenges faced by more than 1,000 aid agencies operating in Haiti.

*Key questions*

- How effective was the 'OneResponse' Web tool as a broad platform for operational information management?
- How were new technologies and communication tools harnessed for the response and recovery?
- To what degree are new technologies and communication tools potentially useful in other disasters? Are they sustainable? Replicable?
- Were new actors in information management and communication effectively coordinated and integrated within existing mechanisms?
- What role did the media play in public perception of the response and what was its subsequent impact on affected populations?

## 4.6 Cross-cutting issues

Cross-cutting issues such as protection, age, disability, gender, HIV/AIDS, disaster risk reduction and environment emerged as key issues throughout the earthquake response.

### *4.6.1 Protection*

In Haiti cluster leads remained those that had been established in 2008. Consequently, the protection cluster, usually led by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), was led by MINUSTAH's Human Rights Section, with support from UNHCR and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Questions arose early in the response regarding MINUSTAH's capacity and the appropriateness of such a choice of leadership in light of its mandate; some wanted UNHCR to lead the protection cluster (Grünewald and Renaudin 2010, Refugees International 2010, 4).

A joint security assessment was conducted in March 2010. Its findings highlighted the widespread perception of insecurity among Haitians living in displacement camps, linked to incidents of rape, other violence, theft and the presence of prison escapees and gang members (MINUSTAH Human Rights Section 2010). Populations particularly vulnerable to security incidents include persons with disabilities, children, women and girls.

### *4.6.2 Child protection and youth*

More than 100,000 children have been recorded to be without any form of family protection since the earthquake, with no access to basic services or support systems and living at high risk of violence and exploitation (Republic of Haiti 2010).

In its *Statement of Concern on Child Protection in Haiti* of 25 January, UNICEF (2010c) notes the emergence of child trafficking activities, including illegal adoption and the removal of orphaned or abandoned children from Haiti. The child protection sub-cluster (led by UNICEF) focused on children and youth at risk. It coordinates activities such as child protection monitoring, reporting child rights violations (including

abduction and trafficking), registration and referral of unaccompanied children, family unification, and psychosocial support to children and their caregivers.

New generations of young leaders emerged in the aftermath of the earthquake, with committees of young leaders organising themselves and helping people in camps (Oxfam 2010a). Plan International and UNICEF led advocacy efforts promoting the participation of children and youth in Haiti's reconstruction and the inclusion of child protection issues in the PDNA process. Plan consulted children throughout the country in February and March 2010 and its message is clear. Interviews with 1,000 Haitian children and young people showed that what they wanted most is to get back to school, to pass their exams and get jobs (2010).

#### *4.6.3 Persons with disabilities and the elderly*

A report by Handicap International (O'Connell, Shivji and Calvot 2010) noted an increase in vulnerability among Haitians with disabilities, stemming from the high prevalence of amputations and injuries following the earthquake. According to the PDNA, 5,250 newly disabled persons have been recorded since the earthquake, including 400 cases of tetraplegia (Republic of Haiti 2010).

Physical rehabilitation (including prosthetics, orthotics and assistive devices) was therefore a key area of focus for the Working Group for Injury, Rehabilitation and Disability (co-chaired by the Secretary of State for the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities, CBM and Handicap International). The working group also advocates for people with disabilities' access to humanitarian aid, such as by ensuring the design of accessible temporary and transitional shelter (Handicap International 2010).

A recent review by HelpAge of how the cluster system and individual agencies have supported and integrated older people's needs into emergency response and relief efforts found that the needs of vulnerable older people remain largely unaddressed (HelpAge 2010):

> It is assumed that older people are reached through programmes that extend to the whole population (i.e., blanket response mechanisms), yet few programmes have specifically addressed their needs. There is a lack of consistent and formal recognition of older people's particular vulnerabilities or strengths. This has often led to inaction, rather than active development of appropriate or alternative age-friendly responses.

#### *4.6.4 Gender and gender-based violence*

While a high level of gender-based violence (GBV) was already documented prior to the earthquake, Haiti has witnessed an alarming rise in incidents particularly in displacement camps where women and girls were at increased risk due to their congestion and lack of lighting (IRC 2010b). The Gender-Based Violence Sub-Cluster (led by UNFPA) and Gender in the Humanitarian Response Working Group advocated for increased lighting and improved access to food and shelter as well as for the installation of separate sanitation (toilets and showers) facilities for women and girls to reduce their vulnerability (Humanitarian Response Working Group 2010).

As noted earlier, while some consultation with Haitian women's groups did take place during the PDNA, several groups felt that these were not sufficiently reflected in the PDNA process and subsequently published the *Gender Shadow Report of the 2010 Haiti PDNA* (AMARC et al. 2010).

#### *4.6.5 HIV/AIDS*

Home to half of all people living with HIV in the region, Haiti is the country with the most severe HIV epidemic among the Caribbean states (UNAIDS 2010). Before the earthquake, however, new infection rates were considered to be under control following an effective campaign that saw the prevalence of HIV/AIDS decreasing dramatically from six per cent of the population in 2001 to around two per cent today (Furnish 2010).

The earthquake caused an interruption of health systems, including HIV/AIDS services and programmes. Increased sexual and gender-based violence in displacements camps also raises vulnerability to HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2010).

#### 4.6.6 *Disaster risk reduction*

According to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), Haiti's poverty and weak institutional capacities compounded by a lack of seismic building standards and inadequate standards of construction represent the major drivers of disaster risk in the country (ISDR 2010).

The earthquake increased Haiti's already high level of vulnerability to a range of disasters—in particular for displaced populations in both rural and urban areas—highlighting the importance of incorporating disaster risk reduction throughout the response and recovery processes (IFRC 2010). The current rainy season and the imminent hurricane season (due to commence in mid-2010) are urgent reminders to take immediate action in disaster preparedness and short-term risk reduction measures, for example, improving existing emergency shelters and clearing rubble from drainage channels to avoid flooding.

Contingency planning efforts were led by an IASC mission with collaboration from the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC), UNDP, IFRC, the Haitian Red Cross and OCHA. Their main focus was preparation of the national 2010 contingency plan—including the development of an early warning system for floods and storms. Unlike the 2009 contingency plan, the 2010 plan addresses hazards such as earthquakes and landslides (OCHA 2010h) and emphasises the need for better coordination and planning between clusters and the Haitian authorities at the local level.

#### 4.6.7 *Environment*

Almost half of the respondents to an Oxfam survey conducted following the disaster blamed environmental degradation for the extent of the damage (Pierre 2010). On top of Haiti's already alarming environmental concerns—particularly deforestation, soil erosion, pollution and overused land—a range of issues have been raised in relation to the environmental impact of the response and recovery: (UNEP 2010a):

- building environmental infrastructure and governance, alongside competing relief and recovery priorities;
- preventing and mitigating environmental damages that will impact Haitians long after the response;
- minimising rural and urban pressures on forest for energy and timber;
- incorporating environmental considerations in existing and future camps, as well as during the planning of new shelter locations; and
- managing human, solid and health care waste.

A recovery assessment conducted by the Red Cross following the earthquake notes that the environmental degradation of Haiti and its associated risks implies a long-term effort to restore, stabilise and improve the environment (IFRC 2010).

*Key questions*

- Were cross-cutting issues (protection, age, disability, gender, HIV/AIDS, disaster risk reduction and environment) effectively mainstreamed?
- Were protection activities and measures included and integrated into the response?
- Were those responsible for cross cutting issues effective in ensuring that each cluster strategy reflected their interests?

### 4.7 Targeting beneficiaries

Humanitarian organisations were confronted with a range of challenges when targeting beneficiaries, largely related to the atypical urban context, the complexities of responding to the needs of displaced people in homes (staying with relatives or friends) and camps and the balancing of aid between Port-au-Prince and the provinces.

#### 4.7.1 *Urban context*

The challenges related to the urban context added an extra layer of complexity vis-à-vis targeting beneficiaries. The revised flash appeal notes a lesson learnt early in the response: the need for a 'UN coordination structure for engineering and infrastructure in this relatively unfamiliar urban environment' (OCHA 2010).

According to a study conducted after the earthquake, 100 per cent of the population described access to housing as a major problem (in comparison to just 2.3 per cent prior to the earthquake) (University of Michigan and Small Arms Survey 2010). Building demolition, debris management, road clearance and emergency repairs posed new challenges for humanitarian organisations more used to working in a rural setting (OCHA 2010). Issues—including settlement planning, land tenure, property rights for owners and tenants and other housing-related issues—have resulted in a particularly complex operating environment for humanitarian organisations working in sectors such as shelter, camp coordination, camp management and early recovery (IFRC 2010).

As noted in the PDNA (Republic of Haiti 2010, 58), lessons from past (more rural) disaster responses in Haiti are of limited use in an urban setting: 'What worked for the disasters in 2007, 2008 and 2009 was designed for a rural setting. . . . These functions must be adapted to suit an urban environment.'

### *4.7.2 Home, hosting and camps*

The question of targeting displaced populations emerged repeatedly in the literature, with most agreeing that 'the home is still a much more preferable option than a camp' (Craig and Marc Kielburger 2010). Indeed, many displaced Haitians left Port-au-Prince to return to their original homes in the provinces, where they lived before moving to the capital in search of jobs and opportunities.

However, evidence shows that displaced populations in official camps had higher quality facilities and services than those staying with family. For example, those registered in camps have a better chance of living in a waterproof shelter, accessing a latrine or flush toilet, and seeing security patrolling the camps (in the form of either the HNP or MINUSTAH) (Ivers et al. 2010).

The displaced have chosen to live in camps for one or several of the following reasons (CCCM 2010):

- They have lost their homes and have no other alternative but to live in displacement settlements.
- They maintain a presence in their houses but are afraid to sleep in them and therefore choose to sleep in displacement sites.
- Even though they have a places to stay, they use camps as a means to access services to respond to their own needs (this includes families that could live with host families in the aftermath of the earthquake).
- They maintain a presence in more than one camp in order to access available services.
- They move back to Port-au-Prince due to a lack of opportunities in the provinces and a general perception that more services are available in the capital.

### *4.7.3 Capital versus provinces*

More than half a million people left the capital in search of shelter and opportunities in the provinces, making the issue of decentralisation 'the hot topic for the majority of Haitians' (Duplat and Parry 2010). While local authorities and civil society have encouraged displaced people to return to their former living places (in cases where they are still habitable or repairable) or move in with host families, others observe that 'many people are not moving, nor do they want to stay where they are' (Katz 2010).

Guidelines for transitional shelter interventions in host families or communities state that hosting arrangements are not a durable solution, proposing host responses for three possible options: (i) return: a gradual movement back to pre-earthquake home locations where pre-earthquake livelihoods and social and economic networks are based; (ii) integration: remaining in host locations because livelihood opportunities are perceived to be viable; and (iii) resettlement: movement on to a brand new location where viable livelihoods and shelter options are perceived to be in place (Haiti Shelter Cluster Technical Working Group 2010).

#### *Key questions*

- How well did the response adapt to the urban context?
- Was the right balance maintained between camp-based support and support to people staying with hosts?

- Was the right balance maintained between support to people in Port-au-Prince and to people who left for other areas?
- What key lessons for humanitarian responders can be taken forward for future urban responses?

## 4.8 Recovery

As highlighted on numerous occasions throughout this section, recovery has emerged as a recurrent theme throughout the earthquake response. As one of two parallel processes currently in progress, recovery activities in Haiti have been conducted according to development principles—in contrast and in complement to those of relief.

Haiti's recovery from the earthquake demands careful attention to sequencing as well as close coordination among international and national actors, individual organisations and clusters, and communities and individuals (Duplat 2010). In its recovery assessment, the IFRC (2010) highlights the challenge of avoiding a prolonged emergency phase and maintaining a delicate balance between responding to critical relief needs and embarking on a sustainable recovery.

Livelihood-related activities such as cash-for-work and cash transfer mechanisms have demonstrated the value of quick impact initiatives that provide communities with opportunities to spontaneously recover by themselves. The Haitian Ministry for Water and Sanitation (DINEPA), the municipalities of Jacmel and Leogane, UNDP and several NGOs launched massive cash-for-work initiatives, employing hundreds of thousands of Haitians to clear debris from the streets and buildings, generating income and injecting much needed cash into the economy.

Some have suggested that the earthquake has the potential to serve as a turning point, a 'harbinger' of 'profound social and economic change' in a country that has faced deep-seated problems for decades (Oxfam 2010, 2). Indeed, the extraordinary reconstruction and recovery funds pledged by donors at the International Donors' Conference held on 31 March in New York are unprecedented for Haiti, presenting an opportunity for the country to emerge from the disaster stronger than ever.

Donors have been reminded of the need to align their recovery activities with the Haitian government's vision to transform Haiti into a decentralised state with a dynamic and competitive economy capable of providing services to its population (as outlined in its *Action Plan for National Reconstruction and Development*[16]) (ICG 2010). At the New York conference, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton talked about the need to change its approach to Haiti:

> It will be tempting to fall back on old habits—to work around the government rather than to work with them as partners, or to fund a scattered array of well-meaning projects rather than making the deeper, long-term investments that Haiti needs now.

### *Key questions*

- Did the design of the intervention contain a transition strategy to recovery and development? Was this linked explicitly with pre-earthquake development objectives and activities?
- Did the cluster strategies specifically cover a transition component and or link clearly to recovery strategy?

16 http://www.cirh.ht/recovery_plan.html

**Ten readings on key issues of the Haiti earthquake response**

OneResponse. Haiti earthquake response information portal. http://haiti.oneresponse.info.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *Haiti Revised Humanitarian Appeal*. OCHA, 18 February 2010. http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?MenuID=13737&Page=1843.

Grünewald, F., A. Binder and Y. Georges. *Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months after the Earthquake*, draft 1. Groupe URD and GPPi, 14 June 2010.

Grünewald, F., and B. Renaudin. *Etude en temps réel de la gestion de la crise en Haïti après le séisme du 12 janvier 2010 : Mission du 9 au 23 février 2010*. Mission Report, Delegation of Strategic of Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, Republic of France, 4 April 2010.

International Crisis Group. *Haiti: Stabilisation and Reconstruction after the Quake*. Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 32, 31 March 2010. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/032-haiti-stabilisation-and-reconstruction-after-the-quake.aspx.

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Republic of Haiti. *Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damage, Losses, General and Sectoral Needs*. Annex to the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, Republic of Haiti, March 2010. http://www.refondation.ht/resources/PDNA_Working_Document.pdf.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. *Haiti Recovery Assessment*. Vol. 1: *Synthesis Report*. IFRC, 29 March 2010. http://assessmentshaiti.googlegroups.com/web/IFRC_Haiti+Recovery+Assessment.doc?gda=7O0hOFUAAACS2jqzAnMH9GU1KU7CPq_IHKWlzRzMtaQQcze-lKM0iH5HY-OsiMyNJza8gimIfI1gChyS6fMA4IS2EyJubFavWzZfMItsiLnCZOaCB_sh9BrtYix3qocOGWUY90Yyf_g.

Republic of Haiti. *Plan d'action pour le relevement et le developpement national—Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti: Immediate Key Initiatives for the Future*. March 2010. http://www.haiticonference.org/Haiti_Action_Plan_ENG.pdf.

# 5 Draft shared evaluation framework for Haiti response

This section presents a first step towards a shared evaluation framework for the Haiti earthquake emergency response. It contains a provisional set of overarching, cross-sectoral questions grounded in accepted humanitarian evaluation criteria and approaches, that reflect the particularities of the Haiti context.

## 5.1 Purpose of the instrument

For decision makers in the Haiti response, the shared evaluation framework was designed with two potential uses in mind:

1) **A chart and assessment of evaluation efforts**. The framework would provide a

means to compile, track, and cross-reference the multiple evaluation initiatives being carried out at different levels of the response (project, sector, cross-cutting theme, system wide) and to rate them for quality (adherence to evaluation standards, etc.).

2) **A compendium and synthesis of evaluation findings**. A systematic compilation of evaluations as described above would facilitate summarisation and cross comparison of key findings, allowing decision makers to identify gaps and weaknesses, and providing the basis for an overall assessment of the response.

In doing so, the framework could serve as a meta-evaluation tool in both senses of the term—an overall synthesis of findings that allows for broader conclusions about the performance and outcomes of the overall humanitarian response, and an assessment of how extensively and well the humanitarian community measured its own results to inform future strategic planning.

Finally, the framework could potentially benefit field practitioners in the Haiti humanitarian response with a third objective or function:

3) **A guide to aid the design of future evaluations.** The framework's set of elemental questions and measures could be used by field practitioners as a preliminary template upon which to design future evaluations (as appropriate to the subject) as well as a useful checklist of basic evaluation components and standards.

## 5.2 Evaluative approach and methods

In addition to the IASC Real Time Evaluation currently underway in Haiti, a large number of other evaluations and reviews are anticipated to come out of the response effort, spanning a wide range of subjects, levels, and approaches. The draft framework presented here is designed to be broad enough to encompass the many types and scopes of evaluations, while at the same time including questions that are specific enough to yield useful findings and meaningful conclusions.

Humanitarian interventions are inherently difficult to evaluate with any degree of rigor, beyond measuring basic inputs and outputs (tonnes of food delivered, numbers of water pumps installed etc.) The reasons are many, but key challenges include the lack of baseline data in many humanitarian contexts, the absence of universally agreed overall results objectives (such as the Millenium Development Goals, MDGs, for development actors), shortages of time and human resources for the task, and the problem of attribution. The last challenge is perhaps the most difficult to overcome, particularly as regards measuring *impact*, i.e., how do you prove a causal link between your programme and beneficiaries' wellbeing in a fluid emergency environment with so many other critical and changing factors that are affecting people's lives?

To help compensate for these limitations, the current state of the art of humanitarian evaluation recommends a mixed methodological, or 'balanced scorecard', approach (Ramalingam et al. 2009). A mixed approach should include the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria[17] (relevance/appropriateness, coherence, connectedness, coverage, effectiveness, efficiency and impact) as adapted for humanitarian programming and as relevant to the particular subject of evaluation (ALNAP 2006). In a mixed approach, however, these performance-based criteria are augmented by additional methods and data sources that take into account a wider range of stakeholder perspectives and indicators in relation to the goals of an intervention. It emphasises, for instance, including the perspectives of stakeholders not typically represented in evaluation (such as beneficiaries, host country and donor governments and publics, suppliers and staff). Moreover, it expands the subject of analysis beyond a linear progression of needs → inputs → activities → outputs → outcomes → impacts[18] to a more circular process that includes organisational learning, accountability, trust and partnership development. It brings in key elements

17 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/0/44798177.pdf

18 The addition of outcomes and impacts is itself a fairly recent development in humanitarian (and public sector) evaluation, which had generally been limited to a span of performance that ended in outputs (Ramalingam et al. 2009).

of the process context such as logistics, planning and coordination arrangements. It examines the resource base supporting the intervention(s). 'The underlying premise is that information coming from multiple angles and perspectives will help provide more of the "full picture" when linear causality between intervention and outcome is not possible to demonstrate' (Taylor et al. forthcoming).

No matter how well-calibrated the lens, however, a distorted picture may still result if the photography is poorly executed. In other words, an evaluation can have an appropriate and comprehensive framework, but without effective data sourcing and logical analysis, its findings will not be useful. If one of the intended uses of the compendium is a synthesis of evaluation findings, the evaluations themselves should be checked against some basic quality standards: 'utility, propriety, feasibility, and accuracy' were set down in 1994 by the Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation.[19] The United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) in 2005 further developed an extensive series of standards for evaluations in the United Nations system under the areas of evaluation management, competencies and ethics, conduct and reports (UN Evaluation Group 2005). These standards cover all aspects of evaluation from personnel considerations to ensuring that evaluation recommendations follow logically from conclusions, which in turn follow from evidence gathered. A checklist of key quality indicators could allow the user to assess the relative weight that the findings should be given. Its purpose would not be to critique, but rather to aid in analysis, and could also potentially serve as a learning exercise to assist future evaluators.

19 http://www.jcsee.org/standards-development

## 5.3 Components of the framework

The draft proposed shared evaluation framework is presented below in outline form. The actual framework is envisioned as a simple database or filtered spreadsheet matrix. The questions are grouped under three components: basic information and categorisation, substantive content and quality indicators. The questions within each of these components are drawn from the approaches and standards outlined above, representing a mixed or balanced approach and tailored to reflect key considerations of the Haiti emergency context. The framework does not represent a complete blueprint, of course. Each evaluation will have a far more extensive level of detail in terms of specific observations and indicators. The questions presented here should be viewed, rather, as key information common to all subjects of evaluation, which will at the same time allow for comparison and synthesis. Not all questions will be equally applicable to all levels of evaluation or types of programming, but an effort was made to frame them in a way to apply to as many subjects and scopes as possible (for instance the term 'intervention' or 'activity' can be read as applying to a specific project or the overall relief response.)

**1. Basic information and categorisation**

The questions in this component are important for cross-referencing and comparisons in an overall compendium, as well as situating the evaluation in the totality of the response.

1.1 Title of the evaluation

1.2 Level or scope of evaluation

- Country or system-wide
- Multi-sectoral (e.g., health and nutrition)
- Region or province
- Sector-wide, geographic area
- Theme or cross-cutting issue
- Organisational (e.g., NGO X's response to the Haiti earthquake disaster)

- Programme
- Project

1.3 Implementer(s) of the evaluation

- Name of the organisation(s)
- Cluster or sub-cluster group
- System

1.4 Sector or cluster in which the evaluation took place, if applicable. How does the (programme, project, activity) fit within the cluster coordination structure?

1.5 Commissioner or sponsoring organisation of the evaluation

1.6 Evaluator(s): As per evaluation standards, the evaluation should include the names, organisational affiliations and contact information of the evaluators, and some indication of their qualifications

1.7 Time frame

**2. Substantive information: Questions pertaining to evaluation findings**

The questions below combine and merge the OECD-DAC criteria with the ALNAP balanced score card perspectives and humanitarian principles under eight subcategories: relevance and appropriateness, coverage, process and performance, resource sufficiency and distribution, stakeholder perspectives, organisational capacity, principled programming and impact.

2.1 Relevance and appropriateness

- Was the intervention predicated on a methodologically sound, comprehensive and prioritised assessment of needs? Which, if any, other humanitarian actors participated in the needs assessment?
- Were beneficiaries and local stakeholders consulted on needs and design of the activity?
- Has the project cycle built in the ongoing participation and consultation of beneficiaries and local or national stakeholders throughout the project cycle?
- Was the design of the project tailored to and appropriate for the urban setting?
- Was it grounded in a solid contextual understanding of the Haitian socio-economic context pre-earthquake and experience of sudden onset disasters (particularly in urban environments)?
- Was a significant proportion of staff involved in the consultations and design of the intervention French or Creole speakers?
- Was the intervention appropriately scaled for the 'mega disaster' conditions in Haiti?

2.2 Coverage

- What percentage of the targeted beneficiaries for this intervention were reached?
- What is the percentage of beneficiaries reached out of the total affected (in need) population for that particular relief area? (For example, what was the percentage of people who received temporary shelter as a result of this intervention out of the total number of Haitians left homeless by the earthquake?)

2.3 Process and performance (includes effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and coordination concerns)

- Was the intervention timely (i.e., how soon after earthquake did activities begin)?
- Were specific output targets met?
- Was the objective or purpose of the intervention achieved or expected to be achieved on the basis of outputs?

- Were the relevant technical standards (Sphere, global cluster or other) applied and met?
- Were activities cost-efficient in terms of financial and human resources?
- Was coordination between humanitarian actors effective identifying and filling gaps, enhancing strategic prioritisation and timeliness? Was it accomplished with a minimum of administrative burden?
- Was operational information managed effective? Were coordination and management decisions made on the basis of information generated by the humanitarian system?
- Were cross-cutting issues (gender, age, disability, environment, DRR) effectively mainstreamed?
- Were protection activities and measures included in or integrated with the intervention?
- Did the design of the intervention contain a transition strategy to recovery and development? Was this linked explicitly with pre-earthquake development objectives and activities?

2.4 Resource sufficiency and proportionality

- Were available resources adequate to meet programming requirements?
- Were there specific sectoral gaps or inequities that affected programming (e.g., was shelter funded adequately vis-à-vis other sectors, based on relative needs)?
- Was funding disbursed in a timely way to ensure advance resources for programming needs?

2.5 Stakeholder perspectives (includes connectedness concerns)

Host authorities and beneficiaries:
- Was targeting among beneficiary groups seen as fair?
- Were there adequate feedback structures and mechanisms for complaints or redress?
- Were programme meetings, organisational leadership, and materials fully linguistically accessible to French and Creole speakers?

Beneficiaries:
- Did the intervention provide a measure of protection (from crime, violence, social unrest)?

Host authorities:
- Were government actors consulted and effectively engaged in the design and management of the response?

Humanitarian actors:
- Did the intervention benefit from effective, strong and strategic leadership?

Local organisations:
- Did the intervention provide opportunities for strengthened partnerships, access to new resources (including international donor funding) and capacity support?

Staff:
- Was there adequate organisational support (including training, communications, clear guidance, provisions for counselling and R&R) for field humanitarian staff?

Donors:
- Were implementers responsive, flexible and willing to participate in coordination structures?

2.6 Organisational capacity

- How well did contingency and preparedness plans work?
- How were partnerships employed in the intervention? Were new partnerships formed or existing ones strengthened?

- Were security management systems clear and consistently applied to manage security risks to staff, partners and beneficiaries?
- Was staff trauma, loss and bereavement resulting from the earthquake addressed by the organisation(s)?
- Have lessons learned been recorded? Shared?

2.7 Principled programming

- Were activities and resources prioritised according to the most urgent humanitarian needs?
- Was aid delivered irrespective of religious or other non-humanitarian objectives or identifications?
- Were the relevant programming standards and principles (Sphere, Red Cross Code of Conduct, GHD, HAP) applied and met?
- Were local capacities identified and built upon in the response? Were they strengthened in anticipation of future response needs?
- Did the response respect and promote the dignity of disaster-affected populations?
- Were civil-military interactions (MINUSTAH, US troops, Haitian police), when and if they occurred, undertaken only as necessary for aid delivery? Were they managed in a way that safeguarded independent and apolitical humanitarian action?

2.8 Impact

- Did the intervention save lives (reduce mortality, morbidity or the risk of disease)?
- Did the intervention directly relieve suffering by addressing acute human needs in the aftermath of the earthquake?
- Did the intervention assist recovery by strengthening livelihoods, community stability, or civil society or by addressing psycho-social needs of the earthquake victims?
- What were the unintended consequences—positive and negative?

**3. Checklist evaluation quality criteria**

These questions address the quality and validity of the evaluation. They can be used as a checklist for evaluators or a means to weight findings and conclusions in a synthesis analysis. They are a 'bare bones' minima of quality criteria. Their purpose is not to thoroughly assess the evaluation, but rather to determine at a glance if it is of acceptable quality.

- Is all the background information (Component 1) included in the evaluation report?
- Is the subject of the evaluation clearly defined?
- Does the evaluation use indicators that are valid measures for the subject of evaluation? Is the chosen methodology well supported in the document?
- Is the strategic purpose of the evaluation made clear?
- Are the targets of the recommendations explicit? (Who is responsible for following up?)
- Are the conclusions well supported by the evidence?
- Are recommendations realistic and actionable?
- What were the unintended consequences—positive and negative?

The matrix below links the questions that were posed in section four of the report with the questions in the framework.

| Framework Questions | Context Analysis Questions |
|---|---|
| Coverage | |
| • What percentage of the targeted beneficiaries for this intervention were reached?<br>• What is the percentage of beneficiaries reached out of the total affected (in need) population for that particular relief area (e.g. the percentage of people who received temporary shelter by this intervention out of the total number of Haitians left homeless by the earthquake)? | • Given the extraordinary influx of aid actors, did the coordination system effectively prioritise capacity and assets to match urgent needs? (4.1)<br>• What the right balance maintained between camp-based support and support to people staying with hosts? (4.7)<br>• Was the right balance maintained between support to people in Port-au-Prince and to people who left for other areas? (4.7) |
| Process and performance (includes effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and coordination concerns) | |
| • Was the intervention timely (i.e., how soon after earthquake did activities begin)?<br>• Were specific output targets met?<br>• Was the objective or purpose of the intervention achieved or expected to be achieved on the basis of outputs?<br>• Were the relevant technical standards (Sphere/ global cluster/other) applied and met?<br>• Were activities cost-efficient in terms of financial and human resources?<br>• Was coordination between humanitarian actors effective in terms of identifying and filling gaps and enhancing strategic prioritization and timeliness, with a minimum administrative burden?<br>• Was operational information managed effectively and were coordination and management decisions made on the basis of information generated by the humanitarian system?<br>• Were cross-cutting issues (gender, age, disability, environment, DRR) effectively mainstreamed?<br>• Were protection activities and measures included and integrated in the intervention?<br>• Did the design of the intervention contain a transition strategy to recovery and development? Was this linked explicitly with pre-earthquake development objectives and activities? | • Were civil-military interactions (MINUSTAH, US troops, Haitian police), when and if they occurred, undertaken only as necessary for aid delivery, and managed in a way that safeguarded independent and apolitical humanitarian action? (4.2)<br>• How effective was the 'OneResponse' web tool as a broad platform for operational information management? (4.5)<br>• How were new technologies and communication tools harnessed for the response and recovery? (4.5)<br>• To what degree are new technologies and communication tools potentially useful in other disasters? Are they sustainable? Replicable? (4.5)<br>• Were new actors in information management and communication effectively coordinated and integrated within existing mechanisms? (4.5)<br>• What role did the media play in public perception of the response and what was its subsequent impact on affected populations? (4.5) |

| Framework Questions | Context Analysis Questions |
|---|---|
| Resource sufficiency and proportionality | |
| • Were available resources adequate to meet programming requirements?<br>• Were there specific sectoral gaps or inequities that affected programming (e.g., was shelter funded adequately vis-à-vis other sectors based on relative needs)?<br>• Was funding disbursed in a timely way to ensure advance resources for programming needs? | • Did the amount of money requested through the Flash Appeal, the International Donors' Conference and other financial mechanisms correspond to the humanitarian needs for response and recovery? (4.3)<br>• Did humanitarian organizations effectively absorb and disburse the resources made available to them? (4.3)<br>• Is the amount of funding provided for relief activities balanced with that provided for recovery? (4.3) |
| Stakeholder perspectives (includes connectedness concerns) | |
| Host authorities and beneficiaries:<br>• Was targeting among beneficiary groups seen as fair?<br>• Were there adequate feedback structures and mechanisms for complaints or redress?<br>• Were programme meetings, organisational leadership, and materials fully linguistically accessible to French and Creole speakers?<br>Beneficiaries:<br>• Did the intervention provide a measure of protection (from crime, violence, social unrest)?<br>Host authorities:<br>• Were government actors consulted and effectively engaged in the design and management of the response?<br>Humanitarian actors:<br>• Did the intervention benefit from effective, strong and strategic leadership?<br>Local organisations:<br>• Did the intervention provide opportunities for strengthened partnerships, access to new resources (including international donor funding) and capacity support?<br>Staff:<br>• Was there adequate organisational support (including training, communications, clear guidance, provisions for counselling and R&R) for field humanitarian staff?<br>Donors:<br>• Were implementers responsive and flexible, and willing to participate in coordination structures? | • To what extent did international humanitarian actors assess Haitian government capacities, working with and providing support to national and local authorities? (4.1)<br>• How effectively did international actors work with government at national, department and municipal levels? (4.1)<br>• How effectively did international actors work with Haitian civil society institutions and organisations? (4.1)<br>• How effective were coordination mechanisms between the Haitian government, the humanitarian community and military actors? Within these structures, how effectively did humanitarian actors articulate their requirements for support from military actors? (4.2) |

| Framework Questions | Context Analysis Questions |
|---|---|
| Organisational capacity | |
| • How well did contingency and preparedness plans work?<br>• How were partnerships employed in the intervention? Were new partnerships formed or existing ones strengthened?<br>• Were security management systems clear and consistently applied to manage security risks to staff, partners and beneficiaries?<br>• Was staff trauma/loss/bereavement resulting from the earthquake addressed by the organisation(s)?<br>• Have lessons-learned been recorded and shared? | • Were security restrictions appropriate or were they too restrictive, hampering key humanitarian engagement with affected populations? (4.2) |
| Principled programming | |
| • Were activities and resources prioritized according to the most urgent humanitarian needs?<br>• Was aid delivered irrespective of religious or other non-humanitarian objectives or identifications?<br>• Were the relevant programming standards and principles (Sphere, Red Cross Code of Conduct, GHD, HAP) applied and met?<br>• Were local capacities identified and built upon in the response, and strengthened for future response needs?<br>• Did the response respect and promote the dignity of disaster affected populations?<br>• Were civil-military interactions (MINUSTAH, US troops, Haitian police), when and if they occurred, undertaken only as necessary for aid delivery, managed in a way that safeguarded independent and apolitical humanitarian action? | • Was sufficient support provided to the HNP for security and protection-related activities? (4.2)<br>• Were assessment tools methodologically sound and context specific? (4.4)<br>• Were results used in an effective and strategic manner? (4.4)<br>• Was there sufficient coordination between needs assessment activities? (4.4)<br>• Did large-scale needs assessments such as the RINAH and PDNA provide value-for-money? (4.4)<br>• Were cross-cutting issues (protection, age, disability, gender, HIV/AIDS, disaster risk reduction and environment) effectively mainstreamed? (4.6)<br>• Were protection activities and measures included and integrated in the response? (4.6)<br>• Were those responsible for cross cutting issues effective in ensuring that each cluster strategy reflected their interests? (4.6)<br>• Did the design of the intervention contain a transition strategy to recovery and development? Was this linked explicitly with pre-earthquake development objectives and activities? (4.8)<br>• Did the cluster strategies specifically cover a transition component and or link clearly to recovery strategy? (4.8) |

| Framework Questions | Context Analysis Questions |
|---|---|
| Impact | |
| • Did the intervention save lives (reduce mortality, morbidity or the risk of disease)?<br>• Did the intervention directly relieve suffering by addressing acute human needs in the aftermath of the earthquake?<br>• Did the intervention assist recovery by strengthening livelihoods, community stability, or civil society, or by addressing psycho-social needs of the earthquake victims?<br>• What were the unintended consequences – positive and negative? | • What key lessons can be taken forward to ensure that the humanitarian system learns for future urban responses? (4.7) |

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# Annex 1: ALNAP Haiti evaluation mapping

**Evaluating the Haiti Response**
**Meeting 18–19 May 2010**
**Evaluations Information Share**

| **Real Time Evaluations** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Agency** | **Title** | **Start** | **Completion** | **Contact** | **Comments** |
| Oxfam | Real Time Evaluation Haiti | — | Feb. 2010 | Ivan Scott iscott@oxfam.org.uk | |
| OCHA | Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation | Jan. 2010 | Feb. 2010 | Scott Green green10@un.org | Carried out by Groupe URD |
| IFRC | Real Time Evaluation | — | April 2010 | | |
| Tearfund | RTE of Tearfund's Haiti Response | 4 May 2010 | 21 May | Alison Claxton alison.claxton@tearfund.org | |
| Christian Aid | Real Time Evaluation | May 2010 | 14 June | Nigel Timmins ntimmins@christianaid.org | Final version including CA management response: 21 June |
| CARE | Real Time Review: Humanitarian Coalition (Canada) | May 2010 | TBC | | |
| UNICEF | Inter-Agency RTE | Spring 2010 | Spring 2011 | Robert McCouch mccouch@unicef.org | 3-phase exercise. 1st phase almost complete |
| British Red Cross | Mass Sanitation Module ERU RTE | TBC | TBC | Jane Waite jwaite@redcross.org.uk | |

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ALNAP
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


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