


EXTERNAL EVALUATION REPORT

DFID/NOVIB FUNDED NGO CONSORTIUM RESPONSE TO DROUGHT IN TOGDHEER, SOOL, BARI/ NUGAAL REGIONS

JULY 2005

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|---|
| CR | Cash Relief |
| CFW | Cash for Work |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| FSAU | Food Security Analysis Unit. |
| IDP | Internally displaced persons |
| IPs | Implementing Partners |
| GB | Great Britain |
| Havoyoco | Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth committee |
| HHs | Households |
| HR | Horn Relief |
| LNGOs | Local Non-Governmental Organizations |
| HU | Horn Umbrella |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NPA | Norwegian Peoples' Aid |
| SWOT | Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats. |
| SVO | Steadfast Voluntary Organization |
| Shilcon | Shillaale Rehabilitation & Ecological Concern |
| VRC | Village Relief Committees |

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Acacia Consultants Ltd.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background: Below is a summary of the June 2005 evaluation of the NGO Consortium response to drought in Togdheer, Sool, Sanaag and Bari/ Nugaal in Somaliland. The consortium response to drought was meant to provide cash to targeted drought affected households to help them meet their basic needs. Important among the needs were food, debt repayments to revitalize the overburdened community credit and other social support systems, purchase of water and rehabilitation of the chronically degraded environment that was key to livestock production under pastoralism. The consortium members were Oxfam-GB, Horn Relief and Norwegian People's Aid. The intervention took six months - January to June 2005, and was implemented by the consortium partners, either directly or through local Non-Governmental Organizations.

The objectives of the evaluation were:

- To develop the evaluation methodology including the criteria for selection of micro-projects to be visited.
- To conduct a comparative analysis of the project implementation process/approaches and present findings on the relevance and the importance of the Consortium approach to emergency interventions.
- To establish the impact of the intervention while taking into consideration the geographical coverage, number of beneficiaries, targeting & selection of beneficiaries, amount of money distributed, periodicity of distribution, gender balance, coordination mechanisms, monitoring and the prevailing socio-economic realities in the project area.

Methodology: Considered in the selection of the evaluation methods and tools was the need to collect representative data from sampled populations in a cost effective way. Equal coverage of every region and every partner was also considered to reduce intra partner bias. The evaluation team visited two sites per partner per region. The choice of the actual site to be visited depended on the multiplicity of activities and sub-activities that existed on the site, access and the possibility of in-depth and exhaustive discussion of relevant issues with the communities. Other considerations taken into account included the number of beneficiaries per site and the gender representation.

At the chosen sites, primary data was collected from focus groups discussions and from key informants. Consortium staff members, the local implementing agency, the Village Relief Committees, men and women beneficiaries were interviewed. A combination of SWOT analysis, Focus Group Discussions, field visits, interviews and casual observations were used to pick out the relevant information. During interviews, men and women were separated in order to pick out gender de-segregated data. The evaluation team had one female interviewee to interview women in focus groups. Data collected from the field was crosschecked to minimize circumstantial bias. Log-frames were used as the basic foundation against which the primary data was gathered.

In addition to the primary data, the evaluation team also relied on secondary data. Secondary data was restricted to progress reports, proposals, baseline survey reports, evaluation reports and workshop materials on cash relief and cash for work.

Evaluation constraints: Given the huge number of actors and the expansive area covered by the project, the evaluation team faced several constraints. Among the most important is the limited timeframe for the initial team planning, inadequate time for in-depth interviews with consortium field

staff (including those of the implementing organizations), the vastness of the project area, unclear indicators and language barrier experienced in a few places.

Findings: The following impacts were noted:

- i. The effect of drought on 8,062 drought-affected households in Togdheer, Bari/Nugal, Sanaag and Sool regions was reduced over the implementation period. Assuming an average of 6 persons per household, 48,372 persons benefited directly from the cash for work and cash relief interventions. The beneficiaries were able to meet basic needs such as food, repayment of debts, purchase of water, clothing, education and medicine. In Togdheer, small sized households of 3-5 members were able to do limited re-stocking. Elsewhere, families with limited stock (less than 40) were cushioned from disposing off their livestock through cash distributions. Ultimately, after the long rains, these families will remain in the pastoral livelihood system when their herds increase.
- ii. The environmental micro-projects covered extensive areas and were focused and result oriented. Sheet erosion control and reduction in gully expansion were evident at sites that were visited. Diversion of runoffs to the rangeland increased the vegetation cover at most of the intervention sites, thus contributing to pasture availability. Similar experiences were witnessed in Xingalool, Sanaag, the Horn Relief area in Sool plateau where water was diverted from 90 sinkholes to the rangelands.
- iii. To a great extent, the evaluation team had clear evidence that the community owned the micro-projects wholly. In all places that were visited, community participation and support in form of labour was far beyond the immediate cash benefits. Partly, this resulted from the fact that the identified micro-projects addressed the relevant community needs and priorities. In addition, the community was involved and participated in the preparatory stages of the project (community mobilization, election of VRCs, discussion and development of the selection criteria, beneficiary selection and vetting). At SVO sites and many other areas, communities provided free labour, side by side with the beneficiaries of the cash for work and cash relief. The project accomplishment in micro-projects implementation was therefore remarkable.
- iv. Community social structures (e.g. VRCs), formed or strengthened during the project implementation were instrumental in settling disputes, promoting proper beneficiary targeting, transparency, accountability, ownership and proper supervision of the project. In all the areas visited, proper targeting was done as evidenced by lack of complains on either targeting or payments to the beneficiaries. Given the absence of central authority in areas covered by Horn Relief and NPA, VRCs are now acting as the basic structures for local community governance.
- v. The injection of money in the local economy expanded the demand for goods and services as witnessed by focus group discussions and traders. During the first two months, beneficiaries invested significant amount of their income in debt repayments and food. Debt payments revived the credit systems and reduced the burden on business community as well as other social support systems. However, this was less so in Sool and western Sanaag areas where cash distributions were two months only.
- vi. No inflation was recorded in all the areas visited. Partly, this could be explained by the small amounts of cash that was distributed per month, sensitization of the business community by religious leaders not to hike prices and the fact that the business community had already stocked goods in anticipation for cash injections. Money exchange rates remained stable.
- vii. In terms of capacity enhancement, implementing organizations gained valuable experience

through lessons learnt in targeting beneficiaries, vetting, micro-project management and emergency intervention in general. However, across the board, micro projects could have benefited from better technical inputs. In a few cases, the intervention could actually lead to creation of secondary environmental problems. Such examples include water diversions that could lead to development of secondary gullies at intervention points.

- viii. At community level, exposure gained from the implementation of the environmental micro-projects was an eye opener to the link between the environment and sustainable livelihoods. Consequently, in some areas like Togdheer, communities have already started conservation efforts on their own. In Sanaag region, specifically Awsane and Mindigale, communities have continued conservation efforts by themselves even after the close of the project interventions. The foremen are now seen as key community resource persons for supervision of independent community initiatives in environmental conservation. VRCs have also gained valuable experience and could act as the entry points for emergency interventions in the respective communities.
- ix. Gender balance and equitable access to resources was ensured through deliberate encouragement of women participation, access and control of project benefits. Women were incorporated in VRCs where they actively participated in project management, supervision and dispute settlements. There were some cases where women were given lighter tasks in recognition of the household workload. Some VRCs earmarked certain types of micro-projects for implementation by women only. Examples include sanitation campaigns in villages. These were micro-projects that required low physical labor input such as sanitation. Women involvement in decision-making contributed to these approaches.

Challenges faced: The Consortium members faced the following challenges:

- i. Current FSAU findings in the north still show continuation of humanitarian crisis arising from cumulative asset loss in the last three years when 60% of shoats and 80% of camels died. Access to milk is still low given that kidding takes time especially for camels. In addition, many pastoralists who lost most of their animals depend on social support systems and have little chance of returning to pastoralism.
- ii. The project duration was too short for effective community mobilization and smooth implementation of micro-projects. Community mobilization, training, feasibility studies for micro-projects, registration and vetting required more time. In addition, time was needed for site selection given the need to trade off between environmental protection priorities against community vulnerability to drought at various sites.
- iii. The cash for work and cash relief interventions could not accommodate all the poor and deserving households. The problem being addressed was far too severe as compared to the available resources, both financial and material. In addition, although the cash relief beneficiaries were sustained over the emergency period, their livelihoods remain as precarious as before.
- iv. During the implementation process, the vastness of the area reduced the contact time between the technical staff and the community, making closer supervision a challenge. This challenge was experienced by all the consortium members but was more pronounced in NPA areas.
- v. VRC members contributed a lot of time and effort to community work in expense of their own. On one hand, compensating them raises a moral issue since they may not be the most vulnerable in the community. On the other hand, their input is too much and motivation is a necessity.

- vi. The cash for work activities had strict work norms and schedules. This differed sharply with the nomadic lifestyle to which the nomadic communities are accustomed. At the beginning, it was difficult for beneficiaries to adhere to work norms and schedules.
- vii. In areas with a high concentration of destitute IDPs, VRCs were not well placed to know the details of each and every member. This made the selection and registration of such beneficiaries particularly difficult. This was the case in Gardo IDP camp within Oxfam area.
- viii. In NPA and Horn Relief project areas, payments to beneficiaries were made in two installments every month. This was particularly challenging given the many sites, the vastness of the area and the logistics that were required.
- ix. Generally, field officers and foremen lacked adequate technical skills in the implementation of the micro-projects. They had difficulties in translating technical designs into concrete action on the ground.
- x. The contact between the various consortium partners at field level was minimal, despite the earlier commitment to work and share information regularly.

Recommendations: The evaluation arrived at the following key recommendations:

- i) The evaluation team recommends retention of the consortium approach for three reasons; Joint response to humanitarian crisis and maintenance of standards, resource mobilization and promotion of interagency learning. The evaluation team further recommends that Coordination mechanisms, roles, responsibilities and delegation of responsibilities among the consortium members be spelt out in form of an agreement/ MOU. There is need for shared vision/goals for the consortium partners.
- ii) The link between the emergency response and the long-term development should be strengthened. The short-term emergency intervention ought to be complimented by long-term recovery programs to rebuild destroyed livelihoods. Strengthening the link between micro-projects and livelihoods should form the basic objective of cash for work activities. A good example is the linking of water diversion during sheet erosion/gully control with re-seeding of rangelands where the water has been spread. For example, other actors in Southern Somalia have shown that re-seeding suitable rangelands with Sudan/Columbus grass can improve milk yields and livestock body scores. The resultant fodder can be sold to pastoralists or could be stored for use as a drought coping tool for the few milking animals left behind after migration of the larger herds.
- iii) The consortium members ought to come up with a plan for local institutional capacity building to make the local partners more effective in future interventions. To be considered are the implementing partners, VRCs and community resource persons in environmental rehabilitation, conservation and implementation of micro-projects. Training materials, technical manuals and exposure visits need to be incorporated as part of the technical support from Consortium members to the local partners.
- iv) It is recommended that the consortium members provide non-monetary incentives to VRCs. Material benefits or recognition/awards could be considered. The incentives could be provided at certain intervals in the life of the project or at the end.
- v) To release staff time for proper project supervision and monitoring, payments to beneficiaries should preferably be once in a month. The money transfer schedules should also be

unpredictable for security reasons. In addition, it is recommended that money transfer companies be used to transport money to the sites instead of shifting the task to implementing partners, as was the case with SVO/ NPA area.

- vi) Balancing clan dynamics and security considerations are critical factors to be considered when selecting project beneficiaries and intervention sites in Somalia. However, focusing on the most vulnerable households and needy minorities should be the driving force in future project interventions.
- vii) Planning and design of micro-projects should take into account gender concerns in order to promote women's participation and empowerment. At Yaka in Bari, women specifically requested for projects that could allow them to participate fully without jeopardizing their daily household chores. Of particular concern was the location of the micro-projects in relation to their homes. At both the community and local partners' levels, women should be encouraged to take up key responsibilities, including field activities.
- viii) Given the enormous threat to livelihoods posed by environmental degradation, environmental rehabilitation and conservation should be taken as a priority in every development initiative in the project area while giving room for other community priorities and needs. Environmental rehabilitation and conservation should also be integrated in the long-term community development strategies.
- ix) The time allocated to the preparatory phase of the emergency project ought to be sufficient to facilitate proper community mobilization, identification of beneficiaries, registration, training, selection of micro-projects and technical planning of specific micro-projects. However, the time allocated to these activities should be rationalized against the need for timely intervention.
- x) The consortium partners should put in place mechanisms for increasing cross-program learning through joint program reviews, exchange visits and joint workshops.
- xi) The continued use of *Hawala* (money transfer companies) for cash distribution is recommended. It has largely reduced anticipated risks in cash transfer to communities. Such companies have increased the speed of cash distribution to communities as they use their trained staff to deliver the cash to individual beneficiaries with the support of Village Relief Committees and implementing partner's staff. The companies also offer an opportunity for humanitarian agencies to increase their capacity for intervention when operating in complex contexts like Somaliland/Somalia where insecurity could undermine timely humanitarian response.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the evaluation team found adequate evidence that suggested that the consortium response to drought stopped the humanitarian crisis from worsening. Drought affected beneficiaries were properly targeted and were able to access basic needs such as food, water and debt repayment, among others. In addition, the local economy was revitalized through cash injections. However, the evaluation also concurs with the FSAU findings that long-term recovery of pastoral livelihoods is subject to long-term environmental rehabilitation efforts, not just good seasonal rains.

1.0: INTRODUCTION

1.1: General background

The Consortium Response to Drought in Togdheer, Sool, Sanaag and Bari/Nugal regions in Somaliland and Puntland was implemented by three consortium partners; Oxfam-GB, Horn Relief and Norwegian Peoples' Aid (NPA). Four local Non-Governmental Organizations (Havoyoco, Shilcon, SVO and Horn Umbrella) were the local implementing partners. Both Havoyoco and Shilcon were Oxfam partners while SVO and Horn Umbrella were NPA partners. Horn Relief implemented the project directly. Department for International Development (DFID) funded the consortium response for a period of six months, January to June 2005. Oxfam-GB contributed 28.8% of the total program budget in Togdheer and Bari to cover budget gaps. The funds came from Oxfam-GB catastrophic funds. NOVIB provided additional funding to Horn Relief for the project and for an in-depth evaluation of the consortium activities.

The main consortium project activities were cash for work and cash relief interventions aimed at offsetting short-term problems occasioned by a four-year drought. Among other things, the drought resulted in death of livestock leaving 313, 200 people (31% in Sool, 40% in Sanaag, 23% in Bari, 30% in Nugal and 26% in Togdheer) in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. These needs included urgent need for food, water and debt repayments to creditors. Severe and chronic environmental degradation was also identified by FSAU as a key problem responsible for diminishing prospects for sustainable livelihoods in the region.

1.2: Background to the consortium approach:

At the beginning of the project, Oxfam-GB, NPA and Horn Relief agreed to formulate and use common implementation approaches and methodologies. This was done while giving leeway to each partner to operationalize their activities at their project areas. The consortium partners agreed to adhere to the following general principles and guidelines:

- i. The use of vulnerability as the key consideration in targeting beneficiaries.
- ii. Use of community based targeting of micro-projects and vetting of beneficiaries.
- iii. The recognition of environmental rehabilitation & conservation as a key element in livelihood support and sustainability.
- iv. Use of standard documentation forms (delivery form and payments records, agreements, registration, equipment inventory, time sheets, and monitoring forms).
- v. Sharing and maintaining information flow between the consortium partners at all times.
- vi. Commitment to learning from continuous assessments and reviews based on agreed monitoring checklists.
- vii. Consideration of gender and minorities during project implementation.
- viii. Transparency and accountability during project implementation.
- ix. Use of money transfer companies to reduce security risks associated with distribution of funds to beneficiaries.

In addition, the following operational guidelines were agreed upon:

- i. Use of common targeting methodology (common selection criteria, village based or clan based approach).
- ii. Each consortium member to decide the mode of implementation (either directly or through local implementing partner (s)) and to be responsible for the outcomes.
- iii. Each organization to conduct risk analysis at their operational areas and take the most

appropriate action while sharing information with other consortium partners.

As the project implementation progressed, differences in approaches became evident. To learn from these differences, an evaluation to assess the achievements, impacts and lessons learnt was deemed necessary by the consortium partners. The lessons learnt will form the basis for future planning.

2.0: SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY

2.1.0: The purpose of the evaluation.

The purpose of the evaluation was to capture the impact and the lessons learnt from the project. The following were the objectives of the evaluation:

- i. To conduct a comparative analysis of the implementation process for consortium partners and present findings on the relevance and the value added in using the consortium implementation approach.
- ii. To establish the impact of the project interventions while bearing in mind the geographical coverage, number of beneficiaries, targeting and selection of beneficiaries, amount of money distributed, periodicity of distribution, gender balance, coordination mechanisms, monitoring and the prevailing socio-economic environment.

The evaluation team developed the evaluation methodology and the following were the expected outputs from the evaluation:

- i. Consortium implementation approaches and methodologies for each consortium member and their local implementing partners assessed.
- ii. Relevance, quality and impact of the emergency response to drought in the target regions assessed.
- iii. Community participation in the project from inception to completion assessed.
- iv. Capacity of implementing partners, VRCs and communities assessed in general terms.
- v. Lessons drawn from the project documented to enhance good practices and to inform future planning.

2.2.1: Evaluation methodology

Several factors were considered when coming up with the best approach for the evaluation exercise. Sample populations needed to be representative of the large population in all the regions. In addition, each partner was to be given equal coverage, including the scope of the information collected and the sites visited. Given the vastness of the project area, the data collection exercise was also to be cost effective. The last consideration was the limited time per consortium partner and also the need to have quality time at the selected project sites. Two sites per partner per region fitted within the available time frame. The actual sites that were selected depended on the multiplicity of activities, sub-activities and accessibility of such sites. Other factors that were considered included number of beneficiaries per site and the gender representation at such sites.

2.2.2: Type of data collected and the tools used.

During the evaluation, primary and secondary data was collected. Secondary data was restricted to progress reports, proposals, baseline survey and evaluation reports, papers presented in workshops

and monthly reports on cash relief and cash for work activities from implementing partners. Primary data was collected from focus groups discussions and interviews with key informants. The following were the tools used;

- Analysis of project strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) at each of the partner's level.
- Focus group discussions.
- Field visits.
- Interview with key informants.
- Casual observations.
- Separation of men and women during interviews.
- Crosschecking data to reduce circumstantial bias at each site.
- Use of logframes as the basic foundation for data collection.

At each site, the evaluation team held discussions with the consortium members, the local implementing agency, the Village Relief Committees, men and women beneficiaries.

2.2.3: The evaluation constraints:

Constraints faced during the evaluation are outlined below:

- i. The time allocated for initial team planning before visiting the respective organizations was inadequate.
- ii. Time for in-depth interviews with consortium staff and local partner organizations was overlooked in the original itinerary.
- iii. The project area was too vast, limiting evaluation visits to two per partner per region.
- iv. The logframes were unclear in respect to purpose, outputs, activities and indicators. In some instances the activities were identified as the outcomes. This was a setback.
- v. In some cases, language was a barrier, especially at sites where separation of men and women was necessary and more neutral interpreters were needed.

3.0: MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION

3.1.1: Adherence to the consortium principles and operational guidelines.

The consortium members adhered to the principles and operational guidelines below:

- All consortium partners used vulnerability (wealth ranking) as the basis for beneficiary selection.
- Standard forms were used for documentation purposes.
- Regular sharing of information on project implementation was done at Nairobi level. Little, if any, occurred at the field.
- To a large extent, community based targeting was used.
- Gender balance and minorities were given priority during the implementation process.
- Though diversification was noted in some cases, most micro-projects addressed environmental rehabilitation.
- All the three consortium partners adhered to use of money transfer companies to distribute cash relief and cash for work except that NPA distributed cash for work directly using the local partner SVO.

3.1.2: Comparative analysis of the consortium implementation approaches.

Despite the consortium members agreeing to use a common approach/ methodology, some notable differences occurred during the project implementation:

- i. Horn Relief implemented the project directly while Oxfam-GB implemented through Shilcon in Bari region and Havoyoco in Togdheer region. NPA also implemented through local partners, SVO and Horn Umbrella in Sool and Southwest Sanaag regions.
- ii. There was a variation in terms of budget allocation to each consortium partner. Oxfam-GB had £1,093,029, Horn Relief, £800,029 and NPA, £298,487.53. Horn relief budget was a combination of funds from both NOVIB and DFID.
- iii. Oxfam and Horn Relief facilitated cash distribution in US \$ dollars. Money transfer companies (Dahabshil and Dalsan) were used. NPA on the other hand, used a dual system. Cash for work was distributed directly by SVO in Somali shillings while Dahabshil distributed Cash Relief in US dollars. The distribution of Somali shillings was done at the prevailing exchange rate. The conversion to Somali shillings was a request from the community.
- iv. In cash for work, both Oxfam and Horn Relief paid \$88 per household per month. In Cash Relief, Oxfam paid \$50 and Horn Relief \$60 for a period of 4 months. In NPA areas, Cash Relief and Cash for Work beneficiaries received US\$ 60 per month for only 2 months. This was in line with the budget allocations in their proposal.
- v. The total beneficiaries of Oxfam-GB, Horn Relief and NPA were 3660, 2000 and 2402 households respectively. In NPA areas, the number of laborers per every type of micro-project was predetermined at the proposal level and budget allocated in line with this. This was not so for Horn Relief and Oxfam-GB. Partly, this is explained by the fact that some organizations like Oxfam-GB laid more emphasis on use of labor-intensive techniques with little or no external material inputs such as reinforcements for gully control. Horn Relief combined labor-intensive techniques with use of external material inputs. While the three consortium partners used the same data collection formats, Oxfam-GB had superior monitoring tools for capturing lessons

learnt and the impact of the cash distributed and by the time of the evaluation, Oxfam was analyzing data on Cash Relief and Cash for Work impact assessments while Horn Relief was in the process of conducting a post-distribution impact survey and during writing of this report they are finalizing their survey report for sharing with donors and partners. NPA had weak monitoring systems in place and has not undertaken any surveys to gauge impact of the project.

- vi. Whereas Horn Relief and Oxfam worked at each site for 4 months continuously, NPA used a phased implementation approach. The NPA area was divided into two and activities were conducted for two months at one site before moving to the next site. However, community mobilization and selection was being done at the second site while still implementing at the first site.
- vii. At the point of interventions, vulnerability levels were higher in Sool and Sanaag compared to Togdheer and Bari regions.
- viii. While all the organizations used VRCs to register beneficiaries, slight differences were noted in the vetting process. NPA, Oxfam-GB/Havoyovo used public vetting, Oxfam/Shilcon used the local authority to vet IDPs. Horn Relief used public and in addition, independent vetting informants (elders and money transfer companies) to vet the beneficiaries.

3.2.1: Approaches, achievements, impacts and challenges in Togdheer, Bari/ Nugaal regions.

The Cash Relief and Cash for Work activities were implemented by Oxfam-GB between February 2005 and June 2005 in this region. Oxfam had several advantages. It had good knowledge of the project area (including having local staff with a strong pastoralist background). It also had good rapport and trust with the community and Somaliland Government institutions. In addition, there were community social structures in existence (e.g VRCs) that Oxfam could build on. At all the intervention sites, emphasis was laid on labour intensive interventions with low external inputs.

A) Approach by Oxfam-GB and the local implementing partners.

At the beginning of the implementation, Oxfam-GB, Havoyoco and Shilcon staff attended a pre-project training workshop organized by the consortium members. The training discussed the approaches to be used by the consortium partners in the implementation process. In Togdheer, Oxfam-GB chose to implement the project through a local partner organization, Havoyoco, which got logistical and technical support from Oxfam-GB. Oxfam also participated alongside the Havoyoco during community mobilization. In Bari, Oxfam-GB Bossaso office implemented the project through a local partner, Shilcon. In this area, Oxfam-GB monitored the activities being undertaken by Shilcon, technical support was less visible. Bari area had a large population of displaced communities. Villages to be targeted were identified and two villages were targeted for cash relief only.

In Togdheer and Bari regions, public meetings were held to mobilize the community, explaining to them the purpose of the project and also to request them to elect the Village Relief Committees (VRCs). The local partners, conducted community mobilization, explained the criteria for choosing beneficiaries in the target village (beneficiaries to include women, minority groups, the elderly and poor women headed households), gave directions on the expected composition of the Village Relief Committees (VRC) and the requirement that a third of the committee members should be women.

Once the VRCs were constituted, they were asked to register the beneficiaries using selection criteria. The beneficiaries were later publicly vetted by the villagers in the presence of the implementing

organizations. In Togdheer, the poorest of the poor were targeted in 22 villages. In total, the target population was 1500, divided into two categories, 300 of the poorest (old, disabled and vulnerable women headed households) were assisted through cash relief. One thousand two hundred (1200) poor households with members who could provide manual labour were assisted through cash for work. In Bari region, a total of 2160 people benefited, 1491 benefited from Cash for Work while 669 benefited from Cash Relief (Appendix 5&7). In both regions, Cash for Work projects were identified and prioritized by the community through the established VRCs. Community priorities were ranked and environmental conservation was given the first priority.

Construction of soil bunds, gully reclamation, water diversion and use of contour bunds to check sheet erosion was agreed on as the instruments to be used in the environmental micro-projects. This was then followed by mobilization and training of the community on how to implement each of the prioritized activities. Thereafter, shovels, wheelbarrows, empty sacks, crowbars, axes, mattocks and hammers were distributed to the VRCs to manage on behalf of the community. Micro-projects started at the end of February 2005.

Payments to the beneficiaries were made on monthly basis, once every month. The cash relief beneficiaries got US\$50 per month while the cash for work beneficiaries got US\$88 per month, equivalent to US\$4 per day for 22 days per month. Each day, labourers worked for 7 hours. The money transfer companies, in the presence of VRCs and representatives of the local implementing partners, made payments. Transportation of funds was the responsibility of the money transfer companies. Oxfam-GB made the first payment before the actual implementation started owing to the delay in starting off the cash for work activities. The local partners and Oxfam-GB jointly conducted monitoring of the cash distributions and the effects in the local economy. During monitoring, the extent of accomplishment of every micro-project was recorded (Appendix 8 and 9).

B) Specific findings

1. Achievements of Cash distributions in Togdheer and Bari region

The target communities in Togdheer and Bari regions were mobilized, beneficiaries' registered and publicly vetted. The choice of the beneficiaries was based on set criteria that picked the neediest members of the community. Although the original consortium criteria advocated that pastoralists with 60 shoats or less to be considered poor, the criterion was lowered to 40 shoats¹ in Togdheer. This reduction was strategically done to cut down the potential beneficiaries of cash relief to match available project resources but had nothing to do with the validity of using 60 shoats as the break-even point on pastoralist poverty levels. During selection of beneficiaries, priority was therefore given to those that had nothing or had the lowest number of animals. Special categories and minorities in the population were given first priority. Such people included the disabled and poor women headed households. However, even among these special categories additional considerations were looked into, a good example is preference of women headed household that had no grown up children as opposed to others with such children. The distribution of cash relief was done on monthly basis. The local partners Havoyoco and Shilcon distributed cash for work and cash relief at US\$88 and US\$50 respectively to 1500 and 2160 beneficiaries in Togdheer and Bari region respectively (Appendix 4 & 6).

2. Impact of cash injection in Togdheer and Bari regions.

¹ Although FSAU reports indicate that Togdheer was less vulnerable than the other regions, vulnerability at specific target villages differs from the averages for the entire region. Oxfam [should have](#) attempted to identify these villages as they had high monitoring capacity.

The evaluation process noted the following impacts:

- i. The injected cash stimulated the local economy, revived the credit system and cushioning pastoralists against disposal of the remaining livestock. The interventions also influenced the local livestock market as the pastoralists kept animals off from the market, in the process, livestock prices remained high, improving the terms of trade for pastoralists who were non-beneficiaries of cash distributions.
- ii. The drought affected pastoralists were enabled to meet basic needs such as purchase of foodstuffs, payments of debt as well as paying for health services, water, education and clothing. The expenditure patterns of the beneficiaries indicated that the priorities were in debt repayments, food purchase, water and clothing in that order. However, it is important to note that a few households with 3-5 members were able to re-stock.
- iii. Because of the level of poverty in the community, income from cash relief and cash for work was shared with other vulnerable people who did not benefit. This provided a safety net for the less fortunate and was an important social coping mechanism in the pastoralist setting. However, sharing of such meagre resources dilutes the overall impact of the program on the targeted beneficiaries. This was more pronounced among the displaced populations. In Gardo IDP camp, the number of family members sharing the monthly cash relief income per target household was 8 persons. In addition, each household agreed to share out with at least three more families that were totally destitute-to keep them alive.

3) Challenges faced during cash injections in Togdheer and Bari regions.

Oxfam, Havoyoco and Shilcon in Togdheer and Bari regions faced the following challenges:

- i) Time allocated for ground planning and mobilization of the community for both cash for work and cash relief was inadequate. Ground planning delayed the intervention to end of February 2005.
- ii) The scale of the need on the ground was far more than the resources that were availed particularly in Bari. In most villages, those that qualified for cash relief were far more than the allocations in the budgets. Similarly, the need for environmental rehabilitation and conservation was urgent and enormous. Related to this was the fact that the project area was vast and sparsely populated, making the task even more challenging.
- iii) The concentration of a large number of internally displaced persons (displaced by different shocks such as drought, tsunami, floods and insecurity) made registration of beneficiaries particularly challenging. Gardo camp in Bari region had more than 1600 people. Most are destitute but a few may not be. It was difficult to distinguish the deserving cases in such camps.
- iii) In Togdheer, laborers were nominated by their households but were not necessarily the recipients of the cash benefits. A few labourers therefore deserted their work. However, given the vulnerability of the households in question, the payments could not be discontinued. Some households replaced such laborers with other family members.

C) Implementation of community identified micro-projects in Togdheer and Bari region.

1. Achievements.

In Togdheer, micro-projects were implemented in 22 villages. Each village had 3 micro-projects. Four categories of micro-projects could be identified; water, sanitation, environment conservation and infrastructure rehabilitation as detailed below.

Table 1: Categories of the micro-projects and the sub-activities in each

| Category | Environmental conservation | Sanitation | Water | Infrastructure |
|---------------------|---|---|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Sub-activity | -Gully control -Sheet erosion control using contour bunds and water diversion. | Digging of dumping pits, refuse pits and cleaning up of villages. | De-silting of water pans. | Improvement of rural access roads. |

Appendix 8 gives detailed accounts of the accomplishments under each category of micro-project in each village. In summary, enormous amount of work was accomplished and the activities were well coordinated and documented. Monitoring was on fortnight basis. Reports from these monitoring exercises were compiled on monthly basis and shared with Oxfam-GB. Activities in Togdheer region were more efficiently implemented, more focused and the staff articulated their vision more effectively, thereby providing the necessary leadership and technical support to the community during the implementation process. This reflects the value added in building the capacity of the local implementing organizations. In Bari region, 14 villages benefited from micro-projects (Appendix 9).

2: Impact

The activities led to considerable impact in Bari and Togdheer regions. Significant was the fact that

- i. In areas where sheet erosion was controlled using soil bunds, there was evidence of rejuvenation of nutritious pasture species in addition to an overall increase in vegetation cover. This was due to better water infiltration into the ground. Pasture was an important link to sustainable livelihoods.
- ii. In Togdheer, neighboring communities have already started soil and water conservation exercises on their own. This was true in at least 2 villages.
- iii. The cash for work activities reduced environmental degradation from charcoal burning for export. Charcoal burners turned to cash for work.
- iv. In respect to expenditure patterns, priority was given to debt repayments, food, water, clothing and medicine in that order. During the second month, food was the first priority and in some very rare cases, families with 3-5 members were able to restock. At all places that were visited, chewing of Khat (*Miraa*) did not feature as an important item in priority of expenses. Sustaining the families by accessing the basic necessities was the priority.
- v. The project staff, VRC and community members gained valuable experience during implementation of the project. The communities learnt new skills and expressed confidence that they could implement similar activities with minimal supervision. This has already been witnessed in villages where communities have started their own conservation efforts.

- vi. Not all impacts were positive. There was influx of pastoralists in some villages in expectation of cash for work or continuation of similar activities.
- vii. Communities in Togdheer prefer cash for work to other forms of emergency interventions, including cash relief and relief food. They value the micro-projects more than the immediate benefits from cash payments. This is understandable given the new understanding about the link between sustainable livelihoods and environmental degradation.

3: Challenges faced in Togdheer and Bari regions.

Several challenges were noted. Below is a summary of the most prominent among them:

- i. While noting the remarkable achievements in the micro-projects, it was noted that some VRC members/foremen did not have adequate technical skills to improve the supervision of the micro-projects. At the same time, the implementing staff from LNGO experienced some difficulties in translating technical designs into actual work on the ground. This was more so in Bari region and more so with soil bunds and gully control. Estimation of the strength of soil bunds in relation to the forces generated by runoffs seemed difficult. As a result, washing away of some soil and contour bunds was noted in Bari and Togdheer areas. In some places, too many circular/ contour bunds in close proximity to each other discouraged rejuvenation of vegetation/ pasture. In a few cases, water diversion could lead to secondary gullies.
- ii. The vastness of the area made it difficult for close supervision of the micro-projects. Contact time between technical staff, the community and Oxfam-GB was low. Given that Oxfam-GB conducts monthly monitoring exercises, mistakes that happened in between became difficult to correct. In addition, consistency in supervision and monitoring was at times difficult given the few technical staff. This was true both for Oxfam and the local partners.
- iii. The cash for work activities were highly regulated in respect to work norms and schedules; this conflicted remarkably with the nomadic lifestyle to which the nomadic communities were accustomed. However this problem was less pronounced as the work progressed.
- iv. Women in Bari complained of long distances to and from the project sites. Old and expectant mothers were more disadvantaged. This calls for more sensitivity to gender issues and probably the need to incorporate women site supervisors.
- v. The influx of people to the cash for work sites resulted in a high concentration of needy people who engaged staff and VRCs in repeated explanations on why they should not be considered in the micro-projects.
- vi. Inadequate technical knowledge on environmental conservation was noted in Bari region. Although exchange visits were organized to Oxfam Togdheer, more in-depth capacity building and exposure visits are needed.

D Strengthening the capacity of Local NGOs in emergency interventions

1 Achievement

The local implementing partners were trained for four days by the consortium prior to project implementation. This was followed by a 3 day planning and training workshop by Oxfam-GB at Hargeisa. Partly, this training was meant for technical staff and covered reporting procedures,

selection criteria, money transfers and monitoring. At community level, the VRC were trained by the LNGO on drought preparedness, focusing on implementation of micro-projects prioritized by the respective communities. On-job training was conducted at each of the selected sites where sensitization on rangeland management was also covered. Overall, there was strong evidence that skills acquired by the community, staff and individuals were partly responsible for creating the project impacts noted above. The trainings also created an enabling environment for cooperation and interaction between the LNGO, Oxfam-GB and the local community.

2. Impact

Generally, capacity building is a long-term undertaking. The capacity built in the LNGOs facilitated efficient mobilization, targeting and vetting of the beneficiaries. In addition, it made the cash distribution efficient and timely. The trainings also contributed to the efficiency of the implementation of micro-projects. Overall, the trainings contributed to the realization of the project objectives in Togdheer and Bari regions. The resultant work has made communities value Cash for Work activities more than any other form of emergency interventions, including Cash Relief.

3. Challenges in strengthening the capacity of LNGOs in emergency interventions.

The following challenges were faced:

- The time allocated for training was inadequate and topics could have been covered in more depth.
- Although the project addressed training of the community on environmental management, technical know-how at the community level is still a major constraint. There are no qualified resource persons at the village level.

3.2.2: Approaches, achievements, impacts and challenges in Sool and Western Sanaag regions.

Norwegian Peoples' Aid implemented the project in 47 locations in Sool and Western Sanaag regions. Two partners, Steadfast Voluntary Organization (SVO) and Horn Umbrella (HU) implemented the project. The entire project covered 1,843 households comprising 1012 Cash for Work beneficiaries and 831 Cash Relief beneficiaries. NPA had the widest geographical coverage among the three consortium partners.

A: Approach to project implementation

After the initial consortium training in Bosaso on 19th January 2005, an internal meeting was held between SVO, NPA and Horn umbrella on details of project implementation as well as signing of agreements between NPA, the two local partners. The money transfer company had an agreement with NPA. NPA also had a predetermined labour force per every type of intervention as shown below.

| | |
|---------------------------|----|
| 1. Galley erosion control | 45 |
| 2. Shallow wells | 35 |
| 3. Balli | 30 |
| 4. Road rehabilitation | 60 |
| 5. Sanitation | 14 |

At 14 out of the 47 locations, the only activity was cash relief. Project implementation was phased because of the vastness of the area covered. The LNGOs mobilized the community in the respective target villages and requested that VRCs be constituted after which agreements were signed between

the VRCs and the LNGOs. The agreements spelt out the responsibilities and obligations from both parties. The selection and registration of beneficiaries was conducted in a participatory manner followed by public vetting of the beneficiaries to ensure transparency and accountability. The details of every beneficiary were thereafter sent to the money transfer companies. During payments, SVO officials and the VRC together with the money transfer companies verified that the correct beneficiaries were paid. Records of each and every payment were kept by SVO.

Payments were made through two parallel systems, cash relief was distributed by the money transfer company in dollars while SVO distributed the cash for work payments in Somali Shillings at the prevailing exchange rate. Under the NPA proposal, only cash relief was to be paid through the cash transfer companies. The money for cash relief transfer was inbuilt into the proposal. Distribution of money in Somali Shillings was a request by the community who were located far from the money exchange facilities. Both cash relief and cash for work activities were implemented in a period of 2 months at each site. Beneficiaries worked for 15 days every month and received 2 payments per month (after 7 and 8 days respectively). The foremen, VRCs and VSO site officers conducted daily site monitoring of project activities. The technical staff monitored the project activities every 15-30 days. Each month, the Executive Director of SVO visited the project sites.

A post distribution impact survey ought to have been carried out in NPA areas just like in Oxfam and Horn Relief areas. A baseline and post distribution impact survey, though essential, was not carried out in NPA areas. Indications are that this could still happen subject to availability of resources. However, this limitation was not unique to NPA alone. The other partners, HR and Oxfam did not have specific allocations for such surveys but still sought resources for this exercise within existing funds budgeted. This should be done in NPA areas in future.

B Cash distributions in Sool and Sanaag regions

1 Achievement

One thousand eight hundred forty three (1843) households benefited from the cash distributions in NPA project areas. The money transfer company distributed US\$ 60 per month per household for 2 months to 831 cash relief households. 1012 households benefiting from cash for work received US \$60 for two months. Each month, they worked for 15 days at US\$ 4 per day. Consequently, all the target beneficiaries received US\$120 per household from the project. In respect to cash for work, in total, six shallow wells were protected, 3 ballis rehabilitated, 16 gullies repaired, 8 road sections improved and environmental sanitation and hygiene conducted at 9 sites (Appendix.10).

2. Impact of the project in Sool and Western Sanaag

- i. One of the most remarkable impacts from the project was the tremendous increase in pasture/vegetation cover at some strategic sites, mainly along dry season grazing valleys that had been totally degraded. Water diverted from seasonal rivers and spread across large areas in such valleys had a tremendous impact on pasture regeneration and livelihoods in general. The diversion of water also helped in down stream gully control.
- ii. Injection of money in the local economy improved the communities' purchasing power for food, water and health services. In addition, the social support systems partially revived after partial debt repayments from the beneficiaries. It was clear from focus group discussions that the US\$120 per household for 2 months was too little to create an impact. The income per household was apportioned to the various needs and was also shared with other needy neighbors. The apportioned amounts could not meet any of the needs adequately. However, as in other regions,

the environmental micro-projects are more valued than the temporary benefits from cash payments.

- iii. Many non-beneficiaries of cash payments in NPA areas worked alongside those who benefited from cash payments. Consequently, the magnitude of the work on micro-project in NPA areas compare fairly well with those implemented over a longer period and where cash benefits were paid for a longer period. Community contribution seems to have been inspired by the honesty, trust and the hard work exemplified by the local implementing partner, SVO. It is also in line with the earlier observation that communities are in dire need of rehabilitating their environments as a way of securing their livelihoods. They appear prepared to do so at any cost but are constrained by lack of resources and technical know-how.
- iv. Improved hygiene and sanitation in villages as well reduced contamination of wells by dirty runoffs was observed. In addition, in areas where hand dug wells were rehabilitated, the quality of water was improved and in other areas where ballis (water pans) were de-silted, access to water was increased.
- v. One other notable impact was the knowledge gained by the community and the realization that environmental rehabilitation holds the key to sustainable livelihoods. Skills gained by the community will be the entry point in future community based initiatives in the respective communities. Overall, the impact of the intervention has made a tremendous change in opening new possibilities for tackling environmental degradation. The actual impact of the project may actually be felt further into the future as the communities initiate rehabilitation exercises on their own.

3 Challenges faced by the project in Sool and Western Sanaag region

The following challenges were experienced in this region:

- i. In NPA areas, the amount of resources provided by the project was too little and was also spread too thinly thereby reducing the immediate benefits from cash injections.
- ii. The phased approach, where activities were completed in one area before moving to the next, delayed the delivery of the much-needed assistance to the drought-affected population at some sites. When the assistance eventually arrived, it was too little too late. The US\$ 120 distributed over a period of 2 months was too little to create an impact.
- iii. It was difficult to choose the villages to focus on given the complex clan dynamics and the potential for conflicts when some clans were left out. This led the project to cover a very large area.
- iv. The risk of transporting cash using LNGOs (as in the case of VSO) is too much. This function should be shifted back to money transfer companies, in the same way that other partners have done. However, in NPA area, this can only be done if the area covered by the project is rationalized. The latter would reduce the distribution costs.
- v. NPA/SVO did not conduct a baseline survey or post-distribution study. This creates a challenge in documenting the impact of the project on the beneficiaries, as well as sharing experiences with external stakeholders.

- vi. Technically, some of the micro-projects require more intense technical input to rationalize the approaches used. For example, it could be more logical and less expensive to divert and spread out the water before reaching the gully head than trying to control expansion of the gully using gabions. The water diverted in the process is then used to support other livelihood options. Several other cases of trying to restrict water flow as opposed to reducing the speed of the flow were noted. This approach was responsible for washing away of some soil bunds in some places. Controlling rather than restricting the water flow would have been a better and less costly option.
- vii. Generally, some communities felt that selection of micro-project had an element of top down approach. However, such cases were few and far apart.
- viii. A moral dilemma was apparent when injuries were sustained. No hospitals exist in the project area and contractual agreement between implementing organizations and the community was that the organizations would not take any liability. In future, it would be advisable to maintain medical kits with minimum medical requirements at the intervention sites. Most injuries can be dealt with at the site.
- ix. Influx of needy people from surrounding areas in anticipation of cash for work was a real dilemma. Beneficiaries were too few compared to the number of the needy people at each site.
- x. In NPA areas, the destitute, especially those under cash relief, are still vulnerable even after the drought. Such households have no alternative livelihoods or skills to fall back to. A long-term intervention to address livelihoods is needed.
- xi. The VRC members put in a lot of effort and have contributed to the realization of the project objectives. However, motivation is still an issue to be dealt with.

C: Increasing the capacity of LNGOs for effective emergency interventions

1. Achievement

Besides the consortium training on 19th January 2005, a planning workshop was organized by NPA for the implementing partners to discuss project implementation modalities. NPA conducted joint project visits with Horn Umbrella and SVO. In addition, Horn umbrella was given office equipments while VSO was provided with radios for communication. This was in addition to further inputs on project management, reporting, accountability and transparency.

2. Impact of the project on local NGOs.

The following were the impacts on the local implementing partners:

- i. Both SVO and Horn umbrella have gained a lot of experience from the implementation of the micro-projects. The project was an important eye opener to them as well as the respective communities that together, they can achieve much more with the experience gained so far.
- ii. The confidence and dedication of the SVO staff had a positive influence in the community. It led to more community members working at the intervention sites, far beyond the number that received cash payments.
- iii. Horn Umbrella, a new organization, implemented and gained experience from the micro-projects. However, it requires additional capacity building and nurturing to be more effective in

aid. NPA could take this opportunity to help Horn Umbrella to come up with realistic strategic plans, organization systems, structures and policies.

3. Capacity challenges faced by the LNGOs in Sool and Western Sanaag

The two LNGOs faced many challenges, the most important being:

- i. The two local implementing partners require more technical collaboration and support to improve their interventions.
- ii. No exposure and exchange visits were organized to other Consortium members with similar cash for work programs. This would have been an opportunity to exchange views and gain insights for improving the implementation of the interventions.
- iii. The VRCs requires motivation or a form of appreciation for their remarkable input into the project. At the beginning of the project, some VRCs become an obstacle to smooth implementation of the project due to lack of motivation. Some villages were therefore skipped in favour of others with active VRCs.

3.0: Approaches, achievements, impacts and challenges in Gebi valley and Eastern Sanaag region.

Horn Relief works with pastoral communities in the Sanaag region to address issues affecting pastoral livelihoods, environment, [and](#) water and education. The organization is trusted by the local community and enjoys good rapport with them. In addition, the organization has been operating in the project area for over 10 years and has developed strong roots in community. It therefore understands the community well. These attributes underlie the emphasis the organization has on sustainable community initiatives. In addition, from past interventions, Horn Relief had experience on cash for work and cash relief interventions as well as implementation of environmental micro-projects. These attributes were important assets during the implementation of the project.

A. The approach used by Horn Relief

Horn Relief, having had previous experience with cash relief and cash for work, had developed the registration, distribution, and targeting methodologies. In addition, having completed a successful cash relief program in 2004/2005 in which the targeting system was thoroughly evaluated by both OCHA and Acacia Consultants, Horn Relief was able to transfer the selection criteria and the overall cash based methodology to consortium members. Therefore, Horn Relief not only trained on the overall implementation methodology for the cash programs but also provided technical training on rainwater harvesting techniques, site identification, developing technical designs for rock and check dams and more. The Horn Relief Project Manager, a soil and water engineer did this as part of the 4-day consortium training in Bossaso in January 2005.

The project implementation process started with identification of the most vulnerable villages and the likely population to be targeted in each. At this point, a decision was made on reserving a number of beneficiary positions to be kept aside for genuine cases that arise after the initial selection. The reserve was on average, 10 people per village. The actual figure was proportional to the number of beneficiaries per village and could be shifted between villages.

The identification of the villages and potential beneficiaries was followed by community mobilization and sensitization. This also included discussions on the problems faced by the community and how they could be addressed. The community was then requested to select VRCs and/ or re-constitute

old ones if the community desired to do so. Signing of agreements with elected VRC members specifying the roles and obligations of Horn Relief and the VRCs followed formation of VRCs. The VRCs then conducted meetings to identify the beneficiaries allocated to each village. Registration was done in two phases, firstly, the cash for work, followed by cash relief. The registered beneficiaries were then forwarded to Horn Relief by the VRCs. Horn Relief vetted the beneficiaries using independent informants like elders and remittance companies. Once vetted, the lists were read in public and beneficiaries were given identification cards bearing their names and photographs for ease of identification during payments.

From among the beneficiaries, foremen were selected to lead a team/group of 60 people or less and given US\$ 2 above the US\$4 paid to the laborers. The foremen worked under the Horn Relief field officers. The VRC, assisted by Horn Relief, were given the responsibility of choosing the specific activities that were to be undertaken under the cash for work. Given that every clan was represented in the committee, by extension, every clan was involved in choosing the activities. The VRCs and Horn Relief officers conducted site visits on areas that were chosen and held consultations with VRCs and elders on information that would guide the type of design of the structures and its' location. The technical aspect of the work was thereafter discussed between the Horn Relief senior staff, field officers and the foremen.

The discussion between the foremen, field officers, VRCs and the beneficiaries followed at every village. Horn Relief provided training to the VRCs, foremen, field officers and beneficiaries on site regarding various aspects of their work and the importance of environmental rehabilitation to their livelihoods. It also covered the details of the work and how it was to be accomplished. After this, the beneficiaries were organized into sub-groups with specific tasks. Work was then started at the sites, monitoring records kept and payments made using independent money transfer companies.

A set of rules regarding maintenance of rehabilitated structures was agreed upon within the community and with incoming pastoralists from the surrounding communities. Families living near the rehabilitated sites were selected and assigned the responsibility of overseeing the maintenance of the structures together with other members of the community.

Horn Relief also took the initiative to negotiate and agree with communities at large that all rehabilitated rangelands would be for communal purposes and should remain so. This was necessary as previous experience indicated that some individuals in a particular site would claim rehabilitated land as theirs and enforce private enclosures. Therefore, it was a Horn Relief policy that all areas rehabilitated would be used for public/communal purposes.

Horn Relief also provided identification cards to beneficiaries to reduced the logistical burden on Horn Relief team in terms of verification of the identities of the beneficiaries during cash payment

Horn Relief provided medical kits to all sites as well for treatment of minor injuries. However, like other agencies, Horn Relief could not take liability for any major injury or death.

B. Cash for work and cash relief distributions in Sool plateau and Gebi valley.

1. Achievements:

On cash for work, trained Horn Relief staff distributed US \$ 88 per month per household for 4 months. Each month, money was distributed in two installments, after every 10 and 12 days respectively. Each day, every laborer worked 7 hours per day for 22 days in a month. Payment was US\$4 per every day

worked. Out of the target 2000 households, 1400 families benefited from Cash for Work while 600 benefited from Cash Relief. Some beneficiaries of cash for work could not cope with physical work and were put under cash relief using the reserve set aside for needy cases after the initial selection of beneficiaries. On Cash Relief, US\$ 60 dollars were distributed to 600 Cash Relief beneficiaries. By the time of the evaluation, some villages were waiting for the final payment, which was being processed. As earlier noted, the foremen got US\$2 above the payments made to the other laborers due to their additional responsibilities for enforcing work norms and overseeing tools and supplies.

43 micro-projects were implemented in ten villages in Sool plateau and Gebi valley [of the Sanaag region](#). The villages covered include Dhahar, Xingalool, Wardheer, Baragaha Qol, Ceel Buh, Carmale, Carmale, Hadaftimo, Badhan, Mindigale and Cawsane. In each village, different micro-projects were prioritized. The activities included gully and sheet erosion control, diversion/spreading of water to the rangelands, soil and water conservation structures, sanitation and rehabilitation of access roads. Monitoring of project activities was conducted on fortnight basis.

2. Impact from cash for work and cash relief distributions.

The following impacts were noted:

- i. The evaluation team noted positive indications that the purchasing power of 2,000 beneficiaries, comprising of a labour force of 1372 laborers, 28 team leaders and 600 cash relief beneficiaries was enhanced. These beneficiaries were able to meet basic needs such as food, debt repayments, purchase of water and payment for health services. Debt payments reduced the strain on the social support system.
- ii. Overall, micro-projects were efficiently implemented in 10 villages. By the time of the evaluation, micro-projects in eight villages had been completed while 2 were at the final stages of completion. The floods during the long rains and the late arrival of external materials (for erection of gabions) were responsible for the delays. Notable accomplishments were on tree planting, gully control, building embankments around the sinkholes, water diversions and retention in the rangeland (See Appendix 11). Horn Relief micro-projects were technically superior in quality and design.
- iii. At some sites, large expanse of previously degraded areas had been rehabilitated and a lot of pasture witnessed. This had a tremendous influence on the local community as it directly translated into support for pastoral livelihoods. The communities in most of these areas had not realized the potential that existed in rehabilitating rangelands. Most were initially skeptical about the exercises. However, by the end of the project, VRC and the community in general were united in requesting for extension of the rehabilitation exercises and were willing to contribute as much as they could to help in the rehabilitation effort.
- iv. One of the most outstanding impacts was the transfer of skills and technologies to the pastoral communities. Individual community members are already using these skills and especially the foremen in maintenance of the structures already put in place and in future, these skills will contribute greatly in facilitation of community initiatives.
- v. Injection of cash in the local economy supported the expansion of business for traders and also saved lives and livelihoods. Pastoralists were cushioned against disposing off of the few livestock that were left. With the onset of the rains and the increase in pasture, such animals have started reproducing.

- vi. It was also noted that communities in Sanaag preferred cash for work to other forms of emergency interventions, including cash relief and relief food similarly to those in Togdheer. They value the long term benefits of the micro-projects and the immediate benefits of the cash payments – both benefits are obtained only through cash for work and not cash relief in their opinion.
- vii. The cash for work also had significant impact in reducing charcoal production as destitute households who have been resorting to charcoal production as means of generating income had received short-term employment opportunities. In addition, the environmental micro-projects mitigated some of the damage from previous charcoal production activities.
- viii. On gender issues, the intervention gave leeway for women participation by encouraging community decision-making structures that included women. Women were part of the decision making VRCs and participated fully in project management, supervision and dispute settlement. In a few cases, women leadership in the VRCs was outstanding and they outdid their male counterparts. Such women ought to be the focus of further training in leadership. Horn Relief also recruited women as Field Officers. It had 2 female Field Officers who, with training, reportedly surpassed many of their male counterparts in efficient management of the sites.
- ix. At few sites that were visited, communities claimed that the selection of the cash for work activities was not participatory and that a top down approach was used to prioritize environmentally related activities. This could be so if the VRC chose the activities without adequate consultation with the community members they represented. However, it should also be noted that after the project had been completed, the communities are now cognizant of the importance and value of the environmental micro-projects undertaken by Horn Relief.
- x. Horn Relief with the assistance of Dalsan and the VRCs, negotiated with local money traders to ensure that beneficiaries received optimal exchange rates. In addition, Horn Relief, VRCs and elders, negotiated with the local businesses to adhere to normal commodity prices and not to inflate prices as a result of the project. This ensured that beneficiaries were not taken advantage off when purchasing goods and services. This approach was as a result of lessons learnt from previous cash programs undertaken by Horn Relief.
- xi. The documentation developed by Horn Relief and used to monitor payments, progress of activities and impact of the micro-projects were effective. Horn Relief also relied on previous assessments for baseline data from cash based programs and is currently in the process of undertaking a post-distribution survey report for this project.

Deleted: ¶

3. Challenges faced by the project in Sool plateau and Gebi valley.

The following challenges were witnessed:

- i. The resource allocated to the project was too limited. Horn Relief had a difficult time convincing the non-beneficiaries to wait for another opportunity in future. Not all poor and deserving individuals could be accommodated.
- ii. Two payments in a month was logistically very challenging due to the vastness of the area. The predictability of payments was also a security risk so was the congregation of needy non-beneficiaries at the pay centers during the times of payments. However, the payment schedule was discussed internally within HR and with partners and HR felt that it would be

difficult for the communities to await an entire month for payments particularly as the households were very vulnerable and in dire need of immediate assistance.

- iii. At the beginning of the project, people who were accustomed to previous cash relief grants expressed reservation on cash for work and also influenced others. Horn Relief initially conducted a lot of sensitizations and offered a lot of explanations on the double benefits from cash for work.
- iv. Time for technical assessments and preparation of bills of quantities for micro-projects was too limited and external inputs for making gabions also took too long to arrive. Despite these shortcomings, the accomplishments of the project on the ground were outstanding.
- v. A moral dilemma exists on how to motivate the VRC members. Paying the VRC members poses a moral dilemma as they will be seen to be taking the place of the poor. Not paying them is also not morally right given the amount of time they provide to the project.
- vi. The chronic environmental degradation and the vastness of the area is a big challenge to the sparse population. The task at hand is enormous.
- vii. Tools were generally of poor quality and inadequate at most sites, a common occurrence in cash for work activities due to unavailability of high quality tools in the market. Partly, the shortage is caused by breakages, as most pastoralists are not accustomed to use of tools.

C. Drought preparedness in target communities.

1 Achievement

The following were the drought preparedness activities that were accomplished:

- i. In all areas where interventions were conducted, new VRCs were formed and/or old ones re-constituted. The VRCs were seen as the entry points to environmental rehabilitation at community level. Training of VRC members has the potential of creating community owned local institutions that could be pivotal in arresting environmental degradation at their respective areas of operation.
- ii. The training of foremen and the involvement of local leaders including the mayors and local traditional chiefs was an important step in creating community resources persons in environmental management at grassroots levels.
- iii. Training/ discussion with communities on drought cycle management and lessening the impact of upcoming droughts through such activities like continuation of rangeland rehabilitation and disposing of cattle during good times to safe cash for the bad times.

2 Challenges under drought preparedness.

Below were some of the challenges faced:

- i. Lack of a central government or authority made environmental protection and management difficult. In disputed territories like Sool and Sanaag regions, it is difficult for different clans to

enforce environmental management and protection. However, as noted earlier, the project made some progress at the intervention points.

- ii. Livelihood concepts and their linkage to rehabilitated environments were new to the pastoralists. Drought and emergencies were seen as natural with minimal influence from human activity.

3 Impacts

The community social structures, like VRCs, are now at the forefront in supporting community environmental rehabilitation initiatives.

4.0: LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE PROJECT.

The consortium approach generated many lessons that could form an important foundation for project planning in future. Below are some of the lessons learnt:

- i) While taking into consideration the safety nets for vulnerable people who are unable to work, most communities preferred cash for work as opposed to cash relief or other forms of emergency interventions. Cash for work was seen to have multiple benefits. It allowed the freedom of choice in use of the income, contributed to sustainable livelihoods, was cheaper to implement as compared to other traditional emergency interventions and was also viewed as a vehicle for acquiring new knowledge or as a tool for technology transfer. In all areas, communities felt that cash relief should be minimized in favor of cash for work. By the end of the project, most community members were not in favor of getting free money.
- ii) Transparency at the initial stages of community mobilization and registration creates trust and makes implementation of the project easier. Public vetting of beneficiaries is an important trust building tool. In places where the IDPs form a large proportion of the population and the local authority is strong, the burden of vetting and registration of beneficiaries is best shared between the VRCs and the local authorities.
- iii) Good rapport with the Government departments and other stakeholders creates an enabling environment for smooth and effective implementation of the project, devoid of conflicting approaches with other stakeholders. It creates a climate for learning among the local stakeholders in the project areas.
- iv) It is crucial to allocate adequate time for planning before the actual implementation of the project. Community mobilization, the constitution of VRCs, the registration of beneficiaries and the vetting takes time and could jeopardize the entire project if rushed.
- v) Sourcing of expertise from other organizations on the basis of their strengths and expertise allows consortium partners to offload the day-to-day project activities to competent local actors. These actors are better placed to make follow-ups at the grassroots level and form an important bridge between the International NGOs and the local community. Not only does this free the international organizations from getting bogged down but also provides the local organizations an opportunity to learn and acquire skills from the International NGOs. Similarly, sourcing services on the same basis by the LNGOs from other local actors improves the efficiency of service delivery. e.g the use of money transfer companies for efficient cash distribution.

- vi) A combination of factors such as the right combination of qualified staff, use of external material inputs and good community organization are important pre-requisite for efficient and effective micro-projects. In addition, the quality of the micro-projects could be greatly improved by organizing local technical trainings for IPs and conducting joint demonstrations supported by use of standard design manuals. There is also need to make sure that technical assessments are made before physical structures are erected. Advice from an environmental conservation expert is of paramount importance.
- vii) Interventions ought to reach as many drought affected households, in adjoining regions, as possible. This would avoid influx of people from one region to another in search of Cash for Work. However, this should not be done at the expense of spreading resources too thinly.
- viii) The micro-projects have opened the eyes of the community, making them appreciate the importance of environmental conservation. Led by skilled community resource persons and supported by an informed local leadership, communities can play a pivotal role in ensuring environmental management, rehabilitation of degraded areas and protection of areas at risk. However, capacity building of communities on environmental management for secure livelihoods remains the greatest challenge for the consortium partners.
- ix) Workload on women is an important issue for consideration in division of labor during implementation of micro-projects. It should also be taken into account at the design stage of the micro-projects. However, this needs to be balanced with ensuring that this is not used to marginalize women from participating in cash for work activities.
- x) Using private money transfer companies is an opportunity for safe and quick disbursement of money to beneficiaries in the project area. This opportunity could be exploited by Humanitarian agencies operating in complex situations like Somaliland/Somalia where the weak local administration and the ever-present security risk undermine humanitarian response. The money transfer companies are respected as they form a trusted link between the local population and the rest of the world for the much-needed assistance in times of need. These companies are able to distribute cash at minimal risks. In each location they employ trusted individuals from the local people who in turn work hand in hand with VRCs and the partner staff.

Deleted: vi).

5.0: RECOMMENDATIONS

Below is a synthesis of some important recommendations:

- i. The consortium approach to project implementation should be retained for three reasons; Joint response to humanitarian crisis and maintenance of standards, resource mobilization and finally, promotion of interagency learning. The evaluation team further recommends that coordination mechanisms, roles, responsibilities and delegation of responsibilities among the consortium members be spelt out in form of an agreement/ MOU. In addition, the consortium partners need to spell out their shared vision and the goals of the consortium.
- ii. The link between the emergency response and the long-term development need to be strengthened. The short-term emergency interventions need to be complimented by a long-term recovery programs to rebuild destroyed livelihoods. Strengthening the link between micro-projects and livelihoods should also form the basic objective of cash for work activities. For example, water diversion to control sheet erosion and gullies could be linked to re-seeding of the rangelands with superior pastures-like Sudan or Columbus grass. The resultant fodder improves milk yields and livestock body scores. The fodder can be sold or could be stored for use as a drought coping tool for milking animals while the larger herds migrate to other regions in search of pasture. This way, communities will sustain the environmental rehabilitation effort.
- iii. All facets of pastoral lives and livelihoods were affected by drought. In future, it could be advisable to expand the range of interventions to address other community priorities rather than restricting the interventions to cash for work and cash relief, interventions that only facilitate basic access to food, water and debt repayment. For example, restocking of pack camels is a priority as most pack camels were lost due to the four-year drought. Loss of pack animals restricts migration opportunities for pastoralists, eventually leading to further loss of their livestock. In addition, some animal health interventions could have complimented the current intervention.
- iv. The consortium members ought to come up with a plan of action for capacity building of local institutions to make them more effective in future interventions. To be considered are the implementing partners, VRCs and community resource persons in environmental conservation and implementation of micro-projects. Training materials, technical manuals and exposure visits need to be incorporated as part of the technical support from consortium members to the local partners.
- v. Consortium members should provide non-monetary incentives to VRCs. Preferably, the incentives should be non-monetary, material benefits or recognition/awards.
- vi. Preferably, payments to the beneficiaries should be once in a month. This would release staff time for better project supervision and monitoring. The money transfer schedules ought to be unpredictable for security reasons. In addition, it is recommended that money transfer companies be used instead of using implementing partners to distribute the cash-as in the case of SVO/Horn Umbrella.
- vii. Balancing clan dynamics and security considerations are critical factors to consider when selecting the project sites and targeting beneficiaries in Somalia. However, focusing on the most vulnerable households and needy minorities should be the driving force in future project interventions.

- viii. Micro-project designs should take gender concerns into consideration in order to promote women participation and empowerment. At Yaka in Bari region, women specifically requested for projects that could allow them to participate fully in the project without jeopardizing their daily household chores. In question was the location of the micro-projects in relation to their homes. At both the community and local partners' levels, women should be encouraged to take up key responsibilities, including field activities.
- ix. Given the enormous threat to livelihoods posed by environmental degradation, environmental rehabilitation and conservation should be taken as a priority in every aid initiative in the project area while giving room for other community priorities and needs. Environmental rehabilitation and conservation should also be integrated in long-term community development.
- x. The time allocated to the preparatory phase of the emergency project ought to be sufficient to facilitate proper community mobilization, identification of beneficiaries, registration, training, selection of micro-projects & technical planning of specific micro-projects.
- xi. The consortium partners ought to put in place mechanisms for increasing cross-program learning through joint program reviews, exchange visits and joint workshops. Exposure to new ideas, skills and management styles through exposure visits is very important and should be encouraged at all levels. In addition, knowledge of participatory planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning should be strengthened across the consortium partners and their local counterparts.

ANNEXES

APPENDIX.1: REFERENCES

1. Emergency Relief and Drought Vulnerability Reduction Programme: Sanaag Region, Northern Somalia. First Interim Report. Horn Relief, March 2005.
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3. Emergency and Drought Vulnerability Reduction Programme, Togdheer and Bari/ Nugaal. Interim Report. Oxfam-GB, March 2005.
4. Emergency Cash Relief to Drought Affected Families of Sool Plateau. Project implemented by Horn Relief and Post distribution Survey Findings Report. UN OCHA, June 2004.
5. Evaluation of the Cash Relief Programme implemented by Horn Relief and commissioned by NOVIB/ Oxfam Netherlands. Final Report. Acacia consultants. June 2004.
6. Local Economic Capacity Assessments in Eastern Sanaag (Sool Plateau, Gebi Valley and Coast). Implemented by Progressive International and commissioned by Horn Relief.
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8. Proposal on NGO consortium response to drought in Togdheer, Sool, Sanaag and Bari/Nugaal (AG, 3980). Oxfam-GB 2004.
9. Cash Relief in a contested area. Lesson from Somalia. Network Paper. Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute. Degan Ali, Fanta Toure and Tilleke Kiewied. March 2005.

APPENDIX 2: PERSONS INTERVIEWED DURING THE MONITORING EXERCISE

| Name. | Position. | Organization/District. |
|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Osman Yusuf | Project Manager | Norwegian People's Aid. |
| 2. Mahdi Yusuf Derie | Program Officer | Oxfam-GB, Hargeisa. |
| 3. Abdirahman Aideed | Program Coordinator | Oxfam-GB, Hargeisa |
| 4. Hassannur A. Sheik | Humanitarian Program Manager. | Oxfam-GB, Hargeisa |
| 5. Eris Lothibe | Program Coordinator | Oxfam-GB, Hargeisa |
| 6. A/Risak Farhan Ali / Hodan Mohamed Ahmed. | Staff, Havoyoco. | Havoyoco, Togdheer |
| 7. Kaise Hassan Gabobe | Project Officer | Havoyoco, Togdheer |
| 8. Faisal Ahmed Mohamed | Cashier | Havoyoco, Togdheer |
| 9. Ibrahim Omar Duale | Project Manager Emergency | Havoyoco, Togdheer |
| 10. Muxamed Muse Elmi | Administrative Finance Officer | Havoyoco, Togdheer |
| 11. Mustafe S. Elmi | Program Coordinator | Havoyoco, Togdheer |
| 12. Cadaw Yurura Village Relief Committee (VRC) | Community Representatives | Cadaw Yurura settlement, Togdheer |
| 13. Omar Sheik Adan/Hussein Ismael Omar | Program Coordinator, Education/ Vocational training. | Havoyoco |
| 14. Mohamed Elmi Aden | Board Chairperson | Havoyoco |
| 15. Reginald Cherogony | Project Manager | Horn Relief, Bosaso, Punt land |
| 16. Hassan Badeed | Project Officer | Horn Relief, Bosaso, Punt land |
| 17. Yaka VRC | Community representatives | Sool Plateau/Sanaag |
| 18. Xingalool Village Relief Committee | Community representatives | Sool Plateau/Sanaag. |
| 19. Dhahar Village Relief Committee | Community representatives/Beneficiaries. | Sool Plateau/Sanaag. |
| 20. Dhahar village relief committee/ beneficiaries | Community representatives/ beneficiaries. | Sool Plateau/Sanaag |
| 21. Qalwo Village relief committee | Community representatives/ beneficiaries. | Nugaal. |
| 22. Gambadhe Village Relief Committee | Community representatives/ beneficiaries | Sool Plateau/Sannag |
| 23. Bohol Village Relief committee | Community representatives/Beneficiaries | Sool Plateau/ Sanaag |
| 24. Saeed Khalif Yusuf | Project Manager | Shilcon |
| 25. Said Hassan Ali | Field Engineer | Shilcon |
| 26. Mohamed Ashmed Saeed | Program Officer | Oxfam GB |
| 27. Mohamed Muse Ismael | Field Officer | Shilcon |
| 28. Abdi Ali Husein | Chairman | Horn Umbrella |
| 29. Sulaiman Yasin | Administration and Finance | Horn umbrella |
| 30. Said Ahmed | Executive Director | SVO |
| 31. Mohamed Farah | Accountant | SVO |
| 32. Mohamed Aden Jama | Project Engineer | SVO |
| 33. Sahra Jama Abdullahi | Project Manager | SVO |
| 34. Shukri Yusuf Abdi | Project Officer | NPA |
| 35. Abdikarim Said Abdi. | Cashier | SVO. |

APPENDIX 3: ITINERARY FOR THE EVALUATION

| Date | Activity | Location |
|-------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| 01/06/05 | Evaluation team pre-planning meeting. Revisiting the terms of reference. | Hargeisa, Somaliland. |
| 02/06/05 | Planning meeting with Oxfam-GB, Discussions with project team. | Oxfam-GB office, Hargeisa, Somaliland |
| 02/06/05 | Travel from Hargeisa to Hoggdheer region. | Burao, Hoggdheer, Somaliland |
| 03/06/05 | Discussion with Havoyoco. Togdheer. | Burao, Togdheer, Somaliland |
| 03/06/05 | Meeting with Cadaw Yurura VRC, Project beneficiaries. | Togdeer, Region, Somaliland |
| 04/ 06/05 | Meeting with Ina-Afmadoobe VRC | Togdeer Region, Somaliland |
| 04/06/05 | Presentation on Havoyoco as an institution and its program activities. | Hargeisa, Somaliland |
| 05/06/05 | Planning meeting with Oxfam-GB, NPA, Horn Relief on monitoring and evaluation in Punt land | Bosasso, Punt land. |
| 06/06/05 | Meeting with Horn Relief staff, Punt land. | Bosasso, Punt land |
| 07/06/05 | Meeting with VRC members | Xingalool, Sool Plateau. |
| 08/06/05 | Meeting with beneficiaries of cash for work and cash relief | Xingalool, Sool Plateau. |
| 09/06/05 | Planning meeting with Oxfam-GB and Shilcon staff, Bari. | Gardo |
| 09/06/05 | Field visit to Oxfam sites in Gardo. | IDP camp at Gardo. |
| 10/06/05 | Field visit to Oxfam/ Shilcon site at Yaka | Gardo |
| 11/06/05 | Meeting with SVO/ Horn Umbrella staff | Galway |
| 12/06/05 | Meeting with VRC/ beneficiaries at Qauulo in Tellex district, NPA/ SVO project sites. | Sool Plateau. |
| 12/06/05 | Meeting with VRC/ beneficiaries at Ardoley village, NPA/ SVO project site. | Sool Plateau |
| 12/06/05 | Meeting with VRC/ beneficiaries at Godaale, NPA/ SVO project sites. | Sool Plateau. |

APPENDIX 4: CASH FOR WORK PAYMENTS BY OXFAM-GB IN TOGDHEER REGION

| Number | Village | Distance from Burao² | Beneficiaries of cash for work |
|---------------|----------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| 1 | Kala-Dhac | 56 | 14 |
| 2 | Cadaw | 27 | 22 |
| 3 | San Yare | 54 | 56 |
| 4 | Cali Saahid | 44 | 56 |
| 5 | Lebi Guun | 36 | 30 |
| 6 | Bali Hiile | 35 | 58 |
| 7 | Bilcil Wayso | 60 | 46 |
| 8 | Waabo Gaajo | 22 | 38 |
| 9 | Unuunley/ Dhakool | 46 | 64 |
| 10 | Ina Afmadoobe | 65 | 64 |
| 11 | Waadama Goo | 110 | 69 |
| 12 | Jaleelo | 115 | 35 |
| 13 | Carro Balanbaal | 165 | 16 |
| 14 | Qabri Huluul | 176 | 64 |
| 15 | Qori Lugud | 195 | 73 |
| 16 | Bali Calanle | 170 | 18 |
| 17 | Shanshacade | 150 | 25 |
| 18 | War ibraan | 125 | 22 |
| 19 | Beeli Eeday | 75 | 10 |
| 20 | Balan Baal | 80 | 11 |
| 21 | Gumbur Libaax | 60 | 8 |
| 22 | Qaloocon | 210 | 12 |
| Total | | | 1200 |

² Burao is the main city in the region where Havoyoco branch office is located.

APPENDIX 5: CASH FOR WORK BENEFICIARIES IN BARI/ NUGAAL.

| Name of village | Cash for work beneficiaries |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Adinsone | 52 |
| 2. Habaal Reer | 47 |
| 3. Gardho | 441 |
| 4. B/Xagakar | 100 |
| 5. Canbaar sare | 81 |
| 6. Yaka | 221 |
| 7. Shaxda | 65 |
| 8. X/ Kheyr | 111 |
| 9. Jedad | 59 |
| 10. Dhaxan sarin | 63 |
| 11. Shire | 91 |
| 12. Qalwo | 29 |
| 13. Qansaar | |
| 14. Libow | 47 |
| 15. Busur | 0 |
| 16. D/Samahelo | 0 |
| Total | 2160 |

APPENDIX 6: CASH RELIEF DISTRIBUTION BY HAVOYOCO IN TOGDHEER REGION

| Number | Village | Distance from Burao City | Beneficiaries of Cash Relief |
|---------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | Kala-Dhac | 56 | 14 |
| 2 | Cadaw | 27 | 22 |
| 3 | San Yare | 54 | 14 |
| 4 | Cali Saahid | 44 | 14 |
| 5 | Lebi Guun | 36 | 8 |
| 6 | Bali Hiile | 35 | 18 |
| 7 | Bilcil Wayso | 60 | 10 |
| 8 | Waabo Gaajo | 22 | 9 |
| 9 | Unuunley/ Dhakool | 46 | 11 |
| 10 | Ina Afmadoobe | 65 | 20 |
| 11 | Waadama Goo | 110 | 24 |
| 12 | Jaleelo | 115 | - |
| 13 | Carro Balanbaal | 165 | 1 |
| 14 | Qabri Huluul | 176 | 6 |
| 15 | Qori Lugud | 195 | 23 |
| 16 | Bali Calanle | 170 | 18 |
| 17 | Shanshacade | 150 | 25 |
| 18 | War ibraan | 125 | 22 |
| 19 | Beeli Eeday | 75 | 10 |
| 20 | Balan Baal | 80 | 11 |
| 21 | Gumbur Libaax | 60 | 8 |
| 22 | Qaloocon | 210 | 12 |
| Total | | | 300 |

APPENDIX 7: CASH RELIEF DISTRIBUTION IN BARI REGION

| Name of village | Cash Relief beneficiaries | Total US\$ |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Adinsone | 33 | 6600 |
| 2. Habaal Reer | 16 | 3200 |
| 3. Gardho | 190 | 38000 |
| 4. B/Xagakar | 49 | 9800 |
| 5. Canbaar sare | 33 | 6600 |
| 6. Yaka | 73 | 14600 |
| 7. Shaxda | 10 | 2000 |
| 8. X/ kheyr | 55 | 11000 |
| 9. Jedad | 7 | 1400 |
| 10. Dhaxan sarin | 17 | 3400 |
| 11. Shire | 39 | 7800 |
| 12. Qalwo | 15 | 3000 |
| 13. Qansaar | 40 | 8000 |
| 14. Libow | 15 | 3000 |
| 15. Busur | 35 | 7000 |
| 16. D/Samahelo | 42 | 8400 |
| Total | 669 | 133800 |

APPENDIX 8: MICRO-PROJECTS IN TOGDHEER REGION

| Village | Type of work | Accomplishments | Direct beneficiaries |
|--------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Waabo gaajo | Pond de-silting | 1912 cubic meters | 38 |
| | Soil Bunds | 3.1 Km | |
| | Contour Bunds | 1200 square meters | |
| 2. Unuunleey | Soil Bunds | 6.8 Kilometers | 39 |
| 3. Ina- afmadoobe | Soil bunds | 5.7 Kilometres | 64 |
| | Contour Bunds | 960 Metres | |
| 4. Ina-dhakool | Soil bunds | 2.2 Kilometres | 25 |
| | Water diversion | 100 Meters | |
| 5. W/ goo | Soil bunds | 4.75 Kilometers | 69 |
| 6. Jaalelo | Pond desilting | 416 Square meters. | 35 |
| 7. Carro balanbal | Soil bunds | 2.2 Kilometers | 16 |
| | Gulley erosion | 1410 meters. | |
| 8. Gabri-Huluul | Gulley control | 2160 meters | 64 |
| | Planting vegetation | 4000 meters | |
| | Soil Bunds | 200 meters | |
| | Road rehabilitation | 260 meters | |
| 9. Bali- calanle | Soil bunds | 3.8 Kilometers | 72 |
| | Gulley control | 7380 meters | |
| 10. Shan – Shacade | Pond desilting | 1230 Meters | 83 |
| 11. Qaloocan | Soil bunds | 5.3 Kilometers | 48 |
| 12. Balanbaal | Gulley control | 11.9 Kilometers | 55 |
| | Soil bunds | 5 Km | |
| 13. Beeli-eeday | Gulley control | 16 Km | 40 |
| 14. Gumbur-libaax | Soil Bunds | 5 Kilometers | 32 |
| | Water diversion | 385 Meters | |
| | Gulley control | 450 meters | |
| 15. Balli- Hiile | Soil Bunds | 3 Kilometres | 58 |
| | Water Diversion | 160 Meters | |
| 16. Labi-Guun | Soil bunds | 6 Kilometres | 30 |
| | Galley erosion | 200 Metres | |
| 17. Sanyare | Soil bunds | 4 Kilometers | 56 |
| | Gulley control | 1020 Meters | |
| 18. Bilcil Wayso | Soil bunds | 1 Kilometer | 46 |
| | Gulley Control | 300 Meters | |
| 19. Cali Saahid | Soil bunds | 7.7 Kilometers | 56 |
| | Water diversion | 60 Meters | |
| | Gulley Control | 1170 Meters | |
| 20. Cadow Yurura | Soil bunds | 2 Kilometers | 73 |
| | Gulley Control | 1500 Meters | |
| 21. War- Cimraan | Soil bunds | 3 Kilometers | 72 |
| | Contour bunds | 3320 Meters | |
| | Gulley control | 2340 Meters | |
| 22. Kaladhac | Soil Bunds | 9 Kilometers | 56 |
| Total³ | | | 1200 |

³ Data for the 23rd village, Qori-Lugud was not due by the time of writing the report.

APPENDIX 9: MICRO-PROJECT IMPLEMENTED IN BARI REGION

| Village | Activities undertaken |
|-------------------|--|
| Adinsone - | Water diversion to a valley. Garbage collection in the village. Construction of water catchments. Trenches made for planting. |
| Habal Reer | Garbage collection 2 Balli excavations |
| Kubo camp (Gardo) | Erosion control with stone weirs Water diversion activities, 3 km. Garbage collection campaigns in Gardo town. De-silting of a Balli Soil bands for erosion control. |
| B/haga kareed | Partial de-silting of a Balli. Erosion control & Gully control using stones. |
| Anbar sare | Excavation of 4 garbage pits of 5m diameter each. Control of the Gullies using stones De-silting of a Balli, 70M in Diameter. Water diversion |
| Yaka | Excavation of a new Balli, 30x30m. Garbage collection campaign Excavation of a garbage pit of 10 m diameter. Rehabilitation of 3 Culverts at the Tarmac road. Rehabilitation of 43 water channels leading to Berkads Micro-catchments made for 40 trees. Erosion control. Excavation of 2 garbage pits each 10 M in Diameter. |
| Shahda | Three new Ballis each 20x25 M. Three garbage pits were excavated. Garbage collection campaign from village site is carried out. Micro water catchments for trees. |
| H/Khayr | Rehabilitation of 20 Culverts at the Tarmac road. Desilting of a big Pan. Rehabilitation of water Channels for 28 Berkads. Excavation of garbage pits. Water catchments of 4x2 M plain ground for tree planting purposes. |
| Jedad | Excavation of 4 garbage pits of 6x3.5 M each Garbage collection campaign at village level. Erection of water speed breakers. Plantating of trees. One gully control. Excavation of a new Balli. Water diversion. |

APPENDIX 9: CONT'D

| | |
|---------------|---|
| Dhahan /Sarin | Excavation of a new Balli, 22m diameter Micro catchments for trees around the village made. Rehabilitation of water channels for Berkads. Water diversion. Excavation of three garbage pits. |
| Shire | 4 garbage pits were excavated. Collection of garbage from the village. Water diversion trenches from the village. Excavation of two new Ballis. Soil bands combined with tree planting Rehabilitation and clearance of Berkads' water channels. Rehabilitation of 15 culverts at the Tarmac road. De-silting and enlarging of one Balli. |
| Qalwo | Excavation of 15m in Diameter Balli. Rehabilitation of Berkads' water channels. Excavation of garbage pits. Garbage collection in the village. |
| Qarar Soor | Excavation of garbage pits of 10m diameter each. Garbage collection from village and its surrounding sites. Rehabilitation of Berkads' water channels. Excavation of new Balli, 15m diameter. |
| Libow | Excavation of 3 Ballis Garbage collection in the village Digging of refuse pits |

APPENDIX 10: CASH FOR WORK INTERVENTIONS AND BENEFICIARIES IN NPA AREAS

| Location | Type of intervention | Cash for Work Beneficiaries/ households |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| 1. Halin | Bali | 30 |
| 2. Dhumay in Talex | Gully | 45 |
| 3. Sarmanyoy | Gully | 45 |
| 4. Aroley | Sanitation | 14 |
| 5. Qawlo | Gully | 45 |
| 6. Godolo | Road | 60 |
| 7. Kl'ad | Sanitation | 14 |
| 8. Hudun | Road | 60 |
| 9. Arda | Gully | 45 |
| 10. Holhol | Sanitation | 14 |
| 11. Dararweyne | Sanitation | 14 |
| 12. Boane | Gulley | 45 |
| 13. Fardhidin | Balli | 30 |
| 14. Gambadhe | Sanitation | 14 |
| 15. Falidhyale | Well | 25 |
| 16. Biyo-gudud | Balli | 30 |
| 17. Damala- Hagare | Gully | 45 |
| 18. Madare | Gully | 45 |
| 19. Masagan | Gully | 45 |
| 20. Sufurwayne | Gully | 45 |
| 21. Yogori | Sanitation | 14 |
| 22. Bohol | Road | 60 |
| 23. Karin Gorofod | Gulley/ sanitation | 59 |
| 24. Figi-fuliye | Well | 25 |
| 25. Talex | Road | 60 |
| 26. Hangey | Gully | 45 |
| 27. Adeybur | Well | 25 |
| 28. Jidali | Sanitation | 14 |
| Total | | 1012 HHs |

APPENDIX 11: HORN RELIEF CASH FOR WORK AND CASH RELIEF BENEFICIARIES

| Village | Type of activity | CFW beneficiaries | CR Beneficiaries |
|-----------------|---|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Dhahar | Geedcilmi rock water barriers Geedcilmi soil bunds strengthened with stone protection Kal Xileed soil bunds/ rock dams Kal Xileed retention structures to facilitate tree planting/ re-vegetation. | 185 | 107 |
| 2. Xingalool | Diversion of water from sinkholes using stone strengthened soil bunds. | 210 | 93 |
| 3. Wardheer | Diversion of water from roads into the rangeland to improve pasture rejuvenation. Blocking the roads with soil bunds and use of circular and contour soil bunds to spread water in the rangelands. | 68 | 12 |
| 4. Baragaha Qol | Diversion of water from roads into the rangeland to improve pasture rejuvenation. Blocking the roads with soil bunds and use of circular and contour soil bunds to spread water in the rangelands. Retention structures made to facilitate re-vegetation. | 160 | 67 |
| 5. Ceel Buh | Construction of water diversion structures, gully control, disposal of water through drop structures. | 180 | 77 |
| 6. Carmale | Gully control, water retention structures, diversion of water from roads to rangelands. | 80 | 17 |
| 7. Hadaftimo | | 175 | 60 |
| 8. Badhan | | 212 | 118 |
| 9. Mindigale | | 70 | 28 |
| 10. Cawsane | | 60 | 21 |
| Total | | 1400 | 600 |