

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING IN THE ASALs OF KENYA

A CASE STUDY TO DOCUMENT THE ACTIONS BEING TAKEN
TO BUILD THE KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDE, PRACTICES AND
CAPACITY OF THE COUNTY GOVERNMENTS/STATE ACTORS



Amina Ibrahim Sheikh Abdulla
Regional Development Consultants



Cover photo:
Fatima Khorow Omar, 45, benefits from Oxfam's 'smart card' programme which provides her with cash every two months - Wajir

Photo credit: Anna Ridout/Oxfam

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10th December, 2015

Report By

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GLOSSARY

CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership
CT	Cash Transfers
CTP	Cash Transfer Programme
CBTM	Community Based Targeting Method
CSG	County Steering Group
HSNP	Hunger Safety Net Program
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
PMT	Proxy Means Test
OPCT	Older Persons Cash Transfers
OVC-CT	Orphans and Vulnerable Children's Caash Transfers
PWSD-CT	Persons With Severe Disabilities Cash Transfers

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SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

As part of its key role of coordination, capacity development and dissemination of learning and best practices, CaLP has been implementing a project on “Improving Coordination and Preparedness to Implement and Scale Up Cash Transfer Programming Responses in Kenya” in order to improve the capacity and quality of the humanitarian cash transfer programs. The project focused on 4 counties i.e. Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir counties. The objectives of the project were:

- Increase coordination, knowledge and capacity in Kenya to implement cash and voucher programming in emergencies
- Gather and disseminate CTP evidence through a range of activities to improve the capacity and quality of humanitarian cash transfer programs

The project implemented over a period of 14 months had a number of inputs including a capacity gaps assessment across all 4 counties, training material developments, capacity building trainings on cash transfer programming and coordination; contingency planning and prepared in cash transfer programming; and post-training follow up visits.

CASE STUDY OBJECTIVES

CaLP commissioned a study to document the impact and lessons learned from its engagement with state actors in the ASAL counties. The study involved collection of data through secondary and primary sources. Given the focus of the project, a qualitative approach was deemed as most appropriate in capturing the changes in attitudes and practice in such a short period of time. Specifically, the assignment sought to:

- Document lessons learned working with government on preparedness, contingency planning and coordination in relation to scalable CTP.
- Identify strengths, weaknesses, challenges and lessons learned in the current context, including consideration of aspects related to gender equality, protection mainstreaming, and inclusion of persons with disabilities and older people.
- Document what has been done in terms of the CaLP and CoP’s activities to build capacity of state actors, its effectiveness, and lessons learned and a detailed account of measures taken to improve coordination and preparedness of key stakeholders to implement and scale up cash transfer programming responses in Kenya.
- Document how this has impacted on the CTP capacities and preparedness of state actors and other stakeholders through capacity building, active knowledge transfer, development of good practice, and incorporation of CTP into relevant plans, policies and procedures.
- Document the processes and learning undertaken by CaLP as a result of working with government on CTP coordination and preparedness and scalable social protection in the Kenya context, and
- Provide recommendations to take learning forward.

FINDINGS

CaLP’s Engagement at County Level

- Contextualizing the training to the local needs and using local programmes as examples resonated very well with the trainees. It helped them develop an understanding of what was happening at local level in terms of programmes, systems used and players involved.
- Trainings were considered relevant as most county governments are in the process of setting up policies for cash transfer implementation (Turkana and Wajir) or have just rolled out a cash transfer programme (Marsabit).

- The trainings did provide a forum for sharing experiences which in turn showcased the amount of technical resources available within the counties across the various programmes.
- The trainings and engagement by CaLP with state actors is said to have provided an impetus on the need for a functional cash coordination forum. In Turkana and Marsabit, there have been requests for support to operationalize the county technical working group.
- Mobilization for the training and follow up activities needed a bit more time for there to be clarity on the expectations and ensure that the right people are nominated for the trainings.
- CaLP's lack of presence in the ASAL counties seems to have been a setback in this project. The level of engagement may have been different if CaLP had developed a working arrangement with the relevant county government department and also provided for a focal point who would continuously engage and spend more time with the county teams.
- The timelines for the project were not sufficient for one to see the trainings undertaken yield results in terms of improved implementation capacity and coordination.

Cash Transfer Programming and Coordination in the Counties

- There seems to be no divided opinion in both the executive and the legislature on the importance of cash transfers in building resilience and addressing chronic vulnerabilities.
- Programmes apply arrange of targeting criteria and methodologies but the most common is the community based targeting methodology. There has been a lot of discussions around the HSNP targeting process which has combined the community based targeting (CBT) with the proxy means targeting (PMT). While the outcome of the CBT is not contested, the outcome of the PMT has generated a lot of debate.
- The conduct of some of the agents for the financial service provider has been criticized-said to be forcing beneficiaries to take goods instead of cash due to cash flow problems. In some counties there have been reports of agents charging beneficiaries an extra fee aside from the commission they are already receiving from financial service provider.
- Cash transfer programme coordination has not really taken off and seems to be limited by issues around leadership and resourcing. There are requests however from Marsabit and Turkana counties for CaLP to facilitate dialogue between state actors and find a solution to moving coordination forward.

Contingency Planning and Preparedness in the Counties

- A key issue that has come out from the training and discussions with stakeholders during the case study is how aside from financial constraints, there is lack of support, understanding and flexibility from the procurement department and emergency response activities are treated like normal programme activities hence delays in the response.
- While the counties have a reasonable representation of financial institutions and infrastructure, there seems to not be any inclusion of the service providers in the preparedness discussions nor consideration for developing pre-agreements that would speed up the response time. The exception to this is with HSNP which has engaged its financial partner Equity bank. This has allowed the programme to respond quickly to shocks using their crisis modifier approach.
- While most officers place needs assessment as key to any response, market assessments seem not to be consistently carried out during an emergency response especially where cash is involved. This is an area where capacity will need to be built moving forward.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To be able to effectively work with government at the county level, the following need to be considered moving forward:

Timelines: Whilst the project objectives are relevant, the project timeline was very restrictive. The actualization of knowledge into practice and the change of attitudes is a process that requires time and continuous support and engagement to see the desired results.

Formal working agreement: It is important to clarify objectives and manage expectations on both the side of CaLP and the county governments. County governments having expressed the need for support to strengthen cash transfer programming, the development of some form of cooperation agreement should not be a problem. This agreement should clearly stipulate the role that CaLP will play as well as that of the government in the areas identified for collaboration.

Stakeholder engagement: CaLP's key role as a coordination and learning platform is to provide a forum for stakeholder engagement. With a lack of a presence in the 4 counties, there is need to consider having a focal point for county government engagement within the regional team in the interim. Future engagements will require more regular visits to the counties, continuous follow with stakeholders to have decisions implemented.

Targeting and mobilization: In future, it is essential that a lot more time is spent on the process of mobilisation and targeting of key staff in each department to work with in order to influence decision making and the capacity building inputs to result in actual change in attitudes and practice in the said counties.

Modular approach to training: As the counties embark on the expansion of cash transfers, it is not only necessary to develop the capacity of more officers to undertake the implementation of cash transfers but also that of other officers that may not be directly involved in the implementation but provide crucial support to the implementation. The trainings will need to take on a modular approach based on seniority, technical skills and level of engagement in the cash transfer programme.

Coordination: All four counties set up mechanisms dictated either by law or need. These have not been functional due to either leadership challenges or not understanding what needs to be done to have this in place. Drawing on its coordination experience, CaLP, working closely with key humanitarian departments within the county, can facilitate the functioning of these forums including helping the counties define the membership and set the agenda for these forums.

Accountability: The various programmes in the county have established different mechanisms and structures for addressing this however there needs to be a common approach to the response and messaging. There is need to review the agency model which currently seems to provide a conducive environment for the infringement of beneficiary rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To be able to effectively work with government at the county level, the following need to be considered moving forward:

Timelines: Whilst the project objectives are relevant, the project timeline was very restrictive. The actualization of knowledge into practice and the change of attitudes is a process that requires time and continuous support and engagement to see the desired results. A capacity development project should have at minimum a timeframe of 18 months of implementation. Future projects will need to review to take this into consideration as the trainings need continuous review and follow up to reinforce the knowledge and skills acquired. This seems to have been an issue in the current project that has limited the level of follow-up and engagement specifically at the county level.

Formal working agreement: It is important to clarify objectives and manage expectations on both the side of CaLP and the county governments. County government having expressed the need for support to strengthen cash transfer programming, the development of some form of cooperation agreement should not be a problem. This agreement should clearly stipulate the role that CaLP will play as well as that of the government in the areas identified for collaboration. This will allow joint responsibility, shared workplans and the initiative being seen as a county government initiative with support from CaLP as opposed to being seen as a CaLP initiative-currently viewed as an external initiative as CaLP has no presence in any of the counties.

Targeting and mobilization: As resources will be allocated by CaLP to support these counties, it is essential that a lot more time is spent in the mobilisation of the government departments and targeting of key staff in each departments to work with in order to influence decision making and the capacity building inputs to result in actual change in attitudes and practice in the said counties. There also needs to be sufficient notice given for the trainings and any engagement with CaLP for the targeted officer to have time to make alternative arrangements for the day to day responsibility and make time to participate in the said trainings or engagement with CaLP.


Stakeholder engagement: CaLP's key role as a coordination and learning platform is to provide a forum for stakeholder engagement. The current implementation arrangements are slightly different from how CaLP has facilitated stakeholder engagement in the past i.e. through the regional working group meetings in Nairobi. With a lack of a presence in the 4 counties, CaLP will need to find innovative ways to continue to engage with key stakeholders in the counties specifically the state actors. There is need to consider having a focal point for county government engagement within the regional team in the interim. This is crucial especially if the challenges around targeting, delivery mechanisms and accountability are to be overcome at county level. It will require a three-pronged approach i.e. regular visits to the counties, continuous follow up through e-mail and telephone as well as engagement with national level representatives of county stakeholders (e.g. Equity bank, KCB, NDMA, etc) in order to have decisions implemented as well as provide innovative solutions to challenges at the county level

Modular approach to training: As the county embarks on the expansion of cash transfers, it is not only necessary to develop the capacity of more officers to undertake the implementation of cash transfers but also look at developing the capacity and understanding of other officers that may not be directly involved in the implementation but provide crucial support to the implementation. Whilst the training modules were developed based on the needs, the roll out of the trainings may need to take on a modular approach based on seniority, technical skills and level of engagement in the cash transfer programme. This is because of the need to build the capacity of key decision makers as well as support staff on CTP for more effective delivery. It has proven difficult to have key decision makers participate in the trainings based on how it is currently being delivered and therefore a more condensed module may be required for this group with constant engagement thereafter to provide support around policy and strategy development. Support departments such as procurement and finance may also need to be targeted for capacity building in order to overcome the current challenges in preparedness that seem to revolve around procurement processes and financing.

Coordination: Crucial to the success of any programme, the lack of a forum for CTP seems to limit the benefits of having multiple actors involved in the programmes through cross learning, resource sharing, advocacy and influence. All four counties have intentions of setting up mechanism dictated either by law or need. These have not been set up due to either leadership challenge or not understanding what needs to be done to have this in place. Drawing on its coordination experience, CaLP, working closely with key humanitarian departments within the county, should facilitate the establishment of these forums including helping the counties define the membership and set the agenda for these forums. This will involve basic things such as facilitating a dialogue on who is best placed take on leadership if this has not already been defined by law, the development of the ToR for the forum, a workplan and allocation of resources for coordination in the interim until resources become available. The leadership, where not defined by law, would be best suited to sit with the county government through a relevant department. As matters related to CT are limited to the county and may not touch on national security matters, placing the leadership with the county government makes practical sense and is also strategic for future resource allocation. County government is not likely to fund a forum that is being led by the national government. National government has in the past not funded adequately lower level coordination mechanisms. These often depended on the goodwill of NGOs to support specific meetings.

Accountability: The challenges experienced in the county are linked to the delivery mechanisms as well as the beneficiaries' level of awareness and understanding on their rights, entitlements and overall objectives of the programmes. The various programmes in the county have established different mechanisms and structures for addressing this however there needs to be a common approach to the response and messaging. There is also need to review the current model used by the main service provider that seems to provide a conducive environment for the infringement of beneficiary rights. Given its influence in CTP within the region, CaLP needs to facilitate dialogue between key decision makers at the county level and service providers at both county and national level to find a workable solution to the agency problem and harmonize accountability measures across actors. A good starting point would be the review of the various accountability systems in place and identify best practices that can be implemented by actors.

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION



I. INTRODUCTION

I.1 BACKGROUND OF THE ASALS

The ASAL regions of Kenya make up a total of 11 counties out of 47 with varying degrees of aridity mostly ranging from 36% to 62% being arid or semi-arid in their expansive, low population density setting. The region is characterized by poor infrastructure, low human development index as well as extreme weather conditions. The regions however have great potential for development and contribution to the national economy through the livestock, trade, energy and tourism sectors which are currently not being realized. The region has over the last two decades been the scene of extreme climatic conditions with devastating effects on the environment and livelihoods of communities. Communities have observed increased frequency of drought with consecutive seasons of failed rains significantly narrowing in the period between droughts from 10 years to as little as one to two years, with some communities reporting four failed rainy seasons within a span of two years. This has put pastoral communities in a very precarious situation with their livelihoods and way of life threatened that has seen at least three large scale humanitarian crises over the last decade.

The frequency and predictability of the humanitarian crises in these regions has over the years brought about a consensus for a more predictable and long term food security response. This has seen humanitarian actors including donors and the national government adopt social protection programs as a mechanism by which predictable resources can be provided. These programs have been seen to not only meet the immediate consumption needs of the poor but over time increase the ability of poor or vulnerable households to withstand shocks and build the asset base of poor households so they can invest in more productive and remunerative livelihoods activities. As such cash transfer programming (CTP) has taken on a greater role in humanitarian response in Kenya over the last 6 years than ever before. Humanitarian stakeholders such as INGOs, UN agencies and the Kenya National Red Cross society (KRCS) have all been implementing cash transfer responses for drought, flooding and conflict-affected populations in need – primarily in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). Kenya has over the years invested in social protection with 5 government coordinated social transfer schemes currently on-going. The largest of these schemes is the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP) that targets poor people in the ASALs.

A National Safety Net Program, supported by the World Bank and other donors, and a National Social Protection Steering Committee, made up of key ministries involved in Social Protection have been established to provide leadership in this area in line with the Social Protection Policy approved in 2012. This policy will be supported by a National Social Protection Strategy which plans to deliver on scalable social protection and gaps in coordination of social transfer schemes, and provide guidelines and institutional frameworks for implementation of a national program.

I.2 DEVOLUTION PROCESS IN KENYA

The current Constitution of Kenya provides for a devolved system of government that has seen a number of development and humanitarian functions previously held by the central government being devolved to the county level. This has seen a number of changes in the national institutions including disaster management structures with the National Disaster Management Authority being a key institution.

In the current period of transition to a devolved system of Government, there has been a need to support the structures at national and county level in strengthening coordination, preparedness and response capacity and the integration of current humanitarian best practice within interventions. According to a recent CaLP research, cash transfers in Kenya can be a useful instrument and can be scaled up but only if data is available on those in need, the mechanisms are in place to deliver the transfer and additional resources are available (and pre-positioned)¹. Capacity building efforts of the structures and institutions at county and national level need to therefore focus on these elements. Coordination between key stakeholders was also identified as critical for preparedness, contingency planning, and the resulting response to be effective. The research identified coordination as requiring strengthening particularly with County Steering Groups and County Disaster

¹ Is Emergency CTP 'Fit for the Future?': Scaling up existing social safety nets to provide humanitarian response, CaLP and Humanitarian Futures Programme, King College London. February 2014.p 19

Management Committees to ensure understanding of CTP and integration of this into planning and response analysis.

I.3 PROJECT OBJECTIVES

The CaLP on “Improving Coordination and Preparedness to Implement and Scale Up Cash Transfer Programming Responses in Kenya” therefore sought to:

- Increase coordination, knowledge and capacity in Kenya to implement cash and voucher programming in emergencies.,
- Gather and disseminate CTP evidence through a range of activities to improve the capacity and quality of humanitarian cash transfer programs.².

The primary target of the project’s capacity building inputs were county institutions involved in or responsible for cash transfer programming, contingency planning and preparedness, and NDMA and NDOC at the national level. The project had several components implemented over a period of 12 months but those specifically targeting the county level institutions include training needs assessment in the areas of coordination, preparedness and contingency planning; development of training manuals covering the needs identified under the 3 areas; phased delivery of the training in 4 counties; linkage of county coordination to regional coordination forum; and documentation and dissemination of lessons.

This report consolidates the findings of the review and case study documentation of CaLP engagement with the ASAL counties of Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir.

I.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

As part of its key role of coordination, capacity development and dissemination of learning and best practices, CaLP commissioned the consultancy to develop a case study and guidance note on lessons learnt and good practices from the ASAL project on “Improving Coordination and Preparedness to Implement and Scale Up Cash Transfer Programming Responses in Kenya” in order to improve the capacity and quality of the humanitarian cash transfer programs. The project worked with state actors at national and sub-national level (4 counties) to develop capacity in the areas of CTP, contingency planning, preparedness and coordination. The case study therefore focused on the review of this engagement with state actors at sub-national level. Specific objectives of this consultancy were:

- Documentation of lessons learned working with government on preparedness, contingency planning and coordination in relation to scalable CTP.
- Identification of strengths, weaknesses, challenges and lessons learned in the current context, including consideration of aspects related to gender equality, protection mainstreaming, and inclusion of persons with disabilities and older people.
- Documentation of what has been done in terms of the CaLP and CoP’s activities to build capacity of state actors, its effectiveness, and lessons learned and a detailed account of measures taken to improve coordination and preparedness of key stakeholders to implement and scale up cash transfer programming responses in Kenya.
- Documentation of how this has impacted on the CTP capacities and preparedness of state actors and other stakeholders through capacity building, active knowledge transfer, development of good practice, and incorporation of CTP into relevant plans, policies and procedures.
- Document the processes and learning undertaken by CaLP as a result of working with government on CTP coordination and preparedness and scalable social protection in the Kenya context, and
- Provide recommendations to take learning forward.

² “Improving coordination and preparedness to implement and scale up cash transfer programming responses in Kenya” AAH/CaLP Project Proposal, May 2014

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study included a desk review which provided an understanding of the project, summarised the state of institutional capacity as at the beginning of the project as well as identified key indicators to track in mapping the projects outputs. The study also included fieldwork that engaged stakeholders as a tracer study following the capacity building. The information gathered through desk review and fieldwork was used to identify the significant changes resulting from the project interventions.

2.2 STUDY APPROACH

The study involved collection of data through secondary and primary sources. The method employed for primary data collection was qualitative method done through key informant interviews and focus group discussions. As the project was near completion at the time of the study and the capacity building activities had been undertaken in the last quarter of project, a qualitative approach was deemed as most appropriate in capturing the changes in attitudes and practice in such a short period of time. The key informant interview and the focus group discussion guides had explicit set of questions covering project components namely;

- Attitudes and changes in attitudes towards cash transfer programming
- Practices including efforts being made to adapt policies, procedures, ways of working and staffing around scalable cash transfer programming in the target counties in the ASALs
- Improvements in knowledge partly due the actions of the CaLP and how the knowledge is shared within the organisation including influencing key decision makers over time.

The analysis and presentation of this data was done through a number of tools and techniques:

Force Field Analysis: will be used to show the movement of people from one level of understanding to another over time and looks at the positive and negative forces which contributed to such a movement over time. This tool has been included in the data collection but will also be used in the analysis to evaluate the sustainability of the CaLP project interventions through for example identifying aspects of the capacity building efforts that the county authorities are prepared to adopt in the short, medium and long term, those that are likely to be modified by members of CSGs and State Actors as well as those that are likely to be discarded or rejected.

Vulnerability analysis: this is to draw out aspects of CTP that are vulnerable to risks and the current institutional/policy factors that can contribute to addressing (or not) the vulnerabilities.

Pairwise ranking: this will be used to show the differences/progress made by the 4 counties in as far as knowledge, attitude and practice towards cash transfer programming is concerned including preparedness and contingency planning. This is with a view to promote peer to peer learning and support.

Stakeholder mapping: this will be used to identify potential 'champions' of cash transfer programming in the counties based on the CSG/stakeholders' perceptions of the capacity and experience in the area. This will provide a picture of in county capacities and resources that can be drawn upon in the future to provide mentoring and follow up support to county institutions that engage in CTP.

The above will inform the narrative of the County case studies that will include the following:

- SWOT analysis approach to comprehend the pre project context using the baseline study for the various project components.
- A synthesis of the CaLP CTP project key actions, output and outcomes which will identify attitudes, early actions and the intent on practice resultant of the CaLP action.
- Mapping out county CTP including the presence, or intent to develop capacity factors including people, policy frameworks, strategic partnerships for transfer and actor environment which is of importance to influencing behavior.

- Actionable recommendations at policy and operational levels for the County Government and development partners.

Limitations of the Study

A major constraint during the assignment were the timelines. Delays in the implementation of some key components of the project meant that trainings for state actors were being conducted in the last quarter of the project. In some counties while the study was on-going and therefore visits had to be delayed. It was therefore challenging to showcase substantial impact from the training especially where the review was being done a week or two weeks after the training.



Participants in a CaLP training in the ASALs

Photo Credit, Charity Lukaya CaLP

SECTION 2: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3. CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES AND COORDINATION

3.1 BACKGROUND

The last 8 years has seen a growth in the number and scale of cash transfer (CT) programmes in ASAL counties implemented by both state and non-state actors. The national government's children's department, the Social Development department and the National Drought Management Authority have been implementing long term CT programmes in the said counties since 2007 as part of the Government of Kenya's Social Protection Strategy. The largest CT programme in all the 4 target counties is the state run Hunger Safety Net Programme, a social protection programme implemented with support from DFID and Australian Aid through the National Drought Management Authority. Non-state actors such as Concern Worldwide, Diocese of Lodwar, Kenya Red Cross Society, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, Save the Children and WFP have also been implementing CT programmes over the years as a response to specific emergencies.

State programmes implemented through the NDMA and Ministry of Labour and Social Services currently cover over 100,000 households across all 4 counties. According to the capacity assessment undertaken by CaLP in the second quarter of 2015, the state actor programmes though in existence over a long period of time, have limited staff capacity with some heavily dependent on NGO capacity (in the case of HSNP) for implementation. The HSNP programme implementation unit is composed of NGO staff seconded to NDMA. The Children's department as well as the Social Development department implement the OVC, OP and PWSN CT directly but are stretched too thinly with no capacity to monitor and respond effectively to beneficiary issues and complaints.

The assessment identified a number of challenges and capacity gaps in relation to CTP with both national and county government departments in the target counties. These included:

Infrastructure: Poor roads network in most parts of these counties affect the ability of traders to deliver goods and/or cash as well as make it an expensive venture for the agents contracted by financial institutions to pay out beneficiaries.

Banking and financial service infrastructure in these counties have improved over the years. Given the vastness of these counties however, there are still areas that are not covered by this infrastructure or distances between villages and nearest service provider are still high in some cases. In Mandera County, the agreement with the service provider was to have a paypoint every 20km in the target location. This has not been achieved and beneficiaries in some locations have to travel to the main branch of the service provider. This has an additional cost to the beneficiaries both in terms of time (beneficiaries are said to spend upto 2 days when travelling to collect benefits) and money (cost of transportation to the nearest service provider could be at minimum \$10 for some beneficiaries)

Policy: Whilst national government programmes are guided by the social protection policy, the county governments, despite being very supportive of CTPs, cannot implement them due to lack of a policy to guide implementation and justify the allocation of resources to the programme. All target counties at the time of the assessment had draft policies in place. The policies (either approved or in draft) look at cash transfers as a tool for delivery of social protection programmes or provide guidance on cash transfer programming across sectors and in both long term and humanitarian programmes. There are no specific policies or guidelines at national or sub-national levels on emergency cash.

Finances: For county governments, the lack of a policy on CTP limits them from allocating funds for this program. For the national government programmes however, the funds that are allocated are not sufficient to address other aspects of the programme such as M&E and accountability. The transfers themselves often experience delays as a result of the government financial disbursement systems. There have been instances where beneficiaries receive up to 5 months of benefits in one transfer occasioned by delays in funds disbursement. This defeats the purpose of a social transfer which is regular and predictable transfers but also increases the chances of fraud as beneficiaries are not likely to know how much they are entitled to.

Human resources: A key challenge identified in all counties was the lack of staffing as well as technical capacity of the existing staff. Most county government and national government departments are understaffed with staff performing multiple functions and often not sufficiently equipped to perform these functions either technically or not having the required resources. There is a heavy reliance on NGOs to perform certain tasks for both the county and national government due to this limitation. Resources to employ additional staff are either not there or where the resources are available the ASAL counties are unable to attract qualified staff due to their remoteness. Capacity development has also been a challenge due to the fact that most departments are understaffed with existing staff (particularly technical staff) being unable to take time to attend trainings and professional development courses.

Processes: For the county governments, not having a CTP in place means that they do not have guidelines and process for implementing CTP in long term social protection as well as emergency programmes. The draft policies in place try to define steps to be taken in identification of beneficiaries, management of the fund to be allocated towards the CTP and coordination between the various government departments. For the existing (government and NGO) CTPs in these 4 counties, there is no harmonization in the processes for targeting and beneficiary identification with organizations and government departments employing different criteria, sometimes in the same locality which often causes confusion and becomes a source of discontent and mistrust amongst communities thereby affecting the credibility and acceptance of the programme. On the same note, monitoring and evaluation processes vary across the programmes with NGO implemented programmes undertaking monthly monitoring (a reasonable timeframe as CTs require close monitoring) whilst government programmes vary between monthly and quarterly monitoring. The variation in the processes can be attributed not only to the availability or lack of resources but also due to poor or non-existent coordination mechanism for CTP. At the time of the assessment, coordination was said to take place through the respective County Steering Groups where CTPs would be discussed occasionally depending on the meeting agenda.

3.2 ROLE OF CALP AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Based on the capacity assessment, CaLP in discussion with NDMA and relevant county government department contextualized the CaLP level 1 training module which provides an introduction to the fundamentals of CTP for people with no prior experience. The module was reviewed to ensure that it was appropriate to context, and aligned to existing government structures and approaches, including reference to scale up of government social safety net programs, namely the DFID funded Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), which in its current phase is in the process of being handed over to the Kenyan government. The contextualization of CaLP Level 1 training materials involved review of the case study, selection of modules that fit the needs identified and inclusion of relevant context specific materials, exercises and examples. County and national government departments nominated staff to be trained. The criteria for the nomination of those trained was their involvement (or likely to be involved in the future) in implementation of CTP i.e. programme level and support functions. Though not all departments were able to nominate staff based on the above criteria either due to absence of those functions within the department currently or unavailability of staff.

The level 1 training was done in 2 phases with phase 1 covering Marsabit and Turkana (September 2015) and phase 2 covering Mandera and Wajir (November 2015). A follow up training focusing on cash coordination was carried out for all the 4 counties (November-December 2015) with a clear actionable workplan developed for the county and national government departments to move forward with it.

The engagement by CaLP has given a new impetus to the discussions around cash transfer programming and the need for harmonization in the ASAL counties. With the level 1 training, departments that had staff participate in the trainings identified the following benefits from the training:

1. A better understanding on the CTP programmes in the county including geographical coverage, number of beneficiaries and the value of benefits transferred on a regular basis. The variation in the methods for targeting and the value of benefits transferred demonstrated the need for urgent measures to be taken to improve coordination amongst stakeholders and move more towards harmonization of approaches.
2. An understanding of the range of financial service infrastructure available in the counties and the common challenges faced in the delivering the benefits to beneficiaries. A common approach to these challenges

would be required e.g. lobbying the service provider to increase coverage as opposed to the current ad-hoc measures of addressing these challenges which in some cases pose a security risk e.g. physical delivery of cash to beneficiaries by the government or NGO in areas where there is no financial service provider or agent.

3. By reviewing existing CT programmes in the respective counties during these trainings, the training provided an opportunity for participants to understand the amount of technical resources available in the counties through the CoP that can be drawn upon especially around targeting, M&E and accountability. Some of the resources have received a heavy investment from donors and is therefore paramount that actors in the county make use of these resources (specific reference to the HSNP beneficiary register and rights and accountability systems).
4. An understanding on the amount of cash injected into the local economy through CTPs and the need for better coordination in order to avoid duplication and increase efficiency. In some counties, over Kshs. 1.2bn (HSNP, Turkana) is injected into the local economy annually through CTPs. Though most county governments don't have CTP policies in place, there is a commitment to allocating resources to CTPs. The Turkana county government has pledged to allocate Kshs. 150m. Marsabit county on the other hand has allocated approximately Kshs. 50m in the current financial year.
5. Although not directly linked to the trainings, Marsabit county has had its social protection policy approved which has seen it implement CTP in the last quarter of 2014/2015 financial year reaching 750 beneficiaries. The CTP targeted mostly the elderly and persons with severe disabilities. This has been doubled in the current financial year to 1500 beneficiaries. Turkana and Wajir counties on the other hand now have a draft policy in place thanks to support from the CoP in the two counties.
6. Following the training, there have been efforts to establish a forum for coordination of CTP. These forums are either established through the social protection policy (as is the case for Marsabit) or purely based on the need to have a forum for coordination (case of Turkana). In Marsabit county, this forum known as the county social protection and coordination committee will be chaired by the county executive responsible for social services and its membership shall include national government social protection programmes coordinators as well as NGOs. The frequency of meetings is supposed to be quarterly and reports to the executive. The scope is currently limited to managing CTs funded through the social protection fund but there is room for widening the scope to coordinate all CTPs. The first meeting for this group is scheduled for the 2nd week of December. Turkana and Mandera counties on the other hand has set up the County Technical Working Group, a sub-set of the County Steering Group that is meant to coordinate between government implemented social protection programmes. The terms of reference for these 2 groups has however not been defined.

3.3 LESSONS EMERGING FROM CALP ENGAGEMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Capacity building on CTP in the counties for state actors by CaLP is a relevant initiative given the gaps in knowledge and technical skills on cash transfer programming. Though the tangible results in terms of outcome of the training may not be much due to the timings of the study, there are a number of important lessons to be taken into consideration moving forward. These include:

There is a great deal of buy in amongst the top leadership in the counties. There seems to be no divided opinion in both the executive and the legislature on the importance of cash transfers in building resilience and addressing chronic vulnerabilities as well as a tool for emergency response which would explain how counties like Marsabit have been able to get their social protection policy passed in the county assembly without much issues.

A key challenge in relation to CTP has been the varied targeting methodologies used for social protection programmes as well as for emergency response by the various agencies involved CTs in the different counties. This has caused a lot of confusion and even brought into question the credibility of some programmes. There is need to look into issues around targeting and develop a harmonised approach to the same guided obviously by the programme objectives.

The timelines for the project were not sufficient for one to see the trainings undertaken yield results in terms of improved implementation capacity and coordination. The trainings and follow-up visits were scheduled in the last quarter of the project-not by choice but due to the amount of time spent in the preparatory phases of the project i.e. capacity gaps assessments and training materials development. Future projects need to allocate at least 18 months where the first 6 months will be spent on assessments and material development and a minimum of 12 months for trainings and follow-up support.

Contextualizing the training to the local needs and using local programmes as examples resonated very well with the trainees. It helped them develop an understanding of what was happening at local level in terms of programmes, systems used and players involved.

Mobilization for the training and follow up activities needed a bit more time for there to be clarity on the expectations and ensure that the right people are nominated for the trainings. Due to the time limitations of the project (with first 6-8 months spent on preparatory work), mobilization for the training seems to have been done in a rush in order to deliver the project commitments. This resulted in a lack of understanding on the part of the state actors as to the intended objectives for the trainings therefore sending the right officials to these trainings. There was also inconsistency in some counties among the nominated officers for the initial trainings and the follow up trainings-each time a different officer would be nominated which could be attributed to the lack of understanding on the purpose and intent of the training. In some counties, it seems to have been perceived as just another training where officers can earn a bit of an allowance. As such, very junior officers were sent for the training and no follow up action was taken by the departments thereafter.

Continued engagement with the state actors at county level is crucial for any results to be achieved when it comes to working with state institutions specifically at county level where capacities are said to be limited. This is even more important for a capacity building project like this one. CaLP's lack of presence in the ASAL counties seems to have been a setback in this project. There was a reliance on state institutions to set the ground for CaLP in some counties which seemed not to have worked very well given the subtle power struggles between national and county government departments. The level of engagement may have been different if CaLP had developed a working arrangement with the relevant county government department and also provided for a focal point who would continuously engage and spend more time with the county teams. The current arrangement of support by the regional officers was at best limited around the trainings and the follow up visit with limited engagement in between. It may have been difficult for the team to achieve anything more than this given their responsibilities in supporting other countries within the region as well as the regional cash working group.

The trainings did provide a forum for sharing experiences which in turn showcased the amount of technical resources available within the counties across the various programmes. Whilst the need to invest in certain processes and infrastructure is there, existing programmes that have had significant investments in tools, processes and infrastructure should look into availing these resources for upcoming programmes to draw from where applicable. A programme in mind is the HSNP which has significant investment in systems, targeting and accountability mechanisms as well as the crisis modifier approach which other programmes should be able to tap into. Sharing of resources across programmes does not seem to be taking place currently.

A key challenge to coordination currently seems to revolve around leadership and resourcing. With several CT projects/programmes being implemented by both state and non-state actors, it is unclear who is to take leadership especially between the state departments since both national and county governments are either implementing or have an interest in the implementation. Leadership is linked to resources as whoever takes up the leadership should also be able to allocate the required resources to provide the necessary secretariat support for the forum and also move forward some key deliverables for the forum as would have been defined by its ToR. NDMA seems to be a more practical option to lead the coordination in most of these counties at the moment given the scale of the HSNP programme and their role in response coordination. The delicate relationship between national and county government institutions and the constant debate on roles and mandates pertaining to matters in the county may however be an impediment for the forum to successfully take off under such an arrangement. Irrespective of capacity or resources, the county government needs to be seen as leading this process for ownership and sustainability.

4. CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

4.1 BACKGROUND

The counties have each undertaken 2 contingency planning processes i.e. the Drought Contingency Planning process in early 2014 and the El-Nino Contingency Planning in the 3rd quarter of 2015. The drought contingency planning process was coordinated by the national government through the NDMA with the county government departments leading the sectoral discussions. The transition into the devolved system of governance in the period 2013/2014 brought with it unique administrative challenges in the national and county government departments with a number of key positions being unfilled for a period of time as recruitments and transfer of staff took place. This had an impact on delivery of services as well as management of processes such as contingency planning and preparedness. Given the above, the timelines allocated for the drought contingency planning process was quite short and county consultations were therefore limited to stakeholders in county headquarters in all the counties but involved both state and non-state actors engaged in emergency response. The drought contingency plan in most counties had CTP included as part of on-going social protection programme with a planned scale-up to reach vulnerable households based on the HSNP, but also as a response tool for livestock and agriculture sectors.

The El-Nino Contingency Plan (CP) however can be seen as an improvement from the drought contingency plan in terms of the processes undertaken and even how the final plan was put together. It provides an analysis of both positive and negative outcomes of the hazard for each sector, detailed activities per sector and budget per activity. In some counties CT are specifically mentioned in the CP as a tool for providing relief whilst in other counties (e.g. Marsabit) it is not featured in the CP in any of the sectors though key informants interviewed identified it as one of the mechanisms for delivery of the CP in the food security sector. This could be due to the fact that in-kind food relief is coordinated by the national government.

On preparedness, the counties have a decent level of infrastructure for CTP set-up over the years by financial service providers (specifically Equity and Safaricom) through the HSNP and other emergency and non-emergency CTP. The geographical coverage of these services is however a challenge given the vastness of the county, poor state of the roads and the costs associated in reaching dispersed populations. Despite this, stakeholders that have responded to emergencies in the past using cash transfers indicated that basic commodities were readily available in the local markets even in remote centers. Commodities seem to find their way to the markets even during the rainy season when most roads are impassable (and even during emergencies).

Though preparedness is recognised by the counties as a key to building resilience, limited measures have been put in place to achieve this in most sectors. CTs have been included in most county contingency plans as a response tool but no preparatory activities have been undertaken to ensure that if when and when the disaster occurs, a response can be activated in the shortest time possible. A key challenge that has been cited by the counties is the lack of resources to undertake preparedness activities. This has seen counties such as Marsabit pass a legislation that provides for the establishment of an emergency fund which will be used to respond to emergencies but also used in preparedness activities where necessary. This fund has however not been set up. Turkana county on the other hand does not have a legislation that establishes an emergency fund, but have been able to allocate Kshs. 50m that was used to provide food relief in the period June-August 2015.

Of all the programmes in the counties, HSNP seems to be the only programme that has built in preparedness measures within the programme. The programme has done a pre-identification process of vulnerable households that are likely to be affected by the different hazards in the county, registered them and have employed the crisis modifier concept that saw them respond to the drought in 2014 and the floods 2015 within 3-4 weeks covering between 28,000-60,000 beneficiaries (Marsabit and Turkana respectively) on top of the regular social protection beneficiaries.

4.2 ROLE OF CALP IN CAPACITY BUILDING

A review of the county contingency plans as part of the CaLP project capacity assessment indicated the following in relation to CTP:

- Inclusion of CTs in all county contingency plans as a response tool
- Limited/no details on how and when the necessary programme assessments will be undertaken e.g. market assessments. The situation analysis also does not include a markets analysis assessing capacity to provide basic commodities during emergencies, as well as absorb the large sums of money likely to be injected during an emergency.
- No details on what preparedness activities need to be undertaken, when and by whom. There is no mention of private service provider engagement in the CP and timelines for service procurement and contractual arrangements
- No clarity on how CT coordination will be undertaken. The CP indicate coordination will take place through the CSGs however based on past experience, this has not been very effective in coordinating CT activities. The CSG is a multi-sectoral coordination forum and due to time constraints (meetings normally last 3 hours) the level of coordination often limited to updates as opposed to linkages and strategic harmonization with discussions related to security issues often taking up much of the time given the context of the ASAL counties under this project.

Based on the assessment, a 2-day training was developed and carried out in each of the 4 counties. The training was combined with the CTP training and targeted the same participants. Most participants in the training had not been involved in the various CP processes that have been undertaken in their respective counties. This therefore provided an opportunity to create awareness on what CP is as well as review the respective county contingency plans with specific reference to the areas covering CTs.

Whilst the training was highly appreciated and helped create an understanding on the CP process and the important elements to be covered in CP and preparedness with regards to CTs, the timing of the training and the level of participants in attendance may have limited the impact of the training. The training took place right in the middle of planning for the el-nino response which meant that key government officials (especially county government) were not available to attend the trainings. This meant that junior officers who are not involved in the decision making and don't participate in coordination meetings were nominated for the training. A good example is how in the review of the CPs during the trainings, the participants made certain recommendations for adjustment that were to be brought to the attention of the respective county CSGs. This was not done despite a CSG having been convened in two of the counties immediately after the training because most participants do not represent their departments in the CSGs and seem also not to feedback to their managers on the outcome of the trainings and the next steps required.

With regards to the above, future trainings will need to carefully consider the timings and also select the participants based on their level of influence within their respective departments. This will require a lot more time during the pre-training mobilization to be able to identify the right participants and get commitment to not just participate in the training but also move the post-training action points forward.

4.3 LESSONS EMERGING FROM CALP ENGAGEMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Preparedness is a task that involves a number of actors from both programmes and non-programme departments. A key issue that has come out from the training and discussions with stakeholders during the case study is how aside from financial constraints, there is lack of support, understanding and flexibility from the procurement department and emergency response activities are treated like normal programme activities hence delays in the response. Inclusion of non-programme staff in future capacity building initiatives will be crucial to create a common understanding and have a joint action plan with clear timeframes for procurement and logistic inputs to facilitate an effective response.

While the counties have a reasonable representation of financial institutions and infrastructure, there seems to not be any inclusion of the service providers in the preparedness discussions nor consideration for developing pre-agreements that would speed up the response time. This seems to be so with the county government departments where the process is considered to be internal to government and humanitarian actors. The exception to this is with HSNP which has engaged its financial partner Equity bank and have an arrangement that involved issuance of cards to all households registered including those not targeted for the regular social protection transfers. This has allowed the programme to respond quickly to shocks in support of households that are vulnerable to the said shock using their crisis modifier approach. NGOs have also been pro-active in the engagement with service providers. For example, Concern Worldwide in its El-Nino preparedness for Marsabit county has not just identified potential beneficiary households, done market assessments in areas likely to be affected but also gone ahead and identified service providers, set up pre-agreements with the providers that would be activated during the emergency as well as printed vouchers that are to be distributed. This is a practice that can be adopted by the government in the future.

Whilst there are programmes that have good systems for preparedness in place, there doesn't seem to be a willingness to share information or draw into existing resources that can enhance preparedness and response. The HSNP programme has a comprehensive database of households in all counties which is not used by other stakeholders. In principle, NDMA says the database is available to stakeholders upon request. In practice however, stakeholders spoken to during this study claim not to have been provided access to the database even after putting in their request. Other stakeholders actually question the credibility of that database due to questions around how the registration and targeting was done-an issue that should be addressed if the resource is to be put to good use.

While most officers place needs assessment as key to any response, market assessments seem not to be considered as important during an emergency response especially where cash is involved. Market assessments are seen as key to long term livelihoods interventions as opposed to emergency response. This could be from a premise that markets have in the past been functional during emergencies but there is need to look into the ability to cope to increased demands for basic commodities occasioned by distribution of cash. This has not been the practice and even the recent county government CT launched in Marsabit county did not undertake a market assessment (though not linked to an emergency). This is an area where capacity will need to be built moving forward.

5. ACCOUNTABILITY, GENDER AND PROTECTION MAINSTREAMING

For any programme intervention, accountability is very important in ensuring that resources are utilized in the most efficient way, reached the intended beneficiaries and achieve the desired outcome. This is even more important when it comes to cash transfers given the nature of assistance and the ease with which cash can be diverted and misused. Given the target for most of these programmes are very poor and vulnerable households; households whose situation is often desperate and would do anything to be registered onto the programme.

Most CT programmes in the county have an accountability process managed through the complaints and response mechanism. This varies from programme to programme with the county government setting up a hotline for complaints, while the national government CT programmes (OVC, OPCT, PWSD and HSNP) work through rights committees and grievances channeled through this committee in collaboration with local administrative structures i.e. chief's office. These structures were used to carry out beneficiary education on the programme and their rights with support from the relative programme staff (in the case of HSNP, this support is provided by HelpAge International as part of the project implementation unit). The nature of grievances handles through this channel included non-inclusion, non-payment/delayed payment, missed payment cycle, service provider related complaints as well as complaints related to secondary beneficiaries. The time taken to resolve the case varied from a number of days to months and is often related to the nature of complaint and the level at which it could be resolved from. Some grievances could only be resolved at Nairobi level e.g. non-payment, non-inclusion and missed payment cycle as the beneficiary list and payroll is generated from Nairobi.

A key issue raised with regards to accountability during the study has been the conduct of some of the agents for the financial service providers. There have been reports of agents forcing beneficiaries to collect goods equivalent to the amount of cash they are to receive instead of cash. This could be related to cash flow problems faced by agents during payment periods or the levels of commission paid by the service provider which some considered to be too low given the distances involved when travelling to the banks and risks involved on the part of the agents when travelling back with cash in time for beneficiary pay out. Some agents have even been charging beneficiaries a fee on top of the commission they are already receiving.

Given the desperate situation of the beneficiaries, most agree to paying these extra fees in order to receive their cash. For those that don't pay, they are forced to travel to the county headquarters to withdraw their cash from the bank, a move that incurs additional costs and they end up using a substantial amount of their transfers on transport and accommodation costs. From the discussions with stakeholders, it was not clear whether these complaints have been brought to the attention of the service providers across all the counties. In places where this has been brought up, the service provider has taken action by terminating the arrangement with the said agent (s).

Gender is seen as having been adequately addressed in these programmes with most stakeholders equating gender to the inclusion of women in the programme as beneficiaries although some stakeholders feel more needs to be done to give women a voice and confidence to air their grievances. In some programmes, women become the default beneficiaries due to their roles as primary caregivers e.g. the OVC and PWSD cash transfers. In other programmes such as the HSNP, they are the secondary beneficiaries in some cases as the transfer is registered under the head of the household. In some cases, the decision has been made at the household level on who the recipient of the transfer should be with the woman being nominated as the recipient following agreements between husband and wife.

Given the patriarchal nature of the pastoralist communities, the discussion on gender and its consideration in programming needs to be encouraged. There needs to be a more deliberate inclusion of women in processes and decision making forum beyond the natural occurrence (e.g. as recipients) because of their caregiving role. This will be achieved through continued awareness and fostering of gender dynamics discussions at the various levels including the households. The rights committees set up within some of these programmes provide a good network to infuse gender discussions into communities without undue resistance as these are seen as internal local structures as opposed to NGOs facilitating that dialogue.

As resources for such programmes are always limited, issues around inclusion and exclusion will always be raised. There has been a lot of discussions around the HSNP targeting process and how the programme has not been very inclusive to the point of suggesting favoritism in some areas. The programme has tried its best to combine a number of targeting methodologies so as to reduce the errors of inclusion and exclusion as much as possible. It combined the much accepted community based targeting with the proxy means targeting. While the outcome of the CMBT is not contested, the outcome of the PMT has been hotly contested. The programme has tried to address some of the concerns raised however it would not have been possible to address all as some are said to be driven by political motives. Whilst there was need to proceed with programme implementation, the programme needs to find ways to engage with stakeholders to improve that process moving forward and build confidence around the integrity of the targeting process they have employed. While there is no doubt that the system is susceptible to errors as it is based on what is inputted, the lack of confidence in the programme's targeting system could have been contributed partly by a lack of an understanding by most stakeholders on how the PMT works, the parameters used and the how these were contextualized to local situations.

6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is growing momentum on cash transfer in these counties and a growing desire to get things right moving forward. The leadership is aware that things need to improve for investments in the sector to yield better results. The improvements required include technical capacity building, coordination, beneficiary education and advocacy, particularly around improvement of infrastructure and financial services. Though some elements of these have been addressed through the initial training conducted by CaLP, the impact has been limited and continued engagement with the county government is required if the desired outcome is to be achieved. Through the current engagement (which was limited by time), the county governments see the potential for a collaboration with CaLP in strengthening the CT sectors in their respective counties. They see a greater role for CaLP in establishing and strengthening cash coordination, building capacity for key technical staff as well as support in advocating for better services and leveraging for improved financial service network. This will require a lot more engagement and possibly additional resources on the part of CaLP to support increased engagement levels with the counties.

To be able to effectively work with government at the county level, the following need to be considered moving forward:

Timelines: Whilst the project objectives are relevant, the project timeline was very restrictive. The actualization of knowledge into practice and the change of attitudes is a process that requires time and continuous support and engagement to see the desired results. A capacity development project should have at minimum a timeframe of 18 months of implementation. Future projects will need to review to take this into consideration as the trainings need continuous review and follow up to reinforce the knowledge and skills acquired. This seems to have been an issue in the current project that has limited the level of follow-up and engagement specifically at the county level.

Formal working agreement: It is important to clarify objectives and manage expectations on both the side of facilitating institution and the county governments when it comes to capacity building support. County governments having expressed the need for support to strengthen cash transfer programming, the development of some form of cooperation agreement should not be a problem. This agreement should clearly stipulate the role that the facilitating agency/institution will play as well as that of the government in the areas identified for collaboration. This will allow joint responsibility, shared workplans and the initiative being seen as a county government initiative with support from institution as opposed to being seen as an external initiative.

Targeting and mobilization: It is essential in future engagement that a lot more time is spent in the mobilisation of the government departments and targeting of key staff in each department to work with in order to influence decision making and the capacity building inputs to result in actual change in attitudes and practice in the said counties. There also needs to be sufficient notice given for the trainings and any engagement for the targeted officer to have time to make alternative arrangements for the day to day responsibility and make time to participate in the said trainings or engage with such projects.

Stakeholder engagement: CaLP's key role as a coordination and learning platform is to provide a forum for stakeholder engagement. The current implementation arrangements are slightly different from how CaLP has facilitated stakeholder engagement in the past i.e. through the regional working group meetings in Nairobi. With a lack of a presence in the 4 counties, CaLP will need to find innovative ways to continue to engage with key stakeholders in the counties specifically the state actors. There is need to consider having a focal point for county government engagement within the regional team in the interim. This is crucial especially if the challenges around targeting, delivery mechanisms and accountability are to be overcome at county level. It will require a three-pronged approach i.e. regular visits to the counties, continuous follow up through e-mail and telephone as well as engagement with national level representatives of county stakeholders (e.g. Equity bank, KCB, NDMA, etc) in order to have decisions implemented as well as provide innovative solutions to challenges at the county level. CaLP's engage with key structures at county (in this case the county steering group) as well as national level will be crucial in order to influence key state actors on CTP.

Modular approach to training: As the county embarks on the expansion of cash transfers, it is not only necessary to develop the capacity of more officers to undertake the implementation of cash transfers but also

look at developing the capacity and understanding of other officers that may not be directly involved in the implementation but provide crucial support to the implementation. Whilst the training modules were developed based on the needs, the roll out of the trainings may need to take on a modular approach based on seniority, technical skills and level of engagement in the cash transfer programme. This is because of the need to build the capacity of key decision makers as well as support staff on CTP for more effective delivery. It has proven difficult to have key decision makers participate in the trainings based on how it is currently being delivered and therefore a more condensed module may be required for this group with constant engagement thereafter to provide support around policy and strategy development. Support departments such as procurement and finance may also need to be targeted for capacity building in order to overcome the current challenges in preparedness that seem to revolve around procurement processes and financing.

Coordination: Crucial to the success of any programme, the lack of a forum for CTP seems to limit the benefits of having multiple actors involved in the programmes through cross learning, resource sharing, advocacy and influence. All four counties have intentions of setting up mechanism dictated either by law or need. These have not been set up due to either leadership challenge or not understanding what needs to be done to have this in place. Drawing on its coordination experience, CaLP, working closely with key humanitarian departments within the county, should facilitate the establishment of these forums including helping the counties define the membership and set the agenda for these forums. This will involve basic things such as facilitating a dialogue on who is best placed take on leadership if this has not already been defined by law, the development of the ToR for the forum, a workplan and allocation of resources for coordination in the interim until resources become available. The leadership, where not defined by law, would be best suited to sit with the county government through a relevant department. As matters related to CT are limited to the county and may not touch on national security matters, placing the leadership with the county government makes practical sense and is also strategic for future resource allocation. County government is not likely to fund a forum that is being led by the national government. National government has in the past not funded adequately lower level coordination mechanisms. These often depended on the goodwill of NGOs to support specific meetings.

Accountability: The challenges experienced in the county are linked to the delivery mechanisms as well as the beneficiaries' level of awareness and understanding on their rights, entitlements and overall objectives of the programmes. The various programmes in the county have established different mechanisms and structures for addressing this however there needs to be a common approach to the response and messaging. There is also need to review the agency model (which involves the engagement of local traders at the community level in making payments on behalf of the service provider at a commission) that currently seems to provide a conducive environment for the infringement of beneficiary rights. Given its influence in CTP within the region, CaLP needs to facilitate dialogue between key decision makers at the county level and service providers at both county and national level to find a workable solution to the agency problem and harmonize accountability measures across actors. A good starting point would be the review of the various accountability systems in place and identify best practices that can be implemented by actors.

SECTION 3: COUNTY CASE STUDIES

Case Study to Document the Actions Being Taken to Build the Knowledge, Attitude, Practices and Capacity of the County Governments/State Actors in Cash Transfer Programming in the ASALs of Kenya

Marsabit County Case Study

October 2015



Photo Credit: Poul Henning / IFRC

Following a drought emergency in Kenya an international support to Kenya Red Cross was initiated and a cash program targeting malnourished children was created to minimize the effects of the drought – Marsabit

I. INTRODUCTION

Marsabit County has had a long history of cash transfer programming both through government and non-governmental organizations. The first CTP programme to be implemented in the County was the Hunger Safety Net Programme funded by DFID and implemented by a consortium of NGOs that included Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE and HelpAge with CARE implementing in Marsabit through local partners. A number of organizations have equally been involved in cash transfer programming as part of emergency and drought recovery responses.

The ASAL project on “Improving Coordination and Preparedness to Implement and Scale Up Cash Transfer Programming Responses in Kenya” by CaLP sought to build on this experience to enhance capacity for CTP amongst state actors and improve coordination mechanisms for CTP in the county. As part of the project, a capacity assessment was undertaken based on the CaLP CTP competency framework. The outcome of this assessment was used to tailor existing training materials to the needs and gaps identified. The result was a modular training package that looked into an introduction to CTP (covering assessment, analysis and design), coordination (why coordinate cash, challenges and consequences, and implementing cash coordination) and contingency planning (which looked into the key processes for contingency planning and the inclusion of cash).

A 5-day training was conducted in Marsabit in early September based on the developed materials. The first 3 days of the training focused on CTP and Cash coordination and the last 2 days focused on contingency planning. The training had participants drawn from different departments of the county government, the national government’s departments of social services and children services, NDMA as well as non-state actors such as the KRCS, international and national NGOs working on CTP in Marsabit.

This visit to document progress was made a few weeks after the training. Based on the timing, it was too early to see tangible progress made in CTP and coordination that are directly attributable to the training. This case study therefore outlines progress made in CTP in the county from the time of the initial CaLP assessment to date.

2. CAPACITY ON CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

During the 2014/2015 financial year, the County enacted legislation and developed a policy framework that provides for the undertaking of CTP in both emergency and non-emergency settings. The county’s legal notice 3³, The Public Financial management regulation 2015 establishes the Marsabit County Social Protection Fund whose aim is to provide regular CTs for vulnerable households as part of an institutionalized SP programme by the county. This puts the county ahead of other ASAL counties in as far as institutionalizing of CTPs is concerned.

As a County, there is extensive experience in CTP using a range of targeting methodologies, delivery mechanisms, as well as monitoring and accountability systems amongst state and non-state actors. Amongst state actors, the capacity and level of experience on CTP varies with some national government departments having staff with over 5 years of experience on CTP and the county government having staff that are just being engaged/exposed to the CTP programme. The scale of the programme is also different with the HSNP, which is being implemented through the national government’s NDMA, covering slightly over 20,000 households and the county government covering 1500 households in the current financial year.

The county government has had a lot of positives to build upon despite their staff’s lack of experience in CTP. There have been a number of targeting mechanisms that had been tried in the county by various actors including national government departments which included proxy means testing and community based targeting. The county drew upon experiences of the other departments and organizations and adopted the methodology perceived to have least amount of errors and controversies i.e. the community based targeting. Acknowledging the potential for duplication between county government’s programme and that of the other national

³ Marsabit County Gazette Supplement No.4; 22nd May, 2015

government, the county government took the initiative to run their list of identified beneficiaries against those of existing national government departments specifically the older persons CTP and the Persons with Severe Disabilities CTP. This ensured that those registered under the programme were not getting double benefits; a major problem due to lack of coordination and reluctance of organizations in sharing their beneficiary data.

There are two main financial service providers for CTP in the county i.e. Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) and Equity Bank. Equity bank has a better infrastructure having been involved in the HSNP programme over the last 7 years. As part of its infrastructure, Equity set up agents in every ward if not location where recipients can receive their monthly benefits from. This infrastructure though has challenges, is what actors including the County government have built upon in the delivery of CTPs. Safaricom have also been involved in the past in the delivery of CTs using the M-Pesa system. Their system has mostly been used by NGOs such as Concern Worldwide as well as the KRCS. The network coverage is relatively good with most of the major trade centres covered by the mobile telephone network. KCB is a new entrant in the CTP sector having been contracted by national government from 2014 to deliver cash for beneficiaries covered under the OPCT, OVC CT and PWSD CT. Though network not so well developed, they are an additional service provider in the county.

The benefits of the transfers to the pastoralists communities cannot be understated as it transcends the benefit of smoothing consumption during lean times and has opened up poor families to "a world of possibilities and opportunities"⁴. It is seen as a key stimulator for getting pastoralists into the cash economy and has opened up opportunities in hitherto remote and marginalized communities.⁵ Though no comprehensive study has been done on the impact of CTP on the local economy, it is felt that the CTPs have had a significant impact due to the increase in the amount and levels of trading in remote villages which has accrued benefits to not just the receiving households and traders but the community at large.

3. CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

The county has to date undertaken 2 contingency planning processes i.e. the Drought Contingency Planning process in early 2014 and the El-Nino Contingency Planning in the 3rd quarter of 2015. The drought contingency planning process was coordinated by the national government through the NDMA with the county government departments leading the sectoral discussions. According to key informants, there was limited time for consultation due to the timelines provided by NDMA. Consultations were therefore limited to stakeholders in Marsabit central but involved both state and non-state actors engaged emergency response. The drought contingency plan had CTP included as part of on-going social protection programme with a planned scale-up to reach vulnerable households based on the HSNP but also as a response tool for livestock and agriculture sectors. Not much details are however provided on how beneficiaries will be identified, market assessments and capacity of service providers, funds or source of funding. For the HSNP scale up, the assumption here is that the details have been worked out in the design of the programme. The same cannot be said for the livestock and agriculture sector.

According to key informants, the training has highlighted the need to do a proper assessment and analysis as part of the contingency planning process in order to effectively respond to an emergency. This was evident in the case of how HSNP was able to scale up within a month from the time the contingency plan was activated in August 2014. The programme had a database with the profiles of over 50,000 households which was created as part of its targeting process and used this to scale up support to vulnerable households when certain emergency thresholds were met as per the contingency plan. This was said to be the fastest CT response in Marsabit county given the scale-reached an additional 20,000 households as part of the emergency scale-up. Though the county government did have a response in 2014 across different sectors, the scale was limited and funding was cited as a challenge.

This seems to be a challenge that the county is working to overcome by the establishment of the County Emergency Fund⁶. According to the Marsabit County Emergency Fund Act, the county is supposed to allocate

⁴Key informant from Marsabit

⁵Key informant from Marsabit county

⁶Marsabit County Gazette Supplement No.13 (Acts No. 1), 17th December 2014

2% of its annual revenue to this fund. The establishment of the fund seems to provide an enabling environment for undertaking a proper contingency planning process as there is some funding attached to the process and is not seen as an exercise in futility⁷.

The El-Nino Contingency plan however is an improvement from the drought contingency plan in terms of the processes undertaken and even how the final plan was put together. It provides an analysis of both positive and negative outcomes of the hazard for each sector, detailed activities per sector and budget per activity. The contingency plan seems to not have looked into food access for poor and vulnerable households (either as relief food or cash transfers) as interventions in agriculture and livestock are centered around provision of seeds and tools for early planting and vaccination and disease control. Cash transfers are not featured in the CP in any of the sectors though key informants interviewed identified it as one of the mechanisms for delivery of the CP in the food security sector. This could be due to the fact that food relief is coordinated by the national government.

Whilst there have been improvements in the process especially around the analysis, the overall coordination and consultations, support is still required in building an understanding and capacity around CTP in emergencies. Whilst CTPs have been on-going in the county for more than 5 years, the state actor implemented programmes (HSNP, OVC, PWSD and OPCT) have mostly been long term safety net programmes.

4. PREPAREDNESS AND CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

The county has a decent infrastructure for CTP set-up over the years by financial service providers (specifically Equity and Safaricom) through the HSNP and other emergency and non-emergency CTP. In recent years, the national government through the OVC-CT, the OP-CT and PWSD-CT has brought on board the Kenya Commercial Bank. The geographical coverage of these services is however a challenge given the vastness of the county and the costs associated in reaching dispersed populations.

Though no detailed county wide market assessment has been done⁸, a visit to the markets during the study showed that basic commodities are readily available in the local markets even in remote centers. Commodities seem to find their way to the markets even during the rainy season when most roads are impassable (and even during emergencies)⁹.

A key challenge that has been cited for CTP preparedness is the government procurement system and the bureaucracy involved in the process¹⁰. The procurement of any item beyond the county's procurement threshold can take anywhere between 4-6 months with the simplest items taking at least 2 months¹¹. This explains why the state implemented CTPs have transfers done every two months as opposed to monthly. The introduction of the E-procurement system for the counties seems to have caused quite a stir with most officers feeling that this is just an additional system that has been brought in to make the process even more lengthier and complicated which is contrary to the intended purpose. The finance and procurement teams are rarely involved in the planning processes to advise the technical officers on what needs to be in place in order to have timely delivery.

The pre-identification of target beneficiaries has only been done by HSNP which at the onset of the programme undertook a massive household registration process which resulted in over 50,000 households being registered onto the programme though only 20,000 receive benefits on a regular basis. The database can be very useful for other actors to draw upon during emergencies but there seems to be controversies at local level around the process of targeting/registration for HSNP that can be attributed to a lack of understanding on the methodologies used (particularly the PMT).

⁷Key Informant, Marsabit County

⁸Non-state actors (NGOs) seem to be doing market assessments in their areas of operation as part of internal monitoring. This doesn't always get shared. NDMA does monitor prices of key commodities and livestock and is included in their monthly drought monitoring bulletin.

⁹Key informant, Marsabit

¹⁰Key informant, Marsabit

¹¹Key informant, Marsabit

5. KEY EMERGING ISSUES

- a. The lack of a coordination mechanism for CTP has created an overlap in beneficiaries, target areas and essentially confusion amongst beneficiaries on the benefits from the different programmes, the target and objectives. Coordination on CTP currently only happens amongst the national government programmes i.e. OP-CT, OVC-CT, PWSD-CT and HSNP. Even with these programmes, the coordination is at the level of information sharing and has not gone beyond that.
- b. Stakeholder engagement has been a challenge as CaLP has no presence in the target counties, engagement with key stakeholders has not been very effective as it has been based on trips into the county by the team with gaps of at least 3-4 weeks in between visits. This being the first time CaLP is engaging with the county government, this arrangement seems to have done a disservice to the project as stakeholders seem not to be familiar with CaLP's work despite the team having held a number of stakeholder meetings and trainings. Follow up has equally been a challenge and slow due to this lack of understanding on the overall objective of the project.
- c. Increasing the capacity and numbers of personnel involved in CTP. The numbers are not sufficient to adequately undertake all programme functions. In most of the government programmes (both national and county government) there are no dedicated staff for CTP (exception is HSNP). Most staff involved in CTP are responsible for other programmes/projects within their departments aside from CTP. The vastness of the county and the need to ensure that CTP reaches beneficiaries across the different parts of the county coupled with the other responsibilities within the department has left the few county and national government programmes staff stretched and not having time for functions such as monitoring, beneficiary education, linkage to other services in order to maximize the transfer benefit. There seems to be an assumption that CTPs are all about the transfers and that once a transfer is done and the reconciliation of the books have been done, the work ends there until the next transfer.
- d. The agency model of existing service providers. Whilst the idea behind the model is great and seems to have brought financial services closer to communities that previously had no access, the context within which it is currently being applied may not be the same as how it was initially designed. There have been a lot of complaints relating to agents not having funds when beneficiaries go to make withdrawals; agents forcing beneficiaries to collect food and/or household items instead of cash; agents charging an extra fee for withdrawal aside from the commission he is paid by the bank among others. The genesis of some of the above practice is said to be the fact that agents, particularly those in very remote centers view the commission paid out by the bank per transaction as minimal and not sufficient to cover some of their costs incurred in facilitating these transactions.
- e. The above raises a lot of issues around accountability and how informed beneficiaries are about the programme, their entitlements and rights as beneficiaries. The lack of awareness and information on the part of the beneficiaries exposes them to exploitation by unscrupulous traders. For those who are aware of their rights and entitlements and choose not to give in to the demands of the traders/agents, they are forced to travel to Marsabit town to withdraw their transfers and in the process end up spending a significant portion of their transfers (some estimate upto 70%) on transportation and accommodation costs.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Coordination:** Crucial to the success of any programme, the lack of a forum for CTP seems to limit the benefits of having multiple actors involved in the programmes through cross learning, resource sharing, advocacy and influence. All four counties have intentions of setting up mechanism dictated either by law or need. These have not been set up due to either leadership challenge or not understanding what needs to be done to have this in place. Drawing on its coordination experience, CaLP, working closely with key humanitarian departments within the county, should facilitate the establishment of these forums including helping the counties define the membership and set the agenda for these forums.
2. **Stakeholder Engagement:** CaLP's key role as a coordination and learning platform is to provide a forum for stakeholder engagement. The current implementation arrangements are slightly different from how CaLP has facilitated stakeholder engagement in the past i.e. through the regional working group meetings in Nairobi. With a lack of a presence in the 4 counties, CaLP will need to find innovative ways to continue to engage with key stakeholders in the counties specifically the state actors. This is crucial especially if the challenges around targeting, delivery mechanisms and accountability are to be overcome at county level. It will require a three-pronged approach i.e. regular visits to the counties, continuous follow up through e-mail and telephone as well as engagement with national level representatives of county stakeholders (e.g. Equity bank, KCB, NDMA, etc) in order to have decisions implemented as well as provide innovative solutions to challenges at the county level. CaLP's participation in crucial steering mechanisms at county level (in this case the county steering group) as well as national level will be crucial in order to influence key state actors on CTP.
3. **Capacity building:** As the county embarks on the expansion of cash transfers, it is not only necessary to develop the capacity of more officers to undertake the implementation of cash transfers but also look at developing the capacity and understanding of other officers that may not be directly involved in the implementation but provide crucial support to the implementation. Whilst the training modules were developed based on the needs, the roll out of the trainings may need to take on a modular approach based on seniority, technical skills and level of engagement in the cash transfer programme. This is because of the need to build the capacity of key decision makers as well as support staff on CTP for more effective delivery. It has proven difficult to have key decision makers participate in the trainings based on how it is currently being delivered and therefore a more condensed module may be required for this group with constant engagement thereafter to provide support around policy and strategy development. Support departments such as procurement and finance may also need to be targeted for capacity building in order to overcome the current challenges in preparedness that seem to revolve around procurement processes and financing.
4. **Timelines:** Whilst the project objectives are relevant, the project timeline was very restrictive. The actualization of knowledge into practice and the change of attitudes is a process that requires time and continuous support and engagement to see the desired results. A capacity development project should have at minimum a timeframe of 18 months of implementation. Future projects will need to review to take this into consideration as the trainings need continuous review and follow up to reinforce the knowledge and skills acquired. This seems to have been an issue in the current project that has limited the level of follow-up and engagement specifically at the county level.

5. **Accountability:** the challenges experienced in the county are linked to the delivery mechanisms as well as the beneficiaries' level of awareness and understanding on their rights, entitlements and overall objectives of the programmes. The various programmes in the county have established different mechanisms and structures for addressing this however there needs to be a common approach to the response and messaging. There is also need to review the agency model which currently seems to provide a conducive environment for the infringement of beneficiary rights. Given its influence in CTP within the region, CaLP needs to facilitate dialogue between key decision makers at the county level and service providers at both county and national level to find a workable solution to the agency problem and harmonize accountability measures across actors. A good starting point would be the review of the various accountability systems in place and identify best practices that can be implemented by actors.

Case Study to Document the Actions Being Taken to Build the Knowledge, Attitude, Practices and Capacity of the County Governments/State Actors in Cash Transfer Programming in the ASALs of Kenya

Turkana County Case Study

October 2015




Photo Credit: Caroline Berger/ Oxfam

Ekimat Maraha, leaves an indelible blue fingerprint to confirm she has received her monthly cash allowance of 3000ksh (Â£22.50) - Turkana

I. INTRODUCTION

Turkana County lies in the North Western Part of Kenya and is regarded as the poorest County in the country with a 94%¹² poverty incidence compared to the country's 45.9%. It borders West Pokot and Baringo Counties to the south, Samburu County to the South East, and Marsabit County to the east. Internationally it borders South Sudan to the north, Uganda to the west and Ethiopia to the northeast. The County shares Lake Turkana with Marsabit County and the total area of the county is 68,680 Km² as per the 2013 CRA county fact sheet. With an estimated 2014 population of 1,000,000¹³, the county has a very high population growth rate estimated at 6.4% annually as reported by the draft Turkana County Integrated Plan (2013/4-2017/8). The proportion of the rural population below the absolute poverty line in 2013 was 49% nationally and 94% in Turkana whilst the percentage of the population 15 years and above who can read and write was 79% nationally and 19% in Turkana reflecting a very high illiteracy rate.

Administratively, the country is divided into 7 sub- counties, formerly 6 with a recent addition of Kibish which was named a sub-county. It consists of 30 wards. The county falls in ecological zones 5, 6 & 7 of which 65% is regarded as very Arid, 29% Arid, 3% semi- arid and the other 3% is classified as other lands. Turkana is typically hot and dry receiving an average rainfall of between 150 and 550mm.

Turkana County has had a history of social protection, particularly cash transfer programming through both government and non-governmental organizations. The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) funded by DfID and implemented by a consortium of NGOs including Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE, HelpAge and CARE, with Oxfam implementing in Turkana County through local NGOs. The national government's department of social services has also had a long term cash transfer programme through the Older Persons Cash transfer, Orphans and Vulnerable Children, and the People living with severe disabilities cash transfers has been ongoing for a few years. NGOs have also undertaken Cash transfer programming including Oxfam, World Vision and HelpAge in the past emergencies response projects, mainly involving displaced households as a result of conflict and households facing the effects of recurrent droughts.

The ASAL project on "Improving Coordination and Preparedness to Implement and Scale Up Cash Transfer Programming Responses in Kenya" by CaLP sought to build on this experience to enhance capacity for CTP amongst state actors and improve coordination mechanisms for CTP in the county. As part of the project, a capacity assessment was undertaken based on the CaLP CTP competency framework. The outcome of this assessment was used to tailor existing training materials to the needs and gaps identified. The result was a modular training package that looked into an introduction to CTP (covering assessment, analysis and design), coordination (why coordinate cash, challenges and consequences, and implementing cash coordination) and contingency planning (which looked into the key processes for contingency planning and the inclusion of cash).

A 5-day training was conducted in Lodwar, Turkana County in early September based on the developed materials. The first 3 days of the training focused on CTP and Cash coordination and the last 2 days focused on contingency planning. The training had participants drawn from different departments of the county government including the Ministry of public service, decentralized administration and disaster management; Ministry of Trade and tourism; Ministry of water, irrigation and agriculture; Ministry of pastoral economies; County government ministry of Education, culture and social services; Department of adult learning; the national government's departments of social services and children services, NDMA as well as Kenya Red Cross Society and the Diocese of Lodwar.

This visit to document progress was made a few weeks after the training. Based on the timing, it was too early to see tangible progress made in CTP and coordination that are directly attributable to the training. This case study therefore outlines progress made in CTP in the county from the time of the initial CaLP assessment to date.

¹²2013 Commission for Revenue Allocation County factsheet

¹³ 2014 Turkana County Contingency Plan

2. CAPACITY ON CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

The Turkana County Government developed a draft cash transfer bill during the 2014/15 financial year alongside budgetary allocation for cash transfer programming to expand on the HSNP in the county. The cash transfer scale up by the County government was meant to target an additional 18,000 households besides the 39,918 Households targeted under HSNP and 3,116 targeted by the department of social services. The increase came as a result of the need noted through the Turkana County contingency plan, 2014 which noted the high poverty incidence as well as the rapidly increasing population with a 6.5%¹⁴ population growth rate.

The County government went further in efforts to institutionalize the County government led cash transfer programme by drafting a County Cash transfer bill which is still in the County Assembly awaiting approval. The Cash transfer bill borrowed from the wide range of experience on cash transfer programming in Turkana County both by state and non-state actors. The draft bill was developed with technical support funded by Oxfam and sought to seek advice from the other development and emergency response partners on cash transfer programming.

The County government efforts on cash transfer programming is led through the Ministry of public service, decentralized administration and disaster management which also played a key role in preparing and facilitating for the capacity building efforts undertaken by CaLP in Turkana County.

Despite Turkana County boasting of extensive cash transfer programming experience, this varies within the state and non-state actors, with some of the County and national government ministries and departments having varying levels of experience. The ministry in charge of the County government's cash transfer programming is relatively new, having been established in 2013 with most of the staff having limited knowledge and skills on cash transfer programming while the director and a few of the technical staff having over 7 years' experience.

The County government also benefitted from the experience provided through the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) which hosts the HSNP targeting over 39,000 households in the County with a planned scale up of additional 9,000 households. The HSNP cash transfer is implemented through Equity Bank which has been operational for the past 6 years in Lodwar with agents in all the County wards. Besides, Post Bank has been undertaken to deliver cash transfer by the national government's social services department. Other commercial banks in Lodwar are The Kenya Commercial Bank and Cooperatives Bank, which offer opportunities for expanding cash transfer delivery through the private sector.

Turkana County has an established social protection technical working group led by the Director of social services, with NDMA and HSNP team co-leading the technical working. The group has been dormant due to lack of facilitation costs, but the social services department, NDMA and HSNP team have played a critical role in advising the County government through the director of disaster management charged with the County Cash transfer programming.

With this in mind, the CaLP team managed to have a mixed group of participants from the national and county governments as well as Kenya Red Cross and Diocese of Lodwar taken through the cash transfer programming training. The participants included departments' representatives with varied experience on cash transfer programming, with some having never undertaken cash transfer programming while had implemented numerous cash transfer projects in the County and other parts of Kenya.

All the participants interviewed during the data collection exercise, including the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) manager, agree that there is no adequate technical skills capacity to undertake a cash transfer programme by the Turkana County government and amongst most stakeholders in County mainly due to the high staff turnover since the County government came into place.

Furthermore, there has not been any evidence of capacity building efforts on CTP before the CaLP training in the County. This is attributed to the notion that Cash Transfer Programming in the County is a new approach within the County government, and in the past has only been implemented through HSNP and the national

¹⁴ 2014 Turkana County Contingency Plan

government's department of social services as a social protection approach and Non state actors during emergency response.

All respondents of interviews and focused group discussions agree that cash transfer programming offers numerous benefits to the County communities, across the 6 livelihood zones of Border pastoral, central pastoral, Kerio and Turkwell riverines, Lake Turkana Fishing and Lodwar urban zones. It plays a role of smoothing consumption during the lean season and strengthens the local markets which lead to more ripple effects benefits from the cash injected into the local economies.

3. CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

Turkana County has undertaken 2 contingency planning processes which are the 2014 Drought contingency plan which was revised in April 2015 and the 2015 El-Nino contingency plan which was ongoing during the data collection exercise. Contingency planning in Turkana is a function of the County Steering Group (CSG). Having participated in the Turkana CSG presentation of the El Nino preparedness and contingency plan for review and adoption by the stakeholders could not gather adequate presentation by stakeholders for adoption since the heads of the various sectors, mostly County government directors were not present, hence postponed to the following week. Upon discussions with the NDMA County coordinator and the County commissioner who chairs the CSG, this was cited as a problem especially towards the last 2 quarters of the year when most implementation is taking place and heads of departments and NGOs sent representatives to the CSG who cannot make decisions on behalf of their departments or organizations.

The 2014 Turkana County Drought Contingency Plan was developed through approval from the CSG, and then each of the six sectors drafted their separate contingency plans. The sectors include: Food Security; Health and Nutrition; WASH; Livestock; Education; and Conflict Management. Cash transfer programing was reflected in the Food security sector in which three of the four identified interventions included cash transfer response as listed below:

1. "Enhance general food distribution, Food for Asset (FFA) food donations/purchase by County government to improve food security at household level.
2. Undertake emergency cash transfer programmes to maximize onward impacts and opportunities to strengthen and diversify livelihoods and the functioning of the market.
3. Scale up Orphan and Vulnerable children (OVC), elderly (65+yrs)& disabled support programmes - This being a cash transfer intervention
4. Scale up of "Hunger Safety Net Program".

Besides the CSG, there are various technical working groups including a Social Protection Technical Working Group to handle Cash Transfer Programming concerns in the County. The technical working has not had a meeting since it was established in September 2014¹⁵, mainly due to lack of financial resources to facilitate the meeting.

Based on the feedback from the interviews as well as the existing County contingency plan, Cash transfer Programming is integrated into the county contingency planning. Staff technical capacity improvement was cited by most of the respondents as a key gap in the County, especially amongst the key decision makers: the County executive committee members; County chief officers; County directors; the disaster management committee of the Turkana County assembly to improve on cash transfer programming policies.

¹⁵ Key Informant, Turkana County

4. PREPAREDNESS AND CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

Turkana County government has an elaborate infrastructure for cash transfer programming set up from the various existing cash transfer projects especially the HSNP and social services department through Equity and Post banks. The key challenge of using the private sector is the limited geographic coverage with all banks located only in Lodwar town while Equity and Cooperative banks have managed to establish agents in at least all County wards, which are still vast for ease of access by beneficiaries especially in the periphery.

Past market assessments mainly from the 2010 Household Economy Approach (HEA) and Oxfam fish market study in Kalokol, have shown that the local markets for most wards can meet local demands during the dry seasons. Rainy seasons and periods of sustained conflicts, the markets become inaccessible and mostly remain un-operational for sustained periods of times leading to acute shortages of food commodities and localized commodity price inflation.

The Turkana County government made a budgetary allocation in the financial year 2014/15 for Cash transfer programming to expand on the HSNP beneficiaries. This was followed by drafting a Cash Transfer policy that is yet to be approved by the County Assembly. The cash transfer budgetary allocation was used for emergency relief food distribution in the months of June to August 2015 since the Cash transfer policy was not approved by then.

In the 2015/16 financial year, the Turkana County government has allocated a similar amount for cash transfer and went a step further to begin the identification of 600 beneficiaries per County ward amongst the 30 Wards. According to the Disaster management department of the County government, the original plan was to use the HSNP beneficiary register which has listed 138,000 households in the County. This plan was frustrated by the elected Members of the Turkana County Assembly who insisted on registering beneficiaries afresh. The exercise has already been completed in about a third of all the Wards.

A key challenge identified by the respondents is the slow progress in adoptions bills by the County Assembly. This has mainly been explained to be a result of the low literacy levels amongst the elected County assembly members as well as the wrangles between the County government executive and the assembly. This has led to the delayed roll out of the planned cash transfer programming, despite budgetary allocation having been made on two financial years.

5. KEY EMERGING ISSUES

1. The cash transfer programming, preparedness and coordination capacity building efforts are much needed in Turkana County. What needs to improve is targeting key decision makers and creating publicity amongst the Members of the County Assembly to enhance quick adoption of policies favoring cash transfer programming.
2. Similar capacity building efforts need to be planned early enough to allow for mobilization. In this instance, for example, the HSNP Manager would have wanted some of her staff included in the training to improve on their cash transfer programming.
3. All stakeholders interviewed, especially the department of disaster management, agree that CaLP's support in future will be greatly needed in actualizing the County government funded cash transfer. The project could adopt a long term capacity building model to improve capacity through support in the actual design and initial implementation of cash transfer programming.
4. The use of localized scenarios and the County contingency during the training played a significant role in enhancing the skill improvement amongst the participants who didn't have any previous knowledge on the cash transfer programming.
5. The Turkana County reflects significant development towards cash transfer such as- inclusion in contingency plan, drafting of a policy document, development of cash transfer programme within the

disaster management department. One of the key gaps has been capacity building of the newly recruited staff to implement the cash transfer programme as well as formulation of guiding principles and processes.

6. Follow up efforts on stakeholder engagement is a key concern considering CaLP doesn't have a local presence in Turkana County. This has been addressed by working closely with the Kenya Red Cross team and the County government's ministry of public service, decentralized administration and disaster management.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. Inclusion of key decision makers during cash transfer capacity building efforts to actualize cash transfer programming
- b. The capacity building efforts to adopt a long term approach, including publicizing CaLP as the source of the training. This could be done through preparatory meetings with the target participants departments and organizations as well as involvement in planning for the training.
- c. Selection of participants who undertake cash transfer programming from their respective departments and organizations to participate in the capacity building exercise.
- d. For participants who didn't participate in the training but would like to, the main challenge identified was the short notice given for the training. This especially came from the HSNP Manager and some of the County disaster management department staff who wanted to take part in the training as they felt it is relevant to their day to day work.
- e. Improving the Turkana County cash transfer programming coordination through strengthening and re-energizing the social protection technical working group through the County Steering Group.
- f. Tackling cash transfer programming accountability concerns especially regarding beneficiary identification and selection processes as well as delivery mechanisms. This can be improved through increased beneficiary awareness and understanding of their rights, entitlements and objectives of the programme.

Case Study to Document the Actions Being Taken to Build the Knowledge, Attitude, Practices and Capacity of the County Governments/State Actors in Cash Transfer Programming in the ASALs of Kenya

Wajir County Case Study
November 2015



Photo Credit: Anna Ridout/Oxfam

Jimare Abdi Nur, 57, is a payment agency for the 'smart card' programme. The poorest and most vulnerable in the community receive cash after being identified by their chip id card and fingerprint. The agent is mobile and is available at any time to dispense cash.

I. INTRODUCTION

Wajir County is located in the North Eastern region of Kenya with an approximate area of 56,685.9 Km². It borders Somalia to the East, Ethiopia to the north, Mandera County to the Northeast, Isiolo County to the South West, Marsabit County to the West and Garissa County to the South. The county is sub-divided into 6 administrative units of Sub Counties, namely Wajir East, Tarbaj, Wajir west, Eldas, Wajir South and Wajir North with a total of 30 electoral wards. Wajir North and Wajir South constituencies have the largest number of wards at 7, and the rest have 4 each.

The 2009 Kenya housing and population census projected the total population at 727,965 which is projected to be 852,963 in 2015¹⁶ with 84% of the population below the age of 29 years¹⁷. The county has an inter-censal growth rate of 3.22 per cent which is higher than the national population growth rate of 3.0 per cent. With an estimated 84%¹⁸ poverty index, this makes the County the third poorest in Kenya with the majority of the population unable to meet basic household needs.

The County has 3 livelihood zones, with Pure Pastoral livelihood zones forming over 70% of the geographic coverage, while there are pockets of agro-pastoral and peri-urban zones towards the North and in major towns respectively.

The ASAL project on “Improving Coordination and Preparedness to Implement and Scale Up Cash Transfer Programming Responses in Kenya” by CaLP sought to build on this experience to enhance capacity for CTP amongst state actors and improve coordination mechanisms for CTP in the county. As part of the project, a capacity assessment was undertaken based on the CaLP CTP competency framework. The outcome of this assessment was used to tailor existing training materials to the needs and gaps identified. The result was a modular training package that looked into an introduction to CTP (covering assessment, analysis and design), coordination (why coordinate cash, challenges and consequences, and implementing cash coordination) and contingency planning (which looked into the key processes for contingency planning and the inclusion of cash).

A 5-day training was conducted in Wajir town, Wajir County in mid-November based on the developed materials. The first 3 days of the training focused on CTP and Cash coordination and the last 2 days focused on contingency planning. The training had 30 participants drawn from different departments of the county government and Non-state actors with an interest in undertaking cash transfer programming in the County.

This visit to document progress was made a few weeks after the training. Based on the timing, it was too early to see tangible progress made in CTP and coordination that are directly attributable to the training. This case study therefore outlines progress made in CTP in the county from the time of the initial CaLP assessment to date.

2. CAPACITY ON CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

There is a considerable experience on cash transfer programming. Besides the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) staff, all other County and national government staff trained on cash transfer programming indicated to relying on past experience in their delivery of cash transfer programme without a specific capacity building efforts in the past.

The HSNP, Older Persons, and the orphan and vulnerable children cash transfers are the main cash transfer programmes in the County. This is in addition to various emergency cash transfer programmes by both state and non-state actors, with the most recent in early 2015 targeting Internally Displaced Persons by the County government. This gives the County a considerable experience in cash transfer programming.

The recent penetration of the private sector Commercial banks such as the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB),

¹⁶ Wajir County Integrated Development Plan, 2013

¹⁷ Wajir County Drought Contingency Plan, 2014

¹⁸ Kenya County Factsheet, Commission on Revenue Allocation, 2013

Equity Bank, First Community Bank, and the National Amana Bank, has offered public-private partnership opportunities in the delivery of cash transfer programmes. The HSNP has partnered with the Equity Bank while the ministry of labour, social security and services delivers its cash transfers through the Kenya Commercial Bank. The widespread coverage of the mobile communications, especially Safaricom has also offered Non-state actors an opportunity to use the M-Pesa facility for cash transfers during emergencies.

Despite the opportunities offered by the private sector, capacity building efforts of staff on cash transfer programming in Wajir County has been lacking, with all respondents acknowledging the recent efforts by CaLP through the Kenya Red Cross, as the first capacity building on cash transfer programming to have brought all stakeholders together.

3. CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

Wajir County has undertaken 2 contingency planning processes which are the 2014 Drought contingency plan which was revised in May 2015 and the 2015 El-Nino contingency plan in October 2015. The contingency planning process is a function of the County Steering Group, which constitutes all stakeholders in the County and meets on a regular and sometimes adhoc basis. The County steering group has a number of technical working groups, but cash transfer technical working group is not amongst them.

Following the cash transfer programming capacity building efforts delivered by Kenya Red Cross, Wajir County office on behalf of CaLP, the participants drawn from a number of national and county government ministries and departments agreed to form a Cash transfer technical working group under the County steering group. At the time of data collection, the technical working group was yet to be formed.

Cash transfer programming in the past has been considered through the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), the orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) and the Older Persons (OPCT) cash transfers implemented by the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) and the national government's devolved function of ministry of labour, social security and services respectively. These are the only social protection cash transfers in the County. During emergencies, organizations including Oxfam, Save the Children and Mercy Corps have undertaken emergency cash transfers to.

All respondents cited the lack of a County wide beneficiary's register, besides the HSNP, to be a key challenge towards addressing problems of targeting households in more than one cash transfers. The cash transfer technical working groups, amongst coordination challenges is also expected to address this challenge through establishment of a County wide cash transfer beneficiaries data base.

All respondents noted the importance of having cash transfer being more elaborate and specific in future County contingency plans than the current situation which gives a reference only to HSNP and the social services led OVC and OPCT cash transfer programmes.

4. PREPAREDNESS AND CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

The Wajir County government relies mainly on HSNP and the ministry of labour, social security and services led cash transfer programmes in the delivery of the County cash transfer programming. This is in addition to the emergency cash transfer programmes by the non-state actors in the County.

Unlike other HSNP covered Counties in the Norther Parts of the Country, Wajir County government has lagged behind in making efforts to supplement the current social safety net cash transfer programmes. The availability of commercial banks as well as mobile phone money transfer platforms such as M-Pesa offers an excellent platform for cash transfer delivery.

All respondents interviewed allude to the sometimes haphazard targeting of beneficiaries for cash transfer programmes due to the lack of a strong cash transfer programming coordination body in the County. The

County department of disaster management is in the process of drafting a bill to address coordination of all development and humanitarian operations including cash transfer programming.

Following the capacity building efforts by CaLP through the Kenya Red Cross Wajir County office, all trained stakeholders agreed on the need to set up a cash transfer technical working group to handle all coordination challenges within the cash transfer programme sector within the County Steering Group.

5. KEY EMERGING ISSUES

1. Cash transfer programming coordination: the cash transfer programming stakeholders have agreed to form the much needed cash transfer technical working group as part of the County Steering Group sub Committees.
2. Capacity building on cash transfer programming: All participating stakeholders interviewed alluded to the importance of the capacity building efforts by CaLP. A case in point is the department of social services which had all her 5 field staff leading the older persons cash transfer programming trained for the first time on cash transfer programming. Follow up trainings in future will help hone further the skills and knowledge acquired on cash transfer programming.
3. Time: A few stakeholders felt that a longer duration of mobilization was necessary so as to have the relevant staff from the County government and non-state actors participate in the training.
4. Presence on the ground: CaLP's presence in Wajir was mentioned by some stakeholders. This is in light of the Kenya Red Cross, Wajir County office being not involved directly with cash transfer programming. The presence of CaLP for a longer period would have helped sustain the momentum created towards improving the cash transfer programming in the County.
5. Stakeholder follow-up: All stakeholders interviewed suggested on the need to have a regular follow up which will encourage fulfillment of the work plans developed during the training as well as offering opportunities for refinement of the work plans.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. Inclusion of key decision makers during cash transfer capacity building efforts to actualize cash transfer programming, especially from the County government ministries and departments.
- b. A longer training period for the cash transfer programming. Most first time trainees on cash transfer programming felt the duration for the training was not adequate to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills on cash transfer programming. CaLP and Kenya Red Cross also need to engage more with the participating stakeholders in terms of setting criteria on who can participate in the capacity building effort so as to have the right persons attending from each ministry or department.
- c. For participants who didn't participate in the training but would like to, the main challenge identified was the short notice given for the training which locked out some participants who were out of the County.
- d. CaLP and Kenya Red Cross in close collaboration with the County department of disaster management to support the development of the cash transfer technical working group which is one of the key action points. This will include guiding the cash transfer programming coordination body in its early stages.
- e. Tackling cash transfer programming accountability concerns especially regarding beneficiary identification and selection processes. This can be improved through developing a centralized and accessible beneficiary register data base.

Case Study to Document the Actions Being Taken to Build the Knowledge, Attitude, Practices and Capacity of the County Governments/State Actors in Cash Transfer Programming in the ASALs of Kenya

Mandera County Case Study

November 2015



Photo Credit: Nicole Johnston/ Oxfam

Caption: Refugees and members of the host community dig trenches to lay pipes as part of Oxfam's "cash for work" programme, Ifo Extension in Dadaab refugee camp

I. INTRODUCTION

Mandera County is located in North Eastern Kenya and borders Ethiopia to the North, Somalia to the East and Wajir to the South. The county is arid and expansive and covers an approximate area of 25,991.5 sq km¹⁹. Mandera, like most of Northern Kenya has a sparsely scattered population, with the density of 40 people per km². It is hot with temperatures at a mean annual average of 28.30°C, but can reach a high of 37°C. Rainfall is scanty and unpredictable averaging 255mm.

The proportion of urban population is 18.1% more compared to the rest of the livelihood zones. The County administratively is subdivided into six Sub Counties namely Mandera West, Mandera South, Banisa, Mandera North, Mandera East and Lafey and further to 30 administrative wards. The poverty index in Mandera is estimated at over 87%²⁰ making it the second poorest County after Turkana.

The county has three main livelihoods Pastoral (covering Mandera east and central districts), Agro Pastoral (western parts) and the irrigated cropping zone found along river Dawa, boreholes and pans. Livestock rearing is the dominant production system in Mandera County with over half the population dependent on livestock. That said however, the majority of the population are marginalized and do not own any livestock and depend on the sale of bush products (firewood, charcoal, building materials, weaving materials, gum) for most of their income. An increasing number of households in Mandera are undergoing a transition from pastoralism which has seen increased sedentarization of the population in small emerging permanent settlements. This has led to an increased need for social protection for the destitute population that is described as being pastoral drop outs.

The County has had a history of social protection, particularly cash transfer programming through both government and non-governmental organizations. The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) funded by DfID and implemented by a consortium of NGOs including Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE, HelpAge and CARE, with Save the Children implementing in Mandera County through local NGOs. The national government's department of social services has also had a long term cash transfer programme through the Older Persons Cash transfer, Orphans and Vulnerable Children, and the People living with severe disabilities cash transfers has been ongoing for a few years. NGOs have also undertaken Cash transfer programming including Save the Children, ACTED, COCOP and Norwegian Refugee Council in the past emergencies response projects, mainly involving displaced households as a result of conflict in Mandera North and households facing the effects of recurrent droughts across the County.

The ASAL project on "Improving Coordination and Preparedness to Implement and Scale Up Cash Transfer Programming Responses in Kenya" by CaLP sought to build on this experience to enhance capacity for CTP amongst state actors and improve coordination mechanisms for CTP in the county. As part of the project, a capacity assessment was undertaken based on the CaLP CTP competency framework. The outcome of this assessment was used to tailor existing training materials to the needs and gaps identified. The result was a modular training package that looked into an introduction to CTP (covering assessment, analysis and design), coordination (why coordinate cash, challenges and consequences, and implementing cash coordination) and contingency planning (which looked into the key processes for contingency planning and the inclusion of cash).

A five days training was conducted in Mandera town in early November led by the Kenya Red Cross Mandera County office based on the developed materials. The first 3 days of the training focused on CTP and Cash coordination and the last 2 days focused on contingency planning. The training had participants drawn from different departments of the county government; the national government's departments of social services and children services, NDMA as well as Kenya Red Cross Society and non state actors operating in the County.

¹⁹ Republic of Kenya, (2011), Vision 2030 Development Strategy for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands: Nairobi: Government of Kenya.

²⁰ 2013 Commission for revenue allocation, County factsheet

This visit to document progress was made two weeks after the training. Based on the timing, it was too early to see tangible progress made in CTP and coordination that are directly attributable to the training. This case study therefore outlines progress made in CTP in the county from the time of the initial CaLP assessment to date.

2. CAPACITY ON CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

Cash transfer programming in Mandera County is mainly through the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) undertaken by the NDMA; the OVC, Older Persons Cash Transfer and the People Living with Severe Disabilities implemented by the National Government's department of social services. These have been beefed up during emergencies by NGOs cash transfers most recently involving the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and ACTED in Mandera North conflict affected population.

Unlike other ASAL Counties under the HSNP, the Mandera County government has not made efforts to expand its cash transfer programming separately but focusses more on scaling up the HSNP during emergencies and working very closely with the NGOs in the County to undertake cash transfer programming during emergencies, with the most recent being targeting internally displaced populations in Mandera North sub Counties, specifically the Rhamu IDP Camps.

Financial service providers based in Mandera include the Kenya Commercial Bank which has been distributing cash transfer for the national government's department of social services for older persons cash transfer, the orphans and vulnerable children and people living with severe disabilities; while Equity bank which has a branch in Mandera town and a sub branch in Elwak town of Mandera South sub County, has been the implementing partner in HSNP. National Amaana bank also offers financial services in the County. There are also the money transfer companies that have in the past been used by NGOs during emergency response but their operations have recently been reduced by CBK in effort to curb on money laundering and funding for terror related organizations which are said to use such systems in moving money across borders.

Most of the respondents agree that the County government should have made more efforts in expanding the cash transfer programming, considering the high rates of poverty, with Mandera considered the second poorest County in the Kenya.

The cash transfer programming capacity is mainly from the experience of HSNP, Social services department and a few of the international and local NGOs which have undertaken past cash transfers in the areas. The large network of M-Pesa and Equity bank agents are considered to offer a huge delivery mechanism potential if pursued.

With this in mind, the CaLP team together with the Kenya Red Cross Mandera County office undertook capacity building efforts on cash transfer programming. Most of the targeted County government employees outside NDMA and the social services departments, noted that they had very limited knowledge on cash transfer programming and agree to the need to involve the County government in future cash transfer programming expansion in the County.

The NGO, NDMA and social services departments' participants brought on most of the experience on cash transfer programming and agreed to increase the functionality of the Mandera social protection technical working group to lead on matters of cash transfer programming in the County.

3. CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

Mandera County has undertaken 2 contingency planning processes which are the 2014 Drought contingency plan and the 2015 El-Nino contingency plan. Contingency planning in Mandera is a function of the County Steering Group (CSG).

The 2014 Mandera County contingency planning process involved sector working groups developing a working draft document, collection of existing Participatory Disaster Risk Analysis from the community contingency plans from six sub counties, initial CSG sensitization, preparation of six individual Sub-County Contingency Plans, consolidation of the six Sub-County Contingency Plans into a draft County Contingency Plan, validation of the draft County Contingency Plan by the six Sub-Counties and approval of the final draft by the Mandera CSG.

The Mandera County Contingency Plan has social protection which includes cash transfer programming as one of the six sectors identified in the plan. Mandera Cash transfer programmes in 2015 include the HSNP which targets over 22,000 households as well as the orphaned and vulnerable children, older persons cash transfers and the people living with severe disabilities cash transfers. The Norwegian Refugee Council and ACTED also had cash transfers targeting displaced populations in Mandera North, mostly within the IDP camps around Rhamu town.

Both the drought and El Nino contingency plans indicate the need to scale up the HSNP cash transfer programme to reach out to an additional 18,000 households in the County to bring the total target beneficiary number to 40,000. The County government has put more emphasis on general food distribution and support to the health and nutrition, agriculture and water sectors.

Having a strong and functional CSG, the contingency planning process is more elaborate compared to most Counties with the presence felt at sub County level where the planning starts. The National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) plays a critical role in the contingency planning coordination, which most respondents indicate might be the reason the County government has put its backing on the HSNP to cater for all the cash transfer programming needs in the County in the wake of emergencies as well as to cater for social protection needs.

4. PREPAREDNESS AND CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMING

Mandera County, through the HSNP and social department cash transfer programmes has an elaborate infrastructure for cash transfer programming set up relying on the developing private sector made mostly of the Equity and Kenya Commercial Bank. NGOs have also used the wide coverage of M-Pesa as a delivery mechanism for the cash transfer programming.

There are no recent County wide market assessments undertaken in the County, with the assessments mostly limited to a few sub Counties or wards. Based on the studies and respondents views, the markets in Mandera are seen to be developing further, especially after the recent (2014) road infrastructure improvements by the County government through all the 6 sub Counties. This provides an avenue for the local communities to meet their food needs through the local markets which have a close linkage to Somalia and Ethiopia as well as Nairobi.

Lack of the County government to undertake cash transfer programming to supplement the HSNP and the social department is considered as a key challenge facing the social protection sector in Mandera County. This is more so, considering the efforts made by other ASAL Counties with the HSNP towards expanding the social protection sector through additional cash transfer programming by the County government.

5. KEY EMERGING ISSUES

1. Capacity building- all the respondents interviewed noted on the importance of the cash transfer programming capacity building efforts which are indicated to have provided the necessary push for the social protection technical working group, especially with regards to coordination efforts on cash transfer programming.
2. Timing of the training- in as much as most of the targeted participants took part in the training, the participants noted on the short notice period for the training, which could have helped in refining the training curriculum to focus more on the needed areas for capacity building on cash transfer programming .
3. Follow up efforts – All respondents feel the need to have a follow up exercise undertaken preferably every quarter or semi-annually to support implementation of the action points developed from the training. Considering the data collection exercise took place a short period after the training, participants felt it was not adequate to capture progress made since the training was completed.
4. Coordination- the Mandera County cash transfer programming coordination is mainly lead by the HSNP team under NDMA in the County in collaboration with the social services department. Future capacity building efforts will be felt to have a better impact if undertaken through the social protection technical working.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. Inclusion of key decision makers during cash transfer capacity building efforts to actualize cash transfer programming efforts in the County would have been achieved if there was specific follow up by the trainers to the relevant departments to help determine who they expected to participate in the training.
- b. The need to involve the social protection technical working, especially HSNP and social services department to lead in the training. This is in recognition that the 2 are the main cash transfer programmes in the County and felt they could offer the most experience and capacity in future capacity building efforts.
- c. Supporting the improvement efforts of the Mandera County social protection technical working group towards improvement of the cash transfer programming coordination. This could be achieved by follow up to be undertaken with the social protection technical working group.
- d. Purposefully engaging the County government executive on the importance of supplementing the existing cash transfer programming. This could be achieved by having lengthy discussions with the County as well as facilitating exchange visits to other Counties that have made headway in this regard but with a similar context to Mandera County.

ANNEX 2: STUDY TOOLS

Key Informant Interview Guide for State Actors

Overview

1. Describe the role of the department (specific inclination to emergency) and interaction with the project (CaLP project team) to date.
2. What is the county's or department's position on cash transfer programming in both emergency and non-emergency situations? Is this articulated in any policy document? If not, are there any plans to have a policy in place?
3. Is the department/ministry involved in cash transfer programming? If yes, what is the current scale? How many staff have the skills and knowledge to implement a cash transfer project? Is this through experience or training?

Preparedness and Contingency Planning

4. Establish existence of a preparedness and contingency plan for the county/department and involvement in the processes.
5. If involved, describe how the process worked in the past?
6. How does the process work currently? What has contributed to this change?
7. Does the contingency plan include cash as a response mechanism in the event of an emergency? What was the rationale for this?

Technical Capacity

8. Is there capacity to respond with cash in an emergency and at what scale? How has the CaLP project contributed in setting up these systems (if capacity exists)? How can this be improved?
9. This being an emergency prone county how has preparedness for emergency cash transfers been addressed (i.e. market surveys, identification of service providers, targeting, which departments to lead the process)? What are the key processes in place for the implementation of cash transfers?
10. What has been the CaLP's contribution to these processes?
11. How has this capacity been tested recently and how long did it take to have the benefits delivered to the beneficiaries? What were the challenges? What currently exists that can be built upon to make scale-up easier?
12. What have been the key learnings around this?

Where are the challenges and opportunities for future improvements?

Coordination

13. How is the coordination among CTP stakeholders currently done?
14. Does the department/county/organization have existing partnerships for delivery of CTP including with the private sector? How effective have these partnerships been?
15. What are the specific actions taken to improve coordination in the county? What has been CaLP's contribution to these actions?
16. How effective have these actions been in addressing challenges faced in CTP in the county?
17. How have elements related to accountability, inclusion, protection and gender mainstreaming in CTP been addressed through coordination? Where are the challenges in addressing these? Has there been any improvement in the understanding of these elements?
18. What are the challenges and where are the opportunities for improving coordination?
19. How different has the current engagement with the CaLP project been from past engagements with other Non-State Actors involved in CT programmes?

Focus Group Discussion Guide for County Stakeholders

Preparedness and Contingency Planning

1. Identify the processes for preparedness and contingency planning in the county (who leads the process; how are consultations done)
2. What are the key delivery mechanisms for the contingency plan? Has it been activated in the past?
3. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that response is in the shortest time possible?
4. How often is the contingency plan reviewed?

Technical Capacity

5. Which are the main CT programmes in the county? Who are the implementers? What is the current scale of the CTP in the county?
6. What capacities exist within the county to undertake this? How is the county government involved in the implementation?

7. Have there been any efforts to build capacity for CTP in the county? What impact have these efforts had if any on delivery of CTP so far? How will these improve future CT programming?
8. What have been the challenges in building capacity? Where are the opportunities for further capacity development?
10. What are the challenges? How has CaLP contributed in addressing these challenges? What are the key lessons from this?
11. Where are the opportunities for improving CT coordination efforts?
12. What can be borrowed from this county as a best practice in CT coordination?

Coordination

9. How does coordination for CTP currently happen? Has this changed from how coordination happened in the past?

	Pre-intervention situation*	Current situation	Desired Change**	Positive Forces	Negative Forces
Technical Capacity					
Preparedness					
Contingency Planning					
Coordination					
	GAP Analysis***				
Technical Capacity					
Preparedness					
Contingency Planning					
Coordination					

*to be drawn from the assessments already done by CaLP

**to be drawn from the project objectives/expected results

***recommendation on what still needs to be done to address the negative forces

Guide for Interview with Project Team in Nairobi

1. Discuss objectives of the CaLP capacity building project including main components of the projects; key activities implemented to date; who are the main partners and/or target group?

2. Discuss project achievements to date including key strengths, opportunities and challenges of the project.
3. How have issues related to accountability, protection, gender mainstreaming and inclusion been addressed through the project?
4. What have been the lessons learned on engagement with state actors through this project? What could have been done differently in the implementation of the project or should be done differently in the future?
5. What are the most significant outcomes of the project and how is this likely to impact on CTP and state actor engagement in the future?

ANNEX 3: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

NAMES AND POSITIONS OF KII		
NAME	POSITION	DEPARTMENT
Julius Taigong	County Drought Coordinator	NDMA
Emanuel Kisangau	County Response Officer	NDMA
	HSNP Manager	NDMA
Wellington Sune	Resilience intern	NDMA
Moses Nawooton	Deputy Director	Department of Public Service
Philip Natapan	Project Officer	Department of Public Service
Vitalis Juma	Agriculture Officer	Department of Agriculture
Eric Oyoo	Assistant Programme Manager	Save the Children
Gabriel Ekuwam	Deputy Area Coordinator	Oxfam
Mary	Logistician	Kenya Red Cross
Abdisalam Ahmed	County Manager	Kenya Red Cross Society
Rashid	Area Coordinator	ACTED
Ali Kheir	Director Disaster Management	Department of Decentralised Administration and Disaster management
Mohamed Adan	County Response Officer	NDMA
Aiman	Head of field office	Norwegian Refugee Council
Issack Ibrahim	HSNP	Equity bank
Yaqub Mohamed		Department of Education
Mohamed	Trade Officer	Department of Trade
Hassan Abdulla	Ag APM	Save the Children
Ahmed Omar	County Manager	Kenya Red Cross Society
Rukia Ali Hassan	County Coordinator	Social Security and Services
Abdinur Sheikh Mohamed	County Coordinator	Children's Department
Abdirahman Mohamed Alas	Social Services Officer	Social Security and Services
Osman Abdullahi Bulle	Children's Officer	Children's Department
Tari Guyo	Programme Officer	PISP
Matthew Lontome	Speaker	County Assembly
Umuro Godana	County Secretary	County Government
Henry Halkano	County Response Officer	NDMA
Mohamed Jillo	Children's Officer	Children's Department
Golicha Sora	County Executive	Department of Trade
Ambrose Lereo	Agriculture Officer	Department of Agriculture
Charles Jow	Ag County Manager	Kenya Red Cross Society
Abdullahi Sheikh	Chief Officer	Department of Social Services
Arbe Umuro	Clerk	County Assembly
Habiba Adan	Social Services Officer	Department of Social Services
Jonah Samana	Coordinator	Hunger Safety Net Programme
Gregory Urayayi	Coordinator	CaLP
Charity Lukaya	Capacity Building Officer	CaLP
Michael Ochieng	Capacity Building Officer	CaLP



The Cash Learning Partnership

CaLP commissioned a study to document the impact and lessons learned from its engagement with state actors in the ASAL counties. The study involved collection of data through secondary and primary sources. Given the focus of the project, a qualitative approach was deemed as most appropriate in capturing the changes in attitudes and practice in such a short period of time. Specifically, the assignment sought to:

- Document lessons learned working with government on preparedness, contingency planning and coordination in relation to scalable CTP.
- Identify strengths, weaknesses, challenges and lessons learned in the current context, including consideration of aspects related to gender equality, protection mainstreaming, and inclusion of persons with disabilities and older people.
- Document what has been done in terms of the CaLP and CoP's activities to build capacity of state actors, its effectiveness, and lessons learned and a detailed account of measures taken to improve coordination and preparedness of key stakeholders to implement and scale up cash transfer programming responses in Kenya.
- Document how this has impacted on the CTP capacities and preparedness of state actors and other stakeholders through capacity building, active knowledge transfer, development of good practice, and incorporation of CTP into relevant plans, policies and procedures.
- Document the processes and learning undertaken by CaLP as a result of working with government on CTP coordination and preparedness and scalable social protection in the Kenya context, and
- Provide recommendations to take learning forward.

