An evaluation of Save the Children's Cash Transfer project in Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, South Sudan.

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Table of Contents

Acronyms 4

Executive summary 5

1. Purpose of evaluation and methodology 7

2. Limitations to the evaluation 9

3. Background on the project area and project design 11
   3.1 Wealth ranking and how to move a wealth group 13

4. Effectiveness of delivery 16
   4.1 Overall understanding of the programme 16
   4.2 Effectiveness and appropriateness of targeting 16
   4.3 Accessibility 18
   4.4 Reliability 20
   4.5 Timeliness 20
   4.6 Security 21
   4.7 Beneficiary satisfaction 21
   4.8 Project monitoring and reporting 23
   4.9 Conclusions and lessons learnt 25

5. Cash For Work component 25
   5.1 Agriculture and Disaster Risk Reduction training 28
   5.2 Complaint mechanisms 28
   5.3 Conclusions and lessons learnt 29

6. Nutrition component 29
   6.1 Conclusions and lessons learnt 32

7. Use of transfers by beneficiaries 33
   7.1 Impact of cash on the role and status of women 33
   7.2 Impact of cash transfers on credit and markets 33
   7.3 Household expenditures prior to cash transfer programme 34
   7.4 Household expenditures during the cash transfer project 35
   7.5 Household expenditures of just the cash transfer 37
   7.6 Food consumption during the project 37
   7.7 Sharing of the cash transfer 39
   7.8 Markets 40
   7.9 Conclusions and lessons learnt 42

8. Cost effectiveness 43
   8.1 Cost effectiveness for beneficiaries 44
   8.2 Cost effectiveness for Save the Children 45
   8.3 Impact on non-beneficiaries 45
   8.4 Conclusions and lessons learnt 46

9. Organisational learning 47
   9.1 Conclusions and lessons learnt 48

10. Where next for the cash transfer project? 49
   10.1 Graduation 49
   10.2 What next for the cash transfer project in Aweil East? 50
   10.3 Conclusions and lessons learnt 53

11. Recommendations 53

12. References **55**
Annex Two – Meetings held **60**
Annex Four – Approaches in hygiene promotion **62**

Acronyms

ACF	-	Action Contre la Faim
ANLA	-	Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment
CFW	-	Cash for Work
DRR	-	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO	-	European Commission for Humanitarian Aid
EMOP	-	Emergency Operation
FCS	-	Food Consumption Score
GAM	-	Global Acute Malnutrition
GoSS	-	Government of South Sudan
HEA	-	Household Economy Approach
IGA	-	Income Generating Activity
IOM	-	International Organisation for Migration
IYCF	-	Infant and Young Child Feeding
LRRD	-	Linking Relief and Rehabilitation to Development
LTSH	-	Landside Transport, Handling and Storage
MDG	-	Millennium Development Goals
Mt	-	Metric Tonne
NBeG	-	Northern Bahr el Ghazal
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organisation
OTP	-	Outpatient Therapeutic Centre
SAM	-	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SC	-	Save the Children
SC	-	Save the Children
SDG	-	Sudanese Pound
SSOP	-	Standard Security Operating Procedures
TA	-	Technical Advisor
UCT	-	Unconditional Cash Transfer
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
VSL	-	Village Savings and Loans
WFP	-	World Food Programme

Executive summary

Since April 2009, Save the Children has been implementing an ECHO-funded cash transfer project in Baac Payam, Aweil East County. The specific objective of this project has been to improve dietary diversity and nutritional outcomes among the targeted households that inhabit a part of Sudan which has some of the worst food security and health figures for the whole country, where a combination of chronic food insecurity, lack of access to clean water and sanitation facilities, regular disease outbreaks and poor child care practices have a negative impact on the nutrition status of people in the area. Compounding these problems is the high number of returnees to the area; all of which put pressure on household food security in their own ways. This evaluation covers the period of July 2010 to March 2011, when four cash distributions provided by this grant took place.

Both conditional and unconditional cash transfers of 80SDG were administered under this project to 1900 households (1400 and 500 respectively), 15,099 people, across nine Bomas, as well as technical assistance for community activities under the cash-for-work component, health and nutrition education, and disaster risk reduction training for selected Bomas.

The evaluation gathered qualitative information to complement the quantitative information gathered by Save the Children at the baseline stage, during the pilot evaluation and during monthly post-distribution reports. Data was gathered through focus group discussions at the Boma level, by one-on-one interviews, interviews with Save the Children staff and direct observation. In addition, an extensive literature review was conducted prior, during and after the evaluation to contextualise the project. Based on the analysis of field findings against other project documents, the following main findings have been drawn from the evaluation:

- The targeting mechanism within this project is commendable as a truly community-driven process, which promotes project ownership, fairness and reduces intra-community tensions. Similarly, the system for choosing cash-for-work activities at community level has been inclusive and highly participatory on the part of the community. Indeed, the only recommendation to improve the project on the part of beneficiaries interviewed was to increase the number of beneficiaries in light of the number of people recently returned from the Northern Sudan.

- Beneficiaries prefer cash to food aid, especially on the grounds of being able to purchase other things, such as healthcare and education, which food aid cannot provide. However, food remains the priority expenditure for cash transfer beneficiaries, especially unconditional beneficiaries. Proportional piling activities suggest that among CFW beneficiaries, spending on food increased from 34-42% during the transfer period. However, among UCT households, the percentage of spending on food, while still the largest expense, dropped from 53-44%. Analysis of Save the Children's monthly data collection indicates that household food consumption improved significantly during the lifetime of the project compared to the baseline.

- Close coordination with local authorities, as well as strict adherence to internal security procedures, has ensured that save the Children has been able to implement

the cash transfer delivery in a way that has created no disputes, no problems at the delivery point, and no money loss or theft, thus adding weight to arguments in favour of implementing cash transfer programmes in post-conflict settings where security remains an issue.

- Save the Children's conditionality requirement for 1400 households under the project injects skills into the area which have all but disappeared due to decades of war. These skills can be carried both horizontally and vertically across people and generations and offer the greatest chance to sustainable income and food security for the people of Baac Payam. Community activities, which employ the newly acquired skills, have continued even without the cash transfer.

- Best practice in healthcare and nutrition remains one of the greatest problems in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and noticing significant behaviour change will take time. Save the Children's health and nutrition education can help in improving overall knowledge on best practice, however, practicing this knowledge needs to be supported. It will be important for the nutritional component of the project to be bolstered in the next phase and more innovative and simple ways of putting across the message of optimal child and healthcare in the community should be explored by Save the Children.

1. Purpose of evaluation and methodology

Save the Children in South Sudan (SC) commissioned an external consultant to conduct an evaluation of the second phase of their ECHO-funded emergency Cash Transfer Project in Baac Payam, Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State. The project aims to assist vulnerable households to reduce food insecurity and increase their resilience through improved consumption and dietary diversity, by protecting and building up household assets, and building up community assets.[1] To facilitate this assistance, 1900 beneficiary households received a monthly cash transfer of 80SDG (approximately €27). 400 of the 1900 households received unconditional cash transfers and the remaining 1500 households received conditional cash transfers in exchange for community driven cash for work activities. Beneficiaries involved in cash for work activities received technical support from Save the Children to carry out their community activities. In addition, targeted households received nutrition education and selected Bomas[2] received emergency preparedness and response training.

The evaluation began with a review of Save the Children's project documents, including the ECHO single form, post-distribution monitoring (PDM) reports, PDM questionnaires, baseline assessment, pilot evaluation and market assessment, as well as more general reading extensively on cash transfer programming, especially in post-conflict settings.

Qualitative data was collected for this evaluation using a guideline questionnaire, developed by the consultant and agreed on by SC. Focus group discussions (FGDs), one-on-one interviews and direct observations were carried out in order to gather as much qualitative information on the project implementation, the use of the cash transfer, and its impact on household food security. Attendance at the FGDs was very good, despite the evaluation taking place at a pivotal moment in the farming calendar.

The purpose of the evaluation was three-fold (see Annex One for full terms of reference):

- To evaluate the impact of the Cash Transfer project on the target community with an emphasis on its impact on children;
- To evaluate the extent to which recommendations and lessons learnt from the pilot phase evaluation were successfully incorporated into the second phase of the project and their effect on the overall implementation and impact of the project; and
- To ensure critical project lessons and experiences are captured and made available to provide evidence-based information to inform design and funding of future cash transfer and safety net programming.

In order to fulfil the objectives of this evaluation and because of time constraints, five out of the nine Bomas covered under this project were visited – two of these Bomas were new to this phase of the evaluation (Uyon and Manyiel) and one Boma (Wunatami) could not be reached during the last evaluation due to floods; therefore new ground was covered under

[1] Save the Children, ECHO single form.

[2] A Boma is the next geographically administrative block after the Payam – many Bomas for a Payam. The Boma is administered by a Boma Chief, who reports to the Payam Administrator. Under the Boma are several villages.

this evaluation. Rumdier and Rupkou were included both in the pilot and the second phase evaluation in order to measure any changes in response between the pilot and second phase evaluations. As it was emphasised that attendance by conditional/cash for work (CFW) beneficiaries and unconditional cash transfer (UCT) beneficiaries, both men and women, was of paramount importance, attendance by the right community members was ensured. In addition, and as the FGDs usual took place in central locations such as Boma centres, the turn out by non-beneficiary community members was quite high. When many non-beneficiaries attended discussions, it was made quite clear that certain questions were only for project beneficiaries to answer.

This evaluation, in contrast to the pilot phase evaluation, was qualitative in design in order to complement the monthly qualitative data gathered by Save the Children in the PDM reports, and to document non-quantifiable information which could shed light on needs and desires of beneficiaries and therefore inform future project design. A guiding set of questions was used throughout the evaluation process – these were slightly amended after the first FGD held in Wunatami Boma, in order to clarify questions that were unclear in translation, to elicit the most useful responses. Questions were asked by the consultant and translated by SC field staff – any clarifications on answers were made immediately to avoid loss of information. During FGDs, beneficiaries were asked to carry out some proportional piling[3] activities to generate data on topics such as wealth ranking, asset sales and cash transfer expenditure. In a context of high illiteracy, proportional piling tends to be an effective way of understanding how people prioritise expenses and results can be pitted against quantitative data gathered in the monthly post-distribution monitoring report.

CFW beneficiaries conducting a proportional piling activity, Wunatami Boma

[3] Proportional piling is a data collection technique used to get people to quantify or express the importance of issues to a specific household or community. For this evaluation, 100 groundnuts were arranged on the floor representing the total number of people in the community, the total annual expenditure, the total cash transfer sum etc. Groups of beneficiaries were then asked to divide the groundnuts according to how money was allocated (for expense prioritization questions) or according how the community is divided economically (for wealth ranking). The process of often quite lengthy and has the advantage of needing a lot of discussion on the part of the team distributing the groundnuts. The advantages of this is that groups can then be probed on why they made those decisions as well as allowing an observer to gain insight into the way people conceptualise their world.

In addition to the FGDs, separate meetings were held with Boma chiefs and project committee members to gather information on the targeting criteria and process. These interviews were also used to gather information on wealth ranking before the project and after the project. One FGD was held with children in Wunatami Boma and another in Uyon Boma.

The consultant spent one day interviewing SC staff on certain aspects of project design, monitoring and reporting. In addition, daily informal conversations were held with the Area Programme Manager and Project Manager, keeping them up to date on findings and airing any issues that could not be resolved in the field. These conversations were invaluable to complementing the information generated in the FGDs.

Lastly, the consultant held meetings in Malualkon, Aweil town and Juba with Ministry, NGO, and Un staff. Annex Two provides a list of people with whom meetings were held in conjunction with this evaluation.

2. Limitations to the evaluation

Qualitative surveying has its advantages and disadvantages. It is optimally used in conjunction with quantitative data collection methods. However, due to the PDM reporting and the pilot phase evaluation having taken on a quantitative approach, it was decided by SC that a complimentary qualitative approach should be used for this evaluation. Some of the main disadvantages of qualitative assessments are:

- Qualitative data alone is often not enough to make generalisations – the assessment time is often too short to gather sizeable data from which to make generalisations;
- Informants can often be affected by the presence and agenda of the researcher (in this case, the fear of the cash transfer ending, as noted below, or the belief that an outside was bringing something new to the area);
- The focus groups during the evaluation have not necessarily been representative of the beneficiary population – the absence of physically challenged UCT beneficiaries, or the presence of influential community leaders swaying or overshadowing answers;
- Qualitative assessments such as this one tend to narrate a specific time and place, whereas quantitative data can be gathered and compared over a period of time for more reliable information on changes within the household or community;
- As noted below, the element of trust required for truthful responses from informants can often not be sought in a ten-day period and would require considerably more time, thus allowing for observation of changes to back up claims of changes;
- And lastly, both the researcher's and informant's biases can come through in the qualitative data collection process which have the potential to impact upon the results.

In addition to these factors, the assessment relied on the voluntary participation of boma inhabitants, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, to give up their time for questioning. PDM data gathered by SC uses probability sampling which can be more effective in gathering information from a cross-section of the population. However, due to the short timeframe, house-to-house surveys were considered neither possible nor necessary for the evaluation.

There appears to be an element of fear among the community that divulging information about economic gains as a result of the project may lead to the cessation of the cash

transfer project – this has most likely hampered levels of honesty in response. To mitigate this, the purpose of the evaluation, as a means for SC to gather information on how the past two years has assisted communities in Baac Payam and a way of informing *future* assistance, was clearly explained at the start of every FGD and respondents were advised to reply as honestly as possible. This limitation was compounded by the time lapse between the last distribution (March) and the evaluation (May/June) as beneficiaries were clearly eager to resume the cash transfers; however, the time lapse was shorter than during the pilot phase evaluation where almost 3 months elapsed between the last cash transfer and the evaluation. It cannot be ruled out that conducting the evaluation two months after the last cash transfer has somehow influenced responses to questions.

In the Dinka culture, asking how many heads of cattle, or indeed how many children, is culturally inappropriate. One can therefore never really know how many animals or how many children a person can have. In addition, asking a direct question may not reap the results desired, as highlighted in the following passage pertaining to Dinka youths in the US; "I have learned from Sudanese informants that Dinka generally do not voice opinions directly. Nor do they usually ask or answer direct questions requiring that they give such opinions; rather, they may answer evasively and politely to avoid offending [……]Furthermore, Dinka may prefer not to answer what they consider to be useless questions because they believe, say informants, that the person asking already knows the answer".[4] This makes accurate data collection, wealth ranking, and thus household profiling, quite a challenge during the evaluation.

Translating the concept of time is often an issue in southern Sudan. Unless it is specified that informants must 'recall the time *in 2008*, before the cash transfer scheme', people have a tendency to pick any time as far back as before the war in Sudan when production was optimal compared with today. And even when a year is specified, people may often be confused as they are not aware of years, but rather events. This has made it challenging getting clear information on household income and expenditure before and during the project. To prevent this, the evaluation used landmark events, such as the census of 2008, to gauge household spending prior to the cash transfer, but it is not clear whether interviewees were able to provide sound information from that far back in time.

The SC field staffs have been very helpful during interviews by translating the consultant's questions into Dinka. However, it has been clear throughout the process that either some phrases or concepts cannot be translated directly into the vernacular, or the field staffs have not always fully grasped the meaning of the question. This has proven especially challenging when, in a bid to cover more ground in a short space of time, FGDs have been divided between CFW and UCT beneficiaries with field staff manning the sessions and the consultant moving between the two – answers to some pertinent questions have come back in a very different form from when the consultant has been leading the discussion.

Given the vast terrain covered within this project, the amount of time set aside for fieldwork was too short; meaning that the consultant was not able to meet with UCT beneficiaries who were not able to come to the FGD – therefore physically disabled, blind and child headed household beneficiaries were not part of FGDs – and that it takes time to build relations of trust with informants in order for responses to be truthful and valid – ten days was not enough to confirm truthful responses and instead, the consultant sought validation of responses from the SC field staff who assisted in the interviews.

[4] Taking a Closer Look at Struggling ESOL Learners, November 2005, http://www.ncsall.net/index.php?id=994

3. Background on the project area and project design

Over 51% of the population of southern Sudan is below the age of 18, with 72% of the population below the age of 30.[5] Sudan ranks 154th out of 159 in the 2010 UNDP Human Development Index and 51% of the population of southern Sudan lives below the poverty line; meaning that 1 in every 2 households cannot afford to meets its basic minimum consumption of food and non-food needs – this is valued at 72.9SDG per month in the WFP Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment (ANLA),[6] whereas SC has valued it at 59SDG for Aweil East in 2009.[7] In addition, Save the Children in South Sudan has calculated that in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, poor households are meeting 25% of their basic minimum consumption through purchasing.

It is estimated that 78% of the total South Sudanese population lives from farming and animal husbandry,[8] and 92% of Northern Bahr el Ghazal is rural – this is the highest percentage for any state in South Sudan.[9] This was echoed in the baseline survey (2009) where 90% of interviewed beneficiaries were earning a living from farming and livestock production. Nationally, 9.7% of the population is severely food insecure; 26.3% of the population is moderately food insecure; and 64% of the population is food secure. For Northern Bahr el Ghazal specifically, the figures read 6.9%, 36% and 57% respectively,[10] thus indicating that the State lags behind national averages on food security, with an above-average percentage of households being moderately food insecure on a regular basis. Reassuringly and conversely, the percentage of severely food insecure households is below the national average. These figures have improved since 2009, when the cash transfer project first started, due to nation-wide favourable rainfall in 2010 facilitating a good harvest, although informants noted that the floods in the lowlands of Aweil East County in 2010 destroyed many crops. However, the ANLA suggests that the number of households that rely on their own production for subsistence has increased dramatically from 37% to 47%, which has led to a reduction in total expenditure on food as households source from their own production.[11] Despite this, NBeG remains one of the top five food insecure States in southern Sudan and during the period of this project – July 2010 to March 2011 – 75, 119 people were assisted with 863Mt of food aid in Aweil East County and 37,170 people were assisted with 466Mt of food in Baac Payam (majority recipients being mothers and infants).[12]

A combination of chronic food insecurity, lack of access to clean water and sanitation facilities (only 24% of the population of Aweil East has access to clean water)[13], regular disease outbreaks, and poor child care practices have a negative impact on the nutrition

[5] Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation.
[6] Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis, January 2011.
[7] Save the Children's Single Form for ECHO grant
[8] Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation.
[9] Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis, January 2011, based on the 2008 national census.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid
[12] World Vision figures from their food distribution across Bakou, Gorthium, Malualkon, Ngapkec, Pariak, Rupkou, Uyon and Warawar. Commodities distributed were cereals, lentils, vegetable oil and salt, with Plumpy Dose for infants.
[13] ACF, Anthropometric and Retrospective Mortality Survey, Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, Southern Sudan, July 2010.

status of people in the area, especially children under five years of age.[14] In 2010, GAM rates for Aweil East were at 23.1% and SAM rates were at 3.2%;[15] in 2011, ACF is reporting GAM rates of 23.5% and SAM rates of 5.3%[16] - both GAM and SAM rates are above WHO emergency thresholds in 2011. Preliminary explanations for the rise in SAM rates are the levels of flooding during the last harvest, which destroyed many crops, poor IYCF practices and poor hygiene in general.[17]

Save the Children's cash transfer project is implemented in Baac Payam, Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (NBeG). This Payam was initially targeted due to the lack of other interventions by aid and development agencies, its high number of population returns since the signing of the CPA in 2005, and the almost annual shocks such as drought, floods, and in some years, both, which lead to depletion of assets and aggravate food insecurity. Due to its proximity to the northern Sudanese border, Northern Bahr el Ghazal has experienced some of the highest number of returnees to any State in Sudan. According to IOM figures, 10,778 people have returned to Baac Payam between July 2009, when the pilot phase of the project began, and March 2011, when the second phase ended. However, it cannot be assumed that IOM has been able to track every returnee to the area and the figures can therefore be understood as a fairly conservative representation of returnees in Baac Payam. The table below gives IOM figures for the whole of Aweil East County during this period – Baac Payam has the highest number of returns of any Payam. In addition to the rate of returns, it is estimated that 56% of Northern Bahr el Ghazal's IDP population is currently residing in Aweil East.[18]

Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil East	Baac	2,097	10,778
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil East	Madhol	1,375	7,052
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil East	Majokyithieu	1,203	6,801
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil East	Malual Bai	1,627	8,128
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil East	Mangar Tong	1,399	6,758
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil East	Mangok	1,168	6,829
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil East	Rumaker	714	4,002
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil East	Wunlang	1,072	5,313
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Aweil East	Yargot	1,043	6,010
			11,698	**61,671**

IOM figures for registered (organised and spontaneous) returnees from July 2009 to March 2011

Through the cash transfer project, Save the Children is supporting approximately 1900 vulnerable households (15,099 people) in nine Bomas of Baac Payam, in response to an on-going acute humanitarian crisis in the area, which has particularly affected peoples' ability to achieve sustainable food security. The pilot phase saw 1400 households targeted; under the second phase, the same 1400 households have been targeted in addition to 500 new households in two new Bomas. 1425 households receive conditional cash support, as a result of participating in cash for work activities; 475 households receive unconditional cash support.

[14] ACF Coverage Survey Report, Aweil East 2010.
[15] ACF, Anthropometric and Retrospective Mortality Survey, Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, Southern Sudan, July 2010.
[16] Meeting with ACF's Nutritionist, Malaulkon.
[17] Ibid.
[18] ACF, Anthropometric and Retrospective Mortality Survey, Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, Southern Sudan, July 2010.

During the period under evaluation, four cash transfers have been provided to 1900 households; 1400 households have now received fourteen cash transfers since the start of the project, as they were also included in the pilot phase, whereas 500 households have now received four cash transfers. All households were identified based on the communities' understanding of their food insecurity; CFW beneficiaries were chosen as they had labour to offer in return for cash, whereas UCT households were food insecure and without labour. The cash transfer is 80SDG per month, calculated to represent 25% of the cost of the minimum food basket obtained by households in the poor wealth quintiles and 35% of households' average monthly income. This 25% is equal to €27 or 80SDG. For those households engaged in the CFW activities, 16 days work was valued at 80SDG based on the calculation of a bundle of grass selling for 5SDG on the market and based on the assumption that a person would spend a whole work day collecting and selling the grass.

By providing cash transfers over the 26-month period, Save the Children has aimed to improve dietary diversity and nutritional outcomes, increase food security by improving access to sufficient quality and quantity food, and help households protect and build livelihood assets.[19] The cash has had the purpose of increasing access to regular and diverse nutritious foods, as well as ensuring that surplus is spent on protecting and building asset bases. In addition to this the CFW activities have had the benefit of building human and social capital at community level.

Running simultaneously to the CFW activities and cash transfers, Chomator and Wunatami Bomas have received disaster risk reduction training and contingency planning due to the two Bomas being situated in the lowland flood planes where flooding is an almost annual disaster. In addition, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of all nine Bomas have received health and nutrition education from nutrition promoters employed under the CFW scheme.

3.1 Wealth ranking and how to move a wealth group

Proportional piling was carried out with Boma chiefs interviewed to ascertain the wealth ranking in Baac Payam. Wealthy households are understood to be those with cows, goats and chickens; households with enough food in the granary to last the year; 4-6 tukuls in the compound and a large *luak*[20] to house the large herd of animals. The middle-rich households are understood as being those with a small number of cows (although it could be just one cow), goats and chickens[21]; 2-3 small tukuls and a small *luak* for the animals. Poor households are considered to be those with a few goats, if any, and chickens; those with only a small amount of food in the home; those households engaged in business (i.e. selling tea, sugar or groundnuts) and therefore dependent on a cash income rather than livestock; and those households with 2-3 tukuls and no *luak*. This echoes ANLA findings (2011), which indicates that the food insecure households rely increasingly on the extraction of natural resources such as grass, firewood, building poles, and charcoal.[22] The images of households

[19] Project logframe objectives.
[20] A mud and thatch building for housing animals. Typically, the *luak* is the largest construction on the compound and a clear indication of a household having animals and therefore relative wealth.
[21] It is important to note here that ascertaining numbers of animals is not possible in Dinka land, so the difference between middle-rich and poor households in terms of animal numbers is not know. A clearer indication is perhaps the presence of a *luak*, and the size of the *luak* if there is one.
[22] Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis, January 2011.

below were taken with the Boma chief of Rumdier, who explained which wealth category each homestead was in.

An example of a middle-rich household, Rumdier Boma

An example of a poor household, Rumdier Boma



An example of a very poor (returnee) household, Rumdier Boma

In a bid to gather some basic information on wealth ranking in the community, interviewees were asked to make piles of the proportion of households in each wealth quintile before and during the cash transfer project, therefore 2008 and 2011 respectively. Before the cash transfer project 13.5% of households were considered wealthy; 15% were considered to be in the middle wealth quintile; 15.5% were considered poor; and 56% were considered very poor. 15.5% of the total number of households in 2008 were returnees according to interviews and were all within the very poor pile. In 2011, after 2 years of cash transfer programming, 15.5% of households are considered wealthy; 14% were in the middle

category; 16% were poor households; and 54.5% were very poor. 27% of returnees in Baac Payam were within the very poor quintile in 2011.



Wealth ranking in Baac payam before and during CT project

These findings, although rudimentary, suggest that there are fewer very poor households in 2011, albeit only a 1.5% difference. The number of poor households has risen by 0.5%. Middle wealth households, according to information provided during the assessment, have dropped in number by 1%, and wealthy households have increased by 1.5%. Overall therefore, from the information provided during interviews, it can be said that the communities interviewed are, on the whole, slightly better off in 2011 than in 2008. However, this alone cannot be an indication of the success of the cash transfer in poverty alleviation in Baac Payam, nor indeed of guaranteed increase in wellbeing in Baac Payam – this exercise would need to be compared with other Payams in Aweil East to understand what the mean difference is as well as measuring wider household economy through an HEA assessment.

Interviewees explained how a household could move up a wealth rank; that by harvesting a good crop a household could sell the surplus and buy goats, which, once accumulated, could be exchanged for cows. Interviewees also mentioned a link between the size of the household and the success of the harvest, meaning that the more people available to help in farming, the more land can be cleared for sorghum cultivation. Cattle are the defining indicator of wealth and social status among the Dinka, however, it is not clear whether this wealth and status can only be achieved once sustainable food security is attained, or whether food security is in any way risked in order to attain cow wealth and status. It does not necessarily follow that adequate (quantity and quality) food is a necessary precursor to cow wealth. The linear progression of poverty to wealth, coupled with the importance of farming in this progression, should aim to be capitalised upon by Save the Children in subsequent phases of the project.

While SC's baseline assessment for the project offers quite detailed information on household characteristics, food consumption and expenditure, it would have been beneficial for SC to have conducted a wider and more in-depth HEA assessment, thus capturing information from all different wealth groups in the area over a food calendar year, rather than just the beneficiaries and control groups from the baseline over a one month recall period. Gathering wider data through a HEA assessment, even at this stage in the project, would be beneficial in order to consider ways of integrating other members of the

community into a more development driven project and to consider different approaches to graduation within the project, as noted below (10.1).

4. Effectiveness of delivery

4.1 Overall understanding of the programme

The first question asked to any beneficiary during focus group discussions was for them to explain the project that SC had brought to their Payam. All FGDs provided similar answers which included explanations of the community cash for work activities, of the cash they were receiving from SC, of the skills they had acquired during the project (brick making, communal farming etc.) and an emphasis on the ability to continue employing those skills even when there was no cash transfer. The closing question to every FGD was to ask what nutrition messages respondents had learnt during the project; many varied messages were cited. However, the link between the increased income as a result of the cash transfer and nutrition and hygiene best practices was not apparent in either the first or last questions asked during FGDs.

4.2 Effectiveness and appropriateness of targeting

The targeting mechanism within this project is commendable as a truly community-driven process. Interviews with Boma chiefs and the project committee members indicated that targeting criteria was determined by cultural/traditional and, importantly, local perceptions of who the most vulnerable households in the area were. It is often understood that communities are in a better position to assess poverty in their local context, and they generally have access to better information about the poor in the community. An OECD paper from 2009 also suggests that community targeting, by virtue of greater local participation in the process, has the potential to strengthen programme ownership among beneficiaries.[23] When considering complaints about the programme below, this may certainly be a reason for limited dissatisfaction. Community-chosen criteria for the most vulnerable households were discussed during interviews and include:

- Households that regularly eat wild leaves;
- Households with very little in the way of food stocks in the house;
- Households with only one small tukul on their homestead;
- Returnee households that have recently returned to the area;
- Households with only one member;
- Households with only a small piece of land under cultivation (an indication of lack of labour within the household or poor social ties);
- Households that work others' land in exchange for food;
- Households that rely on grass/pole selling for cash income; and
- Households without animals, or maybe just a few chickens.

Based upon the above criteria and the project committee's knowledge of the households within the villages under their responsibility, households were selected to be part of the cash transfer project. Names were read out to the respective communities for all to hear

[23] Michael Samson, EPRI, Social Cash Transfers and Pro-Poor Growth, in Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Social Protection, OECD, 2009

and agree upon; interviews suggest that no one has had any issue with this system and it has been highly appreciated as a fair process. Moreover, by making public the chosen beneficiary households, it appears that some beneficiaries voluntarily de-registered themselves and rather nominating who they considered a poorer or more vulnerable household in the community. This can be considered an indication of how close community ties are and how clearly it was understood who should or should not be part of the project as per the community's targeting criteria. In addition, baseline information gathered on food consumption scores clearly indicates that the FCS of beneficiary households is poorer than control households (45% of beneficiary households had a poor FCS, whereas less than 20% of control households had a poor FCS).[24]

Below is a graphic breakdown of household categories chosen by the community for this phase of the project:



Percentage of beneficiaries per target type, based on registration information

Interestingly, while the majority (75%) have been chosen on grounds of economic vulnerability and categorised as very poor by the community, other categories of beneficiary type have been categorised on grounds of their social vulnerability, even if they are also economically vulnerable and in the bottom two quintiles of wealth ranking. As household roles are so gendered among the Dinka (for instance, a man muds the tukul whereas a woman thatches, the inverse is never seen; women rear ruminants whereas men rear cattle), widows and single parents can be especially socially and economically vulnerable. Similarly, physically disabled people are most likely to be in the very poor or poor quintiles due to their inability to engage in manual labour and farming, however, the community has categorised them on grounds of their disability rather than poverty. Returnees, although no indication of whether they are wealthy in cash terms, constitute 3% of households receiving cash transfers under this scheme, with child headed households constituting only 1% of all households under the project receiving cash transfers. It is therefore clear to see that, while the majority of households included within the cash transfer programme have been categorised by the community due to their economic vulnerability, a small percentage of households have been included on grounds of their social vulnerability.

Based on SC's explanation during the evaluation, UCT beneficiaries should be households that are food insecure and that do not have labour to offer in a CFW activity. Communities

[24] Save the Children, Baseline Assessment Report, Cash Transfer Project, Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan, November 2009.

interviewed categorised UCT beneficiaries as physically and mentally disabled people, widows, and pregnant and lactating mothers. These beneficiaries are both socially vulnerable (for instances widows), and also economically vulnerable due to their physical condition. As a result of both social and economic vulnerabilities, these households are most likely to be among the poorest people in Baac Payam and those most in need of the cash transfer. The baseline survey indicates that cash transfer beneficiaries are likely to spend the greatest portion of their income on food items compared with control groups (64% and 43% respectively) and that asset purchases were less in beneficiary households compared with control households (13% and 29% respectively) – these figures indicate greater economic vulnerability among beneficiaries than control groups and suggests correct targeting on the part of the communities.

As the project currently stands, the same beneficiaries have been targeted since the project inception in order to make a sustainable difference to the registered households – this remains undisputed as the best course of action, rather than shifting beneficiaries after every project cycle. However, UCT beneficiaries were originally chosen, two years ago, on the grounds of their lack of labour to contribute to a CFW activity in addition to their initial food insecurity. The reasons for this lack of labour are myriad, but include old age, physical disability, mental disability, pregnancy and lactation. However, whether a UCT beneficiary should be a UCT beneficiary two years on is worth debating, specifically with regards to women targeted as UCT beneficiaries due to pregnancy or breast feeding. It is recommended that annual evaluations of the UCT beneficiaries be conducted, in consultation with the project committee and community, to verify whether the status of UCT beneficiaries has since changed, whether they can move into the CFW group and thus cede their UCT place for a new-comer or newly-vulnerable person (such as a new mother or new widow). This will help to ensure that unconditional transfers are being provided to households that are both food insecure *and* without labour.

4.3 Accessibility

Beneficiaries interviewed were happy with the choice of location for the cash distributions. While no beneficiaries live in Warawar or Mabil, these sites were no more than 4 hours walk away from the village (Wunatami and Chomator Bomas are the furthest away and hardest to get from due to flooding during part of the year). In addition, beneficiaries commented on the ability to attend to private business and buy cheaper food in the larger markets at the same time as collecting the cash transfer (for instance, in February 2011, a *malua* (3.5kg) of sorghum was 1SDG cheaper in Warawar than in Malualkon)[25].

For UCT beneficiaries who are physically challenged, getting to the delivery point can be an ordeal. For this reason, SC allows a nominated person to collect the cash for the UCT recipient, provided that they have the beneficiary's card (see image below with clear instructions on cash collection for those unable to be at the distribution site). The nominated person can be easily verified by the project committee members who are sitting at the distribution desk with the SC staff. This system functions well in the relatively small project, where community ties are great, however, if the project were to be greatly scaled up ever, it could potentially become problematic for the nominated persons to be easily verified. In addition, beneficiaries and SC staff alike mentioned that a person defaulted on collection, SC would hold on to the money until the next distribution. If a person defaulted

[25] Save the Children bi-monthly market data.

twice in a row, SC would take the money to the Boma when conducting post-distribution monitoring to give it to the beneficiary in person. This was apparently very rare though.

The mechanism in place ensures that beneficiaries who miss the distribution day for whatever reason, do not miss out on their cash and all interviewees were satisfied with the mechanism. Although the default levels are low in Baac Payam, 1.5% average failed to show for their cash transfer during the four transfer months under evaluation, it would be interesting to see how receiving double the cash in one distribution alters the way in which money is spent – this could have the potential to influence future decisions on whether a monthly stipend or lump sum amount would be most beneficial in meeting the project's objectives.



A cash transfer beneficiary's card, to be presented at cash distribution

Accessibility has been, at times, an issue for the project staff, especially when monitoring beneficiaries in the lowland Bomas (Wunatami and Chomator). Below is an image of the staff on their way to monitor cash for work activities in the lowland Bomas of Baac Payam. The inaccessibility of certain villages during the flood season undoubtedly adds man-hours to the work, although for the purposes of this evaluation, the financial calculation of these problems was not conducted.

SC project staff on their way to monitor CFW activities during the flood season

4.4 Reliability

Beneficiaries unanimously praised Save the Children's reliability throughout this project. Frequent and transparent communication between Save the Children staff and the Boma leaders, coupled with good intra-Boma communication channels, has meant that beneficiary households have been able, on the whole, to attend every cash transfer delivery day. Save the Children staff have always been at the delivery point on time and the beneficiaries noted that delivery of cash has never taken longer than three hours from start to finish.

While beneficiaries interviewed praised SC for its reliability, they did ask when they were likely to receive their next cash transfer. Unreliability of funding can lead to breaks in transfers. While the current break in transfers (since March 2011) does not yet appear to have deterred cash for work activities from continuing, there is a risk that the cash transfer could be the over-riding incentive to work on the community projects as some projects, building schools for instance, do reply on SC for certain inputs (cement and roofing) that the communities cannot afford themselves. Defaulting on payments due to funding gaps could be detrimental to the whole programme and Save the Children should endeavour to attract longer-term funding for its cash transfer programme in order to plan for the eventual graduation of beneficiaries out of the scheme.

4.5 Timeliness

When asked about whether the cash transfer months under this phase of the project (October, November, February and March) were the most important months for them to receive money, beneficiaries claimed that the hunger gap months (April to July/August) would have been a more timely response to their needs. However, information from the PDM reports indicates how the cash was spent for asset building during this period, thus serving as an important buffer during the huger gap (October and November are within the harvest period in Baac Payam, during which time households are more able to focus on consuming their own food rather than purchasing food from the market). Giving cash transfers during this period was effectively a saving for the households; money received was not spent necessarily on foodstuffs and was rather invested in assets (agricultural tools, chickens and goats), as indicated in the graph below. However, although PDM questionnaires gather information on assets purchased with the cash transfer and assets sold during the same period, the data is not presented in a way which indicates the assets remaining after the hunger gap. This information could be quite beneficial to understand how the cash transfer, when administered during harvest time, can help households to purchase and maintain/protect their asset base. Even as own harvest may have dwindled towards February/March, households were able to invest in assets and services.



Cash utilisation pattern across the 4 months under evaluation – SC PDM reports

The timeliness of distributions was an issue for some of the UCT beneficiaries who felt that 24 hours notice for getting to the cash distribution centre was insufficient. Many UCT beneficiaries are not able to collect the cash themselves and must pre-arrange with family or a neighbour to go – this has apparently been challenging for some households to organise at 24 hours notice.

4.6 Security

Through close coordination with County and Payam authorities and by working according to Standard Security Operation Procedures (SSOP), Save the Children has been able to implement the cash transfer delivery in a way that has ensured no disputes at the community level, no problems at the delivery point, and no money loss or theft to both beneficiaries and Save the Children. SSOPs appear to have been followed for each distribution, meaning that the minimum number of people have been aware of the collection of cash in Aweil town, of the presence of cash within the Save the Children compound, and thus when the distributions might occur in the nine Bomas involved in the project. In addition, distribution points have been in central market locations – Mabil and Warawar – where policemen habitually operate, thus reducing the threat of insecurity, both to beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and to SC staff.

Although beneficiaries did not cite the presence of police agents at the distribution site as a reassurance (as they had during the pilot evaluation), they did note the importance of having the distribution away from their Bomas; this prevents people in the Boma knowing that they have received cash and reduces the risk to them walking home with cash. It is important to add that no beneficiary interviewed claimed feeling unsafe walking home with 80SDG on their person.

However, while SC has never experienced any insecurity during the cash transfer project, it is important to note how important the context is to ensuring the smooth running of this project. Baac Payam, like the rest of Aweil East, is almost entirely inhabited by people of the Dinka tribe. Cultural homogeneity has a significant impact on the kin support systems in the area as well as to levels of conflict – unlike other parts of Sudan, there is no cattle rustling in this area, and there is a great deal of intra-community support. As the cash transfer project is targeting people from the same tribe in a relatively calm part of Sudan, conflict in targeting and distribution have been minimal; it cannot be assumed that if this same project ad been carried out in a multi-tribal part of Sudan that there would have been no ensuing conflict. As noted above, context analysis should be central in the design of any cash transfer project – which should include principals of Do No Harm – to fully understand the applicability of certain models of cash delivery among the target group.

Although the SSOPs drawn up by SC for this project indicated the highest risk to the operation being robbery and fraud, the evaluation found no indication of either occurring during the entire lifetime of the project.

4.7 Beneficiary satisfaction

All beneficiaries interviewed were very satisfied with the project. As a result of the cash transfer, they were guaranteed a certain income each month during the distribution period – this was considered far better than sitting at the market waiting for up to one week to sell a bundle of grass for 5SDG. Beneficiaries were asked during FGDs how the project could be

improved; the only desire for change mentioned during the evaluation was for the number of beneficiaries to increase, especially in light of the number of people recently returned from Northern Sudan. The community felt that, while the most vulnerable households were being rightfully targeted within the project, there were other equally vulnerable households now in their midst.

Respondents were asked whether they received food aid as well as cash transfers – all replied negatively, although findings from World Vision suggest that in Baac Payam, 37,170 people (mainly returnees) received food aid in July/August 2010.[26] Respondents were also asked about the relevance of cash or food aid to alleviate their food insecurity – cash was almost unanimously preferred as a form of assistance. Reasons for this preference are worth noting:

1) Cash can help us buy things we need immediately, such as medicine or school fees;
2) Money can buy foods which are not in the GFD;
3) Money can buy you what the body needs – meat, soap, and clothes;
4) Cash is better as we can carry it home; collecting food aid from Warawar or Mabil would mean having to pay for transport;
5) If we need to run from here, at least we can take cash with us – we would have to leave food behind;
6) Food can catch on fire easily in a house fire, but money can be easily accessed and saved.

Beneficiaries cited the following reasons for food aid being better than cash:

1) Cash is useless when there is no food on the market;
2) Getting food can free up your money to buy other things, so both food and cash would be ideal.

It is clear from the answers that cash is preferred to food by beneficiaries, especially on the grounds of being able to purchase other things, such as healthcare and education, which food aid cannot provide. The issue of there being no food in the market was probed during discussions as this would have been a very important finding, and respondents were therefore asked to elaborate on when exactly they had experienced having cash and no food on the market to buy with it; it transpires that respondents were referring to a past during the 1988 famine. FGDs confirmed that there has never been, during the period under evaluation (nor the pilot phase) times where demand has outweighed supply to the point of there being no food on the markets. Seasonal challenges for getting food to the smaller markets were cited, but in these instances, many people are able to pre-empt these problems and chose instead to shop in the larger terminal markets of Warawar and Wanjok, where food is generally cheaper in the rainy season than on the smaller, more rural markets.

There were no complaints at all during the evaluation about the cash transfer being too small; this could, perhaps, be considered an indication of the cash transfer being too large a sum. Indeed, the South Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation has calculated the average per capita consumption of the poor in Northern Bahr el Ghazal to be 37SDG per month, compared with 128SDG for the non-poor in NBeG.[27] Save the Children's calculation estimates that a households of 6 people in NBeG requires 354SDG a month to fulfil its minimum food basket – this indicates a difference of 22SDG. It is highly possible that for some households, SC may be providing more than 25% of the month food basket with the

[26] WVI figures for GFD distribution in Baac Payam.

[27] Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, 2010 figures for Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

80SDG transfer due to the very low consumption levels of the poorest households in the project area. For purposes of sustainability, it is important for SC to set the cash transfer figure at a rate that still makes it attractive for beneficiaries to engage in other income generating activities.

It would be advisable for SC to review the monthly minimum food basket, to understand why there is disparity between SC figures and the Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation figures, to reassess the price of basic commodities (cost of diet) in light of current trade blockades, to identify a survival and livelihood threshold and to review, if deemed necessary, the cash transfer sum . If the figure needs to come down, it could be suggested that beneficiaries work less than 16 days a month and be encouraged to engage in other income generating activities which could be supported by SC or other agencies in the area. Conducting an in-depth HEA survey would shed light on a lot of pertinent information to add to calculations on the right sum for the cash transfer.

4.8 Project monitoring and reporting

Save the Children has been carrying out monthly post-distribution monitoring (PDM) of cash transfer activities throughout the project period. PDM reports capture the following information each month:

- Numbers of beneficiaries who received cash each month;
- Cash utilisation;
- Household food consumption;
- Sources of food;
- Sources of income;
- Household expenditure patterns;
- Household wealth and asset possession;
- Market price data;
- Summary of nutrition, DRR or agriculture training; and
- Lessons learnt.

On the whole, the information in the reports is of great importance, not only to Save the Children and programme staff, but could be of great use to other agencies working in the area.

One week after cash distributions, 10 trained enumerators, supervised by project staff, are sent to the Bomas to administer 338 questionnaires to randomly selected households (270 beneficiary and 68 control). The project collects information from the same households every month, thus charting the impact of the cash transfer over time (see table below for Boma by Boma breakdown). Depending on the season and accessibility of villages, this process can take up to 9 working days. Following data collection, the data is inputted to SPSS for analysis. Until the last distribution under evaluation, an M&E Officer was responsible for this; however, this person is no longer with SC.

Boma	Beneficiaries			%	Sample Size				
					Beneficiaries			Control	G/Total
	UCT	CFW	Total		UCT	CFW	Total		
Panabiei	45	112	157	8%	6	16	**22**	6	**28**
Rupkou	62	156	218	11%	9	22	**31**	8	**39**

Wunatemei	45	109	154	8%	6	16	**22**	5	**27**
Chumator	104	260	364	19%	15	37	**52**	13	**65**
Rumdier	55	142	197	10%	8	20	**28**	7	**35**
Angot	56	137	193	10%	8	20	**28**	7	**35**
Mathiangdit	33	84	117	6%	5	12	**17**	4	**21**
Uyon	44	248	292	15%	10	31	**41**	11	**52**
Manyiel	31	177	208	11%	7	22	**29**	7	**36**
Total	475	1425	1900		**75**	**196**	**270**	**68**	**338**

Breakdown of beneficiaries and household numbers interviewed during PDM data collection.

While it cannot be disputed that the information contained in the PDM reports is very important and relevant to the project, the presentation of all the data collected each month could enrich the data already provided on a monthly basis. The pilot evaluation recommended that the PDM reports could have been improved by 'bolstering quantitative results with qualitative data'.[28] When comparing pilot and phase 2 reports, there is little in the way of change in the reporting method. If there is no scope for additional qualitative findings within the PDM report, then case studies charting the experiences of households throughout the project could shed useful light into the benefits, opportunities and problems encountered as a result of the project.

Given SC's mandate, it is interesting to learn that no children are interviewed during the data gathering phase of the PDM data collection. Although it was experienced first hand during the evaluation how difficult it is to gather information from children, a regular rapport with interviewed households should open the way for significant data collection from children themselves; children are very much silent beneficiaries in this project. Although IYCF practice and food intake information is gathered during PDM interviews, the information is not regularly presented in the PDM reports, thus omitting vital information pertaining to Result 3 of the project: to improve the knowledge, attitudes and practices towards optimal hygiene and infant and young child feeding practices in the communities. IYCF data collected over a period of time, rather than during a time bound survey period, could be very useful to discuss the impact of the project in terms of improved nutrition and healthcare practices, and certainly information that other agencies working in nutrition and healthcare.

Lastly, PDM reports present very useful information on asset purchases at the household level. The purchase of assets is a valuable indicator of wealth increase at the household level, but to stand the test of time, it is equally important to measure asset sales, especially during the hunger gap – assuming that assets not sold represent a *real* accumulation of wealth. PDM questionnaires collect information on asset purchases and sales generally, which is very important to chart over the months to understand how expenditure patterns change as priorities change over the year. However, PDM questionnaires do not collect information on sales of assets bought only within the cash transfer period, thus it is impossible to know how much better off a household is following the cash transfer project than it was at the start. It would therefore be advisable for PDM questionnaires to include questions on assets purchased and sold over each month to calculate the wealth left at the end of the project.

[28] Improving Income and Food Security through Cash Transfers in Southern Sudan: An Evaluation of Save the Children's Pilot Project in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, southern Sudan, Save the Children, September 2010.

4.9 Conclusions and lessons learnt

- The targeting mechanism within this project is commendable as a truly community-driven process, which promotes project ownership, fairness and reduces intra-community tensions.
- Labour provided for CFW activities appears to be divided among able-bodied household members rather than just the registered beneficiary, and this division of labour depends on the type of CFW activity.
- Some UCT beneficiaries may not need to be UCT beneficiaries throughout the lifetime of the project and may be able to move into a CFW activity. This should be reviewed on an annual basis.
- For some UCT beneficiaries who are physically challenged, getting to the delivery point can be an ordeal and 24 hours notice of the cash delivery is not necessarily enough time for them to organise for someone to collect the cash on their behalf.
- Beneficiaries suggested that receiving the cash transfer during the hunger gap months (April to July/August) would have been a more timely response to their needs than the months when cash transfers were disbursed under this evaluation period (October to March).
- Through close coordination with County and Payam authorities and by working according to Standard Security Operation Procedures, Save the Children has been able to implement the cash transfer delivery in a way that has ensured no disputes, no problems at the delivery point, and no money loss or theft, thus proving the viability to implement cash transfer programmes in post-conflict settings where security remains an issue.
- Collecting money away from their Bomas was very important to beneficiaries as this prevents people in the Boma knowing that they have received cash and reduces the risk to them walking home with cash.
- The only suggestion by beneficiaries for improving the project was for the number of beneficiaries to increase, especially in light of the number of people recently returned from the North of Sudan.
- Beneficiaries prefer cash to food aid, especially on the grounds of being able to purchase other things, such as healthcare and education, which food aid cannot provide.
- For purposes of sustainability, it is important for SC to set the cash transfer figure at a rate which still makes it attractive for beneficiaries to be engaged in other income generating activities.
- Children are very much silent beneficiaries in this project as they are not included in monitoring or design of the project.

5. Cash For Work component

During the evaluation, beneficiaries were asked to explain the cash for work activities they were engaged in and how they were decided upon. From the focus group discussions, it appears that community projects, which were the basis for the cash for work component of the project, were chosen by the project committee at the Boma level, in consultation with the rest of the community. The system appears to be inclusive and all beneficiaries were happy with the projects chosen. The table below outlines the activities chosen by each

Boma. These clearly vary from Boma to Boma depending upon the geographical nature and needs in the Boma – for instance, dyke construction is restricted to the lowlands.

	Chuomator	Wunatemei	Panabei	Uyon	Rupkou	Manyiel	Mathiangdit	Rumdier	Angot
Rice cultivation									
Sorghum cultivation									
Making fishing nets									
Tukul construction									
Boma centre construction									
Brick making									
Dyke construction									
Beehive making									
Groundnut cultivation									
Hand dug wells									

Table of cash for work activities chosen by each Boma

Beneficiaries confirmed that in return for their 80SDG, they worked 16 days a month on the community project, which differed according to the season. As noted above, the number of days work was calculated based on the rate for selling a bundle of grass per day (5SDG). The project committee was responsible for charting the days worked next to each beneficiary's name and handing in the chart to SC field staff on a monthly basis. When asked about penalties for those who did not work the full 16 days, respondents claimed that there were no defaulters in the work and that everyone therefore received his or her 80SDG.

The evaluation was fortunate to see some of the cash for work sites which seem to have been enthusiastically and very well implemented by the community – each Boma visited had a Boma centre, generally made of poles and thatching, which served as a meeting place for community discussions. In Wunatami and Uyon Bomas, brick making was visible for the construction of schools and the school in Wunatami Boma was already under construction. The schools will clearly add value to the communities buy building intellectual/human capacity of the next generation, as well as greatly easing the journey to school for children, especially during the flooding season.

Cash for work community project: Wunatami Boma school, May 2011.

79% of the CFW beneficiaries registered to receive the cash transfer are women, and 21% are male (UCT beneficiaries are 72:28 female:male). However, the work done under the CFW activities, according to the communities interviewed, is not split 79:21 women:men as many of the tasks are strenuous and culturally inappropriate for women. For instance, brick making is conducted by men, although, women are the only ones to gather water for brick making. CFW attendance sheets chart the beneficiary's fulfilment of the MOU with SC (16 days work a month), but they do not chart when two people from the same household work on the community project, and do not record how many hours a person has worked. However, FGDs suggested that the communities were aware of whether anyone was not pulling their weight and complaint mechanisms were in place should this need to be reported. [29] All CFW beneficiaries were aware of the maximum payment of 80SDG/household and yet some chose to work more than 16 days a month. In addition, it was expressed that even non-beneficiaries sometimes take part in the community activities knowing that they will not receive the cash transfer in exchange – it was explained that they did this because they knew the work would benefit the whole community and also because they were able to learn new skills from their peers.

In a context like Aweil East, where the human capital is abundant but where the skills are lacking due to years of war and population movement, SC's conditionality injects skills into the context which can be carried both horizontally and vertically across people and generations. All focus groups highlighted that they had gained skills from the community activities that they had not had before; ranging from farming as a collective through to making bricks. They all stated the ability of these skills to outlive any cash transfer programme in the area. At the time of the evaluation, communities were busy opening land for the planting season; this includes the communal farms anticipated for use as a CFW activity. That the CFW activities have continued despite the cash transfer not being delivered over the past few months is an indication that skills are worthy investments for the long

[29] It is interesting to note that no community FGDs indicated that anyone had ever received less than 80SDG due to poor fulfillment of the MOU agreement. It was also noted that no one had ever had to use the complaint mechanism.

term and can certainly lead away from any dependency on the cash transfer; it also indicates that the community has adopted the skill of working as a collective without the need for continued outside support. However, a clear exit strategy, encompassing skills acquisition, should be elaborated to facilitate this observed lack of dependency on the cash.

5.1 Agriculture and Disaster Risk Reduction training

Under the cash transfer project SC provided technical support to bolster the community projects. Aside from material support (oil drums, cement, iron roofing, tools) for school construction, technical support in the form of trainings were provided.

In December 2010, 43 participants from all Bomas were invited to attend a five-day training on best practice in farming techniques provided by a State Ministry of Agriculture-contracted technician. The training covered the following topics:

- Soil and water management
- Crop management
- Vegetable gardening
- Pest management

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) training was provided for beneficiaries of Chomator and Wunatami Bomas, due to the frequent flooding and destruction caused by floods in those two Bomas. In addition, representative from the Ministries of Agriculture and Education, local authority representatives and project staff (including community supervisors) were invited to join in the training. The training, which lasted five days, covered the following topics:

- An introduction to DRR
- Disaster risk assessment
- Disaster risk analysis
- Participatory rural appraisal tools

The outcome of the training was for a Technical Planning Team (TPT) to be formed in each Boma and for the TPT to conduct a disaster risk assessment in their Bomas. The disaster risk assessments encouraged the community to look at how to mitigate and capitalise on the risk of flooding. One of the risk reduction strategies witnessed was the construction of the school in Wunatami Boma centre, designed to improve access to education for children even when the area is flooded. Community development plans have been devised and the upcoming grant should provide means for the community to carry out more of their plans (see Annex Three).

5.2 Complaint mechanisms

It was reported that if someone was not happy with the status quo, they could raise it with the project committee or Boma chief (the latter especially if the complaint involved the project committee), who could action the complaint or raise it with SC if he could not solve the issue alone. In none of the Bomas visited had this taken place, indicating that the community generally had no complaints over hours or days worked, nor who works on the CFW activities.

Complaints regarding the targeting of beneficiaries under this project have been mitigated by the project committee reading out the chosen households. As noted earlier, this has

given rise to the possibility for people to voluntarily drop out of the project and cede the place to another vulnerable household. There were no complaints noted on the targeting of CFW or UCT beneficiaries during the evaluation.

5.3 Conclusions and lessons learnt

- The system for choosing CFW activities is inclusive and all beneficiaries were happy with the projects chosen.
- Labour carried out under the CFW activities is not split 79:21 women:men, as many of the tasks are strenuous and culturally inappropriate for women.
- Save the Children's conditionality requirement injects skills into the area, which can be carried both horizontally and vertically across people and generations.

6. Nutrition component

Sound nutrition and good hygiene practices remain some of the major challenges in Aweil East to achieving food security. In addition, NBeG has some of the worst health indicators in southern Sudan.[30] The nutrition component of this project is therefore highly pertinent to the needs of the area.

For some of the CFW beneficiaries, their community project/CFW activity is to provide nutrition messaging to their community. 70 nutrition and hygiene promoters[31] were selected to work towards achieving Result 3 of the project: 1,900 households have improved knowledge, attitudes and practices towards optimal hygiene and infant and young child feeding practices.

According to the training material and PDM reports, promoters were chosen on the grounds of:

- Their residence in a Boma/village;
- Their ability to read and write (for male it is must but for female not necessary);
- Their willingness to work;
- Their good health which enables them to walk from house to house;
- Must be cash transfer beneficiaries chosen by project committee.

Promoters chosen did not necessarily have a history of good hygiene and nutrition practice and women were encouraged to be part of the promotion team due to their ability to transmit messages to other women in the community; however, a meeting with SC's Nutrition Officer, it appears that there are more male promoters than female (39:31). In order to access their 80SDG a month, nutrition promoters must also work 16 days a month, conducting group sensitisation sessions and conducting house-to-house visits to reinforce messages from the sessions. Sessions focus on the following messages:

- Breast and complementary feeding practices

[30] IYCF Report, Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, South Sudan, Save the Children, November 2010.
[31] Sadly two promoters have passed away, so 68 are working now.

- Maternal nutrition
- Malnutrition
- Immunisation
- Diarrheal disease
- Hygiene and sanitation

The first question asked in all interviews was for respondents to provide an overview of the project implemented by Save the Children. None of the respondents mentioned the nutrition component when describing the project. The last question of every interview asked whether the respondent had attended any nutrition sessions given by the promoters, and if so, what messages had they retained. Answers indicate that respondents were familiar with the messages given by the promoters; although bias cannot be ruled out nutrition promoters were present in every FGD. However, despite the presence of promoters throughout the FGDs and the opportunity for them to present to the evaluator what they understood by the SC project, the link between the nutrition component and the cash transfer was not clear from beneficiaries' explanations of the project.

The Nutrition Officer has been collecting hygiene promotion session attendance sheets from the nutrition promoters in the field. Promoters are asked to fill out an attendance sheet for every group session they run, as well as indicate how many homes they have visited for follow-up sessions. The table below is a compilation of these figures from January to March 2011, once the Nutrition Officer was on board, which indicates that in three months, 3391 inhabitants of Baac Payam received hygiene and nutrition messaging:

Boma	Total number of attendees (Health and Nutrition Education sessions)			Total number of houses visited
	M	F	Total	
Chuomator	127	404	531	178
Wunatemei	95	315	410	190
Uyon	78	509	587	304
Rupkou	91	113	204	100
Panabei	101	512	613	250
Manyiel	44	105	149	77
Rumdier	131	219	350	130
Mathiangdit	39	149	188	100
Angot	100	259	613	250
TOTAL	**806**	**2585**	**3391**	**1471**

Number of beneficiaries in nutrition and hygiene education sessions, January-March 2011

Save the Children's on-going nutrition and hygiene data collection is conducted as part of the PDM questionnaire; this includes IYCF practices, food consumption, and water and sanitation. In addition, SC conducted an IYCF assessment in November 2010. Baseline information gathered at the start of the project on infant and child dietary intake is limited to one paragraph. While PDM reports provide essential information on food consumption for adults and children (food intake frequency and dietary diversity), PDM reports do not present any of the data collected on infant and young child feeding practices, or on sanitation and hygiene information gathered within the PDM questionnaire, as well as observational information on practice that could be recorded by enumerators. As such, monitoring change in knowledge, attitudes and practice towards hygiene and IYCF is not

captured on a monthly basis and has, instead, been captured in the November 2010 IYCF assessment.

After 2 years of the project, it could be expected that almost everyone in those 2 villages has heard the session several times, and yet, behaviour change appears to remain slow in the area and poor health remains one of the leading causes of child morbidity (calculated as being 75% in November 2010).[32] Reasons for this could be multiple, although the evaluation did not ask beneficiaries why in some cases they might be aware of the message and not act upon it. Poverty is an over-arching problem that could be a reason for not regularly practicing habits such as boiling drinking water, due to a lack of wood/charcoal or a lack of spare pots for this activity. Similarly, a lack of funds to buy enough soap to wash hands and bodies with every day could be a barrier to improved bodily hygiene. However, these are just hypotheses and more investigation into the causal link between knowledge and practice needs to be further explored by Save the Children, and behaviour change needs to be included in monthly monitoring to document any meaningful change. SC's IYCF report of November 2010 also notes that "a further assessment of the hygiene and sanitation practices among caretakers is needed to ensure the correct development and targeting of hygiene and sanitation messages pared with age appropriate IYCF messaging".

Observation whilst in the evaluated Bomas would indicate that knowledge of best practice in nutrition and hygiene has been absorbed at the Boma level, but practice is clearly lacking. The evaluator witnessed several women breastfeeding their children without adhering to the 'clean the breast' message that they were able to cite during FGDs; in addition, whilst discussing the merits of boiling drinking water, the evaluator observed non-respondents collecting water from puddles in the road. Similarly, pit latrines were very rare to find in community compounds. Although these are just a few examples, they are indicative of some of the challenges in behaviour change in the area. While it cannot be expected for people to change age-old habits in a matter of months, the barriers to change need to be understood and documented and that subsequent phases of the project take this information on board in their design. Stringent follow-up activities should also be conducted and information gathered in the PDM questionnaires could form the basis for designing these activities based on the knowledge, attitudes and practices documented therein.

It is recommended that SC conduct a KAP assessment, which could serve as a baseline to begin measuring change in nutrition and hygiene practices in the community. This type of assessment would also flag any particular barriers to behaviour change. As SC is not alone in Aweil East in trying to improve nutrition and hygiene, it would be worthwhile joining forces with other NGOs (most notably ACF and Mercy Corps) to conduct a comprehensive study. In addition, training community nutrition promoters to monitor behaviour change could be a useful way, in addition to project staff and external observation, to gaging change in the communities and promoters could also be trained to conduct regular house-to-house MUAC measurements to monitor child nutrition levels. Although a very comprehensive IYCF survey was conducted by SC in November 2010, the findings cannot be related directly to Baac Payam as the survey was conducted throughout Aweil East.

[32] SC linked diarrhea as one of the most commonly-cited illnesses, with 28% of children recorded as having a diarrheal episode over the two-week recall period prior to the November 2010 IYCF assessment. ACF had noted 13.4% of all 6-59 months children in their anthropometric and mortality survey of July 2010 as having diarrhea. Among many possible explanations for the difference in figures within the same County are seasonal weather changes and their impact on food intake and quality of water.

Research suggests that hygiene promotion is best absorbed when just a few pivotal messages are promoted, rather than a rainbow of new messages; "to be effective, hygiene promotion needs to target those few hygiene practices with documented effect on the greatest risks for disease transmission"; and that focusing on a few central messages in multiple fora is likely to succeed.[33] With this in mind, SC should consider which hygiene and nutrition habits are the main impediments to the communities achieving optimal health and nutritional status and consider focusing on just a few messages. There are various avenues of message transmission that could be explored; ACF and Mercy Corps both use Nhomalaau FM (the local radio station) to air messages, SC could learn from these approaches. Similarly, picture billboards, as used in some of the larger towns in South Sudan, could be an effective way to deliver pictorial messages designed to lead towards behaviour change; these could be placed in central locations, such as schools, markets and churches, for optimal viewing. Annex Four includes different options, with their advantages and limitations, for transmitting hygiene messages, elaborated by a team of researchers working on the challenges of supporting hygiene behaviour change.[34]

Although the start of the project in 2009 witnessed a delay in implementing the nutrition component, any future phases have the advantage of a Nutirion Officer already recruited and a large team of enumerators and field officers familiar with the task required of them. In order to better integrate the nutrition component with the rest of the project, SC should consider exploring ways of better explaining the overall objective of the project to beneficiaries so that they are aware of the importance of good nutrition and hygiene in addition to the cash transfer component. Project inauguration sessions, in each Boma under the project, could aim to gather all beneficiaries who are able to come to a central meeting point, to explain the structure and scope of the project, highlighting the importance of the nutrition component in addressing issues of food security I the area. In addition, nutrition messaging could be incorporated into other parts of the project, for instance reinforcing the impact that disasters can have on nutrition and health during DRR training, highlighting the importance of growing and consuming vegetables in agricultural training, and finding ways to incorporate nutrition into the CFW activities. One idea could be to make items, such as drying racks for pots and pans, that promote better hygiene practice and for the community to see how easy it can be to change. Communities in the lowland flood-prone Bomas noted how difficult it was for the community to change to using pit latrines due to the locally made latrines sinking with every flood – building cement-slab pit latrines could also be promoted as a cash for work activity.

6.1 Conclusions and lessons learnt

- The link between the nutrition component and the cash transfer was not clear from beneficiaries' explanations of the project.
- Observations of the communities during the evaluation would indicate that, while knowledge of nutrition and best practice in healthcare has been absorbed by respondents, practice is clearly lacking; this is an area which needs further investigation to better shape the design of the project.

[33] Rheinländer, T., Evans, B., van der Hoek, W., Peal, A.J., and Konradsen, F., Challenges in supporting hygiene behaviour change, January 2010.
[34] Ibid.

7. Use of transfers by beneficiaries

7.1 Impact of cash on the role and status of women

Although in some households men were chosen as the cash transfer beneficiaries, respondents claimed that women are, on the whole, the main decision makers on how cash is spent within the household and when the cash transfer is registered in a man's name, he usually hands it over to his wife or other main female of the household. Based on FGD answers, this appears to have been the case before the project began and there is no indication from meetings held with beneficiaries that the cash transfer project has increased women's status in this respect. Discussions indicate that women are responsible for all food purchases and have the right to purchase chickens and/or goats with any left over money; she may also decide to sell a chicken, goat or a small quantity of sorghum without seeking approval from a man in the household. However, the purchase or sale of cow is a man's decision to make, although many respondents claimed that it was a joint decision with their spouse. This echoes SC's findings during the IYCF assessment that "[h]usbands also played more of a leadership role is deciding when to sell live assets with only 19.4% of women reporting that women have sole decision making power to decide when to sell small livestock such as chickens, goats or sheep and only 5.9% of women reporting that the decision to sell large livestock such as cattle was solely theirs to take".[35]

The questionnaire administered in FGDs sought in part to understand the impact of receiving cash transfers from the point of view of women's responsibilities at household level and to understand whether receiving 80SDG a month was enabling her to engage in other activities or spend more time doing other things. The question appears to have been quite challenging for many women to respond to. However, those that did, suggested that as a result of receiving the cash, their time was freed up to spend more time in the home looking after children, rather than at market trying to sell grass bundles. Another woman replied that she was now able to invest some money into running a tea stall at the market and make some additional money that way. Although these are just two examples out of many discussions, it does suggest that in some cases, women's time has been freed as a result of cash transfers, and their room to make extra money through other IGAs has been expanded.

7.2 Impact of cash transfers on credit and markets

There was no indication from the evaluation that receiving the cash transfer enabled beneficiaries to purchase items on credit. While a few respondents claimed to be able to purchase on credit, this was as a result of kin ties and restricted only to the local markets. Incidentally, respondents indicated that the local markets were the most expensive (most inaccessible by road) and that purchases made were for small quantities of sugar, meat or sorghum. This is echoed in the SC Market Assessment Report (March 2011).

As noted above, the cash transfer appears to have stimulated local trade to the point of enabling the creation of a small market in Wunatemi Boma centre that did not exist prior to the project. Small markets, such as this one, means that a portion of the cash transfer is recycled in the local economy thereby has multiplier effects. Such natural evolutions should

[35] IYCF Report, Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, South Sudan, Save the Children, November 2010.

be supported and reinforced and it would be wise for SC to branch out into supporting IGA activities, especially in the most remote areas, as a next step on from the cash transfer project for beneficiary households that appear to be requiring the cash less and less.

7.3 Household expenditures prior to cash transfer programme

The pilot phase evaluation report indicated that priority uses of the cash transfer were education, health and assets. This evaluation found that food was very much the main priority in spending, even after 14 cash transfer rounds, especially among UCT beneficiaries. Post-distribution monitoring by SC gathers information on household expenditure one week after distribution. In order to triangulate that data, the evaluation asked respondents to cast their minds back to before the cash transfer programme started (therefore, 2008 or the year if the census) and provide information on their household expenditure. For comparative purposes, respondents were then asked to provide information on their household expenditures whilst receiving cash transfers, thus up to March 2011. For the purpose of this exercise, CFW and UCT beneficiaries were separated to see if there were any differences in spending between the two target types. The information and analysis of an amalgamation of all FGD and interview responses is presented below:



CFW beneficiary spending prior to project



UCT beneficiary spending prior to project

This exercise was done using proportional piling as a data-generating tool, which may well have generated slightly different findings from SC's baseline data. From these two graphs it is possible to see how different household spending is between CFW and UCT beneficiaries before the project started. 53% of UCT income was spent on food whereas only 34% of CFW household income was spent on food. These figures differ slightly from baseline information, which indicated that just under 65% of income was spent on food. Interestingly, education is the second highest expenditure for both UCT and CFW households prior to the project, with UCT dedicating 11% of their income on education and CFW households 18%. UCT households spent only 10% of total income on healthcare whereas CFW households were

able to spend roughly 17%. In UCT households, agricultural tools were the fourth largest expense (9%) whereas for CFW households animals assets constituted the fourth largest expense (9%). UCT households were able to allocate only 7% of their income to reproductive animal assets. It is clear from this data that UCT households are worse off than CFW households, indicated by over 50% of total income being spent on purchasing food, with as little as 10% being spent on health care, and with only 7% being spent on animal assets which can multiply in number and therefore value. Also interesting to note is that CFW households were able to provide 1% more than UCT in terms of kinship support (4% and 5% respectively).

7.4 Household expenditures during the cash transfer project



CFW beneficiary spending during project

UCT beneficiary spending during project

Even during the cash transfer, food is the largest expenditure. Among CFW beneficiaries, spending on food increased from 34-42% during the transfer period. However, among UCT households, the percentage of spending on food, while still the largest expense, dropped from 53-44%. Looking holistically at all other purchases made by UCT households during the cash transfer phase, it is clear to see that this is as a result of increased spending in non-food areas. However, the drop in percentage of food expenditure does not necessarily equate to sufficient food and therefore surplus money to spend on other items; the additional 80SDG per month simply allows the poorest households to expand their priorities to include spending on essential items such as healthcare and education.

For UCT beneficiary households, education was still the second largest expense after food during the cash transfer phase; this rose sharply from 11-18% of total expenditure. This certainly echoes comments from FGDs which suggested that disposable income would be spent on educating children. School uniforms were both the biggest and most expensive impediment to children going to school according to respondents (children interviewed said that a uniform costs 25-35SDG), with school fees and stationary following. The majority of children interviewed during the evaluation were attending school; however, this may not be indicative of the community at large given that FGDs were held in central locations close to

school facilities and it was easy for Boma chiefs to group children for the evaluation on the way out of school. Interviews with children aimed, in part, to ascertain the extent to which cash transfers were assisting children in going to school but children who were aware that there parents were part of the cash transfer scheme has been in school prior to the project commencement, or had been too young at the project start. It was therefore difficult to work out the extent to which cash transfers are facilitating children in receiving a school education and thus helping to bridge the generational poverty gap.

The percentage spent on education among CFW households dropped from 18-13%, but this is not an indication of less children attending school. It may simply be an indication that children already had uniforms and therefore the need to repurchase was eliminated, or it could be an indication that enough children were already going to school, within the limits of facilities in the deep rural areas, and that the additional cash received through the cash transfer was spent on other priorities. The evaluation failed to gain insight into the number of children who were now at school compared with the start of the project. In-depth household baseline data could provide a benchmark for this kind of information and enable SC to measure the success of the cash transfer in reducing the intergenerational poverty gap by providing an education for children and thus linking the emergency cash transfer to long-term sustainable poverty reduction.

For CFW households, spending on healthcare was almost the same before and during the transfers (17% and 16% respectively). For UCT households, spending on healthcare increased from 10% of total expenditure to 14%. This is a very important finding as it suggests that some households are deprived of healthcare because expenditure is prioritized for food. With additional income, priorities can be widened which, in the long run, improve general health and food security.

Another important finding to come out of the focus group discussions is the ability for households to start building up a reproductive asset base with as little as 80SDG per month. Although as a percentage, assets expenditure among CFW households dropped from 9-7%, in cash terms the amount allocated may be somewhat similar due to an overall budget increase. In UCT households, asset purchases increased from 7-9%. Asset purchase figures alone though are a futile indicator as the importance is that households are able to hold onto the animals long enough for them to reproduce and multiply in value. It is also important to understand how many assets are sold out during the hunger gap to understand what a household is left with after the lean period. As noted above, SC's post-distribution monitoring does not gather information on asset sales of assets purchased as a result of the cash transfer. With this information, SC would be able to attribute household asset building to the cash transfers.

Agricultural tool purchases remained constant (6%) for CFW households and rose only by 1% for UCT households (from 6-7%). And interestingly, kinship support remained fairly constant before and during cash transfers; UCT households allocated 4% before and during, and CFW households reduced allocations from 5% to 4%. However, in UCT households, receiving cash transfers paved the way to repay loans taken (from traders or kin) in cash – among UCT households this rose from less than 1% to 3% of total expenses, and among CFW households, it rose from 1% to 2%, indicating fewer loans being taken out by CFW households (although this could also mean that payment is done in non-monetary terms for CFW households).

7.5 Household expenditures of just the cash transfer

After the proportional piling exercise to establish any changes in spending pattern as a result of the cash transfer, respondents were asked to do proportional piling of spending of the cash transfer only, in order to try and understand what exactly the cash transfer is used for, and to understand therefore what it frees up in terms of household capital. Below are the results for CFW and UCT households' expenditures of the cash transfer:



CFW beneficiary expenditure of the cash transfer



UCT beneficiary expenditure of the cash transfer

Here something very interesting can be seen – both CFW and UCT households have the same expenses for food (bear in mind that the groups were split and there was no opportunity to copy the other group). It can therefore be reasoned that cash transfer beneficiaries in Baac Payam spend 44% of their monthly cash transfers on food. The cash transfer appears to be split up and allocated to many causes, rather than being just for one purpose – this may be a safety net approach so that the household does not become dependent on one income source for one purchase type.

For the CFW households, that claim to spend 7% of their total budget on animal assets, 14% of the cash transfer is allocated to that expense, indicating that the transfer has the potential to increase household food security and income over a longer period. For UCT households, health and education are the second and third largest expenditures for the cash transfer, which indicates that the cash transfer has the potential to improve the health and inter-generational poverty gap of the most vulnerable households.

7.6 Food consumption during the project



Food consumption patterns during entire cash transfer project, PDM data

PDM reports monitor household food consumption during the project. The graph above documents all PDM data from the project's inception. Food consumption in the final (14th) month of cash distribution appears to have improved considerably among the poor consumption group from 45-5%; and similarly the percentage of households within acceptable food consumption levels has increased since the baseline stage, from 21-37%. However, true comparison must look beyond the graphs in the PDM to work out the mean food consumption and any statistically significant changes based on the mean. The table below, provided by the Project Manager, indicates the mean value and subsequent statistically significant food consumption changes:

S.N	Mean comparison	Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
					Lower	Upper			
1	Baseline against 10th round	-0.86	0.948	0.068	-0.99	-0.72	-12.706	196	0.000
2	10th around against 11th round	0.41	0.810	0.058	0.30	0.52	7.076	194	0.000
3	11th against 12th round	-0.07	0.900	0.065	-0.20	0.06	-1.129	189	0.260
4	12th round against 13th	-0.01	1.005	0.074	-0.16	0.13	-0.145	186	0.884
5	13th round against 14th	-0.02	0.849	0.062	-0.14	0.10	-0.345	186	0.731
6	10th round against 14th	0.28	0.775	0.055	0.17	0.38	4.977	195	0.000
7	Baseline against 14th	-0.58	1.032	0.074	-0.72	-0.43	-7.818	195	0.000

Food consumption score paired mean comparison (t-test), Save the Children

When comparing the baseline against the 10th round of cash distribution (May 2010), the mean food consumption change is statistically significant, thus indicating an improvement in food intake (quantity and diversity). However, this is not indicative of an improvement only in beneficiary households as during May 2010, even control group results indicated only 4% of households in the poor consumption category. Seasonal fluctuations appear to have greatly affected the data collected in May 2010.

The mean food consumption change is statistically significant when we compare the 10th round (May 2010) with the 11th round (October 2010), with far fewer households in the acceptable food consumption levels (59% down to 29%). As noted above, October is the start of the harvest season and a time when households have their glut if they have started harvesting. The mean food consumption change is insignificant when we compare the 11th round (October) with 12th (November); the 12th round with the 13th (February 2011); and the 13th round with 14th (March 2011).

However, the mean food consumption change is statistically significant when we compare 14th round with 10th round, and 14th round with baseline. Thus indicating that, during the lifetime of the project, household food consumption improved significantly compared to baseline and the last distribution of the first phase last (10th round distribution in May 2010). The change in consumption score can only be ascertained when measuring over several months, as it is insignificant from one month to the next. This reinforces the earlier point that, to see strong results from a cash transfer programme, patience is required and long-term programming is necessary – there are no quick-fix solutions to food security and poverty reduction in cash transfer programming.

7.7 Sharing of the cash transfer

In a context of such strong kin ties, it is logical to ask respondents whether they shared any part of the cash transfer. The majority of respondents answered affirmatively, and this is indicated in the spending of the cash transfer where CFW and UCT households allocate a certain amount of the cash transfer (7% and 3% respectively) to kinship support. This finding was probed, to ascertain whether cash beneficiaries gave cash or in kind support to kin, and whether the support was reciprocal or expected and whether this support was carried out on a monthly basis.

Respondents unanimously claimed that kinship support was not compulsory or expected, although there appear to be very clear channels by which someone can seek assistance from a relative (this apparently dates back to the 1988 famine when chiefs were required by the government to intervene when they were aware of a suffering household and make sure that a wealthy relative assisted them through the loan of a lactating cow or other) – this system is still in place but as households are not as poorly off as during the 1988 famine, it is easier for the community to intervene without the need for chief intervention. It should be noted, however, that some chiefs questioned on whether there were and differences in the community as a result of the cash transfer mentioned that they were asked less frequently since the cash transfer programme to intervene in arranging support for a poor household. Obviously this claim cannot be validated during such an evaluation, but it is interesting that the point came up in two of the Bomas visited.

Several respondents noted that a Dinka cannot feel 'comfortable' eating when they know their neighbour has no food. There is therefore a social support system in place of sharing food (especially when one household has started harvesting before another), which can be

reimbursed in food, or accumulated into animals, over time. From interviews held, it appears that this practice still exists and that the cash is transformed into food assistance. In addition, the loaning of animals to poorer households is still very much practiced, especially of milking cows if a household has young children that require milk. However, unlike small food donations (of a *malua* or two of sorghum), it was highlighted that the Dinka have an institutional memory for cows lent out which goes back generations – this memory is vital for bride wealth when lent cattle are recalled for dowry payment – and cattle must be repaid. It was also mentioned during the FGDs that large quantities of food would also need to be repaid and this could be in food, in cash or in animals if the food amount was significant enough.

In some cases, respondents claimed to help others with the cash. One lady interviewed in Rupkou Boma, Margaret, mentioned exactly how she divides her cash; she was chosen as a CFW beneficiary as she is a widow without her husband's cow wealth for material support. Her husband had 3 other wives, one of whom lives in the same compound as her, one who lives in Pariak, and the other in Wanjok. For some reason unknown during the interview,[36] Margaret chose to assist two of the co-wives – the co-wife she lives with and the co-wife in Wanjok, but not the wife in Pariak. After each distribution, Margaret claimed to give the co-wife in Wanjok 10SDG of the cash and share the remaining cash at home with the co-wife she lives with – this was done in the form of food or money. This case study raises some important findings that need to be further investigated for subsequent phases of the cash transfer:

- The understanding of what a household is in Dinka terms needs to be better understood. SC data on household constitution indicates an average of 7 people per household. However, in the case of Margaret, who lives with her children as well as the children of her co-wife, is this considered one or two households? And if it is two, what makes the community to chose one co-wife over another if they live in the same compound, eating from the same pot, sharing the same firewood and feeding the same children?
- How can the benefit of the cash transfer be measured over so many indirect beneficiaries (although, it could be argued that if they are receiving cash or food that they are also direct beneficiaries)?
- To what extent can cash transfers serve to strengthen kin ties and calm any intra-community tensions?

7.8 Markets

One of the fundamental pre-conditions to the SC project functioning properly is that the availability of food on local markets is maintained throughout the project, and that the prices on the market are conducive to beneficiaries accessing the food and non-food items that they require. Another pre-condition is that the cash transfer does not inflate prices in the local markets and serves rather as an incentive for traders to maintain stocks at the same, or lower, prices so that non-beneficiaries are not discriminated upon but higher prices. A market assessment conducted in early 2011 by SC confirms that during the lifetime of the cash transfer project, both of these pre-conditions have been met and the transfer system has therefore been effective in ensuring that beneficiaries have increased access to food and non-food items from the market and that non-beneficiaries have not been

[36] The interview conducted in Rupkou was unfortunately cut short due to the arrival of heavy rains. Therefore further probing of Margaret's story was not possible.

penalised due to the project; this information was also confirmed by beneficiaries who were interviewed as part of this evaluation.

However, the current economic climate in Sudan and the impact it is having on markets, especially in the northern-most States of Southern Sudan, is not looking optimistic. South Sudan usually imports over 80% of its market produce from neighbouring countries, including northern Sudan, Uganda and Kenya,[37] although recent commotions in commodity flows from the north to south have resulted in a 40% drop in the volume of food and non-food supplies to southern markets.[38] Markets along the northern border rely heavily on trade with northern Sudan; indeed, the SC market assessment estimates that in the markets of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, traders are estimated to be 85% northern and 15% southern.[39] Since May 2011, trade links with North Sudan have been blocked and consequently the price of basic commodities in NBEG is skyrocketing; this is further exacerbated by the global food price hikes and the global escalating cost of fuel. Since 7th July 2011, in a bid to curb the escalation in food prices, the GoSS has abolished taxes on imported food commodities.

Although a rapid market assessment carried out by SC during the time of writing this evaluation report confirmed that traders in NBEG were using trade links in southern Darfur (Nyala) and East Africa, SC's market assessment from earlier in the year notes the challenges that traders in NBEG were facing in sourcing commodities from the East Africa market due to the need to exchange Sudanese Pounds into US Dollars and then into Ugandan or Kenyan Shillings. This was perceived as a double risk to traders due to the possibility of losing money, as well as the fact that there are no financial institutions in Aweil where these exchanges can be made.

With the up-coming Independence on 9th July and the remaining uncertainties with regards to trade with northern Sudan, NBEG, among other States along the north-south border, may see demand for food and non-food supplies far outweigh the supply. As noted in SC's market assessment, 'markets at their current status have the potential to respond to an increase in demand (…). However, supply distortion during separation and further closure of business by the northern traders could have harmful significance to the markets'. In light of SC's upcoming grant to continue and expand the cash transfer project, technical support to increase own produce and generate a surplus for sales on the local markets would be a logical path for Save the Children to follow in Aweil East. AMURT and Mercy Corps have already been engaging in these types of activities and Save the Children could certainly complement these market stimulation activities in new areas (technical support towards market stimulation was recommended in Save the Children's Market Assessment).

As was witnessed during the referendum in January 2011, Independence of the South could ignite even further price rises on local markets as some traders may be forced to exit the South, whereas others may forced to exchange currency twice to purchase goods from afar, thus leaving the consumer to incur the additional cost. In this case, the current cash transfer of 80SDG may no longer be worth 25% of the minimum monthly food basket and could instead come to represent a lot less. It will be important for SC to carry out another in-depth market analysis a few months after Independence to assess the potential for the markets to supply goods on a regular basis and at a regular and affordable cost to the consumer and to calculate the sustainability and applicability of the cash transfer in the given context. During

[37] http://www.sudanradio.org/no-taxes-food-items-southern-sudan-says-goss
[38] FEWSNET, Sudan Referendum Impacts on Market Flows and Livelihoods, May 2011.
[39] Aweil East Market Assessment Report; Setting the Stage for a Cash Transfer Project, Save the Children in South Sudan, 2011.

the evaluation, the cost of some market goods was compared against costs in the minimum food basket provided in the ECHO single form to see if there was a rise in price.

The table below indicates a rise in three out of four commodities on Malualkon market,[40] of an average 19%, while dry fish had reduced considerably by 40% since the calculation at the start of the pilot phase. This decline in dry fish prices was explained by the surplus caught in last year's floods and actually quite uncommon for prices during this period of the year, whereas the increase in prices for sorghum, groundnuts and meat can be explained by both seasonal prices rises (the evaluation was conducted in the annual hunger gap) and the trade blockades with the North. Market prices are monitored bi-monthly by SC and present a very comprehensive set of information on market functions in the area – this information will continue to be invaluable in the coming months and every effort of SC's part should be made to share the data collected with other agencies working on market-related activities.

Expenditure	Market cost at start of project	Market cost in May/June 2011	% Increase/decrease
Sorghum 12 *malua*	72 SDG	84 SDG	+17%
Dry fish 5kg	50 SDG	30 SDG	-40%
Meat 3kg	30 SDG	36 SDG	+20%
G/nut 6 *malua*	20 SDG	24 SDG	+20%

In the event that demand exceeds supply on the markets and renders the cash transfer inefficient, Save the Children could consider factoring in a contingency fund to their next budget that could be used to increase the transfer according to market prices to ensure that beneficiary households are still able to purchase roughly the same quantities. This kind of contingency could be problematic for the donor if left un-spent, therefore a contingency plan for the contingency fund could be set up whereby any unspent money could be incorporated into community works activities for example.

Lastly, some cash transfer programmes offer beneficiaries the option of receiving 'payment' in food when markets are not able to supply the necessary commodities to promote food security – such as the PNSP in Ethiopia. This may be an avenue for Save the Children to explore, perhaps in conjunction with other agencies involved in the distribution of food aid in Aweil East; however, the cost implications of delivering and storing food would undoubtedly outweigh the cost effectiveness of the project as it currently stands. Much will be dependent upon when the next phase of the cash transfer project will start, as the harvest season will begin in October and if the season has been favourable, households should be able to consume their won food whilst investing some of their cash transfer in productive assets such as chickens and goats.

7.9 Conclusions and lessons learnt

- Food was very much the main priority in spending, even after 14 cash transfer rounds, especially among UCT beneficiaries.

[40] It should be noted that the data from May/June 2011 in the table presented represents only prices from Malualkon market. However, on average, SC market data indicates that Malualkon is generally one of the cheapest markets for consumers to purchase goods from after Wanjok and Warawar markets.

- Among CFW beneficiaries, spending on food increased from 34-42% during the transfer period. However, among UCT households, the percentage of spending on food, while still the largest expense, dropped from 53-44%.
- Cash transfer beneficiaries in Baac Payam spent on average 44% of their monthly cash transfers on food.
- The purchase of school uniforms was both the biggest, and most expensive, impediment to children going to school according to respondents.
- With additional income, household priorities can be widened which, in the long run, improve general health and food security.
- For the CFW households that claim to spend 7% of their total budget on animal assets, 14% of the cash transfer itself is allocated to that purchasing animal assets, indicating that the transfer has the potential to increase household food security and income over a longer period.
- The mean food consumption change is statistically significant when we compare 14th round with 10th round, and 14th round with baseline. Thus indicating that, during the lifetime of the project, household food consumption improved significantly compared to baseline and the last distribution of the first phase last.
- In order to see strong results from a cash transfer programme, patience is required and long-term programming is necessary – there are no quick-fix solutions to food security and poverty reduction in cash transfer programming.
- Although the exact percentage is hard to ascertain, cash transfers are shared; this is indicated in the spending of the cash transfer where CFW and UCT households allocate a certain amount of the cash transfer (7% and 3% respectively) to kinship support.
- Technical support to increase own produce and generate a surplus for sales on the local markets would be a logical path for Save the Children to follow in Aweil East.

8. Cost effectiveness

The post-conflict situation in southern Sudan is a unique scenario of frequent protracted and anticipated crises, where the needs are so great that humanitarian assistance has been provided for decades now. In this context, it is hard to envisage long-term development work, although linking relief to development (LRRD) grants are being offered now which have encouraging a change in the way assistance has provided in specific parts of the vast country. The size and diversity of southern Sudan means that context specificity is imperative to any project design; the cash transfer project in Aweil East being no exception. Any project should be based on the outcome of a sound feasibility study. SC conducted a rapid market assessment and demonstrated the project's feasibility.

Cash transfers, in the form of direct cash, cash for work, or vouchers, can be more cost effective than traditional commodity assistance, and has the potential to empower beneficiaries by providing choice in prioritising how the money will be spent.[41] However, correct targeting and monitoring of activities, especially in an innovative project such as this one for southern Sudan, which has a great deal of emphasis on data collection, the overhead costs are considerably higher than one might expect a state-driven social protection venture to cost for the same number of households.

[41] Save the Children, ECHO Single Form.

At present, SC hand delivers 80SDG in cash in envelopes each month to 1900 beneficiary households across 9 Bomas. This is conducted in a context where banks exist only in the towns (Aweil town being the closest bank); in which the economy has until recently been largely based on commodity exchange rather than cash exchange; in which mobile phone coverage is poor; and where many people do not own telephones let alone have access to a power supply to charge the telephone. Within the limits and constraints of Baac Payam, the current system of delivering cash is the only option for Save the Children. As mobile technology changes, it will be worthwhile SC reassessing possibilities for delivery. Agencies such as WFP are interested in branching out to voucher and cash transfer modalities in Sudan and there could be an opportunity for Save the Children to branch out into other transfer modalities too that could be more cost effective than the current transfer system.

8.1 Cost effectiveness for beneficiaries

The cost effectiveness of the project's inputs against its impact is still, 2 years on from the project inception, very difficult to measure as poverty reduction and improvements in food security must be sustainable and this cannot happen in just 2 years. However, the cost benefits of the project can be assessed in terms of whether the method is the best option at a given time and in a given context for a given stakeholder.

For beneficiaries, the input to output seems acceptable. During interviews, there were no negative comments at all about the cash transfer being too small for the amount of work being carried out on the CFW activities – this level of contentment with any project in Sudan is rare and could potentially be considered an indication of the cash transfer being *too* reasonable. While most beneficiaries walk to the distribution sites – and for some that can mean 3 hours walking each way – this was not considered an unreasonable distance or amount of time. Many beneficiaries were able to simultaneously collect their cash and take advantage of the larger market in Warawar and Mabil, which offer slightly cheaper prices on staple foods. Some beneficiaries mentioned being able to get public transport to or from the collection point, but this really only occurs on the way back from distribution when a person has bought a heavier load than is possible to carry; going to collect the cash transfer costs beneficiaries nothing except time.

The assessment endeavoured to assess what the time spent going to the collection point cost the beneficiaries in terms of hours lost engaged in another income generating activity. In terms of moneymaking venture, it appears that beneficiaries would be farming, fishing or collecting grass/poles if they were not going to collect the money. As farming, fishing and grass/pole collecting are seasonal activities, and because the price or worth of the activity can fluctuate over the year, it is difficult to assess the monetary value of the time dedicated to going to collect the cash transfer. When asked if the time spent collecting cash was reasonable, beneficiaries unanimously agreed that it was (although this had more to do with the location being strategic in terms of market and safety). The above-mentioned calculation for how 80SDG was agreed upon as a fair cash transfer appears to outweigh a beneficiary's ability to generate 80SDG over 16 days, as market sales of grass/poles is risky business and there is not always a demand for the goods. Therefore, even if collecting the cash transfer takes a whole day out of usual income generation activities each month, beneficiaries are guaranteed the money, which would not be the case by farming or cutting and selling poles and grass on the markets. With this in mind, everyone interviewed during the evaluation was content with the cash amount, time for collection, and input to the project to gain the money.

8.2 Cost effectiveness for Save the Children

For Save the Children, the cost effectiveness is multi-faceted. During the pilot phase of the project, the evaluation report indicated that over 10 cash distributions the project costs per beneficiary household was €53.00 and the cash transfer delivery cost per beneficiary household was €8.88. During this period of the evaluation (July 2010 to March 2011), which consisted of only 4 cash transfers, the project cost per beneficiary was €36 and the cash transfer delivery cost per beneficiary was €6.29. Although the cash transfer cost per beneficiary has dropped by over €2.5 as a whole due to an increase of 500 households for the same amount of work, carrying out the cash transfer project over 4 transfers has only marginally reduced the cost of the cash transfer delivery (from €12,433 to €11,956). In terms of cost effectiveness from the donor's and SC's perspective, this calculation indicates that it is clearly beneficial to implement using economies of scale and design a project with more cash transfers over a longer period of time, rather than short projects with fewer deliveries.

Cash transfer delivery cost per beneficiary household

	Cash transfer value (SDG)	Cash transfer value (€)	Number of beneficiary households	Total value of cash transfer	Cost of cash transfer delivery	Cash transfer cost/beneficiary
Sept 2010	800 SDG	€270	1400	€398,936	€12,433	€8.88
May 2011	320 SDG	€108	1900	€205,200	€11,956	€6.29

Project delivery cost per beneficiary household

	Cash transfer value (SDG)	Cash transfer value (€)	Number of beneficiary households	Total value of project	Cost of project delivery	Project delivery cost/beneficiary
Sept 2010	800 SDG	€270	1400	€809,597	€74,403	€53.14
May 2011	320 SDG	€108	1900	€976,636	€68,365	€36

8.3 Impact on non-beneficiaries

For non-beneficiaries, the project appears to have been a positive improvement on their lives, albeit minimal compared with beneficiaries, and cost effective. For non-cash recipients living in the midst of cash transfer beneficiaries, it is arguable that they have also been able to gain from the project as a certain portion (discretionary and not necessarily the same each month) goes to supporting kin in the environs; so cash transfers have been disbursed widely throughout the locality ensuring that many more than just 1900 households benefit from the project. In addition, skills learnt from beneficiary members working on CFW activities can also be considered gains for non-beneficiaries, although this evaluation did not seek to calculate the multiplier effect of skills in the community.

From the traders' perspective, the project has led to economic gains as a result of more food being bought from the cash transfer. And in some areas, such as Wunatami Boma, markets have sprung up since the beginning of the cash transfer project, indicating available income within the community, which has the added value of benefiting more than just the direct beneficiaries. In addition, roughly 8% of the cash transfer, according to interviews during the evaluation, is spent on animal assets (small ruminants and chickens), all of which are purchased within the same locality, thus keeping a significant portion of the cash transfer within the community and benefiting non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries alike. The cash transfer in Aweil East is therefore a market stimulant and can help towards stimulating rural enterprise. It is important to note that a recent SC Market Assessment gathered no evidence of inflated market prices as a result of the cash transfer schedule, and indeed, respondents did not cite any examples of increased food prices due to the cash transfer – there was a clear link in the minds of respondents between inflated food prices and seasonal fluctuations and/or current trade blockades with northern Sudan.

8.4 Conclusions and lessons learnt

- Within the limits and constraints of Baac Payam, the current system of delivering cash is the only option for Save the Children.
- The cost effectiveness of the project's inputs against its impact is still, 2 years on from the project inception, very difficult to measure as poverty reduction and improvements in food security must be sustainable and this cannot happen in just 2 years.
- For most beneficiaries, the distance to the distribution point was not an issue as they were able to simultaneously collect their cash and take advantage of the larger market in Warawar and Mabil, which offer slightly cheaper prices on staple foods.
- Carrying out the cash transfer project over 4 transfers has only marginally reduced the cost of the cash transfer delivery (from €12,433 to €11,956), which is therefore a false economy. In terms of cost effectiveness from the donor's and SC's perspective, this calculation indicates that it is clearly beneficial to implement using economies of scale and design a project with more cash transfers over a longer period of time.
- Non-beneficiaries have been able to gain from the project as a certain portion (discretionary and not necessarily the same each month) goes to supporting kin in the environs; so cash transfers have been disbursed widely throughout the locality ensuring that many more than just 1900 households benefit from the project.
- By spending within the community, a significant portion of the cash transfer remains within the community and benefits non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries alike.
- A recent SC Market Assessment gathered no evidence of inflated market prices as a result of the cash transfer schedule, and indeed, respondents did not cite any examples of increased food prices due to the cash transfer.

9. Organisational learning

This section of the evaluation will look at the pilot phase evaluation and seek to assess which, if any, of the recommendations were actioned, and if not, why. Furthermore, lessons learnt from the pilot phase will be compared with those from this second phase evaluation to see if the same lessons can be considered four transfers on.

The pilot evaluation made the following recommendations:

1. The pilot phase should be expanded; however the number of beneficiaries should be increased within existing Bomas before additional Bomas are added.
2. Feasibility of engaging the private sector, specifically the commercial banks, should be explored as partners in the cash distribution process.
3. The nutrition component should be enhanced, and a financial literacy component should be included.
4. Sustainability of the project as it currently stands is questionable, and thus long-term options should be explored more closely.

Each point shall now be analysed:

1. The pilot phase was expanded in phase two, however, this was done contrarily to the recommendation. Beneficiary numbers in each Boma remained static and instead two new Bomas were added. Working within the confines of local authorities can be quite challenging in southern Sudan and Save the Children experienced difficulties negotiating scaling up activities in pilot phase Bomas without spreading into other Bomas. Clearly there are political motivations, but nonetheless, agencies are operating in host countries and have to decide whether or not to agree to the conditions imposed. The compromise with county authorities has been to include an additional 500 households to the project across two new Bomas (Uyon and Manyiel, with 292 and 208 households respectively).
2. At present, there is only one bank in Aweil town where money transfers can be made – Save the Children is already using Ivory Bank to collect its cash from. Banking institutions in Northern Bahr el Ghazal are still very rudimentary and, at present, it is not feasible for people in the village setting to access these institutions. In rural settings, cash is 'saved' in animal assets – with offspring serving as interest. Occasionally during the evaluation, beneficiaries mentioned keeping money with a trader to be accessed in an emergency (such as a health emergency), but this is kept by the trader, without interest.

   There are currently no options, except for Mercy Corps Village Saving and Loans scheme, whereby people at village level can invest money. Similarly, mobile telecommunications in Aweil East are also minimal, with limited network coverage and limited mobile telephone ownership. Mobile phones are generally reserved for those near town where power can be accessed for charging – at the village level very few people have telephones and therefore an Mpesa-type transfer system, such as the one in Kenya, is not feasible without considerable work on network coverage, power supplies in the village, and sensitisation on different ways (other than through animals) to save money.
3. One of the recommendations for this phase of the evaluation is also to enhance the nutrition programming, or to ensure that there is overlap between SC's Cash transfer programme and ACF's nutrition programming. The nutrition component of the programme is still weak, not aided by the vastness of the problems in Aweil East. Nonetheless, it appears that little has been done by SC to address the recommendation from the pilot phase. However, it should also be noted that during

the pilot phase, the nutrition education was delayed for various reasons, but by the end of the phase, nutrition educators had been chosen and trained. Under the second phase of the evaluation, a refresher training was conducted for the educators. However, it took until January 2011 for a nutritionist to be recruited, which has severely hindered the data which could have been gathered – this could be one explanation for the apparent weakness in the nutrition component of the project.

With regards to the financial literacy training, if this is not linked somehow to business development or a saving scheme, it could be a futile endeavour. This was not actioned by Save the Children and was not mentioned by beneficiaries during this evaluation. One recommendation for this phase of the evaluation is for Save the Children to exploit potential linkages with other agencies working in the area – most notably Mercy Corps and its VSL scheme. Should such a linkage be made, financial literacy training would necessarily have to be provided.

4. Sustainability of the project, as a stand-alone entity, is still questionable. However, there are elements of LRRD within the project that could certainly be carried over to a more development-driven project in the area. When asked about the CFW activities, beneficiaries were very happy to have learnt skills that went beyond the lifetime of the project. This can be capitalised upon and new skills can be developed as off-shoots to these (VSL for instance). Funding mechanisms stand in the way of longer-term interventions in Aweil East however, as recurrent food insecurities and problems on the borders reinforce the general perception that development cannot be achieved in this setting. Save the Children has begun to disprove this theory and needs to start looking for long-term funding that could see the graduation of beneficiaries out of the cash transfer project and into market-based projects that would also address issues of food security and poverty alleviation.

   The real issue of sustainability of pilot projects such as this one, however, lies with the government and its willingness to take on board the lessons learnt from the project and incorporate them into a national budget on a national scale. The GoSS is already interested in this project and has plan to introduce a social protection scheme under the South Sudan Development Plan, but it is crucial that SC be more proactive in sharing experiences of this project with the GoSS to assist with all aspects of the project, from targeting through to best methods of cash distribution. Information sharing, at county, national and regional levels needs to be stronger. SC needs to regularly attend State Coordination meetings in Aweil town and a SC representative should regularly attend Food Security/Nutrition Cluster meetings at Juba level, to ensure that best practices from the project can be shared. Similarly, the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group meetings (held once a month) in Nairobi are an additional forum where information can be shared and input from various stakeholders collected. SC Kenya is very active in these meetings, no doubt due to the location, however this is a regional forum and programming of this nature in southern Sudan could definitely influence programming in other fragile and post-conflict states across the East and Horn of Africa region.

9.1 Conclusions and lessons learnt

- The real issue of sustainability of pilot projects such as this one, lies with the government and its willingness to take on board the lessons learnt from the project and incorporate them into a national budget on a national scale

10. Where next for the cash transfer project?

10.1 Graduation

The concept of graduation in social protection programming is broad and causing much debate, yet at the same time, graduation schemes are being employed more and more in social safety net programming throughout the world. Graduation schemes within safety net programming aim to increase household incomes, skills and human capital to reduce household and community poverty and improve long-term welfare.[42] However, there is not yet any conclusive evidence of the longer-term impacts of graduation schemes. In Africa, social protection programming has often been overshadowed by a strong legacy of famine relief, food aid and humanitarian assistance.[43] However, the recent shift in focus away from emergency aid towards more permanent, sustainable, solutions to poverty reduction has paved the way for small-scale social protection pilot schemes such as SC's which bring to the fore important lessons learnt for the eventual social protection take-up by governments across the continent.

One example of this shift in Africa is found in Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), which plans to graduate chronically food insecure households out of chronic food insecurity over a five-year period, focusing on asset protection at the household and community levels. In a similar approach to the SC project in Baac Payam, households with labour are engaged in public works, and those without receive direct support. The PSNP is designed to enable beneficiaries to meet their immediate food needs over the five-year period, whereas beneficiary involvement in concurrent food security programmes allows the households to graduate out of chronic poverty. The productive assets (skills and physical assets) acquired through the programme form the basis of sustainability and aim to mitigate dependency on the cash or food injection received within the programme. Wealthier countries in Africa, such as South Africa, have been able to introduce more permanent social assistance schemes which focus on grants for vulnerable groups such as the elderly and children.[44]

Graduation strategies are context specific and depend very much on the enabling infrastructure and services in the locality for graduating beneficiaries on to something else that can assist in the generation of income, skills and human capital,[45] such as health, education and financial institutions that could promote employment, increase independence and promote general welfare. Graduation is not currently an objective of the cash transfer project implemented by SC. It could be problematic to introduce a graduation component to the project in Baac Payam due to the limited social services provided in the Payam itself, without an organisation like SC first initiating such services. However, more urban centres in Aweil East do offer such services and ways of linking beneficiaries to these seem not impossible as a long term objective.

Help Age International and SC will soon be conducting a feasibility study in southern Sudan, looking at what scope there is to carry out a wider social protection programme, based upon

[42] Safety Nets How To: Graduation, Key Program Processes, The World Bank.
[43] Barrientos, A. and Hulme, D. Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest in Developing Countries: Reflections on a Quiet Revolution, Brooks World Poverty Institute Working Paper 30, The University of Manchester, March 2008.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Safety Nets How To: Graduation, Key Program Processes, The World Bank.

various regional models and the ambitions of the GoSS, to eventually elaborate a social protection framework. If the cash transfer project in Aweil East can adopt an annex to the cash transfer component which focuses on skills acquisition and market support, there is no reason at this stage why that project could not be considered a pioneer of how to conduct conditional cash transfer programming as a means to graduating households and communities out of poverty in a post-conflict setting.

10.2 What next for the cash transfer project in Aweil East?

This section of the report looks at how the cash transfer project could evolve within the context of Aweil East. The issue of some sort of graduation forms a component of the thinking behind moving this project beyond an emergency relief project and linking it to a more development-led programme whereby beneficiaries currently under the cash transfer project could eventually be in a position to generate their own 80SDG a month by employing skills gained under the emergency assistance part of the project.

The cash transfer project, serving as an emergency assistance project to improve the dietary diversity and nutrition among targeted households, has been functioning well, as indicated in the above sections of this report. However, as the needs in Aweil East increase with the number of returnees, and as global food and fuel prices and trade blockades with northern Sudan exacerbate food costs, additional and complementary components may need to be added to this project in order to enhance the sustainability and reinforce the impact among beneficiaries in Baac Payam.

As mentioned by beneficiaries in all FGDs conducted as part of this evaluation, the skills that communities have developed during this project have the potential to continue even when there are no more cash transfers, including but not limited to farming collectively and brick making. Some beneficiaries noted that even after the cash transfer project, they would be able to sell their bricks to the Government or traders as there was such a market for them in Aweil East. This is a very positive part of the project that should be capitalised upon further, ensuring all the while that the context in Baac Payam and beyond is made conducive to households and communities exploiting and furthering these skills to earn income and maintain sustainable food security levels. Aweil East County has the advantage of being served by several NGOs working in the food security and livelihoods sector – for Save the Children, these agencies present opportunities for linking the cash transfer project to more long term development gains for beneficiaries, thus ensuring that beneficiaries are able to graduate out of receiving cash transfers from SC and into a broader programme where they are provided with the necessary capacity building to generate their own equivalent of the cash transfer.

SC needs to establish a clear exit plan for this project, both in terms of exiting a relief operation into a LRRD/development project, and in terms of exiting a future LRRD/development operation. This can only be done through close coordination with GoSS authorities to ensure smooth handover of structures set up within the project and of lessons learnt. For this to take plan, SC needs to be more collaborative in its information sharing, at county level and at national level, to ensure that all stakeholders interested are aware of the innovations unfolding in Aweil East.

At the County level, Mercy Corps, Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and AMURT are all working on agricultural projects, with the aim of increasing production; improving skills and knowledge on best practice in agriculture; diversifying crop production; linking surplus to markets and

empowering women in the labour and market force. Mercy Corps's Aweil East Food Security programme combines farmer field schools with a village saving and loans scheme (VSL) which endows beneficiaries with the necessary skills to pool money and save proceeds from business activities, ensuring high returns on investments. The mid-term evaluation of Mercy Corp's project[46] indicates that the saving component of the intervention is working very well with beneficiaries really seeing the value of investing money in a VSL scheme rather than cattle. However, time is a necessary factor in the farmer field school and dividends from taking part are not immediate; the mid-term evaluation suggest that Mercy Corps should explore possible collaboration with Save the Children and seek to bridge the income gap while beneficiaries are learning by providing a cash-for-work activity. There is reciprocal learning in this report for Save the Children in terms of both income-generating potential for beneficiaries simultaneous to and after the cash transfer project, and in terms of bridging gaps in income.

For the former, there is scope for SC to broaden into LRRD and development activities by mirroring some of the activities that Mercy Corps is involved in, such as vegetable gardening (which has already been proposed for Phase III of the project), business skills development, farmer field schools and VSL learning. Save the Children could easily branch out into any one of these activities – vegetable gardening, when combined with nutrition education, could help pave the way for more rapid gains in nutrition promotion; business skills development, when access to markets and commodities is guaranteed, could help facilitate beneficiaries to expand their income options beyond self-sufficiency farming and cattle keeping and thus increase their coping mechanisms; farmer field schools, if carried out in a central location and if combined with cash-for-work cash transfers to serve as incentive for the first few months, could help in increasing farm output and beneficiary/non-beneficiary food security and income; and lastly, adding a VSL component to vegetable gardening, farmer field schools, or business skills training could serve as a disaster risk reduction strategy ensuring a buffer for those in need, as well as encouraging the diversification of savings strategies beyond investing in animals.

For the latter (bridging a gap), SC needs to assess at which point its role in gap filling is over and at which point it can hand over responsibility to the project beneficiaries to continue filling the food security gap. The ECHO grant is only ever intended to fill a gap; other activities are therefore needed to facilitate gap filling on the part of beneficiaries that can be supported by NGOs. Finding ways to monitor closely the potential of beneficiaries to respond to concurrent trainings and generate their own income could be a way of gaging over what period of time Save the Children can exit the immediate gap filling and focus on supporting beneficiaries to take up this responsibility themselves.

ACF is also involved in various food security and livelihood activities that could benefit the evolution of Save the Children's project, ranging from seed and tool distributions, farmer field schools, demonstration sites, and business administration training as part of IGAs. The interview held with ACF in Malualkon indicated that the following were among the greatest impediments to farming more in the area:

- Farming with the *maloda* (local tilling tool) is labour intensive and requires a lot of energy to open land – children cannot help due to hunger;
- Access to seeds and tools is limited as many households will eat their seeds during the hunger gap – there is not a deep rooted tradition of seed saving in the area;
- Poor understanding of how to use land optimally;

[46] Aweil East Food Security Programme, Mid-Term Evaluation, Mercy Corps, March 2011.

- Lack of pest control management leading to loss of harvest – especially relevant to the striga weed;
- Poor harvesting techniques, where grain is left to dry on the stork thus encouraging pests, birds and floods to ruin the harvest.

Some of these issues were noted during the evaluation when beneficiaries were asked what the greatest impediments were to farming more. By focusing on one or two of these points in a skills based, rather than cash based, extension to the current project, Save the Children could add value to the cash transfer component by helping to boost farm production with the aim of improving household food security and generating revenue from surplus.

ACF is also working in nutrition in Aweil East and is the only organisation to gather anthropometric data on a regular basis to chart developments in nutritional levels. SC conducted an IYCF assessment in November 2010 with information that complements ACF's Anthropometric Survey of Jul 2010. Information sharing should be encouraged between the two organisations working in the same County and opportunities should be explored to find ways of conducting surveys together so that regular nutrition data can be gathered from Baac Payam. During the interview, ACF was asked what had caused the increase in current SAM figures (5.3% versus 3.2% in 2010), the following was mentioned:

- Flooding last harvest which led to loss of crops;
- Poor IYCF practices;
- Poor hygiene generally, with an unclean environment.

Save the Children is already working on combatting the latter two points through its nutrition messaging, and the first point is being addressed through the DRR training offered in Chomator and Wunatami bomas. However, as discussed with ACF, more poignant messaging needs to take place for the messages to lead to behaviour change. Messaging currently being used by ACF includes community mobilisation, radio programmes, and health education at the OTP for mothers. SC and ACF should explore options for collaboration on messaging to ensure maximum coverage in the most effective medium.

Although the cash transfer project is relatively small (1900 households), there is still potential for it to influence developments at the national level – the project has already gained the recognition of the GoSS when it was cited at an AU conference in Addis Ababa earlier this year. Under pillar IV of the South Sudan Development Plan (the Social and Human Development pillar), the GoSS is working on developing a social protection scheme for South Sudan to facilitate vulnerable groups engage in the economy; thus looking at social protection as more of a social commitment rather than a social safety net.[47] As it stands, the programme is likely to target households with children under the age of five, with a stipend much smaller that SC's, although this has yet to be agreed upon. The plan is still in its infancy, with issues of targeting, potential problems of dependency, inflation and the incentive to have larger families yet to be finalised and a draft, elaborated in conjunction with UNDP's MDG Unit, will be presented to the Council of Ministers after 15th June 2011.

With strategic positioning, Save the Children could really help shape the future of social protection programming in southern Sudan. There are significant lessons to be learnt and shared on the targeting process employed by SC in this project, as well as the conditionality clause in the agreement between the organization and beneficiaries and its potential for self-sustainability. Starting at the County level, SC should endeavour to be more pro-active in sharing its lessons learnt and collecting input on the way the project is shaping up; this ought then to be expanded, as noted above, to the national and regional levels to share

[47] Interview with MDG Unit, UNDP Juba, 4th June 2011.

lessons learnt and reap feedback from various stakeholders with a keen interest in this project.

10.3 Conclusions and lessons learnt

- As the needs in Aweil East increase with the number of returnees, and as global food and fuel prices and trade blockades with northern Sudan exacerbate food costs, additional and complementary components may need to be added to this project in order to enhance the sustainability and reinforce the impact among beneficiaries in Baac Payam
- The skills that communities have developed during this project have the potential to continue even when there are no more cash transfers
- There is scope for SC to broaden into LRRD and development activities by mirroring some of the activities that Mercy Corps is involved in, such as vegetable gardening, business skills development, farmer field schools and VSL learning
- By focusing on one or two of the main impediments to farming on a larger scale, Save the Children could add value to the cash transfer component by helping to boost farm production with the aim of improving household food security and generating revenue from surplus

11. Recommendations

Delivery	• Project objectives and structure as a whole needs to be better explained to beneficiaries so that they understand the inter-connectedness of all project components with regards to the overall objective. • SC should conduct an HEA survey to gather payam-specific information looking in particular at wealth ranking and expenditure (on food and assets in particular), returnee needs and skills (to be fed into a holistic project that can weave host and returnee households into the same project for skills exchanging), and children (to understand malnutrition levels as baseline information and to look at possible 'graduation' opportunities based on accomplishment of nutrition levels. • The linear progression to wealth, coupled with the importance of farming in this progression should be capitalised upon by Save the Children in subsequent phases of the project. • The same beneficiaries should continue to be targeted in subsequent phases of the project in order to make a sustainable difference to the registered households, in accordance with community targeting criteria. • Annual re-evaluations of the UCT beneficiaries should be conducted to ensure that the correct beneficiary households are being targeted. • For purposes of scaling up the programme, SC needs to think of a better system for UCT to collect cash if they cannot attend the delivery day, whereby 2-3 designated people could be registered

	for each person unable to collect their cash in person – this would avoid issues of fraud and would also mean that a similar system could function in settings where not all community members are known to one another. • SC should review its monthly minimum food basket to understand why the disparity between SC figures and the Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation figures, and potentially readjust the cash transfer sum. • Save the Children should endeavour to attract longer-term funding for its cash transfer programme in order to plan for the eventual graduation of beneficiaries out of the scheme. • There is need for SC to include more nutritional information within the PDM reports – this could be as simple as getting enumerators to measure MUAC and monitor behaviour change.
Nutrition	• The causal link between knowledge and practice needs to be further explored by Save the Children, and behaviour change needs to be included in monthly monitoring to document any meaningful change. • It is recommended that SC conduct a KAP assessment, which could serve as a baseline to begin measuring change in nutrition and hygiene practices in the community. • Training community nutrition promoters to monitor behaviour change could be a useful way, in addition to observation and evaluation by project staff and external observers, of gaging change in the communities. Promoters could also be trained to conduct regular house-to-house MUAC measurements to monitor child nutrition levels throughout the year. • Nutrition messaging should be incorporated into other parts of the project, for instance highlighting the importance of growing and consuming vegetables in agricultural training, and finding ways to incorporate nutrition into the CFW activities. • Mass messaging techniques should be explored to influence significant behaviour change.
Use of cash transfer	• SC should explore opportunities to support IGA activities, especially in the most remote areas, as a next step on from the cash transfer project. • SC needs to regularly attend State Coordination meetings in Aweil town and a SC representative should regularly attend Food Security/Nutrition Cluster meetings at Juba level, to ensure that best practices from the project can be shared. Similarly, the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group meetings (held once a month) in Nairobi are an additional forum where information can be shared and input from various stakeholders collected. • SC should carry out another in-depth market analysis a few months after Independence to assess the potential for the markets to supply goods on a regular basis and at a regular and affordable cost to the consumer and to calculate the sustainability and applicability of the cash transfer in the new context of independence.
Cost effectiveness	• As mobile technology improves in Aweil East, it will be worthwhile SC reassessing possibilities for cash transfer deliveries.
Organisational	• It is crucial that SC be more proactive in sharing experiences of this

learning	project with the GoSS to assist with all aspects of the project, from targeting through to best methods of cash distribution.
Where next	• SC needs to establish a clear exit plan for this project, both in terms of exiting a relief operation and in terms of exiting a future LRRD/development operation. • SC needs to be more collaborative in its information sharing, at county level and at national level, to ensure that all stakeholders interested are aware of the innovations unfolding in Aweil East. • SC and ACF should explore options for collaboration on nutrition messaging to ensure maximum coverage in the most effective media.

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Annex One – terms of reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN
EVALUATION OF SAVE THE CHILDREN'S
CASH TRANSFER PROJECT (NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL)

EMERGENCY NUTRITION AND FOOD SECURITY SUPPORT TO VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

1. Background

Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal (NBeG) is a food insecure state where more than 20 years of war has meant that agricultural production lags behind the rest of the region resulting in vulnerable communities that cannot meet their own food needs without external assistance. During the war, the State saw some of the heaviest and widespread conflict resulting in massive population displacement, depletion of communities' food production capacity and erosion of production assets.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other agencies have been meeting emergency needs as well as establishing recovery processes, but without yet producing a tangible peace dividend for the people. The government has been pre-occupied with numerous tasks and processes of strengthening decentralised systems of government and addressing inherent government weakness that accumulated over 20 years of war. The southern Sudan humanitarian context, therefore, remains one of predictable emergency, followed by crisis assessment and then a delayed response. There has been very little progress in moving the debate and policy responses forward to tackle predictable problems in a systematic manner and at a structural level. Inadequate economic activities, food intake, poor access to water and sanitation facilities, gaps in human knowledge and resources mean that hygiene, feeding and caring practices constitute an obstacle to ensuring adequate nutrition for significant sections of society and in particular children.

A situation of chronic food insecurity among the returnees and vulnerable host community exists because of **inadequate capacity of people to meet their food requirement on their own and insufficient programmes to meet both emergency food needs while also addressing strategic livelihood needs.** The situation reaches a climax during the seasonal hunger gap during May – August as food access is limited. The chronic food insecurity means that large sections of vulnerable households will continue to require external assistance in order to meet their food needs as well as strengthen their capacity to protect and achieve sustainable livelihood security and prevent further destitution.

Save the Children's (SC) ECHO project directly target approximately 1,900 households in Aweil East County, NBeG. Each household expected to receive monthly transfer of € 27 for four months.

The project is designed so that unconditional transfers are disbursed to a maximum of 400 beneficiary households (approximately 2,400 people) and the opportunity to participate in a Cash For Work (CFW) programme given to 1,500 beneficiary households (approximately 9,000 people). All household were identified using agreed criteria and through a participatory approach of community based and administrative targeting.

The project recognises the importance of generating an evidence base for cash transfer programming approaches in southern Sudan, and as such the project includes a proactive undertaking of both baseline and ongoing impact studies – which cover nutrition, dietary

diversity, childcare and feeding practices, gender and women's empowerment, as well as household economy. During the course of project implementation, Save the Children compile regular and timely progress monitoring reports and financial statements.

2. Purpose of Evaluation

The purpose of the external evaluation is:

- To evaluate the impact of the SC Cash Transfer Program in Malualkon, Northern Bar el Gazal State, on the target community with an emphasis on its impact on children
- To evaluate the extent to which recommendations and lesson learnt from the pilot phase evaluation were successfully incorporated into the second phase and the project and their effect on the overall implementation and impact of the project
- To ensure critical project lessons and experiences are captured and made available to provide evidence based information to inform design and funding of future cash transfer and safety net programming

3. Scope of Work

To provide an independent evaluation of the progress of the project against its intended objectives and targets and to measure the impact of the project on both beneficiaries and the wider communities in which it operates. The final evaluation should:

1) Comprehensively review and evaluate the project with regard to:
    - Relative cost-effectiveness
    - Effectiveness of delivery: (e.g. accessibility, reliability and timeliness; incidence of fraud and of any form of corruption; client satisfaction
    - Quality and appropriateness of project monitoring
    - Effectiveness of targeting and appropriateness of targeting criteria (contextually and in relation to intended outcomes)
    - Use of transfers by beneficiary population,
    - Overall program impact with regard to poverty reduction, improving access to income and household food security, intended nutrition outcomes and intended emergency preparedness outcomes, specific focus on the impact to children of the beneficiary communities
    - Evaluation of Cash for Work component of the project- specifically project selection, implantation, accountability and monitoring
    - Any other positive and negative effects and impacts of the project (e.g. improved health and education outcomes, jealousy and conflicts between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; positive and negative perceptions and concerns; positive and negative effects for non-beneficiaries; economic multiplier effects on community and traders)

2) Analyse the extent to which recommendations and lesson learnt from the pilot phase evaluation were successfully incorporated into the second phase and the project and their effect on the overall implementation and impact of the project

3) Document lessons learned and propose possible future linkages to complementary programmes.

4) Identify and analyse the causes for performance and make clear recommendations regarding program design, beneficiary targeting, monitoring and program implementation to be used to inform future iterations of cash transfer or other safety net programming in NBeG as well as specific recommendations to be considered if similar programming is expanded to other SC program areas.

4. Methodology

A proposed methodology and draft tools should be submitted along with the study concept note/ prposal. While the consultant will take the lead on methodological design and tool development, the s/he will be expected to work with the M&E Advisor in Juba, the Program Manager and the M&E Officer to finalize the methodology and tools. SC envisions the evaluator will employ a mixed methods approach that is tailored to the specific aims of the evaluation and capture overall program impact, effectiveness, lessons learned and recommendations while working with key program stakeholders including program staff, adult and child beneficiaries, and state, local and national government representatives as appropriate.

5. Outputs & Reporting

A work plan will be agreed with ECHO, SC and the consultant. Progress updates will be provided to SC and ECHO representative in Sudan by e-mail. Main deliverable include the production of a hih quality, methodological sound evaluation report. Timeline for draft and final report to be proposed by consultant in proposal and agreed upon in final contract.

6. Requirement for consultants

- Post-graduate degree in Social Sciences, Policy Studies, or Development Studies
- Demonstrated knowledge of evaluation methodologies, data analysis and evaluation report writing
- Experience in working with ECHO; preferably in Southern Sudan, on topics including cash transfer, cash for work, nutrition and emergency preparedness and response
- An understanding of small rural Market systems, excellent understanding of the cash transfer project in post conflict situation is a plus
- An excellent analytical, communication and report writing skills is a necessity, sensitivity to culture and diversity, Resilient and security conscious person.

Interested candidates should submit a concept note regarding this study which includes the following:

- Description of company/organization profile
- Previous relevant experience – listing previous relevant projects and role
- CVs of professionals which will be carrying out the study
- Contact details
- Current contact details of three referees
- Proposed methodology and proposed work plan
- Timeline of study
- Activity budget including all costs related to the consultancy, including travel costs.

The consultants/firm should submit a concept note by March 15, 2011 highlighting research design and methodology, proposed budget and action plan.

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Annex Two – Meetings held

The following is a list of people and organisations met by the consultant in order to gather information for this evaluation:

Mr. Joseph Garang Garang – Director General for Agriculture, State Ministry of Agriculture, Northern Bahr el Ghazal

Mr. Mac Yuang, Officer in Charge, Aweil Sub-Office, WFP

Rachel Eichholz, ACF Food Security and Livelihoods Programme Manager, Malualkon

Collins Lotuk, ACF Surveillance Programme Manager, Malualkon

John Muchiri, IOM Head of Base, Malualkon

Moses Ntambara, World Vision International, Commodities Officer, Malualkon

Roman Majcher, DG Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, ECHO Juba

Mandisa Mashologu, Team Leader, UNDP Poverty Reduction and MDGs Unit

Dr Paul ChirChir, M&E Specialist, World Bank

Annex Three – community development plan

Objective	Community Activities	Strategies	Results/ success indicators	Who is responsible	Resources	
					Needed	**Where to get it?**
Short term objective	**1**.Dykes constructions	Mitigation of flood	Tools received	Community leaders, youth, strong men and women	Sacks, Hoes and soil	Concern community and relevant authorities and NGOs/ UN
	2. Boat making	Community	Boats available			
	3. Migration /evacuation	Community	People evacuated during hazards	Community	Boats and roads	Community make locally boats
Long term objective	**1**.Primary school construction	Construction of primary school from primary one to eight classes	Completed 80,960 for last year is ready for use	Community leaders and project committee	Iron sheets, timbers, Nails, cement window etc.	Community hired contractor and Govt,NGOs/UN agencies to provide support
	2. Concrete dyke construction	Gov't and NGOs	Concrete dyke constructed	Youth, strong men, Gov't and NGOs	Caterpillar and labour	Community, Gov't and NGOs
	3. Dam construction	Gov't and NGOs	Dam constructed	Youth, strong men, Gov't and NGOs	Mechanics	Gov't and NGOs
	4. Roads, school and heath centres	Community, Gov't and NGOs	Roads, school and heath unite available	Community, NGOs and Gov't	Health centres and schools	Gov't and NGOs

Annex Four – Approaches in hygiene promotion

Approach	Advantages	Limitations
Hygiene education including mass media campaigns	- Raises knowledge on health, disease transmission and the benefits of good hygiene. - Can act as a support for other promotional activities (providing basic knowledge and awareness). - Can reach large population groups, and potentially cost-effective.	Does not provide people with either incentive or motivation to change behaviour and may not take into account local values etc. Does not have a long term effect, unless backed by other initiatives.
Participatory community based hygiene promotion	- Motivates and supports behaviour changes, using local language, situations and perceptions - Can become a platform for people to take action on others' aspects of life also - People can be active in developing sustainable and locally appropriate solutions	- Does not reach large groups of people at once, but needs a community-by-community approach. - Expensive in facilitation and demands staff with local knowledge and good communication skills - Takes time and is an intensive programme
Social marketing strategies	- Creates a ***demand*** for behaviour change via social marketing of consumer goods and behaviours - Can generate sources of income for locals	- Can be difficult if there is no strong culture for private sector activities - May not reach the poorest of the poor and the most vulnerable, who have no resources to invest